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GLOSSARY 
Audit. Every three years, the community safety partnerships are statutorily obliged, 
under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, to conduct detailed analyses of local 
crime problems. These have typically relied on police data and there have 
been innovative approaches using spatial data analysis. 
'Building Safer Communities'. A government fund established in 2003. It merged 
funds from 'Communities Against Drugs', partnership development and the 
'Safer Communities Initiative'. The 'Communities Against Drugs' fund 
remains 'ring-fenced' within it, however. 
Citizen's Panels. Each panel involves a group of local citizens who are surveyed each 
year on issues which affect citizens in their area. The panels are sometimes 
surveyed by the community safety partnerships when they carry out 
community consultation on their strategy. There are also sometimes panels or 
'youth councils' specifically set up to survey young people. 
Council for Voluntary Services (CVS). This is a voluntary organisation, which 
promotes a range of local voluntary organisations and community groups, as 
well as giving them a voice, for example at community safety partnership 
meetings. The CVS is funded by statutory agencies such as local authorities, 
and there is one in every local authority district. Local arrangements and 
names may vary; they are sometimes called Voluntary Action or Voluntary 
Sector Council. See http://www.nacvs.org.uk/nacvs/whatcvs/ 
'Communities Against Drugs'. A government fund set up in 2001 to tackle drug 
markets and strengthen communities. In 2003, this fund was incorporated 
into the 'Building Safer Communities' fund. 
Community consultation. Every three years, the community safety partnerships are 
statutorily obliged, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, to consult with a 
range of local citizens including those who are 'hard-to-hear', as to whether or 
not the strategy addresses their concerns. 
Community safety. This has a wider definition than crime reduction and crime 
prevention, as it focuses not only on crime and disorder but also on attempts 
to address quality-of-life issues and fear of crime. Community safety is 
defined in detail in chapter one. 
Community safety partnerships (or crime and disorder reduction partnerships). 
These names are used interchangeably by practitioners to refer to multi-
xiii 
agency partnerships which address local crime and disorder and/ or 
community safety. See chapter one for a detailed definition. 
Community safety team. This is a group of practitioners who provide administrative 
support and advice on community safety and policy development, to the 
strategic community safety board. These teams have different names 
depending on the partnership. 
Connexions. This is a government service, which supports young people aged 13-19 
years during their transition to work and adulthood. The Careers service was 
incorporated into Connexions along with other voluntary organisations. It 
provides advice about careers, and courses, as well as information on 
homelessness, substance misuse and sexual health. See 
http:// www.connexions.gov.uk/partnerships/index.cErn ?Ca tegoryID=3 
Crime Concern. This is an independent, charitable, non-profit organisation 
concerned with tackling crime reduction and community safety, alongside 
local people and practitioners. They implement projects and carry out 
consultancy work. Their consultants are sometimes contracted to conduct 
research on behalf of the community safety partnerships, for example 
evaluating particular initiatives or conducting crime audits. See 
http://www.crirneconcern.org.uk/ 
Crime reduction and crime prevention. Crime prevention and crime reduction are 
distinct from community safety, as they imply a narrower focus on crime and 
disorder. They are defined in detail in Appendix 1. 
Crime reduction toolkits. These are an online resource for community safety 
practitioners and provide a range of information about volume crime, 
including 'best practice'. See http://www.crirnereduction.gov.uk/toolkitsl 
Drug action teams. These are multi-agency organisations established in 1995; they 
involve similar agencies to the community safety partnerships and have a 
local responsibility for treatment, young people and drugs, communities and 
the supply of drugs. Because of the relationship between drugs and crime, the 
drug action teams were either merged (in unitary local authorities) or formed 
a close working relationship (in two-tier local authorities) with the 
community safety partnerships. See 
http://www.drugs.gov.uk/NationaIStrategy/DrugActionTearns 
Government offices. There are nine regional government offices in England and 
Wales and each has a regional director. They were established in 1995. They 
include a number of government departments, such as the Home Office, and 
monitor the performance of the community safety partnerships. The 
government offices relevant to the present research are the Government 
xiv 
Office for the East of England, for the East Midlands and for the West 
Midlands. See for example http://www.go-east.gov.uk!Government Offices! 
Hard-to-reach. The Home Office defines certain groups as 'hard-to-reach' because of 
physical inaccessibility, cultural and language barriers or because of social 
norms which preclude their consideration. According to the Home Office, 
these groups might include the homeless; minority ethnic communities; gay, 
lesbian, transsexual or transgendered people; travellers; asylum seekers; 
people with learning difficulties, physical disabilities or mental health 
problems; faith communities; commuters; the small business community; 
tourists; and rural communities. See 
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/p03110701.htm 
Hard-to-hear. Groups that are 'hard-to-hear' might be the same as those defined by 
the Home Office as 'hard-to-reach'. The idea that groups are 'hard-to-hear' 
conveys the idea, however, that these groups are not only difficult to reach 
but that they are not always listened to and taken into account. These are 
issues with which the community safety partnerships must grapple when 
conducting public consultation. 
Local authorities or local government. During the 1990s, unitary local authorities 
became the favoured model of local authority structure. Unitary local 
authorities have only one district council. Metropolitan local authorities have 
a single district council connected to the wider metropolitan area. Two-tier 
local authorities have a district and county council, which share the delivery 
of local authority services. 
Local Strategic Partnerships. The Department for Transport, Local Government and 
the Regions (DTLR) introduced these multi-agency groups in 2001. Their 
remit includes the environment, road safety, local business and community 
safety typically forms one subgroup of the local strategic partnerships (LSP). 
The LSPs involve those in senior management positions in their respective 
organisations. Like the government offices, they have a role in monitoring the 
performance of the partnerships. 
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders. NACRO is an 
independent crime reduction charity similar to Crime Concern. Its emphasis 
in the past has been on the resettlement of offenders, and currently on 
tackling crime through addressing social exclusion. Like Crime Concern, it 
acts as a consultant to the community safety partnerships, as well as 
implementing community safety initiatives on their behalf. See 
http:// www.nacro.org.uk! 
Partners and practitioners. These two words are used interchangeably to refer to 
those involved in the community safety partnerships at the local level. 
xv 
.' 
'Partnership Development Fund'. This government fund was established in 2001 to 
build the capacity of partnerships in their delivery of community safety. In 
2003, this fund was incorporated into the 'Building Safer Communities' fund. 
It also became referred to as the 'Capacity Building Fund'. See 
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/activecommunities31.htm 
Public service agreements. These set performance targets for crime (such as burglary 
or vehicle crime), education (such as school attendance) and unemployment 
rates. They are drawn up between central government and key local agencies, 
such as the police and the local authorities. When targets are met, 
organisations receive financial rewards, which are supposed to be channelled 
back into the organisations that contributed to meeting the target. 
Regional directors. There are nine regional directors who head the government 
offices across England and Wales. See 'Government Office' above. 
Safer communities initiative. This government fund was established in 2001. It 
allocated funds to community safety partnerships for situational and social 
crime reduction, in order to supplement partner agencies' mainstream 
resources and move away from a competitive bidding system. In 2003, this 
fund was incorporated into the 'single pot', building safer communities fund. 
See http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/safercommunities.htm 
Strategy. Every three years, the community safety partnerships are statutorily 
obliged, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, to develop a strategy in 
which they outline their priorities, for example on which crimes they will 
focus and how they will be tackled. The strategy is supposed to be based on 
the audit and informed by public consultation. 
Strategic Partnership Board. The board makes strategic decisions, for example about 
partnership priorities or the allocation of partnership funds. The board is 
comprised of statutory partners, that is, the local authority, the police, the fire 
service, the primary care trust, the police authority and other relevant 
agencies such as the probation service, the youth offending service, the 
council for voluntary services and so on. 
Subgroups. These groups are normally thematic and based on partnership priorities. 
They are supposed to facilitate the implementation of partnership priorities 
through community safety initiatives. 
Under-spend. These are funds which have not been spent and/or allocated to an 
appropriate partnership activity, towards the end of the funding deadline, 
which is often the end of the financial year. These funds are lost if they are not 
spent or allocated by the agreed deadline and partnerships can receive less 
money, from the same fund, the following financial year. 
xvi 
Youth offending service or youth offending teams. Youth offending teams are multi-
agency organisations which aim to prevent youth crime. They involve similar 
organisations to the community safety partnerships and were also created by 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The term 'youth offending service' is used 
in some areas because youth offending teams have evolved to include a range 
of teams and services. For example, in Cambridge the youth offending service 
also incorporates the community safety partnership and the drug action team. 
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Cops, Councils and Crime And Disorder: A Critical Review Of Three Community Safety Partnerships 
By Layla Skinns 
Abstract 
This dissertation critically reviews three community safety partnerships. It contributes to 
learning by using new data to examine some of the enduring challenges faced by the partnerships as 
they respond to the changing socio-political context. These multi-agency bodies primarily involve the 
police and local authority, along with the fire service, and primary care trust as statutory partners, 
and other criminal justice agencies. Although multi-agency work has a long history, Community 
Safety Partnerships originated most notably within the Morgan Report published in 1991. The 
principles outlined within the Morgan Report were subsequently embodied in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 which itself attempted to formalise and standardise community safety structures 
and practice. 
The research has involved fifty-eight in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, and 
observation of twenty-nine meetings held in Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln. These three areas 
were chosen to facilitate comparison in terms of the size of the city, local authority structure, level of 
urbanisation and concomitant social deprivation, and levels of crime. My research suggests four key 
challenges. The first of these concerns the development of structures within the post Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 period. The purpose, structure and processes varied between areas. Birmingham, 
for example, struggled to develop an appropriate structure because of its size and the devolution of 
local authority services. In all three areas, however, those interviewed noted a lack of decision-
making and implementation which raised questions about the purpose of the partnerships beyond 
being 'talking shops' . 
The second challenge concerns the changing social context for new partnership 
developments. For example, the two-tier local authority structure in Cambridge and Lincoln posed 
particular problems. Moreover, in all three areas community involvement appeared to be symbolic 
rather than 'real'; this inhibited developments and emphasised some of the difficulties inherent in 
communitariarusm. 
The third challenge relates to funding and performance monitoring arrangements. Here, 
practitioners noted the influence of bureaucracy and 'short-termism'. The early 'honeymoon period' 
where there was relatively little government interference (Phillips et al., 2002) had ended and the 
partnerships had clearly experienced increasing managerialist pressure, but in spite of this pressure, 
evidence of longer-term success remained scarce. As outlined in the Audit Commission (2002), 
practitioners in the three partnerships acknowledged that with the exception of specific initiatives, the 
post 1998 developments had yet to make a significant impact on crime and disorder or that at best, 
they remained unclear about the impact. Such uncertainty about impact could be a consequence of 
the difficulties of measuring performance, of course, due to difficulties in accessing relevant data and 
information about community safety initiatives. 
Fourth, there appear to be inherent difficulties in assuming that 'many agencies are better 
than one' in addressing community safety (Liddle, 2001). An 'ideology of unity' (Crawford and Jones, 
1995), however, may mask underlying tensions. My research revealed tensions at different levels, 
including tensions between the local partnerships and national government. This is not to say that 
local practitioners lacked autonomy, however, as they were able to resist some of the governmental 
constraints. But interagency relationships appeared to be underpinned by power struggles which 
served to undermine joined-up community safety practice; in particular, the struggles raised 
questions about who was responsible for community safety in each area. 
The challenges for the partnerships, as revealed in this dissertation, suggest that the 
recommendations within the Morgan Report of 1991 have not been addressed nor has the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 standardised community safety structures and practice. The notion of 
'responsibilisation' (Garland, 2001) through decentralised governance is clearly a complex issue; the 
Government appears to wish to both 'steer' and 'row' each of the partnerships and this leaves 
practitioners uncertain of their own role . This is one example of the contradiction between the ' reality' 
and symbolism of community safety practice which seems to underpin the partnerships. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Community safety partnerships are multi-agency bodiesl which aim to reduce crime 
and disorder, and to increase public reassurance and community safety in a localised 
manner.2 One of their guiding principles is as follows: 
The police service cannot be held solely responsible for community safety 
or for tackling crime in their force area in isolation: the factors which lead 
to offending or which offer the opportunity for crime are not within their 
direct control. Nor can any other single agency or organisation be held 
solely responsible. The growing complexity of society requires a multi-
faceted response (Home Office, 1991: 14). 
New Labour's 'flagship', the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), and, more 
recently, the Police Reform Act 2002, have attempted to reformulate multi-agency 
community safety practice in each local authority district in England and Wales. In 
short, the CDA designated local authorities and the police as the responsible 
authorities for community safety, although more recently the fire Service, the police 
authority, the primary care trust (PCT), and probation service have become 
statutorily accountable in what are now known as Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRPs) or Community Safety Partnerships (CSPS).3 There are 376 
CSPs across England and Wales; there is one in each district, borough or unitary 
1 The CSPs are sometimes referred to as 'virtual' organisations. This is because, with the exception of 
members of the community safety teams, partners tend not to share the same office, rather they 
attend multi-agency meetings. 
2 The partnerships must take account of local crime and disorder issues by conducting an audit of 
local crime problems, which has typically been based on police data (Phillips, 2002). The audit, in 
conjunction with the strategy, is supposed to inform public consultation. 
3 In its guidance and legislation, the Home Office refer to the partnerships as CDRPs. However, 
practitioners in my research preferred alternatives such as Community Safety Partnership, as did the 
Morgan Report, perhaps because this conveys a broader understanding of community safety, which 
goes beyond a focus on crime and disorder. In order to reflect practitioners' experiences I will refer to 
the partnerships as CSPs, not CDRPs. 
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local authority area (Phillips et al., 2002). Since 2001, the CSPs have been funded 
primarily by central government.4 
While appearing to fundamentally change local community safety practice, the 
legislation also clarified, institutionalised and formalised existing practices; these 
had developed, quietly but unevenly, as a result of the 'Five Towns' and 'Safer 
Cities' initiative in the late 1980s, and also as a result of the publication of a Home 
Office report which became known as the Morgan Report. In addition, CSPs can be 
placed in the context of what has been described as a 'culture of control' (Garland, 
2001), in which the 'populist punitiveness' (Bottoms, 1995) of the early 1990s 
continues alongside diverse criminal justice practices (Matthews, 2002a), especially 
in the emergence of crime prevention. Further, these changes in criminal justice 
policy took place during the ascendance of the right-wing politics of neo-liberalism, 
managerialism and communitarianism. Of specific importance to the CSPs was the 
emergence of community governance, in which the stateS appears to devolve its 
responsibilities for public services, such as crime control, to the local level. Before 
examining the historical context of the CSPs, however, I will firstly explore the 
definition of community safety. 
4 Government is the governing body, the system, the action or the manner of governing a state 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2005) . O'Malley (2001b) also notes that government is a planned and 
practical exercise and has the task of identifying and solving problems and thus governing better 
(O'Malley, 2001b). This is reflected in the following quotation that "[t]he happiness of society is the 
end of the government" (John Adams, c.f. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations Online). Furthermore, 
the governance literature suggests that government (unlike governance) has centralised (not 
decentralised) power and control (see for example, Rose, 2000) . 
sAccording to Coleman and Sims, the state refers to macro-level institutions and organisations. The 
state uses consensual and coercive means to achieve social order. In addition, "state institutions are 
involved in constructing and maintaining, not always successfully, a popular legitimacy for the state 
form itself" (2001 : 287) According to Coleman and Sims (2001) definitions of 'the state' have changed 
over time; it used to be viewed, for example by Parsons, Weber and Durkheim, as divorced from the 
interests of particular social groups, although Marxist accounts subsequently questioned this 
assumption. More recently the state has arguably been fragmented and 'hollowed out' from above 
(by political developments in Europe) and below (through decentralisation) . 
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1.1 Key concepts 
As a concept, community safety partnerships can be broken down into the following 
constituent components: what community, or safety, or community safety, or 
partnership means? In this section I explore each of these concepts, as well as 
concepts which describe relationships within the partnerships. At its most basic, a 
partnership refers to people joining together to undertake an initiative or action. The 
concept of partnership suggests that partnerships are similar to a team, since a group 
of social actors work together towards the common objective of community safety 
(Harrison et al., 2003). These simple definitions, however, fail to address issues of 
power, control and the dynamic nature of professional partnerships, such as the 
CSPs (Stokes-White, 2000). 
The CSPs are characterised by multi-agency or inter-agency relationships; these 
terms are used interchangeably. Crawford (1997), however, separates these two 
concepts on a continuum; at one end, multi-agency relations involve the mere 
"coming together of a variety of agencies in relation to a given problem" (Crawford, 
1997: 119), thus multi-agency work is grafted onto the agencies' existing practices 
and core work. At the other end of the continuum, inter-agency relations involve a 
"degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies" (Crawford, 1997: 119); 
they develop new practices and structures in order to conduct their inter-agency 
work and to appreciate organisational differences. This continuum appears to range 
from the practical to the idealistic, given that organisational differences were 
concretized by the differentiation of state institutions during modernization 
(Thacher, 2001). 
The concept of community safety lacks clarity, however, possibly because it has 
multiple definitions, which make it slippery and contentious. Community safety 
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sometimes concerns attempts to achieve security6 or to enhance the quality of life of 
citizens (Audit Commission, 2002; Ekblom, 2000). In achieving these goals, 
community safety interventions target crime and fear of crime (Fraser, 2000). 
Other conceptualisations focus more widely on ridding the community of all harms, 
not just the risks posed by crime and disorder (Wiles and Pease, 2000; Pease, 2001). 
Indeed, a narrower focus on crime and disorder could result in the "emergence of 
double standards, whereby people are protected from attack by others, whilst 
choking on polluted air" (Wiles and Pease, 2000: 21). This conceptualisation of 
community safety necessitates joined-up practices7 in order to respond to citizens' 
experiences of harm, rather than relying on definitions entrenched in the public 
services. However, it also undermines conceptual clarity because it blurs the 
concepts of crime and disorder into community safety, to the extent that crime loses 
its prominence amongst a number of other hazards (Matthews, 2002a). 
The concept of community safety is further obfuscated through its operationalisation 
in interventions. In practice, partly as a result of the CDA, community safety has 
tended to be operationalised in relation to volume crime, rather than wider social 
harms.8 Yet it could be operationalised in a number of ways. Firstly, it could be 
operationalised by a multi-modal preventative approach, combining both situational 
and social harm reduction (Gilling, 1994).9 That is, community safety encompasses 
6 Zedner (2000: 201) refers to community safety as security's 'fashionable analogue' . Security might 
also be seen as an aspect of the quality of life. 
7 This wide definition of community safety has not been employed in the CDA; it is after all, a crime 
and disorder act, not a community safety act (Wiles and Pease, 2000). Indeed, in the CDA crime 
prevention and community safety are conflated; the latter is treated as a 'fluffier' name for the former 
(Wiles and Pease, 2000; Hughes, 2002b). 
8 Stenson prefers the more generic concept of crime control, which refers to "the continuum of 
strategies and technologies that are involved in the struggle to prevent and reduce crime, and impose 
sanctions on offenders" (Stenson 2001: 113). 
9 The concept of community safety began to move from the periphery to the mainstream in the 1980s, 
when crime prevention was dominated by situational approaches; it was thus a means of ushering in 
social approaches to crime prevention. This resulted initially in pessimism, for example Pease (1997) 
suggests that the shift away from situational prevention, in its pure form makes things fail that could 
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an eclectic set of measures for tackling crime and insecurity, best summarised as 
crime (and disorder) prevention, reduction and control. Appendix 1 describes how 
these measures are conceptualised. This approach to community safety appears to 
differ from (failed) modernist approaches to criminal justice, since it is concerned 
with actuarialism and harm reduction, rather than incarceration and social justice 
(Gilling, 2001). Secondly, community safety could be operationalised in an inclusive 
way, by means of engaging and empowering 'communities', in partnership with 
other state and non-state agencies, to enhance the quality of life. This indicates a shift 
from state-controlled approaches to crime control, to greater community governance 
and devolved community safety responsibilities (Gilling, 2001). These two different 
ways of operationalising community safety (and I am sure there are more) suggest 
that vague conceptualisation results in vague operationalisation, and this 
contributes, in a vicious circle, to further conceptual confusions. 
As this second operationalisation of community safety suggests, community safety 
appeals to the 'community',lO without problematising the conceptualisation of 
'community'. For example, its contested definition is not acknowledged in the 
CDA,11 for example. The concept of community safety appears to be premised on a 
vision of a well-ordered and consensual society, thus coinciding neatly with the 
communitarian agenda of New Labour (Gilling, 2001). This is perhaps because 
'community' is a seductive concept. It conjures up images of an idyllic consensual 
existence, reflecting a tradition that has declined in the post-war period. There is a 
work. This initial pessimism waned (for example see Wiles and Pease, 2000), however, perhaps 
because of the endorsement of community safety by New Labour. 
10 McLaughlin (2002a) notes that the centrality of the concept of community emerged in the 1960s in 
relation to the decaying inner cities, but since then its meaning has shifted . By the early 1980s 
community became a place of resistance, evidenced by riots in Brixton, for example. By the end of the 
1980s, the ~community' emerged as a site where multi-agency crime prevention could be 
implemented . By the 1990s, the discovery of the 'underclass' in 'sink estates' coincided with emerging 
communitarianism associated with Etzioni (1993), neo-liberalism and eventually New Labour and the 
Third Way . 
11 In this dissertation, 'community' is conceptualized primarily in terms of place. This is because 
partnerships boundaries reflect the geographical area of the relevant local authority. 
'fluffiness' (Wiles and Pease, 2000) and a 'feel good' factor (Hughes, 1998) to 
community. 
Crawford (1997) summarises conceptualisations of community in community safety: 
(i) a lack of community leads to a spiral of decline and more crime; (ii) stronger 
community relations and institutions results in less crime; (iii) community reflects a 
shared set of attitudes and/or beliefs; (iv) community represents a geographical 
location; (v) a sense of community is necessary as a defence from' outsiders'; (vi) 
community is homogenous and reflects an ideology of unity; (vii) and community 
represents a resource which can be utilised by community safety practitioners. These 
varied understandings of 'community' illustrate that the definition of community, 
like community safety, is problematic and contentious, particularly in view of the 
increasing diversification of British society,12 This heterogeneity raises questions as 
to whom community safety applies and appeals, and how, the views of all 
community members should be reconciled and integrated. 
1.2 A brief history of the partnerships 
In this section of the dissertation I examine the history of crime prevention and 
community safety in the post-war period, as there were a number of antecedents to 
the CDA and the introduction of the CSPs in their present form. The first antecedent 
was rising crime in the post-w::lr period, despite relative economic prosperity 
immediately after the war (Garland, 2001). The growing problem of crime indicated 
a need to seek alternative, yet effective, approaches to tackle this issue. 
Correctionalism13 had been the modus operandi of the criminal justice system (CJS), 
but by the 1970s, this approach to punishment had begun to wane, a 'nothing works' 
12 For example, the minority ethnic population grew by 53 per cent between 1991 and 2001, from 3.0 
million in 1991 to 4.6 million in 2001. See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/default.asp 
13 Since the 1890s, penal welfarism or correctionalism was the modus operandi of the criminal justice 
system. There were two assumptions central to this approach; first, the modern state was placed at 
the centre of the 'war against crime'. Second, it was assumed that crime could be reduced through 
social reform of prisoners (Garland, 2001:34) . 
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pessimism, originating in the US., quickly spread to the u.K.; this coincided with 
bulging prisons, urban riots, rising crime and an aetiological crisis, in which 
criminology had not only failed to discover a cure for criminality, but had also failed 
to find the causes of crime (Gilling, 1994, Tilley, 2002a).14 These difficulties with the 
qs seemingly provided the impetus for change. The demise of rehabilitation, as the 
dominant approach to punishment, contributed to an ideological vacuum. Garland 
(2001) argues that this void was filled by two contradictory trends of 'populist 
punitiveness', resulting in mass imprisonment and (situational) crime prevention, 
and, latterly, community safety.15 
These changes to the criminal justice system also coincided with the law and order 
politics of the New Right: "where cure appears unavailable, and containment is very 
expensive, prevention looked very attractive in the face of a high profile problem 
like crime" (Tilley, 2002a: 16). By the 1980s, in a bid to re-Iegitimate the criminal 
justice system and as a means of encouraging state and non-state agencies and 
individuals to take responsibility for crime control, (situational) crime prevention 
was fast becoming a central part of criminal justice policy (Gilling, 1994). Circular 
8/84, for example, encouraged the need to work together: "some of the factors 
affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of the police, crime 
prevention cannot be left to them alone ... [p ]reventing crime is a task for the whole 
community" (Home Office, 1984, cE. Crawford, 1997: 67). In addition, in the early 
days, crime prevention was seen as specialist, technicist, pragmatic and 
unsociological, thus fitting well with neo-liberal politics (Hughes, 2002b). 
14 Garland (2001) argues that the critique of correctionalism only set change in motion; in fact, it was 
the emerging socio-political context of late modernity that facilitated the new culture of control. Late 
modernity is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
15 Matthews (2002a) suggests that the importance of these trends should not be under-estimated since 
there have been other, concomitant lower profile, but widely used interventions which include the 
following: intensive probation through monitoring and surveillance; a mix of custodial, semi-
custodial and community-based forms of regulation; and mentoring, fines, curfew orders, 
compensation orders and removal of assets for certain kinds of crime. 
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Crime prevention was developing unevenly, however, and the Home Office Crime 
Prevention Unit was unclear about the nature of developments in England and 
Wales, and indeed what constituted 'good practice'. Hence, the Home Office created 
the 'Five Towns' initiatives, neighbourhood watch schemes, and the Kirkholt 
burglary initiative in 1985 (which later prompted the 'Safer Cities' programme in 
1988). These were important precursors of the CSPs as they promoted (situational) 
crime prevention and, more importantly, multi-agency working as 'good practice'. 
During the period which saw the growth of situational crime prevention, 
community safety was also quietly developing in tandem. Since the emergence of 
crime prevention, there had been a diversification of methods at the local level, 
partly due to tensions between situational and social crime prevention, but also due 
to differing local interpretations of crime prevention. The Safer Cities programme, 
for example, promoted situational crime prevention; however, local interpretation of 
the programmes by coordinators, whose ideological standpoints differed from those 
of central government, meant that social measures were ushered in via the backdoor 
(Tilley, 1993). Moreover, situational crime prevention was criticised, for example, for 
promoting a 'fortress mentality', encouraging 'defended locales' and ultimately 
social segregation. Therefore, in the 1990s community safety began to come into 
focus as an alternative to a purely situational approach; it represented a hybrid of 
situational and social crime prevention. 
Community safety originated from community policing, which encourages closer 
involvement of the police in the local communities: 
The concept of the police working in tandem with other organizations and 
involving themselves in the life of the local 'community' became the 
foundation upon which multi-agency crime prevention work throughout 
the 1980s was based (Monaghan, 1997: 23). 
According to Monaghan (1997), this non-confrontational style of policing the 
community can be traced back to a multi-agency Juvenile Liaison Scheme, first 
introduced in Greenock in 1956, although it undoubtedly has a number of 
antecedents in policing reforms originating in the US (e.g. Ericson and Haggerty, 
1997). In the UK, community policing was also arguably a racialised discourse, since 
it attempted to improve strained community relations with black and minority 
ethnic citizens,16 however, this discourse has since been 'whitened', as a result of 
unrest amongst the 'white underclass' (Hughes, 2002b). 
Since its introduction, Hughes (2000b) suggests that there were three key moments 
in the emergence of community safety as a central part of criminal justice policy. 
First, in the mid to late 1980s, the term emerged in the radical left politics of police 
monitoring groups in the Metropolitan Police Authorities, where the concept was 
used to encourage local ownership of crime and disorder by citizens in crime-ridden 
neighbourhoods. The concept was also taken up by the National Association for the 
Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), who promoted community crime 
prevention involving the active participation of community members. 
The second important moment in the development of community safety was the 
publication, in 1991, of a Home Office report, which subsequently became known as 
the Morgan Report,17 This report recommended that, at the local level, crime 
prevention move from the periphery to the mainstream at the local level, through 
the creation of multi-agency groups,lB in which the local authority, in conjunction 
16 The multi-agency approach was also a racialised discourse. Bowling, for example, notes how multi-
agency approaches became increasingly promoted as the best solution for tackling racist violence, to 
the extent that, "by 1986, they were unassailable" (1998: 149). 
17 This Home Office report became known as the Morgan Report because James Morgan chaired the 
committee which researched the report. 
18 The multi-agency or partnership approach emerged alongside the developments in crime 
prevention and community safety, although it acquired a special prominence over the last 15 years. 
The partnership approach arose in a diverse range of fields, not just crime prevention and community 
safety, but also urban regeneration, drugs, health, racial harassment and domestic violence (Liddle, 
2001). 
9 
with the police and other relevant agencies, would be given clear responsibility for 
community safety, and would all operate under the banner of community safety. 
The recommendations in the Morgan Report are discussed in detail in chapter two. 
This report is given a central place in the thesis in order to compare community 
safety practice pre- and post-CDA 1998 and to ascertain the likely impact of the Act 
on post-Morgan developments. 
At the national level, the Conservative government never implemented the Morgan 
Report; they remained silent, for the remainder of their tenure, on the issue of 
community safety (with the exception of the Safer Cities initiative which tentatively 
supported community safety). Gilling (2001) argues that the Conservative 
Government rejected the Morgan Report, because their crime prevention policy was 
based on three key beliefs which did not fit with the community safety agenda. 
Firstly, neo-conservative explanations of the causes of crime ('bad people make bad 
choices') necessitated harsh punishment and situational crime prevention to prevent 
offenders from making 'bad choices', in the first place. Secondly, neo-liberalism 
promotes a limited role for the state in crime control by relinquishing responsibility 
to private, active individuals and communities through crime prevention advice for 
householders, as well as neighbourhood watch schemes and the private security 
industry. This view of the state's role in crime control meant that, by the 1990s, local 
authorities and eventually the police were allocated few resources for community 
safety. Third, conservative policy had become anti-welfarist, which meant social 
policy was no longer about achieving social solidarity and social justice; rather, it 
was about providing a safety net for the most needy and a vehicle for promoting 
individual responsibility, in contrast to a culture of dependency. Thus penal 
welfarism had come to an end and in its place the Conservatives emphasised that 
'prison works' via responsibility and just deserts, and further that situational crime 
prevention (not social crime prevention) works, via the active and responsible 
citizen. 
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Whilst the Morgan Report may not have been given national political endorsement, 
many local authorities took it up, perhaps because local authority employees and 
police officers wrote it for other similarly positioned practitioners. In the spring of 
1996, the Local Government Management Board conducted a survey19 of community 
safety provisions in local authorities across England and Wales, and they found that 
there was a multiplicity of organisational community safety structures in place. For 
example, two thirds of local authorities had crime prevention panels, although there 
was a tendency for such panels merely to implement closed circuit television 
(CCTV). The biggest obstacle to the provision of community safety was lack of 
funding, as well as the absence of a statutory role for the local authority (LGMB, 
1996). 
The lack of a national political endorsement of community safety also meant that the 
influence of the Morgan Report, at the local level, was uneven and non-standardised. 
This is evidenced by the multiplicity of community safety structures found to exist 
by the LGMB. Hence, Hughes notes that "multi-agency crime prevention and 
particularly community safety may be viewed as a ball which a range of elected and 
official local actors have picked up and run with in diverse directions, beyond the 
control of the centre" (1996a: 226). 
This uneven development of community safety, combined with the New Labour's20 
landslide victory in 1997, led to the third important moment in the development of 
community safety, the introduction of the CDA. New Labour also wanted to be seen 
to respond to public concerns about crime and disorder, and the CSPs represented a 
means of reassuring the public (Audit Commission, 2002). The CDA is a clear 
19 The response rate to the survey was 71.0 per cent, that is, 294 local authorities responded to the 
survey. 
20 Gilling (2001) suggests that whilst the Conservatives pursued a narrow vision of crime prevention 
(due to their neo-liberal and neo-conservative agenda), New Labour endorsed community safety 
because it fitted into its left-of-centre, social-democratic politics concerned with social welfare. This 
interpretation, however neglects the repressive aspects of New Labour's criminal justice policies, such 
as ASBOs and Curfew Orders, which contradict any such interpretation. 
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indication that community safety had become an institutionalised feature of the 
crime control landscape. It implemented some of the recommendations from the 
Morgan Report, and thus was a belated admission that the causes of crime lie 
outside the criminal justice system (Hughes, 2002) and as such responsibility for 
crime control should re-allocated and diffused (Hough, 1999). 
With regard to the CSPs, the CDA stipulated that the police and the local authority, 
along with the probation and health services as well as other relevant agencies, were 
to reduce crime by forming partnerships in each local authority. The partnerships 
were to function on a three-yearly cycle, beginning in July 1998, and were given 
three tasks to complete within this time period: the auditing of crime in the local 
area, the development of a strategy, and consultation with the public. The CSPs also 
had to implement community safety initiatives and monitor their effectiveness. This 
was recently reinforced by the Police Reform Act 2002, which created another legal 
obligation to annually review their performance (in terms of crime rates), comparing 
it to targets in their strategy. 
Cilling (2001) suggests that in relation to community safety, there are three crucial 
differences between the Morgan Report and provisions in the CDA. First, the 
Morgan Report hinted at a more important role for the local authority in the CSPs. In 
the CDA, however, the responsibility for community safety was shared between the 
police and the local authority.21 Second, the Morgan Report recommended that CSPs 
receive funding from central government; this was not immediately implemented, as 
central government funding began only in 2001. Since then the government has 
contributed £2.36 billion extra towards crime reduction and community safety in 
various funding streams. Third, the focus has shifted from crime only (in the Morgan 
Report) to crime and disorder (in the CDA), that is both criminal and lower-level 
incivilities such as anti-social behaviour. 
21 This sharing of leadership in the CSPs between the police and the local authority could be because 
of the police's reluctance to follow the local authorities' lead, given the value they place on their 
operational independence (Loveday, 1999: 19). 
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The impact of the CDA on community safety practice remains unclear, as there is 
relatively little empirical research on the topic. Research of this kind is complicated 
by the uneven development of community safety until 1998. Prior to the CDA 
partnerships were ad hoc: 
[T]he forum is drifting, with no adequate sense of the representative 
status of its members, and without a clear direction in terms of identifying 
and confronting actual areas of policy tension and conflict. The meetings 
have no pre-arranged agenda; for example, they are sometimes cancelled 
at short notice, and at the beginning of meetings it is uncertain who will 
chair them (Blagg et al. 1988: 215-216). 
It is unclear, however, if, as intended, the CDA restructured the CSPs by formalising, 
standardising and systematising existing community practices (Loveday, 1999; 
Gilling, 2001). That is, whether practice reflected the intention of the CDA. Phillips' 
(2002) case studies suggest that CSPs were restructured by the CDA. All three of the 
partnerships she studied existed prior to 1998 but appeared to have been re-
structured by the CDA, in particular adding senior agency representatives to 
partnership personnel. Alternatively it is also possible that' old' community safety 
structures continued to exist alongside the 'new' CSPs. In both instances, it is also 
unclear whether current CSPs are more effective in reducing crime and disorder 
than their older counterparts. 
Since the CDA there have been a number of other important legislative changes, 
which have cemented changes introduced by the CDA. The CDA's public 
reassurance agenda was reinforced by the Local Government Act 2000, which 
encouraged local authorities to pursue the social, economic and environmental well-
being of communities (Audit Commission, 2002). The CDA was also reinforced by 
the Police Reform Act 2002, which altered the agencies legally responsible for the 
provision of community safety. Most notably, the Primary Care Trusts and Fire 
Service have now been designated as responsible authorities, in the case of the health 
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service to improve involvement in the CSPs (Audit Commission, 2002; McManus, 
2003; Esat and Armitage 2003). Furthermore, it instigated a legal obligation for 
partnerships to complete an annual review of their performance in relation to the 
targets in their strategy. 
The CSPs are also part of a wider and hastily constructed community safety terrain 
of other multi-agency partnerships (Gilling and Hughes, 2002). In the summer of 
2001 the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR),22 
introduced Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPS).23 Their remit includes the 
environment, road safety, and local business; community safety typically forms one 
subgroup of the LSP. Like CSPs, LSPs are multi-agency meetings involving those in 
senior management positions. The similarities between the CSPs and the LSPs 
suggest that perhaps the DTLR were not fully aware of the existence and remit of the 
CSPs or it had not been communicated to them by the Home Office. 
In addition, the drug action teams (DATs) established in 1995 as part of the 
government's drugs strategy were merged in 2002 with the CSPs, under section 97 
(3) of the Police Reform Act 2002, in order to further join-up community safety or 
perhaps because of the DATs' apparent failure (Davies, 2003). This merger created 
structural difficulties in two-tier local authorities where there is only one DAT to 
merge with multiple district CSPs. There are also difficulties involved in 
harmonizing the agendas of the CSPs and the DATs, not least because of the risk of 
criminalizing health policy (McManus, 2003). Further questions are raised about the 
criminalizing of the health agenda by the Home Office's latest initiative, the drug 
intervention programme introduced in May 2004. Through this programme, 
persistent offenders who are also drug users are fast-tracked into treatment. The aim 
is also to join-up services provided by agencies such as the prison service, probation 
service, health service, police, the DAT and voluntary organisations so that an 
22 The DTLR subsequently re-branded itself as the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). 
23 See http://www.odpm.gov .uk/ 
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offender can be tracked and their case managed whether they are in custody or in 
the 'community' . 
Another important aspect of the changing community safety terrain is the use of 
public service agreements (PSAs), which are performance targets for crime (such as 
burglary or vehicle crime), education (such as school attendance), and 
unemployment rates. They are drawn up between central government and key local 
agencies such as the police and the local authorities. When targets are met, agencies 
receive financial rewards, which are supposed to be channelled back into the 
organisations which contributed to meeting the target. 
The CSPs also have a salient political dimension, most notably to solve the problem 
of rising crime. Stenson and Edwards (2002) suggest, for example, that the 
criminogenic risks, inequalities and social dislocation associated with globalization 
have become a constant feature of the political landscape, and the CSPs are partly a 
means of solving the political dilemma of how to include the resultant 
disadvantaged minority (who challenge the legitimacy of the state) without 
alienating the contented majority (who are the political base). The "turn to the local 
via the rise of community/restorative justice, problem-solving policing and CSPs, 
can be understood as part of this pervasive struggle to revitalize liberal democracy 
and its sovereign authority" (Stenson and Edwards, 2002: 71). 
The rise of CSPs (in their current form) also coincided with the emergence of third-
way politics and late modernity. Hence Crawford (2001) notes an 'unholy trinity' at 
the heart of third-way politics, the three dominant influences of communitarianism, 
managerialism and partnership approaches to the delivery of public services. 
Perhaps also neo-liberalism is a central part of New Labour's Third Way. 
Since the 1980s we have seen increasing privatisation (Crawford, 1997), and related 
to this has been the growth in use of managerialism in the provision of public 
services. This refers to the introduction of "private sector management methods to 
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the public sector" (Rhodes, 1996: 655) and often takes an actuarial form in relation to 
crime control, that is, identifying and acting instrumentally on the basis of risk 
categories (Feeley and Simon, 1992). Crawford argues that the new public 
management (NPM) approach involves a cluster of ideas: 
[T]o hive off certain traditional aspects of public service delivery to the 
private sector; introduce private sector management methods to the 
public sector; flatten bureaucratic hierarchies; measure performance by 
results set against clear objectives; disaggregate separable functions into 
quasi-contractual or quasi-market forms; introduce purchaser/ provider 
distinctions; open up provider roles to competition between agencies and 
private interests; and advocate a closeness to the customer (2001: 59). 
Privatisation and managerialism were given impetus by the rise of neo-liberalism,24 
which refers to "the re-assertion of market disciplines" (Garland, 2001: 98) resulting 
in greater economic freedom and greater individual choice. Liberalism is no longer 
used in the 'bleeding-heart sense' of the word, in which people are able to show 
sympathy for the offender rather than the victim, treating them as a kind of victim 
lacking personal agency due to personal and social pathologies, deprivation and 
inequality.25 Nor is liberalism used to convey the valorisation of human rights 
expressed by the founders of the Enlightenment. The New Right transformed the 
meaning of liberalism to express the need for personal and social responsibility 
moderated by top-down control by the state. Hence the redistribution of 
responsibility for tasks of government to partnerships (between statutory, voluntary 
24 McLaughlin and Murji (2001) argue that it is easy to assume that there is a straightforward 
connection between neo-liberalism and NPM; however, this connection has been overstated. New 
Labour and the Conservatives both embrace NPM, but they differ in their conception of the 
capabilities of the state and the delivery of public services. The Third Way is not synonymous with 
neo-liberalism, nor is the current criminal justice modernization process indistinguishable from the 
policies of the previous Conservative government. NPM is both complex and hybrid. 
25 Sullivan (2001) argues that there remains a moralistic dimension to neo-liberalism, which is 
neglected by commentators such as Garland (1996, 2000) . This moralistic dimension to neo-liberalism 
helps to explain why moralistic socially exclusionary policies co-exist alongside the neo-liberal 
responsibilisation of the middle-classes. 
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and commercial institutions, and citizens), such as the CSPs. Rose (2000) calls this 
'advanced liberalism I, which encouraged citizens" to be more entrepreneurial and 
self-governing, but according to criteria and performance measures set by central 
policy makers, whether in government or on the company board II (p. 322). 
Advanced liberalism is also manifest in the rise of governance, rather than 
government; central government sought to devolve some of its power to the local 
level, thus creating multiple sites governed at a distance. For Edward and Hughes 
(2002), the CSPs exemplify 'community governance'; the state encourages 
'community' participation, by non-state actors and organisations, in crime control 
and other kinds of public policy and thus governs through 'communities'. The 
debate about governance and the CSPs will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
three. 
Closely associated with neo-liberalism is the rise of communitarianism; Etzioni's 
(1993, 2001a, 2001b) calls to reassert the common moral base of society, following its 
collapse due to rampant individualism, has a central place for New Labour. It is 
believed that communitarianism offers the possibility of governing "through a 
community of remoralized, responsibilized and decriminalized local communities" 
(McLaughlin, 2002a: 97). Therefore, the CSPs represent an example of 
comm uni tarianism. 
These political developments can be situated within the broader context of late 
modernity,26 which refers to a wide range of social, cultural, political and 
26 Late modernity suggests that the world has been transformed in the post-war period in a number of 
ways. However, aspects of modernity continue albeit in a different form (for example, time-space 
distanciation existed in modern society, but in late modernity it has been compressed), and thus there 
has not been a total break with the modern, as this would oversimplify a hugely complex and 
contradictory predicament in which there is both continuity and change. The term 'late modernity' as 
opposed to postmodernity has been used in order to avoid, in a similar way to Bottoms and Wiles 
(1996a), the negative connotations of epistemological relativism associated with the latter. 
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technological changes in the post-war period. Aspects of late modernity relevant to 
the CSPs, are examined in chapter three. 
1.3 The research questions 
This dissertation is concerned with a critical review of the CSPs. To this end, there 
are five main research questions: 
1. What processes are involved in smooth-running, multi-functioning and active 
partnerships? 
2. What do local crime statistics reveal about the impact of the partnerships on 
crime and disorder? In particular, what impact have the partnerships had on 
burglary and anti-social behaviour? 
3. What changes, if any, are evident in the partnerships since the introduction of the 
CDA? 
4. What are the implications of the partnerships for the distribution of responsibility 
for crime control? How does this affect the relationship between the state and 
society? 
5. Will the partnerships continue to be an important part of crime prevention policy 
in the future? 
In order to accomplish this task, I firstly review the existing research. The starting 
point of my review of the literature is the Morgan Report, which I have used to 
structure both chapters two and three. This has a central place in the thesis because I 
wish to compare community safety practice pre- and post-CDA 1998; the Morgan 
report provides a logical point of comparison prior to the 1998 Act, since it reviewed 
community safety practice in a number of areas in the early 1990s. I wish to note that 
in drawing this comparison, I am not judging whether or not the Morgan report has 
been implemented as this would be a redundant exercise, given the introduction of 
the CDA. Rather I wish to judge the impact (if any) of the CDA on post-Morgan 
developments. 
The remainder of chapter two examines the literature on the roles played by partners 
and partnership processes. Chapter three situates the partnerships in their wider 
social context; in particular, it examines relations with central government as well 
broader macro-level changes associated with the New Public Management approach 
to public service delivery and late modernity. 
The fourth chapter describes the process of data collection and analysis. I also 
describe the methodological frameworks underpinning my research, 'Adaptive 
Theory' (Layder, 1998) and 'Realistic Evaluation' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) as well 
as the merits of case study research and the possibilities of generalis ability to other 
similar case studies. 
Chapters five, six, seven and eight are the four empirical chapters in which I describe 
the findings from my research. The fifth chapter examines the structure of the 
partnerships and the strategic partnership meetings. It also describes the roles 
played by different partners; I explore key and minor players in the partnership. 
Furthermore I outline practitioners' views on decision-making and implementation. 
In this chapter, it may have been of interest to examine the statutory processes (of 
auditing, consulting, strategising and reviewing performance), but this was excluded 
from the present research partly because documents were unavailable and also 
because these processes had already been empirically examined by the Home 
Office.27 
The sixth chapter describes the partnerships and the wider community safety 
context. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the history of the partnerships; the 
27 See for example, Phillips (2002), Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000), Phillips et al. (2002), 
Newburn and Jones (2002) who describe these statutory community safety processes. 
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impact of the size of the city and social problems such as crime; relationships 
between the CSPs and other community safety structures, such as the DATs and 
LSPs, local people and the media, and local political structures. 
Based on the descriptions provided in chapters five and six, in chapters seven and 
eight I develop a deeper analytical and interpretive perspective. Chapter seven 
explores the measurement of partnership performance. I explore the ways in which 
the partnerships are funded and their performance monitored, as well as partners' 
views on the 'success' or otherwise of partnership processes and outcomes. In the 
final part of this chapter I had intended to explore, using police data, the impact of 
one partnership on burglary. For reasons given in the chapter and in Appendix 14, 
the analysis of police data was not possible, although the difficulties I experienced 
make interesting reading in themselves. 
In chapter eight, I explore the political dimensions of the partnerships. I firstly 
explore interpersonal politics, including tensions and disagreements within the 
partnerships and some of the reasons for their existence, such as resources and 
power. Next, I examine the tensions and disagreements which occur in relationships 
between the partnerships, government office and central government. In order to 
express these hierarchical relationships I have developed a typology (using a 
metaphor with naval personnel) to describe different types of partners. I also 
examine how the politics of partnerships relate to the issues of joined-up community 
safety practice and the responsibility for community safety. 
In chapter nine, the concluding chapter to my thesis, I revisit the key 
recommendations of the Morgan Report in order to examine how far the 
partnerships have progressed since publication of the Report in 1991, and thus the 
possible impact of the CDA. I also explore the implications of the politics of 
partnerships for 'responsibilisation' and 'community governance'. Finally, I examine 
three possible future scenarios for the partnerships, their concomitant advantages 
and disadvantages, and the implications for community safety practice. 
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CHAPTER II: PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CSPS 
2.1 The Morgan Report 
I have already highlighted the importance of the Morgan Report to the development 
of community safety. I now discuss the report in more detail because its key themes 
structure my review of existing research. The main purpose of the working group,28 
chaired by James Morgan, was to monitor "the progress made in the local delivery of 
crime prevention through the multi-agency or partnership approach in the light of 
the guidance contained in the booklet accompanying 44/90" [Home Office Circular] 
(Home Office, 1991: 10) and disseminate good practice. Hence, Chief Constables and 
Chief Executives were asked to comment on current and projected community safety 
practice. These interviews were followed by visits to partnership projects. 
The report made a clear case for community safety; it advocated the use of the term 
'community safety', rather than 'crime prevention' because crime prevention 
reinforces the view that it is the sole responsibility of the police, whereas community 
safety can be more widely interpreted as partnerships between the public and 
statutory organisations which encourage 'community' involvement. The report 
defines community safety as: 
[H]aving both social and situational aspects, as being concerned with 
people, communities and organisations including families, victims and at 
risk groups, as well as with attempting to reduce particular types of crime 
and the fear of crime. Community safety should be seen as the legitimate 
concern of all in the local community (p. 13). 
28 The working group was composed of a range of representatives of different ranks from the police, 
local authority, Home Office, racial equality groups and voluntary organisations, such as Crime 
Concern and NACRO. 
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This preference for community safety contradicted the hitherto narrow, police-
oriented situationalist approaches to crime prevention associated with the 
Conservative government (Gilling, 2001). The attempt to make community safety 
more inclusive of the I community' and no longer the sole responsibility of the police 
can also be interpreted as reflecting an emerging communitarian agenda, eventually 
taken up by New Labour. 
Key themes29 and recommendations in the report concerned firstly, structure. The 
report suggested that progress at the local level is variable, with some partnerships 
taking root and others remaining incoherent with no clear lines of decision-making 
or responsibility for community safety (largely due to a lack of resources and a lack 
of common purpose). The Report outlined possible structural models, which were 
concerned with whether the local authority, police or no particular agency should 
take the lead. The report recommended that a code of practice should be developed 
clarifying objectives, the organisational structure of the partnership, the nature of the 
strategy and the audit process. 
Second, in relation to leadership, the report emphasised the importance of individual 
and collective ownership of community safety. The report recommended that the 
local authority take the lead, in conjunction with the police and to a lesser extent the 
probation service. 
Third, in terms of information the report suggested that in order to improve 
community safety, partnerships should understand local crime problems and thus 
contribute to a problem-solving approach. The report recommended that 
partnerships conduct crime audits "where a detailed analysis is made by all agencies 
on how crime affects their mainstream activities with particular emphasis on the cost 
of crime" (p. 21), which necessitated compatible information systems, coterminous 
29 The report reviewed progress against key themes from a government report entitled ' Partnership in 
Crime Prevention'. These themes included attention to youth matters and training and development, 
which I have not discussed because they are not directly relevant to my research. 
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agency boundaries and information-sharing agreements. It also recommended that 
community safety strategies be devised, at the highest tier of local government, and 
that relevant reports be made publicly available. 
Fourth, the report encouraged partnerships to establish an identity through careful 
management of relations with the media, to promote positive activities and prevent 
labelling neighbourhoods. The report also encouraged the creation of partnership 
logos and the regular publication of information and reports. The report argued that 
the promotion of positive partnership activities (and 'community' involvement in 
the partnership) was an important route to a durable and sustainable structure. 
Durability was the fifth theme in the report, as it recognised that rapid staff turnover 
created difficulties for multi-agency teamwork. The community safety coordinator 
should playa crucial role in retaining staff. 
Sixth, and connected to durability, was the provision of adequate resources. The 
committee found that community safety practitioners viewed inadequate resources 
as a major threat to the survival of the partnerships. These funding difficulties were 
compounded by cuts in the budgets of partner agencies. The report recommended 
that central government fund community safety projects known to work, and at the 
very least, fund a full-time coordinator and administrator. This illustrates the 
seventh theme of co-ordination. The report suggested that a full-time dedicated 
coordinator was essential for success. The coordinator should understand the 
locality and the operation of partner agencies and be able to liaise with senior 
managers. 
Eighth, the report paid attention to the role of the voluntary and business sectors in 
partnerships. The report suggested that the voluntary sector had a vital role because 
of important links with the 'community' and the ability to engage with socially 
excluded groups. The report noted that the business sector was rarely involved, but 
could contribute by minimising the impact of crime on business; utilising business 
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expertise in relation to management or problem-solving; and providing short-term 
funding through sponsorship or donations. 
Finally, the report also noted the role of central government; it was criticised for ad 
hoc community safety initiatives, such as 'Safer Cities', which were finite and 
'parachuted-in' without sufficient local consultation. The report suggested that 
central government should have a prominent role in monitoring progress as well 
disseminating information about 'what works'. The report recommended that 
central government should make a clear statement of intent in relation to community 
safety. 
After thirteen years the content of the Morgan Report remains of relevance to current 
CSPs. Indeed I hope to explore, through my review of the literature and my 
empirical research, whether the Morgan Report continues to have purchase and, if 
so, which aspects remain important. This could raise questions as to whether or not 
lessons of the past have been learned and/or if the partnerships continue to 
encounter similar difficulties, as well as a few new ones. Gilling (2003) speculates 
that lessons from the past have not been learnt by the CSPs because community 
safety lacks clarity in its conceptualisation and has focused on the means of 
partnership, rather than the ends of crime reduction. Hence the concept of multi-
agency partnerships is used as a 'mantra' throughout the criminal justice field. 
The themes I have described can be condensed into four overarching themes30 which 
are of relevance to my research questions and thus structure my examination of the 
extant research. First the roles and responsibilities of local partners raise questions about 
which agencies are actively engaged in the CSPs and which are not. Are the roles of 
the partners clearly defined, and are representatives clear about what their role is? 
Are there any clearly identifiable (team) roles operating with the partnerships? What 
30 Some of these themes appeared in the executive summary of the report, as well as in the main 
section. 
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role does the community safety coordinator play in the partnerships? What role does 
the 'community' (including elected members, the business community and 
voluntary organisations) play in the partnerships? To what extent have the 
partnerships developed a clear identity? Finally, what is the overall role and purpose 
of the partnerships and are they 'talking shops'? This last point connects with the 
theme of performance measurement. 
Second, the Morgan Report discusses the structure and organisation of partnerships, 
and their subgroups and activities. To what extent does local interpretation of the 
CDA vary, and how significant is social context (such as local authority structure or 
population or degree of urbanism or diversity) to the structure and practice of the 
partnerships? How well do the partnerships fulfil their statutory obligations in 
relation to the strategies, audits and consultation mechanisms? How are decisions 
taken and implemented? How do partnerships cope with bureaucracy? 
Third, the Morgan Report draws attention to the issue of leadership and ownership, 
which fits into a wider debate about relations within the partnerships and is also 
connected to the first section on roles and responsibilities. How are the issues of 
power, conflict and trust operationalised within the partnerships? What role does 
central government play in the partnerships? How are the differing priorities of 
central government, local agencies and local citizens balanced (if at all)? To what 
extent do the partnerships operate in the joined-up manner (as intended)? Who 
owns the community safety agenda, that is, what is included in the community 
safety agenda and by whom? How can the partnerships be interpreted in the light of 
the literature on governance? 
Fourth, the Morgan Report identifies resources as a key aspect of partnerships. 
Given the current culture of NPM, the spending of public resources is associated 
with a concomitant need to measure performance in order to ensure that those 
resources are appropriately spent. Hence I examine existing research in relation to 
resources (both the use of information and the provision of money) as well as 
(internal and external) peljormance measurement. To what extent have the 
partnerships fulfilled their obligation to monitor and evaluate their own 
performance, and to what extent are the partnerships meeting government targets 
and expectations? What evidence is there to indicate that the partnerships have had 
a significant impact upon crime and disorder? How have the partnerships overcome 
hurdles in relation to the sharing of information? 
2.2 Roles and responsibilities of local partners 
Active participation by partners 
Since their inception, some agencies, particularly the police, have more actively 
engaged in partnerships than others. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b),31 for example, 
found that the police played a central role in the CSPs studied, although 
commitment to crime prevention within the police service was varied. For example, 
there remained a degree of scepticism about the implications of involvement in 
crime prevention for career development: community safety, like community 
policing was seen to be a demotion rather than a promotion. However, in research 
conducted since the implementation of the CDA, Phillips (2002) found that the 
'prime movers' in the CSPs she studied were the police and the local authority, 
whose shared lead was accepted by the other partners, since it was endorsed by the 
CDA. 
Similarly, Jamel and Mail' (2003), in a study of geographically-based subgroups of a 
CSP in a large Northern city, found that the police and the local authority, by virtue 
of their legal status as responsible authorities, made the most important contribution 
to community safety. In all but two of the sixteen locally-based subgroups studied, 
the police were the most highly represented attendees, closely followed by 
representatives from the city council, which suggested that without these two 
agencies the groups would not have functioned. There were no representatives at 
31 See also Sampson et al. (1988) and Crawford and Jones (1995) who found the police to have a 
dominant role . 
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any of the meetings from the probation service. Jamel and Mail' speculate that this 
was because of a lack of resources. Health was also rarely represented and the fire 
service attended only occasionally. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Jamel 
and Mail' found that interviewees viewed the key players to be those who attended 
regularly, those who serviced the meetings, and those with local knowledge. The 
police were often mentioned in respect of all three criteria. 
Jamel and Mail' are reticent in equating regular police and local authority attendance 
at subgroup meetings with dominance by these agencies, as the criteria used to 
invite attendees were unclear. In addition, the police in particular lacked consistency 
in the individuals who attended meetings, thus having implications for the perceived 
trust worthiness and commitment of the police. Despite the lack of individual 
consistency in attendance, however, Jamel and Mail' concluded that the police were 
the dominant agency. 
Whilst some agencies dominate, others are marginalized and peripheral to the 
partnerships; in their most recent review of the partnerships, the Audit Commission 
(2002) round-up the 'usual suspects' - the health service, probation service, criminal 
justice organisations, education, county councils, youth offending teams (YOTs) and 
DATs - for having patchy attendance (Gilling, 2003). Whilst the fire service and 
Victim Support were surprisingly well represented, the Audit Commission (2002) 
also recognised there was a great deal of local variation in the engagement of 
partners - some partnerships involve only the police and local authority 
representatives, whereas others have twenty or more different representatives. The 
Audit Commission suggested that relevant partners should at least be involved in 
information-sharing and basic planning, and that partners' roles should be clearly 
defined. 
Phillips (2002) found that some agencies, such as health, feel marginalized, leading 
other partners to question whether the health service have a legitimate role to play. 
Gibbs (2001) also envisaged a marginal role for the probation service. Similarly, and 
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contrary to the recommendations in the Morgan Report, the voluntary sector, 
although being consulted, had a rather peripheral role in the CSPs (Hester, 2000) 
compared to other partners. Furthermore, in what empirical research exists on the 
CSPs (since the CDA), there is no mention of the business sector, perhaps because 
their involvement is not legally required by the CDA (although it was mentioned in 
the Morgan Report). The Police Reform Act 2002 should, in theory, facilitate the 
engagement of the health and fire services in the CSPs, since it requires the health 
and fire services to become statutory partners. 
The role of elected members and members of the Police Authority (appointed by 
government or the local authority) in CSPs is potentially contentious because of the 
need for the police to guard their operational independence and because of the 
potential politicisation of crime and disorder. The Audit Commission (2002) 
suggested that this might explain why elected members feel disengaged from 
community safety, despite the possibility of constituents asking probing questions of 
them. 
The dominance of some agencies and marginalisation of others creates uncertainties 
about whether it is realistic to that assume partners can be equal. With the probation 
service in mind, Gibbs (2001) suggests that equality is unrealistic, especially without 
providing agencies with additional resources. She suggests, therefore, that it is more 
realistic to be open about the specific contributions made by different agencies. This 
corresponds with Crawford's (1997) view about the need to recognise difference, as 
opposed to assuming 'unity', as a means of managing conflict. It would seem 
essential for partners to clearly outline the identity of their organisation, as well as 
their perceived role in and contribution to the partnership (Goris, 2001) . This is one 
way of acknowledging, understanding and accepting difference, from which it is 
possible to find constructive ways of negotiating issues that arise in the partnerships. 
Furthermore, perhaps the role of the personal qualities of partners should not be 
underestimated, for example, having a committed and charismatic community 
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safety coordinator can make a fundamental difference in how a partnership 
operates. Walters' (1996) research in Australia indicates that the contributions made 
by committed individuals at the local level, are what made partnerships work, as 
opposed to the combined input of relevant agencies or national 
legislation/ guidelines. Similarly, Bradley and Walters (2002) argue that effective 
community safety initiatives have been the result of highly dedicated paid and 
unpaid personnel whose efforts were not always recognised. This not only supports 
an examination of the issue of whether community safety works in reducing crime, 
but also the issue of who makes it works and how.32 Whilst training might be one 
way of enhancing relevant personal qualities and skills, a lack of training can also be 
used as an excuse for inaction (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c). 
In sum, some partners, such as the police and local authority, are key players and 
other agencies are peripheral. The engagement of partners in the partnership process 
is likely to be affected by personal qualities; legal status (i.e. statutory agency or not); 
occupational cultures; available resources, including knowledge and time available 
to attend meetings; and ultimately the operation of power, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Community safety practitioners flexing their professional muscles? 
The Morgan Report highlighted the significance of community safety coordinators; 
indeed, the report suggested that the centre should at the very least fund a full-time 
coordinator and administrative post. In the early 1990s, this advice had not been 
heeded. Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994a) research, conducted in the early 1990s, 
found that one of the main problems encountered was the absence of full-time 
support for this position. In some partnerships the job was held by a particular 
individual, but in others it was rotated and shared across the partnership. 
32 This connects with the need, in 'realistic evaluation', to examine what goes on below the surface in 
order to ascertain 'what works, for whom, in what context' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
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Times have changed and so too has the terminology; a number of names abound, 
ranging from Community Safety Officer, (police) Local Authority Liaison Officer 
(LALO), Strategy Support Officer, Community Safety Manager and probably many 
more. For this reason I will refer more generically to community safety practitioners 
or partners since this will encapsulate all the various names. Times have also 
changed in the sense that the importance of community safety practitioners and their 
aspirations has received increasing recognition. For example, community safety 
practitioners have become increasingly professionalized; in 1995 a professional 
network of community safety officers, called the National Community Safety 
Network, was created,33 which now has over 350 members. 
Professionalisation has occurred in spite of fears amongst Home Office 
representatives. For example, John Denham, in his speech at a community safety 
conference, suggested that professionalizing community safety practitioners risked 
confining them to a specialist knowledge-base understandable only by other 
practitioners, rather than the 'community' at large (c.f. Hadley, 2002). Without 
professionalisation or accreditation, however, perhaps community safety 
practitioners risk lacking credibility. 
Whilst community safety practitioners are increasingly professionalized and 
recognised there is arguably still a deficit in their skills and expertise. In their recent 
review of the progress of partnerships, the Audit Commission (2002) recognised that 
community safety practitioners are not yet' experts', since their role is a relatively 
new one. This apparent deficit has also been recognised by central government, in 
the form of the partnership development fund to be spent on partnership training, 
rather than community safety projects. The deficit in the expertise of community 
safety practitioners is also illustrated by CSPs' use of organisations such as NACRO 
and Crime Concern for research and professional advice (Gilling and Hughes, 2002). 
33 See http://www.community-safety.net/ 
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This apparent deficit in the skills and knowledge of practitioners is further 
supported by the only empirical study, to my knowledge, of the growing body of 
community safety practitioners. Gilling and Hughes (2002) examined the experience, 
professional aspirations, knowledge and skills of community safety practitioners,34 
with a survey35 in 2001 of 'community safety strategists' in 410 English and Welsh 
responsible local authorities. Their main finding was that community safety 
practitioners were not merely performing a technical exercise; rather there was a 
moral and political dimension to it. Their findings illuminate the relatively current 
status of the community safety profession and so their research will be discussed in 
some detail. 
In terms of their experience, the majority (57 per cent) of those surveyed had been 
involved in the profession, employed primarily by the local authority long before the 
arrival of the CDA; thus the CDA was not simply imprinted onto a blank slate. The 
majority of those surveyed (55 per cent) felt that community safety managers aspired 
towards a more professional status, the majority of whom saw community safety as 
part of a more socially inclusive model of social and economic regeneration. This 
suggests a degree of resistance towards the narrow crime reduction agenda of the 
Home Office, although there was potentially a gulf between responses and actions. 
In terms of skills and knowledge, survey respondents rated inter-professional 
knowledge of the causes of crime, management skills, communication skills and 
34 The research also examined ideal-types described by Hughes (2002a). First the 'technicist risk 
manager' gathers and processes information about the risk of crime and disorder, which is essentially 
an apolitical and technical task. Second, the 'promoter and manager of the new moral hygiene' 
emphasises the moral and political dimensions of crime given the perception of an ever-increasing, 
difficult and dangerous 'underclass'. Third, those with 'radical cadres of h'ansformative power', as a 
result of their experience of local government issues, such as anti-discrimination, multiculturalism 
and pluralism. 
35 A covering note requested that the questionnaire be forwarded to the most senior officer 
responsible for community safety and crime and disorder reduction. This method was chosen because 
there was no comprehensive list of community safety practitioners and there was also local variation 
in their titles. They received 206 completed questionnaires but it was difficult to determine the 
response rate, as the sample population was unknown. For this reason the authors do not claim that 
the sample is representative, although they do believe it has a reasonably wide coverage. 
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knowledge of the policy context as the most developed; and IT, auditing, knowledge 
of research methods, public relations, and evaluation skills and knowledge as the 
least developed. These findings suggest that community safety managers de-
emphasised the technical aspects of their role and emphasised the political and 
localised aspects, which required delicate negotiations. 
Cilling and Hughes speculate that community safety practitioners off-loaded 
technicist tasks onto others who possessed the relevant skills, such as police data 
analysts. It is also possible that they simply lacked the necessary technical 
knowledge and skills, and so were avoiding difficult tasks which they could not 
complete. Alternatively it was also possible that they deliberately prioritised the 
political over the technicist aspects of their jobs because they were acutely aware of 
the fragility of the local community safety structure. 
Cilling and Hughes (2002) concluded that tensions between the centre and the local 
level, identified in the Morgan Report, remained a pertinent issue. They argued that 
their research demonstrates that community safety practitioners were doing more 
than 'rowing', they were also 'steering' the community safety agenda at the local 
level: 
[O]ur survey raises the impression that community safety managers do 
not just want to row. From where they are sitting, they may be better 
sighted to justify having at least a hand on the rudder, mindful of the 
danger of running aground. Yet as navigators they themselves may not be 
certain of where they will end up; and while they may be able to avoid the 
shallow waters, they are still very much at risk from the strong currents 
(Cilling and Hughes, 2002: 12). 
This finding contradicts other research, in which local community safety 
practitioners lacked autonomy. For example, in a study of street crime initiatives 
instigated by the CSP in Lambeth, Hallsworth (2002) argues that practitioners lacked 
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autonomy to develop more humane and effective approaches to street crime 
(beyond enforcement, situational crime prevention and incarceration). He argues 
that the "problem is not that of there being too much power, but not enough of the 
right kind of power exercised in the right way" (p. 213). This tension between the 
central and local community safety agendas is dearly a factor which requires further 
empirical research. It will also be discussed in more detail in chapter three. 
/Community/ engagement witb tbe partnersbips 
Attempts to involve the' community' in the partnerships have arisen in part because 
of the government's need to offer reassurance to the public about crime and 
disorder. For example, between 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 crime recorded by the 
British Crime Survey dropped by 5 per cent and recorded crime fell by 1 %, and, yet, 
in 2003/2004 48 per cent of respondents thought that local crime had increased (this 
figure was 52 per cent in 2002/3) (Dodd et al. 2004). This also shows that the 
reassurance agenda has arisen in the context of both hyper-politicisation (and also a 
mass media society), in which spin is added to criminal justice policy in order to 
make it 'eye-catching' to the public and to reassert politicians' stances as tough on 
crime, to the extent that it is hard to know what is 'real' (McLaughlin 2002b: 53). 
The involvement of the' community' is also supposedly an attempt to empower local 
people, to give them ownership of local crime and disorder problems and potential 
solutions. "[W]hatever the political connotations, the 'socialization' of community 
safety seems, in one way or another, to be a necessary precondition for persuading 
and organizing ordinary citizens to solve the problems of crime and disorder within 
their own communities through the activities of their everyday life" (Hope, 2001: 
436). 
'Community' involvement might also serve another purpose. Marinetto (2002) notes 
the importance of 'community' involvement to New Labour's Third Way politics, in 
particular communitarianism. He argues that citizens are encouraged to be active in 
urban regeneration initiatives (as well as in the delivery of other public services) as 
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part of the governmentality project, that is, governing without government. 
However, he questions the extent of 'community' involvement, aside from in public 
consultation. As I discuss next, this tendency to conflate 'community' involvement 
with public consultation is also evident in relation to the CSPs. 
In theory, the 'community' can be involved in the partnerships in a number of ways. 
'Community' involvement in partnership subgroups has been encouraged by the 
Audit Commission (2002) and information about partnership activities (contained in 
partnership documents such as audits, strategies and annual reviews) is also 
supposed to be publicly disseminated, although the extent to which this information 
is read and digested is unclear. The 'community' can also engage with the 
partnerships via elected members and the statutory consultation process. 
Most of the empirical research on community engagement with the CSPs has 
focused on this consultation process. Some argue that consultation with the 
community is an important component in community safety; "active, involved 
community consultation is the essential ingredient for successful, sustained 
community safety ... consultation is part of the glue that can help rebuild 
community confidence and involvement" (Ballintyne and Fraser 2000: 164). 
Consultation also has the potential to enhance accountability, improve the quality of 
the services provided, and facilitate a problem-solving approach (Ballintyne and 
Fraser, 2000). However, as the following empirical research illustrates, partnership 
consultation has varied in its 'success', as partnerships may not actively engage with 
the 'community'. 
In terms of the 'success' of community consultation, Phillips et al. (2002) found that 
responsibility for consultation was allocated primarily to community safety officers. 
In the first round the nature, timing and methods of consultation varied a great deal. 
Too little thought was given to consultation with 'hard-to-hear' groups, and 
opportunities to use existing forums were often missed. The authors also found that 
there were similarities between the priorities raised in the audit and those raised by 
local communities. 
In a more detailed study of consultation by the CSPs, Newburn and Jones (2002)36 
found that consultation was mostly the responsibility of community safety officers, 
although some CSPs had employed external consultants. Consultation mechanisms 
varied, but mostly included a survey, media coverage of activities, and police 
community consultative groups (PCCGs), with some use of focus groups for 'hard-
to-hear' groups with whom most partnerships did consult. Citizens' panels were 
rated as the most useful form of consultation by community safety officers but were 
not widely used. Consultation was used to confirm, narrow and prioritise ways of 
tackling crime, as well as identifying priorities amongst 'hard-to-hear' groups. The 
Audit Commission question whether consultation every three years is adequate and 
suggest that communication with communities should take place continuously. 
Some commentators have argued that the 'community' remains, at best, on the 
margins of the CSPs, as the statutory consultation mechanisms are inadequate. The 
Audit Commission (2002) recognised the lack of engagement of the community at 
the partnership level. Jamel and Mair (2003) examine the lack of community 
engagement in neighbourhood CSPs; they suggest there is a tension between 
including and excluding the community - none of the meetings were open to the 
public for fears that they would be overly crowded or end up as 'police-bashing' 
sessions (although this contradicts the thinking behind the CDA and the CSPs). 
Similarly Foster (2002) argues that people who live in high-crime neighbourhoods 
are an essential element of the community safety puzzle, yet these' people pieces' are 
often neglected and rarely empowered as practitioners talk at local people rather 
work with and alongside them. Roche also recognises the limited role played by the 
36 Newburn and Jones (2002) conducted a telephone survey of community safety officers in all CSPs in 
England and Wales, and also used in-depth case studies. 
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'community' in community safety in France. He argues that the missing actor in the 
new' community governance' is the citizen. 
Today, citizens are not at the forefront of responses to crime. A 
managerial style has emerged. Proximite in the hands of professionals, 
but no citizen participation, is the implicit watch-word. But in the 
meantime, the opposition parties have become the ruling elite and this 
might well hold the underlying explanation (2002: 231). 
In terms of active engagement with the 'community', Foster (2002) takes a cynical 
view of community consultation. She argues that decisions are framed and decided 
by practitioners prior to the beginning of consultation, rendering it tokenistic. This is 
also illustrated by the failure of partnerships to address the issue of diversity and the 
contested nature of crime and disorder. The Morgan Report was notably silent on 
how partnerships should engage with diverse and complex 'communities'. Focus 
groups conducted by the CSPs, with 'hard-to-hear' groups, are arguably a poor 
substitute for understanding a cross-section of the community's views. The inability 
of some partnerships to actively engage with diverse communities and address 
potentially competing priorities raises questions about who is influencing local 
criminalisation processes, the local ownership and democratic legitimacy of the 
CSPs. Yet without good community consultation, community safety can become a 
'club good' rather than a 'public good ' (Crawford, 1998a). 
This apparent lack of 'community' involvement in the partnerships signals a missed 
opportunity for 'progressive local governance' (i.e. community involvement in 
decision-making and policy formation) through a 'participative local democracy', 
because the local community safety agenda is subject to the whims of local actors or 
central government, rather than the 'community'. Hughes and Edwards argue that 
central government is dependent on "street-level bureaucrats" to enact their 
demands and thus local actors have an opportunity to "resist, contest, and 
manipulate central commands to fit their own agendas" (2002: 11). Coleman, Sim 
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and Whyte (2002) also suggest that the partnerships have swept 'community' 
interests aside in favour of the national politicised community safety agenda. The 
possibility remains, though, that partnership structures create new opportunities for 
community resistance to the politicised and whimsical national community safety 
agenda. 
Such a participative democracy would also have to find a way of dealing with 
competing priorities as a result of diversity within communities; otherwise the same 
problems of local criminalization processes, ownership and democratic legitimacy 
would remain, and CSPs would run the risk of /I privatising government around 
bigoted and exclusionary constructions of crime control and community" (Edwards, 
2002b: 162). Thus the challenge is to develop innovative forms of participation which 
give citizens a voice, but avoid exacerbating tensions between different social groups 
within the community. 
At the same time there are reasons to be wary of the partnerships, despite their 
seductive appeal to 'community' and some of the opportunities I have just 
described. First, they could present an opportunity for decentralised governance and 
thus tighter government control of local actors and 'communities', through the 
dispersal of social control (which will be discussed in the chapter three). They could 
also lead to the relinquishing of state responsibility for crime control (especially by 
encouraging citizens to purchase security, if they can afford it [Lea, 2002]), and the 
transfer of responsibility onto communities unable to manage this responsibility. 
Interpreting roles in the partners11ips 
Liddle and Bottoms (1991) developed six ideal-types to describe the involvement of 
different agencies in CSPs. These modes of involvement are not mutually exclusive 
or static and are influenced by the personal characteristics of agency representatives, 
such as their personal interest in crime reduction, as well as institutional and 
structural constraints such as available resources and credibility. 
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First, 'prime movers' assume a more active role in the partnership, taking on a 
disproportionate amount of work; they found this tended to be representatives from 
the police and local authorities. Second, 'supportive passengers' give vocal support 
to the activities of the partnership but offer few resources. Third, 'sleeping partners' 
or 'chair warmers' contribute little in terms of ideas, verbal support or resources. 
Fourth, 'obstructers' are openly critical and/ or negative about the activities of the 
partnership and other participating agencies. Fifth, 'agency spies' take part only to 
keep tabs on the activities of other agencies. Sixth, 'proselytisers' take part only to 
promote the activities of their agency to a wider audience. Liddle and Gelsthorpe 
(1994b) also found evidence of these ideal types. 
The CSPs can also be viewed as a team context since the partners are all working, 
(sometimes) in a group setting, towards a common goal. Belbin's research is 
illuminating as to the kind of team roles (i.e. clusters of accepted behaviours) 
assumed by business professionals in a group setting, and is of relevance to the 
CSPs. He notes that: 
The types of behaviour in which people engage are infinite. But the range 
of useful behaviours, which make an effective contribution to team 
performance, is finite. These behaviours could be grouped into a set 
number of related clusters to which the term 'team role' is applied (Belbin 
1993: 20). 
He develops nine team roles which have been externally validated by empirical 
research: (i) the plant or ideas person is the creative thinker who is able to solve 
difficult problems; (ii) the resource investigator is enthusiastic and extroverted, and 
willing to explore new opportunities; (iii) the coordinator is a mature and confident 
chairperson who clarifies goals and promotes decision-making; (iv) the shapeI' is 
challenging and dynamic, and able to overcome obstacles; (v) the monitor evaluator 
is strategic and discerning, taking into account a range of options; (vi) the team 
worker is co-operative and diplomatic, thus able to avert friction; (vii) the 
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implementer is disciplined, reliable, efficient and able to turn ideas into practice; 
(viii) the completer is conscientious, seeking to rectify errors and deliver on time; (ix) 
the specialist is single-minded, possessing rare skills and knowledge. 
Social actors commonly have a profile of team roles,37 that is, they have a repertoire 
of team roles, which they move between depending on their social context. 
Successful teams require a balance of team roles. Team roles also come to the fore in 
managing strained or difficult relations, because the strength of one team role 
illuminates an associated weakness and vice versa. For example, in groups, vigorous 
objectors can upset others and result in unsatisfactory outcomes. However, the 
vigour with which they object might indicate the makings of a shapeI' (who can be a 
driver of change). 
This is applicable to the CSPs; because of their multi-agency nature, there are 
differences in occupational cultures, resources (money and knowledge) and 
ultimately power which make a diverse range of team roles likely, as well as the 
possibility of strain and conflict. This will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
Understanding the behaviour of partners 
Fitzmaurice and Pease (1986) use cognitive errors developed in social psychology to 
understand judicial sentencing; some of these may be of use in understanding the 
behaviour of community safety practitioners. First, the fundamental attribution error 
refers to an over-emphasis on dispositional factors and under-emphasis on 
situational factors affecting behaviour; that is, we attribute behaviour to personal 
rather than situational factors. For example, increases in crime might be attributed to 
37 Social actors come to know and understand each other's team roles through experience and 
observing regularities in behaviour. A team role is distinct from a functional role - the latter 
concerns technical skills and operational knowledge required to complete a task and remain the same, 
whereas team roles vary. Team roles can be over-ridden by personality traits, value systems 
experience, and constraints in the immediate social environment, such as the presence of the boss. 
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a one-man crime wave, or lack of attendance at partnership meetings might be 
attributed to the individual personality of the non-attendee, rather than structural 
issues in their organisation which prevent them from attending. 
Second, anchoring effects refer to perceptual anchors which limit the range of 
judgements made by an individual; that is, perceptual anchors alter the range within 
which a judgement is made. In psychology experiments, the supply of a starting 
point (or anchor) determines the answer individuals give. For example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974; d. Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986) asked two groups of participants 
to estimate the number of African countries in the United Nations; the starting-point 
was 10 per cent for the first group and 65 per cent for the second group. The answers 
they gave were 25 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. This might apply to 
community safety practitioners, since each representative might have perceptual 
anchors determined by the culture of their organisation. These could limit their 
ability to understand the perceptual anchors of others, which might in turn 
undermine the possibility of joined-up practice. 
2.3 Structure, practice, and context 
Structure 
In the early 1990s, partnerships would typically have an executive group and 
thematic subgroups (although their structure also depended on the local authority 
structure) (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a) and some would have a community safety 
coordinator (LGMB, 1996). Similarly since the CDA, partnerships have an executive 
group, typically comprised of the statutory partners and other key partners, which 
makes strategic decisions about the direction of the partnership, although there are 
also more peripheral members who might attend irregularly or receive minutes from 
meetings. This strategic executive group is typically supported by a community 
safety team involved in the day-to-day administration of the partnership, and by a 
number of subgroups which are thematic, based on partnership priorities or 
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geographically-based. The YOTs and the DATs are typically subgroups in the 
partnerships (see Figure 1 below). 
Since the CDA, each partnerships also fits into the wider structure of their (Home 
Office) 'family group'; 'similar' partnerships were grouped together using cluster 
analysis38 (Leigh et al., 2000; Harper et al. 2002),39 although these groups have not 
been defined for fear of labelling areas. The cluster analysis takes into account 
relevant contextual information relating mainly to socio-demographic variables, 
such as population size and density; and measures of poverty, such as levels of 
unemployment or over-crowding.4o Crime rates were not included as a variable in 
the analysis, due to concerns over circularity.41 Furthermore, each partnership is 
monitored by a regional government office, which is in turn monitored by the Home 
Office. The new LSPs also act as an overarching partnership, in which the CSPs are 
typically a subgroup. 
Formality 
In the early 1990s Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a) found that CSPs varied in their 
level of formality. Those partnerships with a formal structure had an official title and 
were designated as a partnership; they involved representatives of the different 
agencies at regular meetings; records were well maintained, and liaison between 
different levels of the partnership occurred. Those partnerships which were 
informally structured were less likely to have an official title or to be designated as a 
partnership; they tended to have fluid and flexible networks; relations between 
partners tended to be personal rather than professional; the maintenance of records 
38 Cluster analysis is not an 'exact science' . For example, because variables in the analysis are 
measured in different ways they have to be standardised and could thus lose some of their original 
meaning. Cluster analysis also always finds clusters, and different kinds of cluster analysis techniques 
often find different kinds of clusters within the same data set (Hair, 1998). 
39 See Appendix 2 for a list of partnership families. 
40 See Appendix 3 for a full list of the variables included in the cluster analysis . 
41 Crime rates are the primary means by which the performance of each CSP will be compared. This 
would not be possible if crime rates had been included in the cluster analysis. 
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was less likely, and the organisational arrangements were more ad hoc and less 
hierarchical. The informal partnerships were likely to reach decisions more quickly 
but lacked accountability. 
Levels of formality seem redundant given that all local authorities should, as a result 
of the CDA, formally have a CSP. Partnerships might vary, however, in the formality 
of meetings. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b) suggested that formal meetings should 
be as brief and as frequent as possible, in order to prevent informal meetings which 
can be alienating for partners who are excluded.42 Informal meetings might exist, 
however, alongside formal structures, meetings and procedures. These informal 
meetings have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, such meetings can 
be exclusive, inclusion involving power and knowing the 'rules of the game' 
(Crawford, 1997), thus reinforcing existing power differentials (Crawford and Jones, 
1995). These meetings can involve the exchange of sensitive information which can 
violate procedural safeguards and have implications for confidentiality. Informal 
meetings also create problems for accountability (Sampson et al. 1988). On the other 
hand, these informal relations might provide an appropriate context for constructive 
and meaningful negotiations, perhaps over conflicting issues. 
42 See also Sampson et al. (1988) who argue that informal meetings and communication can breach 
confidentiality and create unaccountable working practices. Crawford and Jones (1995) found also 
that informal relations can exacerbate existing power differentials, especially since informal meetings 
tend to involve the more powerful agencies, which result in those excluded from informal meetings 
becoming further marginalised . 
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Figure 1 - Typical structure of the CSPs. The level 1 and 2 subgroups can be either geographically or thematically focused. 
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Decision-making 
Decision-making43 is a complex affair (Hawkins, 2003) . In the CSPs, decisions are 
taken about a wide range of issues,44 some of which will inform the implementation 
process.45 Decision-making in the context of the criminal justice system (and 
including the CSPs) inevitably entails the contentious concept of discretion, in which 
professionals have mandated flexibility of decision-making and thus an opportunity 
to engage in discriminatory activities and to subvert policies with which they do not 
agree. The degree to which community safety practitioners subvert or resist Home 
Office priorities and pressures will be discussed in chapter three. /I At its simplest, 
then, discretion refers to the freedom, power, authority, decision or leeway of an 
official, organisation or individual to decide, discern or determine to make 
judgment, choice or decision, about alternative courses of action or inaction" 
(Gelsthorpe and Padfield, 2003: 3). 
Decision-making is also an interpretive process; in their research on decision-making 
in discretionary lifer panels (DLPs),46 for example, Padfield and Liebling (2003) 
found that decision-making was systematic but not standardised (whereby they 
might consider the same factors in each case) or validated. Instead, panel members 
applied common sense when choosing and weighting factors for consideration; 
hence, there was room for bias and subjectivity to enter the decision-making process. 
This lack of standardisation in decision-making might also be apparent in CSPs, 
especially if there are no decision-making criteria. In any case, rules about decision-
making might not clarify the decision-making process or manage inconsistencies, as 
43 According to Hawkins (2003), the purpose of decision-making is appropriate justification for 
decisions, efficiency and creating rationality, in an uncertain world . 
44 Decisions take place throughout the partnership structure on issues such as partnership priorities, 
funding allocation, administrative matters and the allocation of tasks. 
45 Decision-making is likely to inform implementation and vice versa; this process is ' messy', and 
lines of accountability are far from clear-cut. 
46 DLPs consist of three representatives, normally a judge, a psychiatrist and a probation officer, who 
read and/ or write reports about the prisoner in advance and come prepared to make a decision about 
his or her release. The hearing is preceded by a pre-hearing discussion. Parallels can be drawn 
between decision-making in the CSPs and DLPs. 
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they can create perversities of their own, depending on how closely the rules are 
followed and on the use of discretion by decision-makers (Hawkins, 2003).47 
The lack of standardisation in decision-making might be explained by different 
kinds of decision-makers who interpret the same issues differently. Weber (2003), for 
example, explores how individual immigration officers, within a wider social setting 
of permissive guidelines, make decisions. She found that such decisions are an 
expression of a combination of rule- (i.e. they comply with directions), role- (i.e. they 
identify with the organization) or value-orientation (i.e. they question authority and 
focus on meanings and individual responsibility). From this stems five ideal types: 
(i) border guard (role-orientated); (ii) civil servant (rule-orientated); (iii) 
humanitarian (value-orientated and role-orientated); (iv) professional (value-
orientated and rule-orientated); (v) individualist (value-orientated). These types of 
decision-makers might also be found in the context of community safety 
practitioners at the local level. 
Timely information is also seemingly crucial to decision-making. The decisions of 
the DLP, for example, were contingent on timely and high-quality pre-hearing 
reports. Similarly, the CSPs might rely on timely and well-prepared reports which 
practitioners read, digest and discuss until they reach a decision in meetings. 
In the context of DLPs and possibly also CSPs, decision-making also appears to take 
place informally. For DLPs, the pre-hearing discussions are an opportunity to 
explore key issues and /I establish a degree of consensus and where necessary, they 
began the process of gentle negotiation" (Padfield and Liebling, 2003: 57). For CSPs I 
have already described how formal and informal meetings co-existed. Like CSPs, 
DLPs can result in a shared accountability; Padfield and Liebling found that sharing 
decision-making in DLPs was a means of sharing potential blame if something were 
47 Rules are not always followed according to their intention. They might also be followed too closely 
and bureaucratically. Rules can also be bent or side-stepped, based on personal relations of trust and 
reciprocity (Hawkins, 2003) . 
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to go wrong. In the context of the CSPs, shared decision-making could mean a lack 
of clear accountability and a degree of 'buck-passing'. 
Connected to a lack of accountability is an apparent lack of clarity about the locus of 
decision-making. As is the case of the CSPs, there were tensions between central 
government and local DLPs. The power of the DLP to release a prisoner was 
ultimately constrained by the Prison Service and the Home Secretary. 
The context of decision-making might also be of importance to the CSPs. For 
example, in the DLPs organisational, occupational and situational factors affected 
decision-making and the exercise of discretion, and this was also connected to the 
operation of power (Gels thorpe and Padfield, 2003). 
Hawkins (2003) suggests that there are three significant aspects of the locus of 
decision-making (which are seemingly pertinent to the CSPs). First, there is the 
surround, the broad setting of political and economic forces in which decision-
making takes place. With this in mind, the CSPs were implemented and could as 
easily be 'unimplemented' on a political whim (if the government were to change in 
the next general election). Second, decision-making is influenced by the field; that is, 
the legal and organisational setting. Third, the frame (or conceptual schema);48 that is, 
beliefs and ideologies influence interpretative behaviour used to make decisions -
this is where the professional world meets the real world. For example, the 
particular occupational cultures of the police and the local authority are not easy to 
reconcile in the CSPS.49 
48 This fits with the account provided by Fitzmaurice and Pease (1986) of anchoring effects, in which 
our behaviour and judgements (in this case decision-making) are shaped by perceptual anchors. 
49 The significance of the frame is illustrated by Weber's (2003) research described above. 
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Implementation 
There is a perceived lack of decision-making taking place within the partnerships. 
Since the inception of the partnerships, commentators have critically described the 
CSPs as either 'talking shops', 'paper partnerships', 'window dressing' or places in 
which to exchange information or ratify decisions taken elsewhere. For example, 
Blagg et al. (1988) recognised the potential for partnerships to be rhetorical,5o 
symbolic or ideological in their efforts. Bradley and Walters describe developments 
of community crime prevention in New Zealand as /I a unique example of window 
dressing - of a government being seen to be doing something ... /I (2002: 256). More 
recently, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) (1998; c.£. Kirby, 2003) 
have suggested that the implementation of successful partnership initiatives has 
remained elusive. 
Kirby goes on to suggest that implementation has been undermined by a failure to 
recognise that the police are not always an appropriate lead. Difficulties with 
implementation are also associated with a lack of capacity, in terms of knowledge, 
time and money amongst partners; since for many agencies, community safety is 
being 'tacked-on' to their day jobs. Thus the Audit Commission (2002) criticise the 
partnerships for their lack of use of the mainstream activities of partner agencies, to 
deliver community safety. 
The remaining empirical research on the implementation of community safety 
relates to the statutory processes of auditing, consultation and strategy development. 
The extent and meaning of community consultation has already been discussed 
earlier in this chapter, in relation to community engagement with the partnerships, 
so I will now examine prior research on audits and strategies. 
Auditing, involving accurate and up-to-date information about local crime, is 
essential for targeting limited resources and thus creating effective community safety 
50 See also Stokes-White (2000), for example. 
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projects (Morgan 1991; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c; Evans, 1998; Walklate, 1999).51 
The first round of audits, conducted in 1998/1999, relied on police data and thus on 
conventional crime. Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000),52 for example, found that 
the average number of data sources used in the CSPs in their survey was fourteen. 
Police data, however, were the most prominent; followed by information from the 
education department on exclusion and truancy; offender data; drug treatment data; 
fire service data and information from victim support schemes. Similarly, Gilling 
(2003) argues that the quality of crime audits is not high; they become repositories 
for sets of data which lack interpretation and meaning. 
The seemingly poor quality of the audits was perhaps explained by difficulties with 
the analysis; insufficient time; the use of external consultants who lacked relevant 
local knowledge; inaccurate, incomplete, inaccessible data; a lack of coterminosity 
with other data; and the fact that, despite information-sharing protocols, information 
was not always shared (Phillips et al 2002).53 For most CSPs, therefore, it is clear that 
the audit process needs some refinement,54 although perhaps it is important that the 
audit process does not distract partners from implementing community safety 
(Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994c). 
In terms of strategies, in theory their purpose is to set crime reduction targets, based 
on an understanding of local crime patterns, thus following recommendations in the 
51 For example, both Evans (1998) and Walklate (1999) compare two neighbourhoods in Salford, 
which are similar in their crime rates and levels of deprivation, yet residents in these two areas 
understood and experienced crime in different ways. Bankside was a 'frightened community' 
whereas Oldtown was a 'defended community' . This highlights the need for local understanding of 
local crime problems. Perhaps audits facilitate such nuanced understandings, although this will 
depend on the extent to which the concerns of local people are also included. 
52 Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000) examined 69 per cent (N=2S9) of the audits and 97 per cent 
(N=363) of strategies produced in the first round in 1999 (and which have to be produced every three 
years) . She provides an insight into the partnerships in the early stages of implementing the CDA. 
53 Phillips et al. (2002) carried out in-depth case studies of three CSPs in order to examine some of the 
processes involved in their development of audits, consultation procedures and strategy documents . 
54 Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000) suggest a number of ways in which audits could be improved, 
such as by using spatial data analysis, collecting data between audits, and using data from the 
voluntary and business sectors. 
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Morgan Report. Deciding on which issues to focus, however, is difficult and the 
prioritisation of types of crime to be addressed can be contentious. Under-reported 
kinds of crime, for example, could be missed from priority lists. Blagg et al. (1988) 
found that domestic violence and racially motivated crime were rarely addressed by 
partnerships. More recently, however, this was not found to be the case, as Phillips, 
Considine and Lewis (2000) found that in 86 per cent of CSPs, domestic violence was 
the most commonly cited priority. 
The recent prominence of police data in audits might also result in a focus on 
conventional crime (Tierney, 2001) and an absence of interest in non-conventional 
crime, such as corporate crime. Indeed even deciding how many, and the purpose 
and range of priorities to include in the strategy was contentious. Phillips, Considine 
and Lewis (2000) found that the average number of priorities set was eight, although 
Home Office guidance suggested that six was the optimum number. Targets were 
both short-term and long-term (as the Home Office has suggested), but specific 
targets were not always set for particular crimes; for example, domestic violence had 
a specific target set in only 7 per cent of CSPs. The range of priorities included in the 
strategies for 1998 to 2001 was also considered to be too broad (Audit Commission, 
2002). Strategies also failed to explain the rationale behind the selection of priorities 
and provided little information on how progress was to be monitored (Gilling, 2003; 
Audit Commission, 2002).55 
Difficulties in setting partnership priorities could be explained by the need to 
balance the different demands of central government, consultants and 
audit/ consultation information (Phillips et al., 2002) and apparently exacerbated by 
time pressures. Partnership funding also became available too late to influence 
priority setting in 1998. Alternatively perhaps the difficulties stem from the three-
55 To improve priority setting, Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000) suggest CSPs use short-term and 
long-term output and outcome targets which are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-
scaled (SMART). The Audit Commission (2002) also suggest that CSPs be clear about their objectives 
and why these achievements are important to local people. They also suggest that CSPs write delivery 
plans. 
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yearly process for the audit, strategy and consultation (government funding operates 
on an annual basis) (Gilling, 2003), and partnership priorities can change in this 
period of time. 
The significance of social context to the structure and operation of the 
partnerships 
The significance of social context in relation to community safety cannot be ignored 
- "effective design, implementation and evaluation of crime prevention measures 
need to be cognizant of its social context; and any measure which does not properly 
take into account the systems and contexts in which it is embedded is more likely to 
fail than succeed" (Hope, 2001: 425). Since the Morgan Report, the social context of 
the CSPs has been recognised to be significant to how they operate, as its 
recommendations varied according to whether the partnership was a unitary or two-
tier local authority. Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a)56 also found that partnership 
structure was determined by the local authority structure. Local authority structure 
remains an important contextual factor. The Audit Commission, for example, note 
that unitary local authorities seem to be progressing at a quicker pace since they are 
relatively "unhampered by the historical constraints of previous issues relating to 
community safety, and so are free to take a more innovative approach" (2002:18). 
Progress in the partnerships is also potentially affected by urbanism, diversity, 
population size and density, levels of deprivation, levels of crime and other late 
modernity variables such as perceptions of risky 'communities' and people.57 The 
Audit Commission (2002), for example, found that smaller district and unitary 
councils delivered community safety more effectively than larger councils. They are 
56 Liddle and Gelsthorpe undertook an extensive Home Office-funded study which had two phases. 
The first involved two case studies conducted by Nellis and Enterkin (1991; d. Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 
1994a), and the second phase involved six detailed case studies combined with research in areas that 
appeared to offer useful contrasts and was the basis of three Home Office Reports (Liddle and 
Gelsthorpe, 1994a, 1994b and 1994c). 
57 See Bottoms and Wiles (2003) for a discussion of late modernity, communities and crime; see also 
chapter three. 
unclear why, but suggest that smaller local authorities are responding well to the 
challenge of community safety, with less support than urban areas. The wider 
community safety context could also affect the structure and operation of the 
partnerships. As I have already indicated, the CSPs were created during a period of 
change which also saw the emergence of the YOTs, DATs, LSPs, Regional 
Government Offices and so on. 
The apparent significance of social context to the operation of the CSPs undermines 
the' one size fits all' agenda, evident in the promotion of ministerial priorities or the 
evidence-based 'what works' approaches of the Home Office. It also implies that, 
despite attempts by the CDA to standardise existing CSPs and despite various 
pressures emanating from the Home Office, the legislation and guidance will be 
interpreted and implemented in localised rather than standardised ways. 
2.4 Partnership relations -ownership and leadership 
Inter-agency relations 
The most obvious issue that emerges in the context of multi-agency partnerships is 
the potential clash of occupational cultures, working practices and discourses, since 
agencies within the CSPs differ materially and ideologically. Hallam (2002) suggests 
that the police, for example, are concerned with enforcement, rather than prevention, 
further encouraged by government-led performance indicators which focus on 
enforcement issues such as response times, rather than effectiveness in dealing with 
problems. Gilling (1993, 1997a) suggests that the police and the probation service 
have different discourses on crime and crime prevention, derived from their 
different organisational and professional histories. On the one hand, the /I dominant 
crime prevention discourse within the police is one of neoclassicism which presents 
crime as a problem of control through deterrence, either proactively through patrol, 
or reactively through detection" (Gilling, 1993: 149). An interest in the causes of 
crime remains a less important part of their discourse, although their neoclassical 
stance fits well with situational crime prevention. 
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On the other hand, Gilling (1993) suggests that the probation service's interest in the 
offender, and in causal explanations of offending behaviour, is derived from its 
theoretical basis in positivism. This leads the probation service to emphasise a 
treatment or welfarist approach to prevention. Since 1993, however, the probation 
service, like other public sector organisations has been transformed by 
managerialism (Mair, 2003). 
Different occupational cultures, working practices and discourses might also 
undermine the establishment of trust between partners, especially because of the 
haste with which the partnerships were established. The Audit Commission (2002), 
for example, noted a lack of trust (particularly between senior council and police 
personnel), illustrated by the lack of co-operation between agencies in the exchange 
of data. There is also little time for networking, trust building or testing of the 
competence and integrity of relationships, given the pressures to produce audits and 
strategies, for example. The rapid turnover of practitioners, particularly the police, 
might also contribute to an absence of trust. 
Competition between agencies could undermine not only trust but also joined-up 
relations. Agencies appear to compete in three different ways. Firstly, each agency is 
individually measured on its performance against government targets. Thus 
partners might focus on the performance of the parent agency, rather than the 
performance of the partnership (Crawford, 1997). Second, different parts of the CSP 
structure compete with each other. For example, subgroups compete for central 
government funds. Third partnerships compete in relation to their performance 
against government targets. For example, partnerships are compared using Home 
Office family groupings and more recently IQuanta. 
Underlying much of what has been discussed so far in relation to occupational 
cultures, trust and competition, is the operation of power. The relative power of each 
agency appears to depend on a range of factors connected to the wider social context 
of the partnership, such as the extent to which they have funding, time, relevant 
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knowledge or information, legal obligations and performance indicators with which 
the partnership could help. 
There is an expectation, advocated by the CDA and the Audit Commission, that 
senior council and police representatives should be responsible for providing 
leadership, co-ordination and commitment to the partnership.58 The domination of 
the partnerships by the police can further be attributed to their construction as 
'experts', 'knowledge brokers', or 'specialists' in crime prevention and the main 
custodians of crime statistics (Crawford, 1997; Tierney, 2001). "In the face of this 
'expertise', other partners in inter-agency work are left muted" (Crawford, 1997: 
131). In their research Sampson et al. (1988) found that the police and housing 
department were powerful partnership members because of the resources they 
wield over other agencies. Bowling (1998) also found that the police dominated 
discussions in multi-agency partnerships, but they were also quick to absolve 
themselves of sole responsibility for tackling racist incidents. 
On the one hand, these power differentials have implications for the definition of 
crime and possible solutions, which ultimately filter down to the 'community' . Blagg 
et al (1988), for example, found that the police, as the most powerful partner, 
favoured situational approaches over social approaches.59 Sampson et al (1988) 
noted how power differentials in a partnership affected the definition of the problem 
and its solution, and undermined the quality of life of minority ethnic groups living 
on 'sink estates'. 
On the other hand, Crawford and Jones (1995) argue that power differentials within 
the partnerships do not always have negative consequences. They are critical of 
Sampson et al.' s (1988) overly simplistic treatment of power relations within the 
58 The Audit Commission (2002) recognise the pitfalls of weak compared with over-bearing 
leaderships: weak leadership can be a barrier to improvement, whilst over-bearing leadership can 
strain relationships between partners. 
59 Pearson et al. (1992), for example, also found the police to dominate multi-agency partnerships. 
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partnerships; they treat them as divisive and restraining when in fact, power can 
also be productive. Crawford and Jones (1995) suggest that power differentials can 
be beneficial to partnerships as they can result in creative approaches to the 
management of conflict through negotiation and compromise. Crawford and Jones 
(1995) are also critical of Sampson et al.'s implicit assumption that unity, as opposed 
to conflict and disagreement, is desirable. They suggest that subscribing to an 
'ideology of unity' can disguise conflict and drive it underground, when in fact 
conflict can be usefully harnessed to: 
[A] constructive debate concerning the competing contributions, 
priorities, and aims of the agencies involved, as well as for the expression 
of intra-communal conflicts. Conflict may be the healthy expression of 
different interests. Mutual recognition of difference represents a more 
preferable premise for inter-agency relations than either an assumed 
consensus or an ends-oriented 'quest for unity' (Crawford and Jones, 
1995: 31). 
Whilst differences between agencies might be helpful for stimulating debate, conflict 
management and creative problem-solving, it remains the case that power 
differentials result in inequality between partners, which perhaps cannot be counter-
balanced by any of the benefits outlined by Crawford and Jones (1995). 
Power differentials might also be the result of prevailing ideologies in the CSPs, 
rather than simply being based on differences in time or money. According to Lukes' 
third dimension of power, through ideology, one social group manipulates the 
desires and wishes of another, perhaps in ways that are contrary to their best 
interests (Lukes, 1974).60 Thus power can operate not only through obvious displays 
of resources but also in subtle ways. An example of the third dimension of power 
60 The other two dimensions of power are firstly, in relation to decision-making, where opinions are 
divided; one group has power over another to make a decision. Secondly, in relation to non-decision-
making, power can be used to prevent discussion and thus decision-making. 
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might be the construction of the police in the CSPs as crime and disorder' experts'. 
This is an ideology which might enhance their power in partnership activities, such 
as decision-making, contrary to the interests of others. 
The discussion so far about the operation of power suggests that partnerships might 
represent an opportunity to reinforce existing relations between the police and other 
agencies; they may provide "new concrete mechanisms for local hegemony building, 
in particular with respect to policing" (Coleman, Sim and Whyte, 2002: 98). Coleman, 
Sim and Whyte (2002) argue that this hegemony building takes place because the 
police ensure that funds are channelled to 'reliable', 'credible' and 'responsible' 
partners, rather than partners who may be more critical or ask uncomfortable 
questions. The latter are thus assimilated into the local state structure in a 
'controlled' and benign way. 
Differences between partners in terms of occupational cultures, trust, competition 
and the operation of power imply that conflict, disagreement and debate are a strong 
possibility. Indeed, as I shortly discuss, much of the existing research examines 
conflict in partnerships. There is also some evidence to suggest partnerships could 
be (overly) polite and consensual. For example, Padfield and Liebling (2002) found 
that discretionary lifer panels were surprisingly quick and consensual in their 
discussions, with little challenge to what they deemed to be insufficient evidence or 
the labelling of offenders. Disagreements did influence decision-making, however, 
which illustrates that conflict does not necessarily have negative connotations, but 
rather might have a role to play in cross-examining the issues or evidence and/ or 
holding partners or subgroups to account for their actions or decisions. 
Conflict can take different forms; it can occur between different members of the same 
agency (intra-organisational) or between representatives of different agencies (inter-
organisational). These different kinds of conflict imply that not only are partnerships 
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heterogeneous but so too are the individual agencies that comprise them.61 Pearson 
et al. (1992) found that inter-organisational conflict often masked intra-
organisational conflict. They argue, for example, that intra-organisational conflict in 
the police occurred because their division of labour is complex, which means that the 
work of one police department might be undermined by the heavy-handed 
approach of another. Inter-organisational conflict, however, could mask this intra-
organisational conflict. 
Similarly, Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b) found intra-organisational conflict to be 
common in larger agencies, such as the police, because of competition between 
different departments, as well as differing levels of commitment towards, and 
ownership of, crime prevention and community safety. Intra-organisational conflict 
might also be caused by poor channels of communication within an organisation, 
which means that partners are not necessarily representative of their organisation. 
They conclude that inter-agency and intra-agency conflicts co-exist alongside each 
other, indeed "[i]nteragency conflicts, ... , are both constituted by, and constitutive 
of intra-organisational tensions" (Crawford, 1997: 145). 
Sampson et al (1988) attempt to model inter-organisational conflict using the 
concepts of 'benevolence' and' conspiracy'. The conspiracy model suggests that the 
police co-opt other agencies and the community into pursuing police-defined goals. 
Sampson et al. (1988) also find evidence to support this, but at the same time cite 
evidence to suggest that there are pockets of resistance to police domination, 
indicating that the concept does not take into account the complexities within the 
different agencies that the police attempt to co-opt. Similarly, Phillips (2002)62 found 
61 The heterogeneity of individual agencies means it may be difficult to talk of a 'police perspective' or 
'social services position', as it thus disguises important internal conflicts within those particular 
agencies (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994b). 
62 Phillips (2002) documents the development of the CSPs in three different case-study sites using 
observations, documentary analysis and in-depth interviews. 
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partnerships to monitor and evaluate their performance is clearly contingent on the 
expertise of partners; Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994c) found a general lack of training 
and expertise in evaluation, making it difficult to develop knowledge about the 
impact of community safety initiatives. More recently, Gilling and Hughes (2002) 
similarly noted difficulties experienced by community safety practitioners with 
evaluation and auditing. Respondents to their survey rated inter-professional skills, 
knowledge of the causes of crime, management skills, communication skills, and 
knowledge of the policy context as the most developed skills, whilst IT, auditing, 
knowledge of research methods, public relations, and evaluation skills and 
knowledge were the least developed. A lack of trust may also contribute to 
difficulties with the exchange of data between agencies (Gilling, 2003). 
Practitioners may lack appropriate skills to monitor and evaluate partnership 
performance; they are, however, under increasing pressure to measure performance, 
which might suggest that the 'honeymoon' period (Phillips, 2002) is over for the 
partnerships. Partnerships are subject to both internal and external forms of 
monitoring and evaluation. Internally, partnerships monitor their progress on a 
fairly regular basis against the targets in their strategy, culminating in an annual 
review of performance.65 Partnerships also occasionally conduct evaluations of 
specific interventions, often with the help of consultants. 
External measurement of performance can take a variety of forms. Firstly, each 
organisation is accountable for its performance (including its role in the CSPs) to its 
own 'independent assessor'. For example, the police are accountable to HMIC, and 
local authorities are accountable to the Audit Commission.66 Second, agencies are 
measured against national performance indicators which tend to focus on single 
issues and vary between agencies (Audit Commission, 2002). 
65 In the Police Reform Act 2002, the annual review became a statutory partnership process. 
66 See Audit Commission (2002) for more information concerning accountability of partner 
organ is a tions. 
Third, Home Office family groups, described earlier in the chapter, are used to 
compare similar partnerships in terms of crime rates (for notifiable offences like 
burglary, robbery and car crime) and thus to create a 'league table'. More recently, 
however, partnerships have been compared with each other, using 'IQuanta' and the 
'partnership self-assessment' procedure. IQuanta uses police crime statistics to 
monitor performance; it is an Internet-based tool, with restricted access, and allows 
partnerships to compare themselves with their peers, across time and in relation to 
their targets (Home Office, 2004a). Performance can also be examined at force, BCU, 
and partnership level. The partnerships are ranked; the idea being that partnerships 
ranked in the top quartile (i.e. with high crime rates) should be converging with 
those in the lower quartile. Unsurprisingly it is all the major cities which fall into the 
top quartile. The partnership self-assessment process occurred in 2003/2004; 
partnerships were asked to examine their processual performance and provide 
supporting evidence from documents or minutes from meetings. Finally, the 
performance of the partnerships is also monitored through the regional government 
offices and by the Local Strategic Partnerships. 
Performance measurement arrangements also raise questions about the quality of 
the information produced: firstly, because of the tendency to focus on outputs,67 
rather than outcomes68 (Audit Commission, 2002; Bradley and Walters, 2002), since 
they are easier to measure; and secondly because government performance 
measurement appear to reduce complexity to 'self-referential performance 
indica tors': 
State and private bureaucracies alike take refuge in a pseudo-reduction of 
complexity, which takes place not in the real world of actual solutions to 
67 Outputs examine the performance of the partnership or an initiative by considering, for example, 
the number of people involved, the level of attendance, time devoted etc. 
68 Outcomes refer to the impact of the partnership or a particular strategy on crime and disorder. It 
addresses the question of whether reductions in crime and disorder are attributable to the activities of 
the partnerships. 
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social, economic and environmental problems, but in the largely self-
referential world of performance indicators, frequently massaged, and 
measured outcomes which evaluate simply the capacity of the 
organisation to produce statistics and devise indicators (Lea 2002: 120). 
The effect of this focus on outputs and self-referential performance indicators might 
be detrimental to the delivery of community safety and waste public money. 
Paradoxically, underpinning these developments is the new public management 
(NPM) of public service delivery. Essentially, NPM concerns the application of free 
market techniques, such as performance measurement to the public sector, in order 
to increase productivity and accountability.69 Hence criminal justice agencies, for 
example, constantly search for 'what works' in order to prove that they are' on top' 
of the problem of crime and disorder. 
In relation to the CSPs, it is arguable that NPM undermines the delivery of 
community safety by encouraging partnerships to implement what is measurable 
and likely to produce' quick wins' (such as situation crime prevention), rather than 
problem-solving and/ or long-term solutions (such as social crime prevention). 
Organisational pressures to meet government targets cause partner organisations to 
focus on outputs and outcomes of their own organisation, rather than partnership 
outcomes. This undermines joined-up practices and encourages the view that 
community safety is peripheral rather than central to the workload of each partner 
(Crawford, 2001). Finally, the questions raised about the quality of performance 
measurement undermine trust amongst the public in professional expertise, and 
thus (ironically) decrease public accountability. Finally, NPM illustrates how central 
government steers local community safety agendas from afar, as CSPs can be held to 
69 According to McLaughlin and Murji (2001), NPM is a complex web of knowledge, practices and 
techniques including measurable targets; costing of all activities; performance indicators; an emphasis 
on outputs and results, rather than processes; the rationalization of organisations, particularly by 
identifying their core competencies; competitive environments; and viewing the recipients of services 
as consumers. NPM aims to transform the funding and delivery processes of the public sector to 
make them more productive and accountable. 
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account by central government for local performance, especially because public 
money is involved. 
Despite attempts by government to measure partnership performance, there has 
been little measurement of the impact of partnerships on crime and disorder. The 
Audit Commission (2002) suggest that even the early inspections by the Audit 
Commission and HMIC were focused solely on procedural issues, thus sending 
inaccurate messages to the partnerships, resulting in a continued focus, by 
partnerships, on processes rather than outcomes. 
External audits of the partnerships, conducted by the Audit Commission in 1999 and 
2000, found that the partnerships had high aspirations but poor delivery and 
performance management (Audit Commission, 2002) . In the most recent inspection 
of partnerships, the Audit Commission found that there was still a lack of ownership 
of community safety by some partners, a lack of focus in partnership priorities, and a 
failure to use the capacity of partner organisations to deliver community safety as 
part of their mainstream provisions (Audit Commission, 2002) . 
Interestingly, the Audit Commission also expressed uncertainty about the impact of 
the partnerships on crime rates: 
Local partnerships have not made an obvious impact on community safety 
between 1999 and 2000 (2002: 1). 
Although in some partnership areas the Government's national crime 
reduction targets have been achieved, local partnerships' contribution to 
achieving this is unclear; data that are currently available do not give a 
complete picture of partnership performance, nor do they correlate to crime 
rates (2002: 18). 
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The lack of research and uncertainty about partnership outcomes is difficult to 
reconcile with the performance measurement culture; however, it implies that the 
concept of partnerships, rather than being driven by research, rests on the assumption 
that many agencies are better than one (Liddle, 2001: 50).70 Perhaps the lack of 
research is because government and the CSPs struggle to know how to measure 
outcomes. Indeed there are a number of factors to be disentangled in order to 
understand the impact of community safety projects on crime. Some of the 
difficulties of measuring outcomes will be discussed in the chapter on the 
methodology. Furthermore, uncertainties about the impact of the partnerships on 
crime also raise questions about whether or not they waste public money and why 
they continue to exist - perhaps they have a wider symbolic function, such as 
reassuring the public? 
2.6 Chapter summary 
The CSPs emerged from developments in multi-agency crime prevention, such as 
the 'Five Towns' and 'Safer Cities' initiatives in the late 1980s. Thereafter, the 
Morgan Report was particularly influential; it recommended that the local authority 
work in conjunction with the police, the probation service, the business community 
and local voluntary organisations to tackle local crime. The report also 
recommended that central government fund the partnerships. 
The Morgan Report was 'shelved' by the Conservative government but its key ideas 
were taken up in the CDA 1998, which attempted to formalise and standardise 
existing community safety practice. In addition, since 1999 CSPs have been primarily 
funded by central government. The CDA differed from the Morgan Report chiefly in 
the change of focus from crime to crime and disorder, and also in that the police and 
local authorities were to jointly lead the partnerships. The CSPs emerged alongside 
70 Rein (1983) identifies seven sources of such pleas for coordination, for example, the need to plug 
gaps and ensure the provision of services is continuous rather than disjointed or the need for 
comprehensiveness . He also argues that pleas for coordination are contradicted by the problems that 
grow out of the practice of coordination. 
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other multi-agency partnerships such as the YOTs, DATs and LSPs. The Police 
Reform Act 2002 has further endorsed the CSPs; it has extended the number of 
statutory partners to include the PCTs and the Fire Service, and statutory processes 
to include an annual review of performance. 
The relevance of criticisms and recommendations in the Morgan Report to current 
community safety practice raises questions about whether or not community safety 
practice has moved on since 1991. The police remain important players within the 
CSPs, although local authorities increasingly playa significant role. Some agencies 
such as the PCT, the business sector and voluntary organisations remain peripheral. 
Community safety practitioners are increasingly professionalised; they support the 
operation of the partnerships, which suggests that the Morgan Report's 
recommendations concerning the necessity of a community safety coordinator have 
been heeded. Community safety practitioners appear to focus on local and political 
issues rather than on the technical aspects of their jobs, perhaps even resisting 
national political priorities (Gilling and Hughes, 2002) . Hence tensions between the 
local and the national level, identified by Morgan, continue to be of significance. 
The' community' and/ or community-based organisations continue to have a limited 
role in the partnership, beyond statutory consultation mechanisms, publication of 
strategies and audits, and occasional involvement in subgroups or via elected 
members. This is despite the Morgan Report's recommendation for partnerships to 
develop a clear identity, in order to fit into a wider public reassurance agenda. The 
failure of partnerships to address 'diversity' could imply that 'community' 
involvement is tokenistic or rhetorical, and that an opportunity has been missed for 
a progressive local governance through a 'participative local democracy', in which 
local people are re-engaged with democracy and decision-making at the local level 
(Hughes and Edwards, 2002). 
The roles of agency representatives can be interpreted in the light of typologies 
about participation in multi-agency partnerships (Liddle and Bottoms, 1991; Liddle 
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and Gelsthorpe, 1994b) or different kinds of team roles (Belbin, 1993). These 
differences in roles imply that many agencies are not necessarily better than one in 
multi-agency settings. Rather, differences between agencies influence both attempts 
to agree community safety priorities and other dimensions of partnership activity. 
The partnerships retain structures similar to those noted by the Morgan Report; 
Figure 1 illustrates that they include a strategic body, which makes decisions about 
the overall direction of the partnership (supported by subgroups and community 
safety practitioners, who implement decisions taken by the partnership board). The 
'new' regional government offices, and sometimes the LSPs, also monitor 
partnership progress. However, these structures might lead to bureaucracy, and 
confusion about decision-making and implementation. 
Formal meetings are the intended locus of decision-making, although in practice 
decisions also appear to be taken informally and ratified later. Decision-making is a 
complex affair which involves discretion and interpretation, leaving room for the 
operation of subjectivity and possibly bias, evidenced by different kinds of decision-
makers (Weber, 2003). Decisions are also influenced by practical considerations such 
as timely information, informal meetings, and conversations, as well as the broader 
socio-political context, occupational cultures, and individual beliefs and ideologies. 
Despite this, decision-making in practice proceeds without conflict or disagreement, 
perhaps because of expectations about the need for multi-agency meetings to be 
consensual. 
There is little research on the implementation of community safety, but there are 
concerns that successful implementation has been elusive. Research on 
implementation concerns auditing, strategy development and consultation. Audits 
have tended to rely on police data and have neglected interpretation of the data. 
Strategies have tended to include a wide range of priorities (in order to keep all 
partners happy), which may not be achievable. The audit and strategy process is 
complicated by tight deadlines and three-yearly cycles, which do not coincide with 
annual funding arrangements. 
The social context of CSPs may also influence their structure, and the interpretation 
of the CDA and subsequent legislation and guidelines. Local authority structure may 
be of importance, as well as the size of the town/ city in which the CSP is located .. 
The partnership process is further affected by inter-agency differences in terms of 
occupational cultures, discourses and ideologies. These differences can undermine 
trust, compounded by competition. Power appears to underpin inter-agency 
relationships and is determined by access to resources (time, money and knowledge) 
as well as by prevailing ideologies. The police, for example, are constructed as 
'experts' because they are the 'gatekeepers' to information about crime and disorder. 
As a result of these inter-agency differences, inter- and intra-organisation conflict 
can sometimes arise, and when it does it appears to be managed by creating a broad 
range of priorities with which everyone is happy, and through informal meetings. 
This calls into question the assumption that many agencies are better than one in 
addressing community safety. 
Tensions between central government and local community safety practitioners are 
evident in relation to money, information, and performance measurement. Funding 
arrangements involve rules about how and when funding should be spent, with 
sanctions imposed if the partnerships do not comply with the rules. The 
performance measurement culture encourages money to be spent on measurable71 
and easily implemented interventions, rather than on the most appropriate solutions 
to the greatest problems. This might explain why Gilling (2003) claims that the 
government has little to show for the money invested in community safety. 
71 There are exceptions to this, such as domestic violence. 
69 
Recording-keeping remains a difficulty for the partnerships. In addition, the 
'honeymoon' could well be over for the partnerships, since their performance is 
subject to increasing internal and external scrutiny. Yet there also appears to be a 
dearth of information about the impact of partnerships on crime and disorder, 
perhaps because of the difficulties experienced by government and local CSPs in 
measuring outcomes. 
The focus on performance measurement is part of the NPM approach to public 
service delivery, which may undermine trust and joined-up practice by encouraging 
partner agencies to focus on their own performance indicators. NPM also illustrates 
that central government may well be steering the community safety agenda from 
afar; the CSPs are part of a tendency towards governance, rather than government. 
This issue is examined in the next chapter, along with the wider socio-political 
context of the CSPs in late modern society. 
CHAPTER III: PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON 
GOVERNANCE AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
OFTHE CSPS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the socio-political context of the partnerships. In particular, 
I examine the implications of the partnerships for debates about governance and late 
modernity. In order to set the scene for this discussion, I outline some of the 
implications of inter-agency differences and the contested nature of crime and 
disorder amongst local citizens, as this has a bearing on the discussion that follows. 
Inter-agency relations: joined up but fragmented? 
The existence of different occupational cultures, levels of trust, competition, and the 
operation of power and conflict undermine the possibility of joined-up community 
safety practice. These inter-agency differences might ultimately result in the 
contradictory tendency towards fragmentation in community safety practice 
(Crawford, 2001). Fragmentation or difficulty in joining-up community safety 
practice is unsurprising for two reasons. Firstly, during modernisation, the functions 
of agencies involved in community safety were differentiated precisely because they 
had different values and processes. Therefore, partnerships attempt to rail against 
social differentiation, embedded in the history of the rise of the modern state. As 
Thacher notes: 
Any complex society involves differentiations in terms of roles and values 
(Durkheim, 1960; Walzer, 1984), so every social institution pursues 
priorities separate from and potentially in conflict with the others. 
Consequently inter-organizational partnerships bring together institutions 
committed to potentially incompatible priorities. The practitioners who 
manage these relationships will find themselves in contested normative 
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terrain, pressured by conflicting social aims that had formerly been 
institutionally segregated (2001: 766) . 
The very existence of partnerships, which attempt to reverse structures and patterns 
that arose during modernity, might suggest that we have moved or are moving 
beyond modernity, to a different societal form, perhaps that of late modernity. 
This reversal of the differentiation of the institutions of society is illustrated by the 
increasing use of multi-agency partnerships in the field of criminal justice (and 
possibly beyond), with the creation of drug action teams, youth offending teams, 
local strategic partnerships and the drug intervention programmes. At the same 
time, the multitudes of multi-agency partnerships appear incoherent because they 
are underpinned by a fragmented (and perhaps modern, rather than late-modern) 
central government. The Audit Commission (2002) note that community safety is 
currently predominantly a matter for the Home Office, but community safety is also 
inherent in - but not always recognised or owned by - a number of other 
government departments, such as education (DfES), health (DH), transport (DTLR), 
and environment and rural affairs (DEFRA). 
A more extreme example of this 'reversal' of the differentiation of social institutions 
is provided by Pease (2001), in his 'pan-hazard' approach to community safety, 
which enables all harmful aspects of the physical and social environment to be 
addressed.72 Thus citizens do not face a dilemma about which agency to call on 
when faced with a social problem such as noisy neighbours.73 
72 The problem with a pan-hazard approach to community safety is that there is a risk of criminalizing 
social policy, such that it becomes of interest or importance only because of its connections with crime 
and disorder. 
73 Most people would call the police to deal with noisy neighbours, when in fact it is the local 
authority who have the powers to deal with this situation. 
72 
Relations between the centre and the local level 
The second reason partnerships appear joined-up but fragmented is that, in tackling 
community safety, partnerships must reconcile inter-agency differences, the views of 
diverse 'communities' and central government. Hence local crime and disorder is a 
contested matter, embedded in the social relations of crime controF4 in which 
partnerships risk alienating or accommodating some social groups and/or 
government. 
Stenson and Edwards' (2002) research exemplifies the difficulties of joined-up 
community safety as a result of the conflicting interests of the 'community' and 
practitioners. In one estate in Leicester, citizens were consulted about solutions to car 
crime committed by young people. Citizens suggested a motor project, which was 
rejected by practitioners because of a lack of evidence that projects of this kind 
demonstrate an impact on outcomes. Consequently, citizens became cynical of the 
partnership, and were further excluded from solving the problems of the estate. 
Furthermore there was conflict between different coalitions within the partnership 
- youth workers wanted to prioritise outreach work, whereas residents associations 
and housing officers wanted to prioritise enhanced safety. In the end, security 
measures were prioritised, as they were more amenable to performance monitoring, 
and the partnership tackled the effects of local crime, rather than its causes. 
In terms of reconciling governmental priorities, the Audit Commission (2002) 
suggest that there is a good fit between local and national priorities, as long as the 
latter take into account local conditions and find common ground. However, Jamel 
and Mail' (2003) found that the main topic of discussion in CSP subgroups was 
environmental issues, such as young people causing annoyance; traffic and parking; 
drug dealing; neighbourhood policing; and prostitution, whereas government 
priorities were burglary, car crime and violent crime. This finding implies that there 
74 The social relations of crime control refer to actors (the state, criminal justice agencies, offenders, 
victims and various 'communities'), roles and interactions, which contribute to the criminalization, 
management and conh'ol of criminality (Lea 2002: 14). 
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may be difficulties identifying commonalities between the priorities of citizens, 
practitioners and central government. 
Other research also suggests that practitioners lack autonomy in their choice of local 
community safety priorities and approaches (e.g. Hallsworth, 2002). Gilling (2001, 
2003) suggests that the CSPs appear democratic through their use of consultation 
with local people, but in fact Home Office priorities take precedence, as a result of 
the pressures of performance measurement and the under-reporting of crime such as 
racial violence. At the same time, as discussed in chapter two, Gilling and Hughes 
(2002) found that practitioners partially resisted government pressures. 
In the early 1990s questions were raised about the extent to which CSPs were 
influenced by central government. Tilley (1993), for example, in his 'insider' account 
of the Safer Cities Programme, concluded that the state had minimal influence on 
local community safety practice. Indeed, he argued that state power was a 'hollow 
shell', filled by competing interest groups at the locallevet as a result of full-time 
coordinators with occupational backgrounds and ideological standpoints which 
differed from prevailing government ideologies. Tilley perhaps failed to view the 
state as a constraint, however, because he failed to recognise its manipulation of 
practitioners' ideological assumptions (Hughes, 1996a). 
Following the introduction of the CDA, central government is never far from the 
day-to-day practice of most CSPs. For example, 86 per cent of CSPs included 
domestic violence in their strategy documents (Phillips, Considine and Lewis, 2000). 
This is an important target but it is questionable if such a high proportion of CSPs 
would have focused on this issue had the Home Office Minister Paul Boateng not 
urged them, in writing, to address this issue in their strategies (Phillips, 2002). 
Central government continues to offer a constraining context for the CSPs through 
guidelines, but most importantly, as I discussed in chapter two, through funding 
arrangements and the measurement of partnership performance, which raises 
questions as to whether or not government holds the 'purse strings' to the 
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partnerships. Constraints placed on CSPs by central government suggest a move to 
governance, rather than government. 
3.2 Partnerships, 'community governance'75 and the polycentric state? 
Crime and disorder, including the growth of CSPs, is arguably a politicised issue.76 
In particular, CSPs imply changes in the relationship between the state and civil 
society, which are theorised in a variety of ways. The 'systems failure' thesis 
suggests that specialised and differentiated institutions result in gaps in public 
service delivery (Crawford, 1997) because of a lack of co-ordination and a lack of 
responsiveness to problems as and when they arise. Thus, it is argued that 
partnerships, through joined-up working, will plug these gaps. 
The 'state overload' thesis suggests that the state can no longer cope with the scale of 
social problems, such as crime, and/ or public expectations, in its delivery of public 
services. Hence, the neo-liberal solution promotes greater individual and collective 
responsibility for services traditionally provided by the state, and the provision of 
services by private or quasi-private organisations in order to discourage dependence 
on the state. In terms of community safety, this necessitates active citizens and/or 
'communities' to take responsibility for local crime control (Crawford, 1997).77 
The 'dispersal of social control' thesis, popularised by Stanley Cohen (1979, 1985) 
suggests an extension of state power through the criminal justice system. It builds on 
7S Edwards and Hughes (2002) suggest that 'community governance' refers to 'community' 
involvement in local crime control and other kinds of public policy. 
76 Bradley and Walters (2002) argue that the growth of community crime prevention in New Zealand 
is a politically motivated response, not to the growing crime problem and perceived failures in the 
criminal justice system, but rather to an emerging neo-liberal political opportunity. Hence they view 
partnerships as politically effective yet tokenistic, and an example of 'window dressing' with little 
impact on outcomes. The political dimension to community safety, however, is perhaps an important 
but partial explanation of its growth (Crawford, 1997). 
77 This connects with Garland's (1996, 2000, 2001) concept of ' responsibilisation' and ' preventative 
partnershi ps'. 
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Foucault's (1977) research on nineteenth-century institutions in which discipline 
became the dominant mode of control. Discipline refers to individualised and 
moralistic soul training, hierarchical observation and 'normalisation', and is 
epitomised in Bentham's Panopticon, whose 'hub and spoke' model permits almost 
total surveillance, resulting in a self-disciplining dynamic. Cohen (1985) argues that 
discipline was transported from its institutional setting of the carceral and dispersed, 
through transcarceration, into wider society, creating a 'carceral archipelago'. 
Following Bottoms' (1983) criticisms concerning the non-disciplinary nature of 
widely-used sanctions such as the fine, Cohen (1985) revised his argument to suggest 
a dispersal of social control, rather than dispersal of discipline. He also argued that, 
instead of reducing the deviant population, transcarceration increased it through net 
widening (because more people are drawn into the criminal justice system), net 
strengthening (because punishment increased in intensity and had additional 
requirements), and the blurring of boundaries (between liberty and confinement, 
friend and controller) . 
The CSPs raise questions about the dispersal of social control; they may illustrate the 
co-opting of non-state agencies into the state machine and indicate how the 
boundaries between state and non-state agencies involved in crime control become 
blurred. Furthermore, performance measurement arrangements illustrate the 
panopticon-like qualities of the CSPs; there is a desire to surveille78 their 
performance and use this knowledge to improve, and possibly induce, an element of 
self-discipline amongst the CSPs. Thus self-discipline co-exists alongside an 
increasingly watchful central executive function, which causes Boyne (2000) to reject 
suggestions that we have moved to post-panopticism, in which there is believed to 
be an end to centralised state power. 
78 The word surveille is chosen deliberately to reflect the French title of 'Discipline and Punish', which 
is 'Surveille et Punir' . 
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The CSPs can also be theorised in terms of the simultaneous centralisation and 
decentralisation of the state. The last decade has seen more governance and less 
government, associated with the rise of the new public management approach to 
public services (Rhodes, 1996). Rhodes (2000) argues that governance was pre-
eminent at the turn of the last century, obsolete by the 1960s and re-invented again 
in the 1980s. The concept of government suggests that the nation-state monopolises 
power and the delivery of public services (Hughes, 2000b), whereas governance 
involves decentralised service delivery through local non-governmental 
organisations, coupled with centralised financial control. This suggests that the 
relationship between the state and civil society is changing; indeed, old notions of 
local and central government have become problematic. The central state no longer 
rows it steers79 the 'Good Ship Society' (Hughes, 2000b). 
Governance is manifested in "self-organising, inter-organisational networks" 
(Rhodes, 2000: 346), whose characteristics include interdependence between 
organisations based on trust and regulated by rules; these networks have some 
autonomy because they are not accountable to the state. CSPs might exemplify inter-
organisational networks because they require interdependence between 
organisations and have some autonomy from the state. However, they are based on 
legislation rather than trust. 
Governance suggests a polycentric state in which governance is more encompassing 
than government because it operates at multiple levels in society. Governance also 
suggests that responsibility for crime control (including community safety) be re-
located in local state and non-state organisations, communities and individuals. 
O'Malley (1992) describes this as 'private prudentialism',80 in which services 
79 Osborne and Gaebler (1992) suggest that steering concerns policy development and change, 
whereas rowing concerns service delivery. If government 'steers' and local organisations 'row', this 
suggests a smaller but stronger government, which controls the destination of the 'rowers'. 
80 O'Malley (2001a) suggests that he overstated his thesis about private prudentialism; in fact, 
developments are more complex and contradictory than he originally allowed. 
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traditionally provided by the state are increasingly paid for by private individuals, 
creating disparities between those who can and cannot afford to pay. O'Malley 
(1992) argues that 'private prudentialism' (alongside populist punitiveness) replaced 
'socialised actuarialism,' because it is reconcilable with the value placed on free 
market forces, in neo-conservatism. 
Instead of governance operating through individuals (as O'Malley suggests), or 
society (as it did in the past), Rose suggests that it operates through individuals in 
local communities; he believes this spells the death of the society as we know it, as 
society becomes a "dissociated group of ethical and cultural communities with 
incompatible allegiances and incommensurable obligations" (1996: 353). This process 
is seen in the transformation of security, for example, from a state responsibility to 
an individual responsibility of the active agent in a 'community'. 
Garland (1996, 2000, 2001) suggests that decentralised state power results in 
contradictory crime control policies, which simultaneously reinforce the power of 
the state and depend on local citizens and practitioners to provide crime control 
services. Garland also argues that high levels of crime in the post-war period (which 
he calls the predicament of crime control) forced the state to withdraw some of its 
claim to be the primary provider of security and crime control, but that this is not 
without political costs, which are remedied through evasive crime control polices 
(that is, through 'punitive segregation' or incapacitation, which expresses both the 
anger that crime evokes and re-asserts the power of state in tackling crime control). 
Strategies of crime control also adapt to the crime complex through preventative 
partnerships, which" share the responsibility for crime control and build a crime 
prevention infrastructure beyond the state" (Garland, 2001: 140). This relocating and 
redefining of responsibilities has resulted in a tendency to see the community as the 
panacea to the problems and the development of a 'responsibilisation strategy', 
which involves localised state and non-state organisations and actors in a "network 
of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and 
extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state" (Garland 2001: 124). 
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'Responsibilisation', like the dispersal of social control thesis, implies that the 
boundaries between citizens, 'communities', state and non-state organisations 
become blurred. Garland (2001) concludes that the most important lesson of the 
twentieth century is that responsibility for crime control must be shared between the 
institutions of civil society: 
Social and political theorists have long argued that effective government 
in complex societies cannot rely upon centralised command and coercion. 
Instead it must harness the governmental capacities of the organisations 
and associations of civil society, together with the local powers and 
knowledge that they contain. We are discovering - and not before time -
that this is true of crime control as well (Garland, 2001: 205). 
Garland's account has been widely criticised.s1 His Anglo-American focus, for 
example, means that he fails to appreciate the significance of European 
developments, which suggest that political authority is increasingly located in 
multiple sites of governance beyond the nation-state (Crawford, 2002b). Matthews 
(2002a, 2002b) suggests that Garland's account fails to examine the 'mysterious 
process' driving the changes he describes, that is, globalisation. 
Like David Garland, Lea (2002) emphasises the simultaneous centralisation and 
decentralisation of state power in relation to crime control. Global capitalism, 
however, is his starting point; he argues that it undermined the coercive and 
regulatory capacities of the state, causing it to seek other forms of de centralised 
coercion which operate alongside existing authoritarian approaches to crime control. 
He calls this 'debilitated authoritarianism' . 
81 Matthews (2002a, 2002b) critiques Garland's (2000):account: Matthews suggests that Garland's 
account is neither structural nor a genealogy, as promised; the depth of Garland's analysis does not 
match the level of abstraction and hence it fails to address the issue of globalisation; it lacks theory, 
concepts, arguments and a solid conclusion; the relationship between economic, social, political and 
cultural determinants remains unclear; it is pessimistic and replicates, rather than explores, 
limitations in the extant social control literature. See also Young (2002a, 2002b), Sullivan (2001) . 
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According to Lea, global capital accumulation and social cohesion move in opposite 
directions, which increases social problems and decreases the state's capacity to 
solve them. The middle classes are able to purchase their own security (and object to 
paying for the security of the poor), but the poor cannot; thus physical security 
becomes a private good rather than a universal provision, which he calls 'tactical 
sovereignty' . At the same time, since the state cannot address these social problems, 
due to public hysteria over law and order politics, the state suffers a crisis in 
legitimacy, thus facilitating repressive and seemingly well-justified criminal justice 
strategies. In sum, Lea argues that we are seeing the emergence of an authoritarian 
state, which is centralised and repressive, but also decentralised and connected to 
the 'community': 
Authoritarian centralisation absorbs autonomous and informal structures 
of regulation, discourse, processes of reinforcement and generation of 
norms into the mechanisms of state surveillance ... Decentralisation 
meanwhile undermines social citizenship with the ideology of the 
responsible individual, the customer and property owner as self-
managing their affairs (2002: 174-5). 
According to Lea, through purchasing security the' active community'82 is mobilised 
to protect itself from the disadvantaged poor. The community is also useful to the 
police and in partnerships, because of its local knowledge and ability to mobilise 
itself. 
Given the emergence of centralisation and decentralisation in the provision of crime 
control, one question that emerges is whether the state has become weaker or 
stronger. Edwards and Hughes (2002) suggest that there are three ways of 
interpreting recent developments in 'community governance', which operate in 
82 According to Lea, communities are not necessarily exclusionary, as they can be inclusive through 
restorative justice. Nor are they necessarily geographical communities; they can also involve private 
or semi-private property, such as commercial institutions, banks or transport systems. 
parallel. First, there are Neo-Marxist approaches which suggest that 'community 
governance' reasserts the sovereign authority of the state and strengthens its 
position, in order to further the interests of capital.83 The second interpretation 
suggests that the responsibility for goods, such as security, is genuinely devolved 
from statutory authorities to individuals and organisations in communities. In this 
sense the state's role in providing public services is weakened. The third 
interpretation suggests that partnerships represent a new model of participatory 
liberal democracy at the local level, which values pluralism and diversity and thus 
restores public consent to being governed. In this sense there is simultaneous 
centralisation and decentralisation of the state, whose power is simultaneously 
strengthened and weakened through multiple sites of governance. 84 
It can be argued that the state is weaker; it has promoted local autonomy and this 
may have fragmented and dispersed its power through multiple sites of governance. 
Whilst partnership responsibilities are outlined in the CDA and Home Office 
guidance, there is some flexibility in how they are interpreted by practitioners (see 
Tilley, 1993, for example). There may also be opportunities for emancipation and 
empowerment of local communities since, as Matthews (2002a) points out, 
responsibilisation can be bottom-up as well as top-down. If indeed the state is 
weaker, the current form of 'community governance' may not indicate a return to 
pre-modern forms of decentralised state power. Lea (2002) argues that, whilst 
current patterns of governance share some similarities to pre-modern governance, 
this is not a 're-medievalisation' because of important differences in these 
relationships. Governance is no longer bounded by the nation-state, for example; 
83 Stanley Cohen's Foucauldian thesis about the dispersal of social control also fits into this bracket, as 
he suggests that the tentacles of the state reach deeper and deeper into the social fabric, resulting in a 
more powerful state machine (1985). Cohen's thesis also alerts us to the possibility of the blurring of 
boundaries between state and non-state organisations and individuals. 
84 David Garland's concept of 'responsibilisation', fits into both the second and third of these 
interpretations of 'community governance'. This is because whilst Garland suggests the state has 
devolved responsibility for public safety (manifest in the 'preventative partnerships'), this is 
contradicted by antithetical attempts to reassert the power of the sovereign state, manifested in mass 
imprisonment. 
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rather it is bounded by the global economy, which is also the cause of government, 
at a distance. Hence Lea describes 'community governance' as a 'back to the future' 
phenomenon. 
However, it is also possible to argue that in steering, as opposed to rowing, the state 
is more powerful because it shapes the overall destination of local community safety 
practice. In addition, decentralisation co-exists alongside criminal justice policies, 
which reinforce the might of the state, through mass imprisonment, for example. 
Furthermore, whilst the state promotes autonomy it retains ultimate sanction and 
control, through government guidance for example, which may be more prescriptive 
than it appears (Gilling, 2003). This is also evident in CSP priorities, which appear to 
be influenced as much by government priorities as local priorities.85 Furthermore, 
the funding of CSPs remains centralised. 
It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion about which of the three interpretations of 
'community governance' is the most plausible, and the extent to which the provision 
of crime control has become decentralised. These uncertainties and complexities may 
also arise because the state did not govern with absolute control in the past 
(Crawford, 2001). In addition, whilst governance provides a framework to 
understand current developments in crime control policies, it also raises a number of 
unanswered questions about the novelty of the partnerships or the mechanisms used 
by the state to steer governance, for example. Consequently, I remain reticent about 
the implications of the partnerships for the demise of state power. The complexity of 
these relations, in practice, may reveal otherwise and thus requires closer 
examination. 
85 See my discussion in chapter two of the inclusion of domestic violence as a priority in partnership 
strategies. 
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3.3 The wider partnership context: Late modernity and the future of 
crime control 
In this section I explore changes in the economic, cultural, technological and social 
context of the partnerships86 in the post-war period, which cohere around the term 
'late modernity'. This is in order to provide a comprehensive account of the 
partnerships from the micro to the macro level, which is also in keeping with the 
methodological approach of my research (to be discussed in chapter four). 
Furthermore, consideration of late modernity is important because, as Garland 
(2001) suggests, it might underpin current developments in crime control. 
Economic changes 
In the post-war period there have been a number of economic changes affecting 
citizens and communities potentially involved in CSPs. De-industrialisation began in 
the 1970s and 1980s, industrial production collapsed, and the market was 
restructured into a service economy with a large number of low-skilled, feminised 
and part-time/temporary jobs (Bottoms and Wiles, 1996a; Taylor, 1999; Young, 
2002c; Office of National Statistics, 2004),87 The economy has also been affected by an 
increasingly international flow of capital and business with the emergence of global 
markets and numerous multi-national corporations (Bottoms and Wiles, 1996a). 
Income has been increasingly polarised, contributing to social inequality88 and the 
creation of the so-called 'underclass' who are multiply excluded and who have 
86 Political developments are also of significance to the partnerships but these have already been 
discussed in chapter one when I described the rise of neo-liberalism, communitarianism and 
managerialism. In addition, I have spent some time in this chapter outlining the politics of 
decentralised state control. 
87 For example, between 1983 and 2003 the percentage of men and women working in the 
manufacturing industry had fallen by 9 per cent. The largest increase (in male and female jobs) in this 
period was in financial and business services (Office of National Statistics, 2004). 
88 For example, during the whole of the 1980s (disposable) income inequality increased. This 
stabilised until the mid 1990s. In 2004, "the ratio of the share of the bottom quintile group (7.5 per 
cent) to that of the top quintile group (42 per cent) was 5.6, slightly higher than the ratio of 5.2 in 
1994/95 indicating a slight increase in inequality" (Office of National Statistics, 2004: 82). 
become the dangerous 'other', not only scapegoated for society's ills but also 
feared.89 There is also a spatial dimension to income polarisation; not only are the 
most impoverished symbolically separated by their material lack of resources, they 
are also spatially segregated into 'sink' estates (Taylor, 1999; Garland, 2001) . Those 
who can afford to leave these areas of deprivation do so. Such communities may 
pose particular challenges for the CSPs. In 'rust-belt' towns and cities, deeply 
affected by de-industrialisation, the CSPs may also run the risk, through the 
responsibilisation agenda, of "placing yet more strain on the backs of the most 
stressed, least affluent and least connected communities ... " (Hughes, 2000a: 283). 
At the same time, the post-war years have also seen the advent of mass 
consumerism; (immediate) consumption has come to represent an important route to 
happiness, resulting in multiple opportunities for consumption of goods, services, 
leisure and pleasure. This can be summarised as a kind of 'I think therefore I shop' 
mentality. Consumption (not production or working) becomes the central hub 
around which the world revolves (Lyon, 1999). Indeed it has become one of the 
defining aspects of late modernity, which extends beyond nation-states to affect 
global society. 
Consumption arguably becomes a means of conferring social identity, whilst the 
traditional social markers, gender or class, become less important, as "everything is a 
show, a spectacle, and the public image is all" (Lyon, 1999: 4) and "[w]e are what we 
consume" (Lyon 1999: 4). Mass consumerism is intrinsically divisive; the continued 
existence of capitalism means the division of the social spectrum into those who can 
and those who cannot consume. Bauman (1999) calls the latter 'flawed consumers', 
and they form a part of the socially excluded minority who exist at the margins of 
society and who are subject to increasingly repressive social control. This culture of 
consumption means that acquisitive crime, especially of socially desirable items 
89 Whilst the 'contented' and the socially excluded are portrayed as binary opposites, these two social 
groups may have similar values and aspirations acquired through the social institutions of society, 
such as the mass media, mass education, the criminal justice system and so on (Young, 2002c). 
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(such as mobile phones and/or laptops) might pose a particular problem for the 
CSPs. 
Cultural cbanges 
The late-modern world is also undergoing changes in the way risks are experienced; 
the management of risk and concomitant anxiety has become commonplace (Beck, 
1992; Giddens, 1990). Risk is experienced through the job market; Young (2002c) 
argues that post-Fordist, short-term contracts, longer hours and requirements for 
greater flexibility amongst employees generate insecurities over employment 
amongst the 'contented' and the socially excluded. Similarly, crime is a risk that 
needs to be routinely dealt with; both crime and fear of crime have come to affect the 
lives of the majority of people, even the liberal elites, which Garland calls the new 
criminological predicament, resulting in "a widespread fear of crime, routine 
avoidance behaviour, pervasive media and cultural representations, and a 
generalised 'crime consciousness'" (2001: 106). 
The increasing focus on risk might be explained by the emergence of the 'risk 
society' .9o Beck (1992) argues that the development of science and technology in the 
twentieth century unleashed a new set of risks,91 generating a sense of insecurity 
about the potential for risk in the future. These risks are global92 in their impact, such 
as the meltdown of one of the nuclear reactors in Chernobyl, for example. Beck 
argues that, despite increasing risk and decreasing direct experience of risk, we are 
less willing to trust experts' risk assessments, because their monopoly on scientific 
rationality has been broken by the many claims and counter-claims to safety. 
Knowledge about risk is filtered through the mass media. In sum, the risk society is 
90 Critics of the risk society thesis such as Furedi (1997) suggest that "proponents of the risk society 
thesis have added intellectual fuel to the moral panic over risk and safety" (d. Hughes, 2000a: 281). 
91 Beck defines risk as "the probabilities of physical harm due to technological or other processes" 
(1992: 279). 
92 Hughes adds that the global dimension to risk is not a new phenomenon, as global risks such as 
enslavement, opium addiction and colonization existed in the nineteenth century (Hughes, 2000a). 
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characterised by uncertainty about the present and future, and by nostalgia for the 
security lost. Risk society is both held together and torn apart by a 'commonality of 
anxiety' (Hughes, 2000a). 
According to Giddens (1990), the experience of risk is intimately connected to trust. 
In late modernity there have been changes in the sources of trust; localised, 
traditional and religious sources have been replaced by elective relationships and 
trust in abstract systems (and experts), and for some this has generated' ontological 
insecurity'. The emergence of globalisation also suggests that the world has become 
a more inter-connected and uncertain place. 
The focus on risk in late modernity is manifest in the CSPs. Community safety 
partnerships perhaps assuage anxieties or ontological insecurities over a wide range 
of crime and non-crime related issues (Liddle, 2001).93 Indeed, the wide-ranging 
concept of community safety could be pertinent precisely because it tackles a broad 
range of risks and fears, generated by ontological insecurities and the restructuring 
of environments of trust. Perhaps crime and disorder becomes a convenient location 
for displaced concerns and anxieties associated with the unsettling socio-political 
climate of late modernity (Hollway and Jefferson, 1997). Maguire (2002) argues 
further that CSP crime audits embody the preoccupation with risk in criminal justice 
policy; CSPs conduct audits in order to calculate, predict and map risks of different 
crimes across different areas down to the ward levet and to generate policy to 
reduce the risk of offending. 
Changes in the sources of trust could also affect inter-agency trust in the CSPs. 
Crawford (2000b) argues that in the CSPs, there is a new emphasis on contracts and 
audits, and hence trust becomes invested in formal procedures of surveillance, 
recording and monitoring. In addition, he argues that managerialism 
93 This seems plausible since there is little evidence to suggest that the CSPs have made a significant 
impact on crime and disorder (Audit Commission, 2002). 
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institutionalises distrust because it encourages competition and an intra-
organisational focus. Given both of these processes, he argues that trust is 
simultaneously more transparent, but more fragile and in need of reflexive 
monitoring by partners. 
Other significant cultural changes are increasing pluralism, multi-culturalism and 
increasing expectations about social rights, equality, inclusion and citizenship, which 
Garland (2001) calls the I democratisation of social life and culture'. This suggests 
that the CSPs have to pay attention to diversity within their citizenry, as well as 
addressing crime and disorder as a contested and potentially divisive issue. Finally, 
changes in families and parenting94 affect levels of parental supervision and informal 
social control of young people and possibly the capacity of adults to be involved in 
the CSPs. 
Technological c11anges 
Information technology, electronic communication and the mass media have been 
growing at a fast pace, and have had a profound impact on the way we live our 
lives. For example, the mass media provides new ways of communicating 
information about social expectations, thus making relative deprivation acutely 
apparent (Young, 2002c). The mass media is also a means of communicating 
information about risk (Beck, 1992), including the risks associated with crime, 
although the evidence is ambiguous as to whether the media heightens fear of crime 
(e.g. Sparks, 1992). On the plus side, however, technological developments increase 
governmental accountability (Garland, 2001) because of the possibility of 
government being quickly and easily thrust into the media spotlight. Hence, the 
partnerships may also have to manage their media image, through the appointment 
of public relations officers, for example. 
94 According to Young (2002c), there are more reconstituted, single-parent, dual-earning and 
'stressed-out' families. This is confirmed by social trend data. For example, in 1971, 92 per cent of 
families in Great Britain consisted of a married or cohabiting couple and their dependent children. 
This was figure was 73 per cent in 2002. In 2002, this figure was 73 per cent. See 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=819 
In addition, technological developments have facilitated the growth of increasingly 
sophisticated but repressive methods of crime control, such as the new methods of 
surveillance, for example CCTV and even more recently algorithmic surveillance, 
digital facial recognition systems (Norris and Armstrong, 1999) or electronic tagging. 
The CSPs thus have a wider range of crime prevention options available to them. 
These new technologies of crime control could be a double-edged sword for the 
CSPs, however, since they may have to strike a balance between security and 
freedom for some, and the loss of liberty and repression for others. Furthermore, as 
Maguire (2002) suggests that technology interacts with crime, criminals and 
criminologists. For example, perhaps partnerships will need increasing numbers of 
data analysts able to use increasingly sophisticated analytical techniques, in order to 
keep-up with the' data explosion' and requirements for detailed, local knowledge 
about crime and criminals. 
Social changes 
The post-war period has seen a crisis in masculinity and the gender order. Taylor 
(1999) notes the development of a 'protest masculinity', which aggressively colonises 
the streets. Mobile phone theft might be an example of this, as it is primarily a male-
on-male crime involving young people (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). Concerns 
about the aggressive colonisation of the street are expressed in anti-social behaviour 
legislation, for example, with the introduction of anti-social behaviour orders 
(ASBOs) and anti-social behaviour contracts (McHale, 2001). This implies that there 
could be political imperatives for the CSPs to address this type of behaviour. 
In the post-war period there has been a simultaneous emphasis on the contradictory 
and inter-related forces of localisation and globalisation. In pre-modern societies, the 
'local' was an important source of ontological security; in late modernity, although 
the 'local' remains a significant way of making sense of the world, its significance is 
arguably undermined by the process of 'time-space distanciation' (Giddens, 1990): 
that is, distances in time and space have become compressed, making the world 
seem like a much smaller place, as is evidenced clearly by advances in 
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telecommunications such as the Internet. The CSPs represent an example of 
localisation, given their locally nuanced remit and interpretation of policy,95 yet they 
simultaneously mark a global trend (Crawford, 1997, 2000a), since the partnership 
approach has gained currency across the world in New Zealand (Bradley and 
Walters, 2002), France (Crawford, 2002a; Roche, 2002) Belgium (Goris, 2001), 
Holland (Van Swaaningen, 2002) and the US (Thacher, 2001). 
The emergence of more governance and less government also suggests the creation 
of multiple social orders. Bottoms and Wiles (1996a) note that multiple social orders 
are exemplified by the emergence of mass-private property and quasi-public spaces, 
such as shopping malls or themes parks. The CSPs could also illustrate this tendency 
towards multiple social orders since they are another context in which order is 
maintained in a localised fashion. 
The future of crime control 
Various writers speculate, with varying degrees of pessimism and/or optimism, 
about the future of crime control. Garland (2001) for example, offers a pessimistic 
account, suggesting a new 'iron cage', not of rationality as Weber suggested, but of 
crime control, which will outlast the social conditions from which it originated and 
have enormous social costs associated with mass imprisonment. Others, such as 
Matthews (2002a) and Lea (2002) are more optimistic; they suggest that conflict, 
contradiction and competing interests could generate resistance to the 'iron cage' of 
crime control. 
These accounts suggest that community safety practice provides opportunities, as 
well as challenges and risks, and that there are three themes in the literature. First, in 
terms of community safety practice, community safety could provide an opportunity 
for agencies to merge different discourses and approaches to crime and crime 
95 See Crawford (2002a) for example, for a discussion of how the distinctive socia-political context of 
France has had a particular impact on community safety practice. 
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prevention. For example, in relation to the police and the probation service, Gilling 
envisages a "post-modern hybrid crime prevention agency, which shakes off the 
chains of its parent discourses and develops an alternative, more flexible structure 
which combines discourses and even develops new ones" (1993: 155-156). Such a 
hybrid might contribute to holistic understandings of crime96 and joined-up 
community safety practice. Holistic and joined-up practice could be dangerous, 
however, because blurred boundaries might result in 'buck passing' and the 
criminalisation of social policy.97 
Hughes (2000a) suggests that a wide conception of community safety is one way of 
re-thinking community safety in terms of social justice not just criminal justice, 
because it broadens the focus from crime to a wider range of social harms. This 
"subordination of questions of crime control to those of social justice may open up a 
new discourse of possibilities, beyond the current obsession with prevention, for all 
involved in the contested politics of community safety" (Hughes, 2000a: 294). 
Second, in relation to criminology, community safety could result in an increasing 
focus on the 'what works' paradigm and also the 'criminologies of everyday life', 
such as rational choice theory, in order to demonstrate effectiveness but also because 
of their pragmatism, simplicity and commonsensical nature (Hughes, McLaughlin 
and Muncie, 2002). These criminological approaches ignore structural factors, 
however. This could result in an intellectual struggle with other kinds of 
criminological theorising and possibly, according to Zimring (2001), the integration 
of different perspectives, so that there will no longer be different kinds of 
criminology. 
96 This is likely to be particularly challenging for the police, whose culture and values will have to 
change to incorporate community safety as an integral part of their activities, as well giving in to the 
'service ethic' (which it has resisted so far) and recognising the multi-cultural diversity of Britain 
(Newburn, 2002) . 
97 The criminalisation of social policy is when policies are introduced or projects funded because of 
their impact on crime and disorder, rather than the value of the policies per se. 
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Third, community safety has implications for society; the current trends in social 
control have led to pessimistic predictions about fortified enclaves, including gated 
communities and quasi-public spaces (such as shopping malls and theme parks, 
from which' flawed consumers' and' the other' are excluded, on the basis of actuarial 
risk calculations) juxtaposed against places of terror where the police do battle with 
the criminalised poor (Davis, 1990; Feeley and Simon, 1994; Shearing and Stenning, 
1985). Community safety could contribute to this spatial segregation. 
More optimistically, instead of contributing to social and spatial segregation, 
Hughes (2000a) suggests that community safety provides an opportunity for 
'progressive local governance', which combines top-down and bottom-up 
participation by the state as the coordinator of public service provisions, and its 
citizens, working in tandem, thus making up for the democratic deficit in the UK. 
This will be a re-awakening of civil society, based on a strong tradition of citizenship 
and social justice. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
The complex nature of inter-agency relations suggests that the partnerships are 
likely to operate in a joined-up but fragmented manner. That is, joined-up working 
practices are undermined by the operation of different occupational cultures, an 
absence of trust, and the operation of competition and power. This takes place 
within the broader context of tensions between central government and local 
community safety practitioners, such that the balancing of priorities is not an easy 
task, perhaps because community safety is a contested issue. However, whilst 
pressures from central government are not a new phenomenon, these pressures are 
likely to increase, given current funding and performance management 
arrangements. 
These tensions between partners, and between the partnership and central 
government, can be interpreted as 'community governance' in which the 
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government is both centralised and decentralised in its delivery of public services 
such as crime control. The government more or less steers the local community 
safety agenda, whilst encouraging local community safety practitioners and state 
and non-state agencies to do the rowing. At the same time, there are contradictory 
impulses towards populist punitiveness. Together, this creates uncertainties about 
whether or not the role of the state in controlling crime is strengthened and/or 
weakened. Finally, in order to provide a comprehensive account of the CSPs, I 
explored the relationship between the partnerships and their economic, cultural, 
technological and social contexts, as well as accounts which speculate about the 
future of the relations of crime control. 
3.5 Challenges faced by the partnerships 
In this and the preceding chapter I have reviewed previous research on the CSPs; 
this research can be usefully summarised into four challenges for the partnerships, 
which build on the research questions outlined in chapter one. Firstly, CSPs could be 
bureaucratic98 talking shops, which assuage fears and ratify decisions. Bureaucracy 
might slow down decision-making and implementation, but might also contribute to 
a lack of purpose, decision-making and implementation. Inter-agency relationships 
may also pose challenges for partnership processes. 
Second, the social context of partnerships could affect partnership processes and 
outcomes. Whilst the CDA attempted to create uniformity of practice between 
partnerships, this is unlikely given the impact of contextual factors, such as the local 
authority structure, the size of the city, the extent of social problems including crime, 
the partnership family group and so on. 
98 CSPs are bureaucratic because there are multiple subgroups and complicated funding 
arrangements (partly dictated by government). 
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Third, the lack of measurement of success99 so far means it is unclear if partnerships 
impact on crime and disorder and if the CDA 1998 has had the desired effect. Yet the 
legitimacy of the partnerships, and possibly their future, depends on proving their 
, success', particularly given increasing internal and external pressures to do so now 
that the 'honeymoon is over'. The complexities of measuring 'success' may be 
compounded by community safety practitioners lacking the necessary skills and 
knowledge (Gilling and Hughes, 2002) . Without information on success it is difficult 
to discern whether the partnerships add value: that is, if multi-agency partnerships 
are more effective than the agencies concerned working on an individual basis. In 
short, partnerships intuitively sound like a good idea, but there is little evidence as 
yet to support this assumption. 
Fourth, and related to this, given that crime appears to have multiple causes, it is 
assumed that 'many agencies are better than one' because of the benefits of joined-up, 
integrated and holistic community safety practice. Many agencies could also mean, 
however, that partnerships have to reconcile the different priorities of agencies, 
'communities' and central government, which could be a difficult task given that 
crime and disorder is a contested issue. These difficulties raise questions about: (a) 
who is responsible for community safety (b) tensions between partner organisations, 
central government and the 'community' (c) power relations and the locus of control 
underpinning the partnerships. 
In essence, these four difficulties can be summarised as: What do the partnerships do 
and how do they do it? What impact does social context have on the operation of the 
partnerships? How do partnerships 'know' that they are impacting on crime and 
disorder, rather than just acting as 'window dressing'? How do partnerships 
overcome the difficulties that arise from working in partnership, such as different 
organisational cultures and tensions with central government? 
99 'Success' can be measured in terms of processes, outputs and outcomes. It is the latter issue of 
outcomes which poses the greatest difficulty since there are potentially a range of factors to 
disentangle, in order to understand if and how a community safety initiative impacted on crime. 
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These four key problems structure the four empirical chapters in my thesis. Chapter 
five is the first empirical chapter; it describes the purpose, structure and processes of 
the partnerships. In chapter six I describe the social context of the partnerships and 
its impact on partnership processes. The descriptive nature of the first two empirical 
chapters provides a solid foundation for the remaining empirical chapters and 
conclusion. The dissertation thus becomes increasingly analytical and interpretative 
in its orientation. In chapter seven, I explore the measurement of partnership 
performance and in chapter eight I examine the assumption in the CSPs that 'many 
agencies are better than one'. In the next chapter, however, I describe the 
methodological framework and practicalities of the research. 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY 
For practical purposes, the kind of knowledge that is most useful is 
detailed, specific, local knowledge, focused on a particular problem or 
institution, or policy question and informed about the specific, cultural, 
political and penological circumstances that apply. The best studies of this 
kind are nuanced, subtle and complex; are able to see the phenomenon in 
all its complexity and yet at the same time clearly situate it within its 
social and historical context; and aim to unravel the details of its many 
determinants, dynamics and consequences. Typically works of this kind 
... utilize .. . interpretive pluralism ... rather than rely entirely on one or 
other interpretive framework (Garland, 1998: 385-6). 
4.1 Introduction 
Thus far I have explored extant research on the CSPs, from the micro to the macro 
level, in order to understand the practice and potential difficulties associated with 
community safety and its wider socio-political context and antecedents. In this 
chapter I outline how I researched the challenges faced by three CSPs. 
Garland's quotation above illustrates the methodological aims of the research. In 
briet within each of the three case studies, I employed a multi-method approach: I 
interviewed 58 practitioners, observed 31 meetings and examined minutes, agendas 
and other partnership documents. I also attempted to analyse police data relating to 
burglary in all three of the case studies.100 The three case studies selected were 
Cambridge, Birmingham and Lincoln, and fieldwork spanned roughly one year in 
each location. The time-line in Appendix 5 clarifies the order in which I conducted 
the fieldwork. 
100 See Appendix 4 for information on the data collected in each area. 
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To give a brief overview, in this chapter I firstly discuss the methodological 
framework of the research. Second, I discuss the selection of case studies and their 
utility for generalisations. Third, I discuss strategies of research and finally, I discuss 
the analysis of data. Appendix 6 provides a reflexive account of my experiences of 
conducting fieldwork. 101 
4.2 The research framework 
The research is situated primarily within two methodological frameworks. First, 
since I am interested in how existing knowledge (for example, from the Morgan 
Report) has informed and guided action,102 there was an evaluative component to 
my research, although as I discuss later in this chapter and also in Appendix 14, the 
evaluation of effectiveness was eventually excluded from the research because of 
difficulties with access to relevant police data and partnership information. 
The practice of evaluation103 is contentious and controversial in criminological 
research, yet it is also increasingly widespread (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Conducting evaluation is part of a desire to 'improve our lot' (Pawson and Tilley, 
1994, 1997), to understand which social programmes104 effectively address social 
problems with minimum effort and cost. Yet it may not live up to this laudable goal, 
possibly even undermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. The 
'nothing works' crisis of the 1970s, stimulated by Martinson's (1974) controversial 
101 Appendix 6 further explores the choice of case studies, negotiating formal access, the process of 
conducting interviews and observing meetings, including the challenges of being a young female 
researcher, relations with participants in my research, as well as some of the possible limitations of 
the research. 
102 Clarke (1999) uses this concept of studying effectiveness to define evaluation. 
103 The word evaluation is laden with different meanings, connotations and associations - it is an 
elastic concept (Clarke, 1999), which refers to a wide range of tasks and methods. For example, it 
tends to be associated with the government's emphasis on evidence led-practice; it also tends to be 
associated with the positivist paradigm and randomised control trials. Given its elasticity it is thus a 
problematic concept. 
104 Social programme refers to interventions aimed at ameliorating a particular social problem. They 
can involve the interplay of micro-, meso- and macro-level factors (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). CSPs 
implement social programmes, for example. 
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meta-analysis,lOS might be an example of this. The contentious nature of evaluation 
suggests that findings can be at best marginalised and at worse ignored, depending 
on the political climate. 
Bottoms (2000) argues that combining adaptive theory (Layder, 1998), the context, 
mechanism and outcome (CMO) configurations of realistic evaluation (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997), and quasi-experimental methods (most notably promulgated by 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) and Cook and Campbell (1979)) might improve 
criminological evaluative research and contribute to criminological theory, policy 
and practice. According to Bottoms (2000), adaptive theory provides a way of 
creatively combining quantitative and qualitative data, thus capitalising on the 
strengths of different approaches. 
Therefore, adaptive theory is the second methodological framework which 
structures my research. Adaptivel06 theory (Layder, 1998) is eclectic, synthesising a 
range of approaches, paradigms and epistemological positions. It fuses inductive 
reasoning with deductive reasoning; extant theory shapes data collection and, at the 
same time, theory emerges and is refined during data collection. Theorising is thus a 
continuous part of the research process. For example, the present research was 
shaped by extant research which indicated some of the challenges faced by the CSPs. 
These challenges structure this dissertation, providing a platform for refining 
existing research. 
Like the quotation by Garland above, 'adaptive theory' draws attention to the 
interconnections between human agency, social activities, organisations, structures 
105 Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue that the apparent failure of evaluation to live up to its promise of 
improving the quality of life is not attributable to programme failure; rather it is attributable to the 
inadequacies of experimental and/ or quasi-experimental evaluation. In addition, Martinson's critique 
applied only to treatment interventions; later research has suggested that interventions of this kind 
were more effective than was originally thought (Raynor, 2002). 
106 Adaptive theory is adaptive in two ways; theory adapts to accommodate research findings and the 
research process adapts and unfolds, according to theory. 
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and systems.107 This is because Layder (1998) considers social reality to be multi-
layered, containing objective and subjective elements, thus reconciling positivism 
and interpretivism. Adaptive theory "targets the multiplicity of forms of 
interconnections between social agency and social structure (or system elements). 
These elements are tightly bound together to form a complex and multi-faceted 
social reality" (Layder, 1998: 143). It therefore follows that adaptive theory advocates 
multiple strategies of research in order to explore the multiple layers of the social 
world. This maxim is followed in the present research. 
4.3 Choice of case studies 
The definition and value of case study research varies between academic disciplines 
(Platt, 1988). The term 'case study' refers to in-depth investigation of one or more 
naturally occurring cases. A case may be a person, a small group, a community, an 
event or an episode (Platt, 1988). According to these definitions a CSP constitutes a 
case. 
Case studies are useful for exploring micro-level social action. In the present 
research, understanding local community safety practice is an important means of 
exploring the uneven way in which national guidelines and legislation have been 
interpreted (Hughes, 1998). Case studies are also useful for exploring the impact of 
diverse contexts, for example, on community safety practice. This will help ascertain 
whether or not policies are transferable from one social context to another (Edward 
and Hughes, 2002; Stenson, 2002; Edwards, 2002) and prevent the creation of false 
universals108 (associated with 'what works', administrative criminology). 
107 This interest in systemic phenomena, as opposed to social action, indicates its affinity with critical 
theory, which centralises the analysis of power and domination in social research. 
108 Case studies also have the potential for false particularisations, and for this reason it is necessary to 
understand both localised detail and the national picture (Hughes and Edwards, 2002). 
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The accumulation of localised knowledge of the CSPs might also contribute to in-
depth understandings of the national picture of community safety. Case study 
research into community safety might also, through its synergy with macro-level 
socio-political developments, such as decentralised government and late modernity, 
contribute to criminological theorising. Hence, case study research is in keeping with 
the 'moderate objectivity' of adaptive theory, as it explores the complexity of the 
micro social world whilst contributing to understandings of structural factors. 
The value of case studies also relates to their generalisability. The present research 
does not generalise from a few CSPs to all CSPs; rather it contributes to 'lessons' for 
similar community safety settings.109 The central question is not whether one can 
generalize, but rather to what one can reasonably generalize. Generalisation of this 
kind requires in-depth, 'thick description'uo (Stake, 2000b) of the context of the case 
studies to convey when those 'lessons' might be relevant. Generalisation of this kind 
suggests that there is no single representative case, rather that the selection of cases 
requires systematised and strategic choices. Platt (1988) argues that researchers 
should consider the logical relation between the characteristics of cases and then 
devise an interpretation in keeping with its features, rather than generalising to 
larger numbers. 
Therefore, as Platt advocates, the three CSPs in the present research were chosen 
strategically and systematically, and interpretations are based on the features of the 
cases. Preliminary research began in Cambridge, which was chosen mainly because 
of its proximity and the relative ease with which I could begin my research. This 
preliminary work clarified the objectives of the research, and refined interview and 
observation schedules and techniques. In addition, this preliminary research 
highlighted contextual issues, such as two-tier local authority status, relevant to the 
research. 
109 Case study research might also raise questions for future empirical investigations. 
110 The context of the cases is described later in this chapter and also in chapters five and six. 
As discussed in chapter two, partnerships have been grouped by the Home Office 
into 'families' of 'similar' partnerships.111 Cambridge, the site of the preliminary 
research, is located in family ten. Family four was also of interest because of the 
possibility of including Birmingham as a case study; the reasons for this will be 
discussed shortly. Family four has the highest average crime rate of all family types 
(17.1 crimes per 1,000 of the population), the lowest is 3.1; family ten has an average 
crime rate of 9.8 crimes per 1,000 (Harper et al. 2002). 
Also, as is evident from a cursory glance at the CSPs included in each family group, 
family four is comprised of most of the major cities (with the exception of London, 
whose boroughs have been allocated primarily to families one, two and three) in 
England and Wales. This suggests that partnerships could be compared in terms of 
urbanism, although to some extent these issues are already taken into account by the 
family groupings. 
Since the local authority and police were designated as lead agencies by the CDA, 
local government structure is another potentially important contextual factor. Since 
the 1990s, central government has favoured the creation of single-tier unitary local 
authorities which co-exist alongside single-tier metropolitan boroughs, single-tier 
London Boroughs, single-tier Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish boroughs, and two-
tier county councils and district councils. 
It became apparent from existing research, such as Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a, 
1994b and 1994c) and policy documents such as the Morgan Report that different 
areas had varied community safety histories which might have affected the 
implementation of the CDA. Contextual differences between Scotland and England 
111 See Appendix 2 for a list of partnership families. 
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might also have impacted on community safety practice, although the inclusion of a 
Scottish case was not possible due to difficulties in securing access.112 
With these contextual issues in mind, I decided that the cases would be Birmingham, 
Cambridge, Lincoln and Glasgow. Birmingham was included primarily because it 
was a large city, but also because of its community safety history, which pre-dated 
the Morgan Report. Birmingham CSP was used as a model of good practice for 
community safety in the early 1990s; as a result of its Safer Cities initiative, it was 
cited in the Government Circular 44/90 and the Morgan Report, for example. At this 
time, Birmingham CSP was pioneering a new approach to crime which subsequently 
received political endorsement. I decided that it would be of interest to explore how 
the history of community safety in Birmingham impacted on its current structure. 
Cambridge was retained in the main body of the research primarily because I did 
not want to waste valuable data and information. In order to retain Cambridge CSP 
within the main body of the research, I re-interviewed some practitioners and 
excluded field notes from the first few meetings I attended. This was because my 
interview and observation schedules changed, as a result of these early experiences. 
By retaining Cambridge, Lincoln appeared to be the most obvious point of 
comparison because of its two-tier status and its inclusion in family ten (of the Home 
Office families). Finally, Glasgow was a potentially valuable case because of the size 
of the city, which made it comparable to Birmingham, but also because it was in 
Scotland. 
112 Scotland was of interest to me primarily because the CDA did not apply there and community 
safety appeared to be developing at a slower pace, hampered by difficulties with funding (Accounts 
Commission, 2000) . Comparisons between CSPs in England and Scotland could have been hindered, 
however, by differences in the way crime is recorded; the structure, purpose and philosophy of the 
criminal justice system; cultural and political differences, especially due to devolution and the growth 
of Scottish Nationalism; community safety in Scotland may have been influenced by developments 
elsewhere. See Appendix 6 for a discussion of difficulties with access. 
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In sum, by including Birmingham and Glasgow, England could be compared with 
Scotland. By comparing Birmingham and Glasgow with Cambridge and Lincoln, 
unitary local authorities could be compared with two-tier local authorities; large 
cities could be compared with smaller cities;113 and family 10 (Cambridge and 
Lincoln) could be compared with family four (Birmingham). Also, since Lincoln and 
Cambridge are in the same family group, it was possible to examine whether 
community safety was implemented differently in ostensibly similar areas. 
Having decided on these case studies, I then began the lengthy process of 
negotiating access with 'gatekeepers', who were normally either the chair of the 
partnership or key policy makers or community safety officers, and then with 
practitioners 'on the ground'. Formal access to Birmingham and Lincoln was 
granted, and I began my research, in Birmingham in November 2002 and in Lincoln 
in December 2002, whilst continuing my research in Cambridge throughout this 
period. After much negotiation,114 Glasgow CSP declined to be involved in the 
research because of concerns about restructuring and how it would impact on the 
research findings. For this reason, as well as the complications of comparative 
research and the pragmatics of time and resources, I decided to exclude Glasgow as 
a case study. Contextual information about Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln is 
summarised in the table below. 
113 With hindsight, had I known that Glasgow would decline to take part in the research, I might have 
included a medium-sized city such as Bristol, rather than Lincoln, to make my research of wider use 
(in terms of 'lessons' for other similar settings), At the same time, comparing two ostensibly similar 
cities like Cambridge and Lincoln allowed me to explore local interpretations of community safety. 
114 The issue of negotiating access to the CSPs, including Glasgow, is discussed in more detail in 
Appendix 6. 
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Table 4.1 Socio-economic contextual information, by area 
. ,,~. 
Partnership 
1. .:... ... ' r: ... "lIoo '", .- ... : 
" _ '. ~~ Cambridge Lincoln 
, . 
Population 977,087 
Local authority type Unitary (Met.) 
Family grouping 
Percentage non-white 
Percentage 
unemployed 
Percentage of the 
population claiming 
Job Seekers' 
Allowance 
Percentage of 
population claiming 
income su ort 
Rank of deprivationl15 
Rank of partnership 
4 
29.6 
5.7 
3.1 
10.3 
23 
for volume crime 2002- 35 
03116 
108,863 85,595 
Shire Shire 
10 10 
10.6 2.2 
2.3 4.2 
1.0 1.9 
4.3 7.9 
249 61 
75 91 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (2004), Home Office (2003a). 
National 
average 
NjA 
NjA 
NjA 
9.1 
3.4 
Unavailable 
Unavailable 
NjA 
NjA 
115 This is the rank of average ward scores. This figure ranks the population-weighted average of the 
combined scores (of measures of deprivation) for the wards in a district. There are a possible 354 
ranks; a rank of one indicates the highest level of deprivation. 
116 This information is from a letter from the Home Office dated 26 November 2003 and circulated at a 
meeting in Lincoln 11 December 2003. For more details see Home Office (2003a). The ranking of 
partnerships was based on 2002-03 crime statistics for vehicle crime, robbery and burglary in the 94 
partnerships with the highest crime rates. A rank of one indicates the highest level of volume crime. 
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Table 4.2 Recorded crime data, by area 
Offences recorded per 1000 of the population in 2003/04, by 
Offences 
rate 
% change 
rate 
% change 
Violence against the 24.1 9 24.6 6 32.1 3 
Sexual offences 1.4 3 1.2 -4 1.7 24 
Robbery 6.2 3 2.4 -18 1.2 0 
Burglary dwelling 30.8 3 24.8 -12 19.1 -34 
offences118 
Theft of motor 9.9 -4 4.8 -9 3.4 -21 
vehicles offences 
Theft from motor 14.1 -11 10.5 -20 11.5 -9 
vehicles offences 
Source : h ttp: //www.home o ffi ce . gov .uk/rd s/c rimeew03 04.ht ml 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that Birmingham is notably different from Cambridge 
and Lincoln. It is the largest city outside London, and it is a unitary local authority. It 
has high levels of deprivation in certain wards in the city, as well as high levels of 
ethnic diversity. Cambridge and Lincoln are more similar; both are small cities, 
university and old market towns and in two-tier local authority areas. Cambridge is 
more affluent than Birmingham and Lincoln, having recently benefited from the 
boom in the high-tech industry, although there are pockets of deprivation.119 
Compared to Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln are not ethnically diverse; 
Lincoln in particular has less diversity than the national average. 
117 The change in recorded crime is based on a comparison with 2002/03. To present a fuller picture, 
trends in recorded crime should be examined both short-term and long-term (Maguire, 2002) but 
these percentage changes are sufficient for the present table. 
118 The crime rates in this table are per 1000 of the population, except for burglary dwelling offences 
where, in order to present a more accurate picture, they are per 1000 households. 
119 Four of fourteen of its electoral wards are ranked within the top 2000 (of 8414) of the most 
deprived wards in England and Wales, on a range of deprivation indices. 
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In Birmingham, crime rates are generally above the national average. In Cambridge 
and Lincoln, most crime rates are below or on the national average with the 
exception of burglary. In a recent ranking of partnership crime rates by partnership 
area, the Home Office identified 94 CDRPs with the highest crime rates. Of the case 
studies in my research, Birmingham was ranked highest, followed by Cambridge 
and Lincoln. 
4.4 Strategies of research 
Interviews 
The purpose of the interviews was to understand the perspectives of community 
safety practitioners attending board meetings. In each case study I also interviewed 
the chairs of burglary and ASB subgroups. The purpose of these additional 
interviews was to understand the perspective of practitioners operating elsewhere in 
the partnership structure, in the belief that this might also inform the analysis of 
police data . 
The Vlews expressed by practitioners appeared to depend on their length of 
involvement in the partnership; the context of the interview (for example, the degree 
to which they believed their anonymity would be protected); the area; and their 
seniority. Existing research suggested that type of agency was also of importance 
(e.g. Blagg et al. 1988; Crawford, 2001; Edwards and Benyon, 2000). Hence I 
interviewed a wide range of practitioners; that is, most if not all who regularly 
attended the community safety board meetings. 
Most practitioners agreed to be interviewed, and all kept their appointments even if 
they had to be rescheduled. During the course of the research, only two practitioners 
declined to be interviewed. Interestingly, these two refusals were from the respective 
directors of Birmingham Voluntary Services and Cambridge Voluntary Services 
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because of work commitments.120 This was disappointing as it meant I could only 
speculate on the involvement or otherwise of the voluntary sector in the 
partnerships. 
All the interviews121 lasted approximately one hour, although this also depended on 
the time each interviewee had available. The interviews were semi-structured and 
involved an interview schedule which asked a series of open-ended questions which 
I followed more or less in order. The key themes in the interview schedule were roles 
and responsibilities, decision-making, implementation, external pressures, outcomes, 
the impact of the CDA and the future of the partnership.122 As my research 
progressed, the interview schedule changed slightly; the topic of training and 
professional development, for example, became of less priority (relative to other 
topics). Initially, I asked questions about this topic only if there was enough time 
during the interview; eventually the topic was dropped altogether. 
The interviews were tape-recorded and I also took notes during the interview.123 
These field notes acted as summaries of interviews and substitutes for transcripts, on 
the few occasions when the tape-recorder failed to record the interviews. Each 
interview was transcribed, primarily by myself, but also by a professional typist,124 
120 The issue of access 'on the ground' is discussed in more detail in Appendix 6 
121 I viewed the interviews not only as an opportunity to explore practitioner perspectives on 
community safety, but also to get a sense of the context in which they worked. For this reason, I 
would try to arrive a little early to interviews, observing comings and goings, as I waited. I recorded 
these observations in my field diary. 
122 The interview schedule is included in Appendix 7. 
123 Notes from the interviews were particularly useful because I was careful to make sense of them by 
inputting them into my computer as soon after the interview as possible. 
124 The typist was instructed to exclude irrelevant utterances or repeated words. In addition, the typist 
was familiarised with the research topic, she was given a brief outline and verbal explanation of my 
research, as well as a list of key words and their abbreviations. 
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Observation of meetings 
The purpose of observing partnership meetings was to record and explore 
interactions between agency representatives and the degree of correspondence 
between interview and observational data. I observed board and subgroups 
meetings, in particular those related to burglary, ASB and the community safety 
teams. Information about the frequency, length and number of attendees is included 
in chapter five. 
Of the four ideal-typical roles described by Burgess (1984),125 I chose the 'participant 
as observer role'; the observer does not conceal that they are observing research-
participants, and their role as an observer takes precedence over their participatory 
role. This role was appropriate since my research was not covert nor was I an active 
member of any of the partnerships. When attending meetings, I consciously tried to 
blend in as much as possible so that my appearance and demeanour was in keeping 
with that of others attending the meeting. I employed the same strategy when 
interviewing practitioners. In meetings, I would rarely speak unless, for example, I 
was asked about my research or to introduce myself. 
By arriving early to each meeting, I would position myself to maximise my view of 
the room. Arriving early and/ or delaying my departure from the meeting also 
allowed me to introduce myself to attendees. I also used this time to request an 
interview, if appropriate, and observed informal interactions between participants. 
Before attending meetings, I read information such as the minutes, agenda and 
supporting papers. This enabled me to follow the direction of discussion in meetings 
whilst observing interactions and keeping in mind the research questions. 
Preparation of this kind, though crucial, was not always possible, as I did not always 
receive the paperwork in advance. I received papers in advance, from Cambridge 
125 The other three ideal types are complete participant, participant as observer and the complete 
observer. See Burgess (1984) for definitions of these roles. 
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CSP on most occasions, but only two or three times (out of seven) in Lincoln and 
Birmingham. 
During each meeting I was able to make copious notes, as did many other 
representatives attending the meeting. My field notes126 were firstly comprised of a 
seating plan, which served as a reminder of who was there. Fortunately most 
meetings began with each attendee introducing themselves; hence I knew the names 
and agencies of most. In my field notes I had a section for each topic of discussion 
(based on the agenda), and I wrote down the initials of the attendee each time they 
spoke, and a synopsis and/ or significant statements. I also noted the length of time 
spent discussing each topic, if a decision was taken and if so who instigated that 
decision. At the end of each meeting, I would summarise the meeting, highlighting 
issues relevant to my research questions. 
Documents 
Documents were used to explore historical developments of the partnerships, in 
particular the impact of the CDA. The documents used depended on what was 
available. In all the partnerships I examined strategies and audits for 1998-2001 and 
2002-2005, although in Lincoln the documents were not available for 1998-2001.127 
In addition, where possible, I examined minutes and agendas from previous 
partnership meetings, including those prior to the CDA. In Cambridge I scanned 
into my computer minutes and agendas from CSP meetings dating back to 1996. In 
Lincoln, I had minutes from some subgroup meetings but few for board meetings. In 
Birmingham, practitioners were unable to locate similar documents; hence I relied 
on unpublished128 research on community safety conducted between 1991 and 1996. 
126 Appendix 8 contains field notes for a CSP meeting. The names of the partnership and individual 
speakers have been changed to protect anonymity. 
127 See Appendix 9 for a summary of these strategies. 
128 The research was conducted by Mark Liddle on behalf of the Home Office, but was not published 
because of the sensitive nature of the findings . 
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This report provided an interpretation of the historical context of community safety 
in Birmingham. 
The lack of overall consistency between partnerships, in the documentation I 
acquired, raised questions about the value of systematic analysis. Difficulties in 
accessing partnership documents appeared to be symptomatic of difficulties with 
management and storage of partnership information. Practitioners were unable to 
find the documentation I required, either because they did not know where it had 
been stored by their predecessor or due to moving premises. 
Police data 
Access to police burglary data required negotiations (in addition to those with 
'gatekeepers' to the CSPs and with community safety practitioners' on the ground') 
with the relevant police forces: that is, West Midlands Police, Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary and Lincolnshire Police. In all areas this was a lengthy and arduous 
process, given the sensitive nature of the grid-referenced data that I required.129 
I originally intended to examine the impact of the partnerships on burglary and ASB. 
ASB incident data were too problematic, however, because there was no specific 
category for ASB, rather there were a number of categories used as a proxy for ASB 
incidents, such as the disorder13o category. These categories were also overlapping, 
which suggested that ASB incidents might not have been accurately recorded 
perhaps due to a lack of conceptual clarity. Aside from difficulties with 
conceptualisation and recording practices,131 the incident data I requested were 
extremely large, making them cumbersome and complicated to analyse. 
129 I also requested address information for victims (in order to examine repeat victimisation) and 
offender information but this made it even less likely that my data request would be granted. 
130 Police analysts tended to use this incident category as a proximate measure of ASB when 
presenting reports to the partnerships. 
131 Analysts in all three police forces acknowledged these difficulties. 
For these reasons, it seemed reasonable to exclude the analysis of ASB from my 
research, and I decided to focus on the impact of each esp, through the schemes 
they implemented between 1998 and 2001, on burglanj. I intended to use spatial data 
analysis132 to examine this issue; Bowers et al. (2003), for example, suggest 
techniques for measuring the impact of crime reduction initiatives. In order to 
examine the impact of burglary reduction initiatives on burglary, they compared 
burglary rates in census output areas,133 where burglary reduction initiatives took 
place, to (a) another comparable census output area, in terms of the number of 
households and its socio-demographic characteristics; (b) the rest of the ward; (c) the 
rest of the police force area. Their analysis also took into account repeat victimisation 
and different kinds of displacement. 
In order to conduct similar kinds of analyses I required grid-referenced police 
burglary data, and specific information about where and when burglary reduction 
projects were implemented. I failed to access any burglary data in Lincoln134 and 
information about where and when burglary initiatives were implemented in all 
three areas. This calls into question the validity and meaning of any kind of analysis 
on the impact of partnerships on burglary. The difficulties I experienced might also 
suggest that practitioners had limited knowledge about the 'success' of the 
partnerships, which I discuss in chapter seven. 
132 In order to carry out this analysis, I learned about spatial data analysis through reading and 
attending courses in the Geography Department. I also learned how to use ArcGIS software, through 
on-line tutorials. I also discussed my research with 'experts' on burglary and spatial data analysis, 
such as Andrew Costello, Ken Pease and Tim Coupe. 
133 Census output areas replaced enumeration districts in the 2001 census. 
134 In Birmingham, I accessed grid-referenced data and victim address information but only on police 
premises. In Cambridge, I accessed grid-referenced data for use on my own computer, but not victim 
address information. 
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4.5 Qualitative analysis of interview transcripts and observation of 
meetings 
Coding the data 
Interview transcripts and field-notes from my observation of partnership meetings 
were analysed using NVIVO.135 Through coding, the analysis explored themes in the 
data. The completed coding schema can be found in Appendix 10. There were two 
stages to the coding process. During primary coding, I coded six interview 
transcripts from senior police and local authority representatives,136 two from each 
of the case studies. The transcripts also included a balance of male and female 
interviewees. In order to enhance the validity of the coding categories, through inter-
rater reliability, my supervisor and I both coded the six transcripts. Before I coded 
the transcripts I re-read my review of the existing research and reminded myself of 
my research questions and interview schedule. I also supplied my supervisor with 
copies of the challenges faced by the partnerships, as well as my original research 
questions and a summary of my research. 
As a result of this coding process, there appeared to be five main coding categories 
or nodes, which were equivalent to the four potential partnership difficulties137 
identified at the end of chapter three, as well as a miscellaneous category. These five 
main nodes could also be divided into sub-nodes. The themes developed by my 
supervisor were broader and incorporated positive as well as negative aspects of 
partnership processes. For example, she suggested that I include a node to represent 
positive connections between partners, and another node which drew an analogy 
135 I used NVIVO rather than analyse the data manually because of the savings in time and effort, as 
once the data was coded it was easy to retrieve the required information. 
136 I chose transcripts from interviews with senior police and local authority because these are the lead 
agencies in the partnerships and thus likely to have an overview of the partnerships. 
137 In brief, the four challenges were (i) clarity of purpose, structure and processes, (ii) relationships 
with the wider partnership context (iii) measuring performance (iv) 'many agencies are better than 
one'. 
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between practitioners and naval personnel. Without her suggestions, my analysis 
would have missed important themes and findings. 
During secondary coding, I merged the nodes developed by my supervisor and I, 
sub-categorised them, and added to them by re-examining nodes developed in 
previous research138. This re-examination of previous themes revealed I had missed 
a few nodes, such as whether the partnerships were joined-up and different 
occupational cultures. I also sub-categorised nodes by browsing139 through the data 
for each. As a result, I added sub-nodes such as community consultation, specific 
examples of decision-making and room for manoeuvre around government 
constraints. I drew a conceptual diagram to represent the nodes and sub-nodes, and 
drew arrows between them to indicate possible links. This diagram was a useful 
aide-memoire throughout the analysis. 
The coding process was still not complete. I inputted the nodes I had developed so 
far into NVIVO, giving each one as precise a definition as possible. Then, using these 
nodes, I coded three strategic partnership meetings, one from each partnership, all of 
which took place in September/October 2003.140 The purpose of coding these 
meetings was to check whether the nodes were valid and also to add to them if 
necessary, especially since I had yet to code any partnership meetings. Hence I 
remained open to the emergence of new nodes and/or sub-nodes, which I added 
and defined as I coded the meetings. 
At this point, I was satisfied that the nodes were as complete and accurate as 
possible, and I began coding all interview transcripts and field-notes. However, I 
138 I coded data from Cambridge in March 2003 for a conference presentation and to provide the 
partnership with feedback. 
139 Whilst browsing through the data, I realised that when coding, the excerpts should be long enough 
to retain contextual information but not so long that important information was lost. 
140 I selected three meetings from the same month, September 2003, because they would be more 
likely to be discussing similar issues than three meetings from different points in time. 
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also continued to add nodes, sub-nodes and connections between nodes. The nodes 
added included: use of crime data, performance management, how information 
should be divulged to the I community', the size of the partnership, publicising 
positive news. By 1 April 2004 I had coded all interviews and meetings. 
Analysis and writing 
Whilst analysing and writing my thesis, I was guided by Wolcott's (1994) principle 
of balancing description, analysis and interpretation. Description addresses the 
question of what is going on; it is about letting the data speak. Analysis identifies 
essential features and systematically examines similarities and differences in the 
data. Interpretation refers to meaning and context; it extends the analysis by 
drawing implications and inferences. Separating these processes was a way of 
varying their emphasis in the research, although this is not to say they are pure, in 
fact, they are inter-related. Separating these processes strengthened my analysis and 
writing because description formed a foundation from which to build the analysis 
and interpretation. 
The chapters were written in the order that they appear in the thesis. Chapters five 
and six are relatively descriptive, providing a basis for the rest of the thesis. The 
analysis in chapters seven and eight was comparative in nature; it was both 
horizontal, drawing comparisons across three different partnerships, as well as 
vertical, comparing partners from different agencies within each of the three case 
studies. These comparisons were also intended to be systematic, in order to look 
beyond an individual or case, perhaps to other similar partnerships: 
The key to comparison ... lies in uncovering I systematic relationships'. 
That is the challenge, but that does not seem to be what researchers 
customarily do. Instead, they endlessly catalogue similarities and 
differences, meeting the letter but not the spirit of comparison, often 
leaving the reader with the question we most hope will not be raised 
about our efforts, ISO what l? (Wolcott, 1994: 183). 
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The comparison of views across case studies and agencies was facilitated by NVIVO 
since it allowed me to search the coded data by theme, agency or partnership. I used 
these search tools to write notes for each chapter. These notes consisted of bullet 
points for each theme in the chapter; underneath, I summarised each speakers' 
views141 by case study, and 'cut and pasted' relevant quotes or excerpts from 
NVIVO. In Appendix 11 I have included a sample of the notes used to write part of 
chapter five, although speakers' initials have been altered to protect their anonymity. 
The chapters and their themes were determined by challenges facing the 
partnerships, identified at the end of chapter three. Whilst writing the notes for each 
chapter, a node(s) would normally (although not always142) correspond to a sub-
theme in a chapter. I would read through the data for this particular node, 
partnership by partnership, summarising the views of each interviewee or 
meeting.143 Whilst summarising partners' views, I would also sub-divide a chapter 
theme into sub-themes, by speaker and by partnership. 
Once I became more adept, I was able to summarise views by sub-theme, 
partnership and speaker/meeting initials. When making these notes, quotations that 
appeared typical or atypical were 'cut and pasted' into the notes from NVIVO. 
Unusual views, either summaries or quotations, were coloured orange, and 
interpretations were put in square brackets. Once I completed the chapter notes I 
would return to the beginning and use these notes to determine what I wrote. I 
would subsequently move on to the next chapter and follow the same process. 
When writing, I ensured interviewees' initials were removed from the document and 
I would indicate instead the area and/or agency to which they belonged. In 
141 I always included speakers' initials. 
142 Each theme in the chapter sometimes drew on information from other nodes. 
143 My notes included the initials of each interviewee, or initials which abbreviated the partnership 
meeting. 
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partnerships where I interviewed only one individual from a particular agency, I 
cited only the name of the case or the name of the agency.144 For example, where I 
write "Interviewee, Cambridge" or "Youth Offending Service representative", this is 
to protect interviewees' anonymity. 
4.6 Quantitative analysis of observation of meetings 
Coding and creating tbe database145 
Since interactions between participants and themes in partnership meetings were 
explored qualitatively, as I have just described, the purpose of the Access146 database 
was to address neglected research questions and aspects of my field-notes. For 
example, what was the average length of meeting, number of attendees and number 
of agenda items? Which partners attended regularly? How much community safety 
experience did partners have? Which topics were most commonly discussed? Which 
partners talked the most and on which topics? How much decision-making took 
place and who were the key instigators of decisions? Therefore the database 
included, by partnership and by meeting, information about the length of meeting, 
who attended, the decisions taken and by whom, how many times each individual 
spoke in the meeting, and on which topic. 
The database was created through trial and error. With these questions in mind, six 
relational tables, and a form through which to enter data, were created. Field-notes 
from one meeting were entered into the database, and simultaneously amendments 
to the database were made; for example, automatic drop-down menus were added 
and the decision-maker field was changed to include both initials and agency type. 
144 My decision as to whether or not to note the agency or case depended on which was most relevant 
to the analysis and writing. 
145 The Access database was created with the assistance of my good friend and colleague, Rebecca 
Foreman. 
146 Access is used to analyse relational data; it creates a series of interlinked tables. It is possible to run 
queries on the data in Access, or tables from the database or queries can be exported into Excel and 
SPSS for further analysis or graphing. 
Another two meetings were then added and a few queries were run, in order to 
determine whether it would produce the required information. In its final form, it 
consisted of eight interlinked tables, which were amalgamated into one form (with a 
series of sub-forms) for inputting the data. See Appendix 12 for a sample of the form 
used to input the data for each agenda item in each meeting. 
In order to create the database, agencies and topics discussed in meetings were 
coded into categories; otherwise this information would have been too specific to 
examine general patterns: for example, about police behaviour or key topics 
discussed in each meeting. Topics discussed were coded when the database was 
under construction, using a similar process to the coding of qualitative data which I 
described above. A list of topic categories were developed, based on three meetings 
inputted in the early stages of constructing the database, but others were added as 
the rest of the data were entered. I identified 31 topics discussed in partnership 
meetings; see Appendix 13 for a list of these. 
I also had to categorise attendees at meetings into agency categories. Initially, these 
categories were too specific; there were 52 in total. Later in the analysis, I collapsed 
these agency categories from 52 to 10, in order to make the findings more 
understandable. For example, police representatives were initially divided into six 
different categories (Assistant Chief Constable, Analyst, Police Authority, 
Commander, Local Authority Liaison Officer and Other) and these were collapsed 
into one category of police. See Appendix 13 for a list of agency categories. 
An additional table in the database contained information about attendees at the 
meetings, such as name, initials and agency. To this table, I added information 
gleaned from interviews and coded in NVIVO about their length of involvement (in 
months) in the current partnership, in multi-agency partnerships and community 
safety generally. This table was later exported to SPSS and used to calculate partners' 
length of involvement in CSPs. 
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Analysis 
The analysis of the data contained in Access was primarily descriptive and 
exploratory, based on frequencies, averages and cross-tabulation. Data from the 
Access database were exported to Excel and SPSS in order to calculate these figures 
and produce graphs, if it was not possible in Access. 
4.7 Chapter summary 
In sum, my research contains an evaluative component and it is situated within the 
methodological framework of adaptive theory, which views theorising as fluid, 
social reality as having multiple dimensions and encourages multiple strategies of 
research. Hence, interviews, observation, documentary analysis and analysis of 
police data were chosen to explore the challenges faced by the CSPs, which were 
identified in chapter three. Three CSPs were selected because of the comparisons 
they facilitated, for example between different family groupings, large and small 
cities. 'Thick description' of the context of these cases suggests that generalisations to 
other similar areas would be possible. 
In practice, analysis of documents and police data became too problematic to 
accomplish because of difficulties with access to data and relevant information. The 
research thus relied on information gleaned through interviews and observation of 
meetings. Interviews and observational data were coded and analysed using 
NVIVO, in order to draw out key themes relevant to the problems of partnerships. 
Observational data were additionally analysed in Access, using simple descriptive 
statistics. The purpose of this was to provide a different perspective on issues not 
fully explored qualitatively. 
In chapter five, I descriptively examine partnership priorities, structure and purpose. 
Chapter six is also descriptive; it explores partnership context and its impact on 
partnership processes. The description in these two chapters contributes to the 
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formulation of 'lessons for other settings', and provides a foundation for the 
remaining analytical and interpretative chapters seven, eight and nine. 
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CHAPTER V: CLARITY OF PURPOSE, STRUCTURE AND 
PROCESS 
I think there's a fundamentally sensible approach in ... the Crime and 
Disorder Act ... which says you must work together to do things to reduce 
crime. I think the difficulty comes pretty soon after that however, simply 
in role definition, and even this debate about what are they called, and 
what are they; are they crime and reduction disorder partnerships, or are 
they community safety partnerships? (City Council representative, 
Birmingham). 
This quotation suggests that, in the cases in the research, partners were unclear 
about the purpose, structure and processes of the partnerships. The aim of this 
chapter is to explore these themes. I firstly describe the structure of the partnerships 
- for example the role of subgroups and the community safety team - as well as 
difficulties noted by practitioners with this structure. Second, I describe partnership 
meetings: their length, frequency, levels of attendance, and topics discussed and by 
whom. Third, I compare interview and observational data in order to explore the 
key, minor and absent agencies, and how newness to the partnership affects these 
relationships. Fourth,147 I examine practitioners' descriptions of the decision-making 
process and the locus of decision-making. In relation to implementation, I examine 
practitioners' descriptions of the delivery process and its effectiveness. I return to 
this theme in chapter seven on measuring performance, when I compare 
practitioners' perceptions of the effectiveness of implementation with police data (or 
lack of it). 
147 I do not examine the processes of auditing and strategy development because they have already 
been examined in previous research: see Philips et al. (2002) and Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000) . 
119 
5.1 Structure and size 
Figure one, in chapter two, illustrates a typical partnership structure. Strategic 
partnership boards had an overview and made 'strategic'148 decisions about funding 
allocation or partnership priorities,149 for example. A community safety team and 
subgroups normally supported each strategic board. Lincoln had an unusual 
structure because it had two practitioners who supported the strategic partnership 
but, unlike Birmingham and Cambridge, it did not have a community safety team as 
such. This unusual structure appeared to be a consequence of its prior involvement 
in the Safer Cities initiative; I explore this issue in more detail later in this chapter. 
Typically subgroups were based on partnership priorities; there was a level 1 
subgroup for each priority and a level 2 subgroup for sub-priorities. 
Tlze subgroups 
In all three partnerships, the subgroups were described as relatively autonomous. In 
Birmingham and Cambridge there were six subgroups, and in Lincoln there were 
three.1SO In some meetings, strategic matters were remitted to theme group leaders 
for action. Delegation of this kind was considered sensible, since the board meetings 
were intended to be strategic. 
Despite their' autonomy' from the partnerships, it was unusual for subgroups to 
have large budgets of their own.1Sl In all three areas, practitioners suggested that 
subgroups bid for funding from the partnership for agreed community safety 
projects in accordance with partnership priorities, which might imply that they 
148 During the research I was unclear, indeed I remain unclear about what 'strategic' means. Strategic 
implies that the board is directing partnership activities through discussions and the formulation of a 
plan, which raises questions about whether or not the board is 'talking' rather than 'doing' . The term 
also appears to imply an ethos of managerialism. I continue to use the word for ease and also to 
reflect practitioners' views. 
149 The table in Appendix 9 illustrates the priorities of each partnership in 1998-2002 and 2002-2005. 
150 A local authority representative from Lincoln said that the partnership reduced the number of 
subgroups to three in 2002-2005, in order to simplify the structure and bureaucracy of the partnership. 
151 Subgroups in Birmingham had £40,000-50,000 at their disposal. 
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lacked autonomy. In addition, the Chairs of level 1 subgroups in Birmingham and 
Lincoln attended strategic partnership meetings and provided regular progress 
reports. Subgroup Chairs tended to be members of the Local Authority and Police, 
and the Youth Offending Service.152 
When asked about the role of the subgroups in the partnership, practitioners in all 
three areas mentioned decision-making and implementation. One interviewee 
suggested that the partnership board took strategic decisions, whilst other decisions 
were taken operationally by the subgroups: 
[T]he strategic leaders are only ever going to have the options about one 
or two key decisions ... So the CDRP sits as a strategic group, but it says 
the strategy is that we will attack along these seven strands which is the 
plan. These seven strands will have seven commanders, and we will 
resource these commanders to this level ... the targets are reduce 
whatever, OK, green light, go (Police representative, Birmingham). 
It was intimated by others, however, that decisions taken by subgroups were subject 
to the approval of the strategic partnership board, which again creates uncertainties 
about their 'autonomy'. 
In terms of implementation, questions were raised as to whether or not individual 
agencies, rather than the subgroups, implemented community safety initiatives. A 
police representative in Cambridge, for example, suggested that subgroups claimed 
that police activities were the work of the subgroup, not that of the police. I will call 
this 'community safety plagiarism'. A different kind of 'community safety 
plagiarism' appeared to occur because the partnership appropriated existing 
community organisations and incorporated them as a subgroup. The activities of this 
community organisation then became viewed as partnership activities. I will call this 
152 Because theme group chairs did not attend strategic partnership meetings in Cambridge, I am 
unclear from which agencies they were drawn. 
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'community safety appropriation'.153 It was unclear whether or not community 
organisations appropriated by the partnership would have continued, regardless of 
the partnership, thus making the board superfluous. 
The relationship between the strategic partnership and its subgroups was not always 
clear-cut, particularly in Cambridge. In a board meeting, a Local Authority 
representative questioned whether the subgroups were advising the partnership, or 
the partnership was advising the subgroups. This representative argued for the latter 
position; the partnership should use crime data to focus subgroups on relevant 
issues. Indeed, in Cambridge relations between the board and its subgroups were 
viewed as in need of improvement; a number of approaches were tried and tested,154 
but difficulties appeared to remain. For example, it was reported that a subgroup 
member recommended the community safety strategy to a member of the 
community safety team; this was paradoxical given that the community safety team 
wrote the strategy. 
In Birmingham, a subgroup Chair suggested that relations between subgroups and 
the strategic partnership were nominal, but other partners disagreed. On the surface, 
it appeared that there were structures to facilitate communication between the 
subgroups and the strategic partnership. The strategic partnership regularly received 
subgroup progress reports and action plans for approval; in addition, subgroup 
chairs attended meetings. In Lincoln, communication was facilitated by subgroup 
chairs attending strategic partnership meetings. 
153 There was some evidence of community safety plagiarism in Birmingham and Lincoln but not 
community safety appropriation, but my research focused on the board not the subgroups. 
154 According to a local authority interviewee, initially subgroup chairs attended board meetings but 
found it was not the best use of their time. Members of the community safety team then took 
responsibility for specific subgroups. This did not work either, as subgroup leaders felt that they did 
not understand the board's decisions and that the board remained distant. The system changed again: 
subgroup leaders met quarterly, and each subgroup had a mentor from the board (normally from the 
same organisation as the subgroup chair) and from the community safety team. 
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In Lincoln, partners were happy that the subgroups functioned as they should. In 
Birmingham and Cambridge, however, practitioners were sceptical about whether or 
not subgroups contributed to community safety. A Birmingham subgroup, for 
example, experienced difficulties because of its diverse remit and a lack of capacity; 
interviewees noted that none of the statutory agencies owned its priorities and these 
priorities were also poorly integrated. In Cambridge, a consultant from NACRO was 
hired to re-structure one of its subgroups. 
The discussion so far about the' autonomy' of the subgroups, difficulties in relations 
between the board and the subgroup, and community safety plagiarism and 
appropriation highlights uncertainties about the relative contribution of the 
subgroups and the board to community safety. 
The community safety teams 
In Birmingham, the community safety team, 'the hub', was composed of five policy 
officers, a communications officer, two administrative staff, two police officers and a 
manager who were, with the exception of the police officers, paid and housed by the 
city council. During fieldwork, a Community Safety Programme Manager was 
appointed to ensure that community safety was delivered on budget and on time. 
The Programme Manager and his team were housed on different floors but in the 
same building as the community safety (policy) team. Attempts to merge these two 
teams were resisted. 
In Cambridge, the Community Safety Team, the 'Officer Support Group' (OSG), was 
comprised of a representative each from the Police, Local Authority, County Council 
and an administrative officer. In Lincoln, for much of the fieldwork there was no 
community safety team as such. A Police Local Authority Liaison Officer155 and a 
voluntary sector representative (who was a retired police officer), provided 
155 For a time, there was also another police officer, who line-managed the LALO, but moved to a 
different post about halfway through the fieldwork. 
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partnership support. The latter fulfilled a similar role to that of a community safety 
manager. 
When asked about the role of the community safety team,156 interviewees in 
Birmingham, particularly from the team and the city council, emphasised that the 
team were policy officers, not community safety experts, whose primary function 
was policy development, not the delivery of community safety initiatives: 
We're not a community safety unit ... we're the partnership development 
team within the policy development division, ... the people working in 
this area have got a background in policy work, and we're not community 
safety experts ... we're not operational, we're not service. We were 
brought together to facilitate the partnership to operate, and that's very 
different from people's expectations that we have budgets, that we can 
offer guidance and expertise on technical things ... We might know 
somebody who does, but it's not us, we're actually servicing the 
infrastructure (Community safety team member, Birmingham). 
Other interviewees had different expectations; they expected the community safety 
team to be driving the community safety agenda and to be more involved with 
delivery. 
In Birmingham, other practitioners also viewed the community safety team as a 
resource to be shared and owned by partners; they were a source of knowledge on 
best practice, monitoring and evaluation, and operationalising ideas and concepts. 
To an extent, the OSG in Cambridge were also viewed as a specialist guide and 
source of knowledge on best practice, whilst not being full members of the 
partnership. Partners also stressed their administrative role, for example in 
facilitating decisions and implementation, as well as joining-up the partnership. In 
156 Since there was no community safety team in Lincoln, it was difficult and perhaps irrelevant to ask 
interviewees about its role in the partnership. 
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essence they were viewed as the do-ers and the people that worked between 
meetings, as well as drafting the strategy and audit: 
[T]hey are not kind of the decision [makers]... they don't have the 
accountability for the decisions, but they in effect do a lot of the work that 
makes the partnership tick and run; so they are the people who have 
physically written the strategy and they give advice to the board and kind 
of manage the agenda for the board (City Council representative, 
Cambridge). 
When interviewees in Lincoln commented on the two community safety support 
staff, they described them as administrators, do-ers and joining-up the partnership. 
In a different way to Birmingham, interviewees in Lincoln157 and Cambridge also 
viewed the community safety team as having a co-ordinating role in the partnership 
structure; they acted as a conduit through which information flowed between the 
strategic partnership and its subgroups, as well driving those decisions through to 
the delivery stage. 
Interviewees also expressed concerns and criticisms about the community safety 
teams. In Birmingham and Cambridge, partners from the local authority, DAT and 
PCT were uncertain about the role of the team. An interviewee in Birmingham, for 
example, was unclear about the kind of support offered by the community safety 
team, which contrasted with attempts by the community safety manager to 
encourage partners to make use of the resources offered by the team. In 
Birmingham, this City Council representative also believed that the team was not 
meeting the needs of the partnership: 
157 The views offered by interviewees in Lincoln were prospective, as partners looked forward to the 
appointment of new members of staff to the community safety team. 
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So there is a lack of clarity about what they are there to do, but what they 
are doing is useful .. . I think it is about clarifying roles ... in a sense what 
we've got there is imposed upon us and not something where we've been 
joint-party to working out what we need ... we're not being offered a 
support service, we're being offered a restricted service, it's service led 
rather than customer led (City council representative, Birmingham). 
In Cambridge, there was uncertainty about what each member of the OSG 
contributed to the group. Interviewees commented that the role of the OSG in the 
partnership was based on a loose arrangement, without clear definitions of roles. 
This contributed to tensions amongst the OSG, because each member of the team 
had a different understanding of their job, derived from each of their respective 
organisa tions. 
Another concern raised about the community safety teams was that they were 
perhaps too small and lacked capacity. In Birmingham, for example, a city council 
interviewee suggested that the team was small in relation to the size of the city. He 
compared the team to that of a London borough where he had recently worked, 
which had a team of thirteen (compared to Birmingham's team of approximately 
ten) to service the borough with a population of 200,000 (compared to Birmingham's 
population of over 1 million). In Cambridge, concerns over capacity were tied to the 
impending workload associated with the self-assessment procedure instigated by 
the Home Office. 
Concerns about a lack of capacity in the community safety team were expressed 
most forcefully in Lincoln: one interviewee made it very clear that the partnership 
lacked a middle tier in its structure and so there were no officers to drive the 
partnership. He argued that the absence of a community safety team resulted in long 
meetings, because they covered both strategic and administrative issues. He 
suggested the middle-tier was trying to be the top-tier (rather than the top-tier trying 
to be the middle-tier). 
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Other interviewees explained that the absence of a middle-tier or community safety 
team was a consequence of the history of the partnership. After the Safer Cities 
initiative ended in the early 1990s, the group was reformed into a registered charity 
called Urban Challenge (housed by the city council); many of its directors were those 
who had been closely involved in the Safer Cities initiative. When the CDA was 
enacted, Urban Challenge (on behalf of the city council) became the secretariat for 
the subgroups, and the manager of Urban Challenge became a key player in the 
partnership. At the time of the CDA it was believed that this was the easiest way in 
which to 'kick-start' the partnership, although in the longer term it made 
relationships and the sharing of the workload perhaps more difficult (compared to 
other neighbouring partnerships, which had a dedicated community safety team). In 
particular the city council appeared to have offered limited support. 
However, the impending retirement of the community safety manager, at the end of 
the fieldwork, prompted change; the partnership decided to create a new secretariat 
post (funded by the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund), to support both the CSP and 
the LSP. This person was to add to the growing community safety team comprised 
of three posts each of which addressed youth crime, ASB and domestic violence. The 
team was housed in city council premises: 
I think capacity issues is an issue ... the LCRE is being expected to hit so 
many targets and coordinate so many initiatives without a proper 
secretariat, it was a nonsense from the start and it put a lot of pressure on 
a lot of organisation to give a lot in kind, which was clearly a drain on 
those organisations' resources ... I think we're starting to identify now a 
hub of people who will help to support and guide the LCRE in a much 
better way (Interviewee, Lincoln). 
In sum, Birmingham and Cambridge had longstanding community safety teams, 
whilst the team in Lincoln remained in an embryonic stage of development. In 
Birmingham the team developed policy and were viewed as a resource and source of 
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knowledge, but in Cambridge and Lincoln the team fulfilled administrative duties. 
In all three areas, there were confusions amongst partners about the exact role of the 
team in the partnerships, as well as concerns about their lack of capacity, especially 
in Lincoln. 
The Chair 
In each of the areas the selection of the chair varied.158,159 Since its inception, the 
partnership in Birmingham had been chaired by the Chief Executive of Birmingham 
City Council; this was partly because for many years the city council had a strong 
role in community safety, and also because the Chief Executive was believed to be 
the most powerful attendee. In Cambridge, the Chair was rotated around the 
partnership, although in practice it swung primarily between the city council and the 
police. At the end of my research, when a new Chair was appointed, nominations 
were slow to arrive. This implies that partners were reluctant to take the position, 
presumably because of the heavy workload involved. In Lincoln, the police chaired 
the partnership until the start of the fieldwork, when a new Chair was appointed 
from the city council. Views were mixed as to whether the Chair should be rotated. 
Some felt that it should be rotated amongst the statutory partners, although not to 
the county council because of its countywide remit. Others were less sure that the 
chair should be rotated, since not all partners had appropriate resources or skills to 
perform the role. 
There were similarities across partnerships and amongst interviewees in views about 
the role of the chair in the partnership. The themes were firstly, that the chair was a 
leader, someone able to speak with authority on behalf of the partnership, as well as 
steering the partnership in order to achieve partnership objectives. Second, the chair 
158 Coincidentally, at the start of fieldwork, each partnership had a new chair; in Birmingham and 
Lincoln the partnership was chaired by a representative from the city council and in Cambridge by a 
representative from the youth offending service. 
159 The word chair should be written in lower case when referring generally to the duties of a 
chairperson, but the word chair should be capitalised when referring to a specific chairperson (Trask, 
1997). 
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was able to facilitate positive connections with other community safety structures 
such as the DAT, and more importantly joining-up different agencies (with different 
agendas and working practices) and resolving tensions. In this way the chair was 
seen to be crucial in developing team working and trust between agencies, and 
drawing together a large and diverse agenda. Third, partners suggested that the 
chair should possess personal qualities (such as commitment, interest and 
enthusiasm for community safety) communication skills (in order to facilitate 
discussion in the meetings and negotiate between partners) and an ability to focus 
on the most important issues. Fourth, practitioners also suggested that the chair 
should possess skills related to chairing meetings, such as being well prepared; 
having a tight control of the agenda and the time available to discuss the issues; 
allowing everyone sufficient opportunity to air their views; as well as being able to 
politely ask someone to shut up. 
One of the most notable differences between Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln 
was that partners in Birmingham saw the Chair as facilitating the delivery of 
outcomes by monitoring performance and celebrating achievements, as well as 
holding partners to account by asking them challenging questions about their 
progress. The Chairs were not described in this way in Cambridge and Lincoln. 
Structural difficulties 
Size 
Interviewees in Lincoln and Cambridge described the partnership as small, whereas 
interviewees in Birmingham described it as large. The following table shows the 
average number of people attending the partnership, as well as the minimum and 
the maximum, during the year of fieldwork in each area. The table also includes 
information about the population of each city in order to place the number of 
partners attending the strategic partnership meeting in context. 
Table 5.1 Number of attendees at partnership meetings160 
~~<!'",.J~"",,~l~~J-.o'I 
• , _ .'. 'I:: Ca 111 bridge Lineol n ~ .,;.:; ~~ (N=8) (N=7) Attendees 
Total for all 
CSP 167 104 73 
meetin s 
Average 23.9 13 lOA 
Min 21 10 9 
Max 29 16 12 
Population 977, 087 108,863 85,595 
This table shows that on average Birmingham had the largest number of attendees at 
strategic partnership meetings. 
In Birmingham, some practitioners were in favour of a smaller partnership in order 
to strike a balance between exclusivity and large unmanageable meetings. This issue 
arose in a number of meetings; for example, after the partnership I away day' (which 
considered restructuring the partnership), the Chair mooted the idea of a smaller 
partnership, but this was never approved during fieldwork. A city council 
interviewee, however, had resigned himself to the expansion of the partnership; he 
argued that once other agencies realised the partnership was a 'good thing', they 
would also want to be a part of it. 
The size of the strategic partnership meeting in Birmingham had two main 
consequences. First there were practical difficulties; during discussions, attendees 
had to wait for their turn to speak, by which time the discussion had moved on to 
another topic. Also, there were difficulties in remembering who everyone was 
(despite having introductions at the start of every meeting) and being able to see 
160 These figures do not take into account those partners who were nominally involved, for example 
those who were listed as partners but rarely attended meetings. 
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everyone in the room. Second, there were many perspectives to be reconciled, which 
necessitated longer meetings. 
Purpose and priorities 
In Birmingham, partners were especially concerned that the purpose of the 
partnership was unclear. Two interviewees claimed not to understand the purpose 
of the partnership, other than to produce a strategy and audit: 
[W]hat's my role in the partnership? I find it really difficult to define 
because I don't understand what the partnership is. I don't understand 
what the role and the function of the partnership are. I know we have the 
strategy ... but then beyond that, what are the priorities, who's 
responsible for leading on those, how are they developed, how do they 
link into the localised strategies and development? All of those things I 
don't understand, I don't know. (Interviewee, Birmingham). 
Another interviewee suggested that the partnership lacked direction: 
What are our priorities in this partnership, because currently it's like a big 
tanker, isn't it, drifting on the sea of social issues, and everybody can see 
it, but nobody really knows where it's going. You stand on the seashore 
and you see this huge ferry going by, and it says community safety on it, 
and somehow it gets bigger every time you see it, but you have no idea 
really where it's coming from, and where it's going (Member of the 
community safety team, Birmingham). 
Hence, the partnership 'away day' considered the purpose of the partnership and 
decided that there was a need for partnership priorities to be more focused . The 
-
partnership eventually decided on four key priorities161 (compared to the six that 
appeared in the strategy). 
Cambridge also appeared to lack focus in its priorities. Like Birmingham, Cambridge 
had a facilitated discussion about its priorities, although unlike Birmingham this 
discussion was in order to improve relations with the subgroups. This lack of focus 
in partnership priorities could be part of a strategy to avoid tension and 
disagreement, a theme to which I return in chapter eight; by including many 
priorities the partnership addressed the agendas of many different partners but to 
the detriment of prioritisation. 
A lack of focus in partnership priorities was less of a concern for partners in Lincoln, 
perhaps because it had fewer priorities, fewer subgroups and fewer attendees than 
the other partnerships. Three interviewees did suggest that the partnership could be 
more focused, although this might have excluded some partners. 
Bureaucracy 
Interviewees, particularly in Birmingham and Cambridge, were concerned about 
three kinds of bureaucracy. Firstly, bureaucracy associated with the partnership 
itself; interviewees in Cambridge recognised the potential for endless subgroups and 
increasing numbers of meetings. On joining the partnership in Birmingham, one 
police representative was baffled, for a number of months, by its bureaucracy: 
When I first took over I really just didn't understand how the whole thing 
worked; it was as if I didn't recognise the city that I'd worked in for a 
number of years, and the first two or three months ... I just unravelled 
structures and systems that had emerged over time ... it was like a ball of 
spaghetti really. Couldn't track decisions, couldn't relate expenditure to 
161 These four priorities were victims; young people (as victims and offenders); clean, safe and public 
reassurance; and offender management. 
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outcomes, decisions in the past lacked transparency as to how they came 
about, and it somewhat alarmed me (Police representative, Birmingham). 
Second, partners were concerned about the bureaucracy associated with government 
office (and central government). In Cambridge, for example, it was estimated that 
the self-assessment procedure alone would account for 50 per cent of the time of the 
OSG over the coming months. Interviewees also commented that they were expected 
to go through lengthy bureaucratic procedures in order to secure small amounts of 
money, despite attempts by the Home Office to reduce bureaucracy, such as through 
merging funding streams. 
Third, a police representative in Birmingham was also concerned that the 
partnership was influenced by the bureaucratic approach of the city council. Indeed 
another interviewee compared the city council with Russia: 
I mean, you're dealing with organisations here that are incredibly large, 
we were described in a peer review earlier this year as Mother Russia ... 
we have to change our minds towards something that's much more 
geared to saying ... what actual difference have we made, to one person 
out there. Because if we haven't made any difference to one person out 
there then ... there's no point in meeting, otherwise we just reconstruct 
another set of bureaucratic procedures and structures (City council 
representative, Birmingham). 
This interviewee emphasised that partnerships need to focus on delivery. In all three 
partnerships, commissioning was considered to be one way of facilitating delivery. 
In relation to community safety, commissioning involves encouraging organisations 
to bid for money, in order to provide a particular service or meet a particular need 
and normally in keeping with partnership priorities. Commissioners (the 
partnerships) determine the aims and expected outcomes of the project, as well as 
any monitoring and evaluation requirements. Money is then allocated to the best 
bid. 
This approach was already employed by the DATs and the LSPs but it was unclear 
why it was not favoured by the CSPs, especially given the increasing managerialism 
associated with Third Way politics. A government office representative suggested 
that this approach might be employed by the CSPs in the future. Other practitioners 
in all three areas were also in favour of this approach, as it meant they could find the 
'best' organisation to meet partnership priorities. 
5.2 Meetings 
The table below shows the average length of strategic partnership meetings in all 
three case studies; in Birmingham and Cambridge the average meeting length was 
approximately 2.5 hours, in Lincoln it was 1.5 hours. This table also shows the 
average time period between meetings;162 Birmingham met approximately every 2 
months, Cambridge met approximately every 2.5 months and Lincoln met 
approximately every 1.5 months. 
Table 5.2 Meeting length and time between meetings. 
~ Cambridge Lincoln 
Average (mins) 161.1 162.5 99.7 
Minimum (mins) 151 136 67 
Maximum (mins) 170 210 143 
A verage time period 65.5 77.3 49 between meetings (days) 
162 See Appendix 5 for a time-line of the research. 
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This table suggests that meetings were longer and less frequent in Birmingham and 
Cambridge, and shorter and more frequent in Lincoln. 
The following tables (5.3, 5.4 and 5.5) indicate not only the levels of attendance163 at 
each meeting but the agencies164 represented. The columns refer to each meeting 
(number 1-7 or 1-8 in the case of Cambridge) and the rows refer to agency categories. 
In Birmingham, regular attendees were the city council, community safety team, 
police, probation service and the youth offending service. The irregular attendees 
were elected members, the PCT and the fire service. In Cambridge, the regular 
attendees were the city council, the PCT, the probation service and members of the 
community safety team. In meeting four the fire service began attending meetings on 
a regular basis; however, at this point the voluntary sector and county council 
stopped attending. In Lincoln, the only regular attendees were the city council and 
the police. The irregular attendees were the fire service, the youth offending service 
(YOS), voluntary sector, the probation service, the county council and the PCT. 
163 Attendance at meetings does not necessarily indicate anything about involvement in the 
partnership. I explore the involvement of partners later in this chapter. 
164 When the data were originally entered, agencies were coded into 56 different categories; however, 
these agencies were compressed into 9 categories. 
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Table 5.3 Attendance at Birmingham Community Safety Partnership (BCSP) strategic partnership 
meetings by agency category 
City Council 5 6 7 4 6 5 5 
CS team 4 6 4 3 3 2 4 
Elected member 1 1 1 
Fire 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other 9 5 4 7 5 5 4 
PCT 2 1 1 1 1 
Police 6 4 5 5 6 5 4 
Probation 1 1 1 1 1 1 
YOS 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Total 30 27 27 26 29 27 29 
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Table 5.4 Attendance at Cambridge Community Safety Partnership (CCSP) strategic partnership 
meetings by agency category 
City Council 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
County Council 1 1 1 1 
CS team 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 
Fire 2 2 1 1 2 
Other 2 1 3 4 1 
PCT 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Police 2 2 2 2 2 5 1 4 
Probation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Voluntary 1 1 1 
YOS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 14 14 18 20 17 18 17 22 
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Table 5.5 Attendance at Lincoln Crime Reduction Executive (LCRE) strategic partnership meetings 
by agency category 
City Council 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
County Council 1 1 1 1 
CS team 1 1 1 1 1 
Fire 1 1 1 1 1 
Other 3 2 2 5 2 3 3 
PCT 1 1 
Police 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 
Probation 1 1 2 1 
Voluntary 1 
YOS 1 1 
Total 12 12 12 16 15 16 18 
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During the interviews practitioners were asked about the length of their experience 
in the current partnership, and community safety generally. Averages of this 
information are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, by agency type.165 Overall, there 
were few similarities between cases; that is, local variation perhaps depended on 
individuals rather than just the organisation to which they belonged. In 
Birmingham, members of the community safety team had the longest average 
experience of the current partnership, whilst the PCT had the shortest. 
Representatives from the city council and police were similar. 
In Cambridge, the probation service had the longest average length of experience of 
the current partnership and the fire service had the least; this is unsurprising given 
that the fire service began attending the partnership only in meeting four. The city 
and county council representatives166 had similar lengths of experience, which were 
more than the police. In Lincoln, on average the city council had the longest 
experience of the partnership, after which members of the community safety team, 
the county council and police had similar amounts. The probation service had the 
least experience. 
Whilst some agencies had little experience of the current partnership, they had 
lengthy experience of community safety generally. For example, representatives 
from the fire service in Lincoln had only eleven months' experience of the current 
partnership, yet they had approximately 6.5 years' experience of community safety. 
In Cambridge, the police had the most experience of community safety. In 
Birmingham the probation service had the longest average experience of community 
safety. These variations between agencies and between cases, in terms of experience 
165 In order to ensure that estimates of experience were fair, averages were based on the time between 
the date of the interview and the last interview in the research (on 2 February 2004). 
166 The figure for the county council was perhaps an over-estimate because it was not adjusted to take 
into account when an individual stopped attending the partnership, as this representative did in 
meeting four. 
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of community safety, might contribute to differing interpretation of the CDA and 
subsequent legislation. 
In order to examine the kinds of topics discussed in meetings, they were coded into a 
number of categories,167 and the frequency with which they occurred across all the 
partnership meetings was counted and recalculated into a percentage of all topics 
discussed in all meetings, in each partnership. The findings are summarised in 
Figure 5.3, which indicates variation between cases in the topics discussed with 
greatest frequency, during my observation of meetings. In Birmingham the most 
frequently discussed topic was performance monitoring; this includes progress 
reports given to the partnership by theme group leaders at each meeting. In 
Cambridge the most frequently discussed topic was money allocation and in Lincoln 
it was items of information for partners or administrative matters, for example 
decisions about who was to attend conferences. 
Figure 5.3 also indicates that crime data and intelligence were regularly discussed 
only in Birmingham. This was unsurprising as there was a subgroup dedicated to 
this topic. On first glance, Birmingham and Lincoln appeared to discuss performance 
monitoring more than did Cambridge, but this was perhaps because subgroup 
progress reports168 were included in the performance-monitoring category. As I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, Cambridge did not have subgroup progress 
reports in partnership meetings. 
167 The topics were given a primary and secondary code. The primary code reflected the overarching 
nature of the discussion and the secondary code reflected the more peripheral aspects of the 
discussion. For example, a discussion about money allocation might specifically focus on money to be 
allocated to burglary reduction; in this instance, the primary code was money allocation and 
secondary code was burglary. Figures 5.3 and 5.6-5.8 were derived from the primary codes. 
168 Questions were raised by interviewees about the quality of these reports, which I explore further in 
chapter seven 
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Figure 5.3 Frequency with which topics were discussed in all strategic partnership meetings, as a percentage of all topics discussed. 
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In sum, the three most frequently discussed topics in strategic partnership meetings 
in Birmingham were performance monitoring, crime datal money allocation and 
partnership structure. In Cambridge the three most frequently discussed topics were 
money allocation, information only and administration, and performance 
monitoring and structure. In Lincoln, the three most frequently discussed topics 
were information only and administration, performance monitoring, and money 
allocation. The focus on structural issues by Birmingham and Cambridge might be 
explained by the structural changes that were underway, discussed earlier in the 
chapter. These findings also suggest that Cambridge and Lincoln were more focused 
on processual issues rather than outcomes, compared to Birmingham. This might 
indicate that the partnership in Birmingham was better informed about its impact on 
crime. 
In order to examine which agencies spoke most frequently on which topics, Tables 
5.6-5.8 summarise speaking interactions169 across partnership meetings, by agency 
category and by topic of discussion. These tables support the findings above about 
the most common topics discussed in board meetings.170 On the surface, the tables 
indicate that the police, the city council and the community safety team dominated 
most discussions, which suggests they may be the key players in the partnerships. 
However, since the chair spoke most frequently during meetings, these findings 
might reflect the agency he or she represented. This appeared to be the case in 
Birmingham, as city council representatives used the greatest number of speaking 
169 Speaking interactions refer to the number of times an individual participates in a particular 
discussion. During observations of meetings, I noted the initials of each person as they spoke; each set 
of initials was then summed for each topic of discussion. One difficulty with this measure is that it 
does not take into account the length of time for which an individual spoke. 
170 In Birmingham and Cambridge representatives spoke most on the topics of performance 
monitoring and money allocation, respectively. In Lincoln, however, representatives spoke most on 
the topic of money allocation, rather than information only and administration. Perhaps this was 
because information only or administration appeared not to require extensive discussion and so, 
despite this being the topic that appeared most on agendas, there were few speaking interactions. 
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interactions and the Chair was from also from the city council. However, it was not 
the case in Cambridge, as the police used the greatest number of speaking 
interactions, but the Chair was from the YOS, not the police. The remaining 
interactions were fairly evenly distributed between the YOS, city counciC 
community safety team and the probation service. Lincoln was more similar to 
Cambridge than to Birmingham, as the police representatives used the greatest 
number of speaking interactions and the remainder were distributed between the 
city council, the community safety team and other agencies. 
In addition, whilst Tables 5.6-5.8 suggest that the police, the city council and the 
community safety team dominated most discussions, speaking interactions do not 
take into account the number of attendees from each agency. Thus the tables may 
simply reflect that there were more city council representatives at the meetings, 
rather than that the city council dominated discussions. 
Weighting the data to reflect the number of attendees from each agency and the 
agency the chair represented might address these difficulties. This might, however, 
go beyond the limitations imposed by the data. Despite the caveats, these findings 
are interesting, moreover, because (like speaking interactions) decision-making, 
discussed below, was more evenly shared between partners in Cambridge and 
Lincoln (compared to Birmingham). This might suggest that board meetings in 
Cambridge and Lincoln were more of a shared activity than those in Birmingham. 
Another interpretation might be that Cambridge and Lincoln lacked a clear leader. 
Table 5.6 Counts of speaking interactions by agency category and topic category in Birmingham. 
AOB 13 1 5 2 1 22 
Audit 9 3 1 1 7 21 
Crime datal 104 14 5 1 2 84 18 6 234 
Internal presentation 26 2 I I 10 15 5 58 
Intro/ apologies 1 3 14 
Mins/ matters arising 23 2 5 18 12 11 141 
Money allocation 47 16 2 3 11 114 11 11 185 
Performance 
, 150 121 4 39 4 68 12 18 316 
Structure 186 19 5 7 53 10 1 182 
Youth 6 3 9 
Process 6 3 2 2 13 
Delivery 7 7 
Other 2 1 I I 13 
Info only or admin 11 2 2 12 I 117 
Social issues 13 3 1 3 11 I 121 
Violent crime 3 1 2 13 I 19 
Total 507 86 122 68 9 1262 156 I 31 11042 
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Table 5.7 Counts of speaking interactions by agency category and topic category in Cambridge. 
AOB 121 10 19 3 3 14 11 26 87 
Arson 8 4 1 17 2 34 3 2 71 
Audit 1 1 1 3 
Ext presentation 2 8 2 10 1 4 10 37 
Internal presentation 3 2 0 1 4 3 7 13 I I 10 I 70 
Intro/ apologies 2 14 16 
Mins/matters arising 13 13 6 16 19 120 177 
Money allocation 113 12 71 4 5 19 108 152 198 1482 
Performance 
t 38 78 3 2 6 112 31 1 32 303 
Structure 30 13 4 2 7 33 12 31 132 
Process 21 19 3 24 13 1 121 1 101 
Info only or admin 7 3 9 7 9 1 110 1146 
Drugs 6 1 15 3 1 9 13 18 146 
Community 
111 I :0 14 11 
1
5 
1:
3 14 12 19 159 
consultation 
Public reassurance 12 
Total 1275 126 1 222 129 142 167 1374 1157 15 1282 11479 
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Table 5.8 Counts of speaking interactions by agency category and topic category in Lincoln 
AOB 
1 :1 14 1
16 I: I: 1:5 1106 Arson I 18 
Crime 12 
datal intelligence 
6 2 4 8 11 133 
Ext presentation 18 23 3 12 2 36 194 
Internal presentation 5 6 10 7 128 
Introlapologies 3 1 14 
Mins/matters arising 58 10 27 2 17 24 1138 
Money allocation 56 5 59 3 53 2 69 1247 
Performance 146 6 47 17 65 1 81 
Structure 12 10 1 10 17 1 50 
Youth 6 1 3 7 1 I I 117 
Process 16 19 4 29 20 12 I I 190 
Delivery 3 1 3 1 1 1 17 
Regenera tion 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Other 4 2 3 I I I 19 
Media 23 16 1 17 16 73 
Info only or admin 53 1 16 1 21 56 148 
Social issues 8 7 3 5 1 2 24 
Total 359 22 254 26 211 4 383 4 4 1267 
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Difficulties in meetings 
In Cambridge, interviewees were concerned that discussions in meetings were too 
detailed rather than strategic and that presentations over-ran. One police 
representative also suggested that meetings were too infrequent. Other 
representatives were initially resistant to increasing the frequency of meetings 
because it would increase the workload of the officer support group. Eventually it 
was agreed, however, that the partnership would meet bimonthly, rather than 
quarterly, with shorter meetings. 
In Birmingham, interviewees were concerned that meetings were too long and that 
there were too many agenda items which appeared to lack prioritisation. A city 
council representative, for example, appeared aggrieved that it took three months for 
the partnership to discuss the future of the subgroup he/ she chaired, during which 
time smaller agencies were given an opportunity to give presentations, which 
he/ she felt were peripheral to the partnership. Other interviewees also took issue 
with the organisation of the meeting; the papers were viewed as too lengthy or 
tabled late (including on the day of the meeting). One city council representative 
further criticised crime up-dates produced by police analysts for meetings, because 
they were inaccessible and of limited practical use. 
5.3 Different types of partners 
I~ey players 
It was noted above that, in terms of speaking interactions, the police, the city council 
and members of the community safety team appeared to dominate partnership 
discussions. In interviews the police, the city council and the county council 
appeared to be regarded as the key players. This view was expressed by a range of 
agencies in Birmingham, but mainly by police, police authority and city council 
representatives in Cambridge and Lincoln (despite the county council having a 
similar statutory commitment). The county council was viewed as a key player in 
Cambridge and Lincoln by representatives from the county council and by partners 
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with a countywide focus, such as the probation service.l7l This was surprising given 
that the county council had patchy attendance at partnership meetings in both 
Cambridge and Lincoln. The concept of key players is further illuminated by their 
role in decision-making, which will be discussed shortly. 
The police, the city council (and the county council to an extent) were regarded as 
key players because, in Birmingham and Lincoln, community safety was regarded as 
the" core business" of the police because they had performance indicators related to 
crime and disorder. The city council was regarded as a key player because they had 
powerl72 at their disposal, especially in Birmingham: 
The council and the police are far the most powerful agencies within the 
CDRP, the council because they are a powerful agency per se and the 
police because they have more knowledge about crime and disorder than 
any other agencies ... success or failure is down to the relationship 
between the council or the police and the rest is peripheral ... For example, 
you name any other agency that it is not cardinal to the delivery of every 
single strand. But the delivery of every single strand is dependent upon 
the police and the council (Police representative, Birmingham). 
The status of the city council and police, as key players, was also believed to be 
because attendees from these organisations outnumbered those of other 
organisations and, more importantly, because they are the designated lead agencies 
in the 1998 CD A. 
171 This view was not expressed in Birmingham because it is not a two-tier local authority. 
172 Birmingham City Council had a budget, according to a city council interviewee, of over £2 billion 
per year and employed over 50,000 staff. A fire service representative claimed that the city council 
budget was over £3 billion per year. 
Minor and absent players 
There also appeared to be minor and absent players.173 These varied between areas; 
according to a range of practitioners, in Birmingham the absent players were the 
voluntary sector and, although they attended regularly, the minor players were the 
fire service, PCT, chamber of commerce and customs and excise.174 In Cambridge, 
the business community were absent and the minor players were the county council, 
PCT, fire service and voluntary sector. The latter three agencies attended regularly 
but were also relatively new. In Lincoln, the absent partners were the county council, 
business community, the voluntary sector and, until recently, the fire service, the 
probation service and the PCT. The latter three had begun to attend fairly regularly 
towards the end of the fieldwork. 
In all three areas interviewees suggested that the fire service struggled to know 
where they fitted into the partnership, partly because they were not included in the 
original CDA and also because the partnerships focused on crime and disorder 
rather than community safety. These views are summarised by the following fire 
service representative, who lamented that the partnerships were a missed 
opportunity: 
[T]he fire service is always on the list of partners as long as we don't ask 
for anything ... because we're always willing and smiling generally, 
outside of the dispute .. . but we weren't a statutory member, which we 
are now under the Police Reform Act . . . the crime and disorder 
partnership focuses very much on crime .... it's not safety in the broadest 
concept ... so we were very much on the outside (Fire service 
representative). 
173 Despite absent and minor players in all three partnerships, there did not appear to be procedures 
in place to address non-attendance. In Cambridge, one interviewee found this irksome. A police 
representative in Lincoln suggested that Government Office should hold partners to account for non-
attendance. 
174 Interestingly few interviewees mentioned the police authority (despite their being a statutory 
partner). 
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This fire service representative also suggested that the fire service would have to 
commit some of its own resources before it could gain resources from the 
partnership. 
It is well established that the PCTs remain on the periphery of the CSPs (e.g. Audit 
Commission, 2002). The reasons given by partners were similar across partnerships 
and organisations, and a number of themes emerged. One reason given was 
organisational turmoil, wrought by the reorganisation of the health service into 
PCTs. Interviewees suggested that this resulted in discontinuity of representation to 
the partnership. Interviewees also noted difficulties associated with performance 
management culture, as the PCTs did not have crime and disorder performance 
indicators and were keen to focus on targets against which their performance would 
be measured: 
[T]here was a county-wide conference earlier this year, the chief executive 
[of the PCT] said, I look at my desk and I think, what on this desk is going 
to get me sacked, and the conclusion I corne to is that not getting hospital 
waiting lists down could get me the sack, not going to a crime and 
disorder partnership meeting is not going to cause me any trouble (City 
Council representative). 
In addition, interviewees recognised that, like the fire service, the PCT did not 
understand its role in the partnership because, with the exception of the provision of 
drug treatment services, the connection between health and crime is not always 
clear-cut. Interviewees in Lincoln and Cambridge also noted that PCT 
representatives were concerned about data protection issues as a result of 
information-sharing with other agencies. 
In Lincoln the probation service were viewed as a minor player because of staffing 
difficulties and structural changes. A police representative suggested that the 
involvement of the probation service, however, depended on the commitment and 
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personality of the individual attendee. This illustrates a fundamental attribution 
error, since this police representative blames the individual rather than the situation 
(Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986). Similarly, the absence of county council involvement 
in Lincoln was explained by the retirement of a key individual, although there was 
also some recognition in Lincoln and Cambridge of the difficulties associated with a 
county-wide organisation servicing a number of district partnerships and also 
finding someone representative of the county council as a whole, given the breadth 
of its remit. 
The Morgan Report and interviewees in my research noted the significance of the 
voluntary sector in CSPs, but it appeared to remain on the periphery.175 In 
Birmingham and Cambridge, interviewees suggested that the involvement of the 
voluntary sector was important because they were 'mavericks', they were able to be 
innovative because they were not a part of 'the establishment': 
The voluntary sector is freer; if things are statutorily funded then they 
have certain criteria that they have to meet. The voluntary sector is 
independent of that, so I think it's very important because it gives us the 
opportunity to have innovative approaches to things ... it's important 
because statutory groups can get constrained and set in their ways ... and 
the voluntary sector is a chance to break free of that. It's the 
establishment, it's the status quo and it gives them the freedom to have 
innovative ideas and to test them out and I think that's vitally important 
(DAT representative). 
Voluntary sector representatives attended Cambridge and Birmingham (although 
not on a regular basis) but they declined to be interviewed. In all three partnerships, 
voluntary organisations such as Women's Aid, Victims Support and Neighbourhood 
Watch were involved in the subgroups, but their involvement was not quantified 
because the main focus of the research was the partnership board. 
175 See also Audit Commission (2002) . 
Perhaps voluntary organisations lacked full involvement in the partnerships because 
of a lack of resources and capacity. One city council interviewee in Cambridge 
suggested that many statutory agencies want the voluntary sector to attend meetings 
or to help deliver services but, unlike the statutory agencies, they do not have 
mainstream budgets to pay staff to deliver services, or to attend meetings which are 
not directly related to the work of the organisation. In a board meeting in 
Cambridge, for example, during a discussion about the provision of drugs education 
in schools, the voluntary sector representative said "if you ask the voluntary sector 
for something then you have to pay them for it". 
Interviewees in Birmingham noted that community safety was not the 'core 
business' of most voluntary organisations and for this reason it was not their 
priority. In addition, interviewees suggested that the voluntary sector struggled to 
think' outside the box' of their organisation, which could be akin to the perceptual 
anchoring effects described by Fitzmaurice and Pease (1986) and could also apply to 
other agencies. As with the county council, it was difficult to find individuals 
representative of the voluntary sector in its entirety. These views raise questions 
about whether or not too much was expected of the voluntary sector. A city council 
representative felt that it was important instead to view the voluntary sector as a 
group of specialised organisations, which are of use at particular points in the 
partnership process or in a particular location or for a particular purpose. 
The voluntary sector may also have remained on the periphery of the partnerships 
because of their tense relationship with statutory organisations such as the city 
council and the police. The 'Cambridge two', Ruth Wyner and John Brock, for 
example, found that working with the police had unintended consequences, as they 
were convicted in December 1999 of "knowingly permitting"176 the sale of heroin on 
176 Ruth Wyner and John Brock were given sentences of five years and four years respectively, which 
were subsequently quashed. Ruth Wyner remains openly critical of the way in which the police dealt 
with their case; she argues that Wintercornfort had an exemplary drugs policy and had worked 
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the premises of the voluntary homeless day-centre they managed. This case received 
national media attention and raised concerns about whether or not other similar 
voluntary sector workers could be punished in the same manner. At the very least, 
we might speculate that this case had repercussions for relations between the 
voluntary sector and the police in Cambridge and might explain the reticence of the 
voluntary sector to be involved in the CSP. 
The Morgan Report noted not only the importance of the voluntary sector, but also 
the importance of the business community and its lack of involvement in community 
safety in the early 1990s. Interviewees from the Chamber of Commerce played a 
minor role because business crime was not a partnership priority, and so partnership 
discussions were often irrelevant to the interests of their clients: 
[T]here is actually no angle on business, so there's actually no ownership, 
there's no logical peg that you can sort of latch on to ... partly because 
business crime isn't a key indicator as far as the police are concerned ... 
partly because crime that affects business is a multitude of things ... you 
can feel quite marginalised, because you sit through a substantial part of 
it, thinking well what is going on ... in terms of actually getting involved 
and actually feeling that they're wanted there, it's not that you feel overtly 
unwanted, it's just that, what can you actually get into (Chamber of 
Commerce representative, Birmingham). 
Interestingly, a government office interviewee was opposed to using public money 
to address business crime (in national and multi-national companies), because he 
believed companies were unwilling to sacrifice their profit margins to help 
themselves through additional security measures or by contributing to the CSPs. 
alongside the police in trying to address the drugs problem in their day-centre (see Wyner, 2003) . 
They were convicted based on an undercover policing operation. 
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Commitment continuity and their consequences 
The significance of 'people pieces'177 or key individuals and individual personalities 
were themes that emerged in all three areas. As I have already noted, in Lincoln the 
involvement of the probation service and the county council depended on the 
commitment and enthusiasm of individual representatives rather than on directives 
or legislation. Reliance on key individuals could be a risky strategy, however; when 
these individuals leave, the partnerships struggle to function and replacements 
might not be easy to find. In Lincoln, for example, after the county council 
representative retired, there had been no continuous involvement of this agency. 
In Birmingham, practitioners from the city council, police, DAT and community 
safety team suggested that community safety partly depended on individual 
personali ties: 
I heard partnerships defined as ... a group of people with barely 
concealed mutual loathing, forced together in the never-ending search for 
money. . .. I think people underestimate how critically important they are 
[as individuals] ... if you get a chief executive and chief constable who 
don't get on, you can forget it .. . personalities will run straight through 
(Police officer, Birmingham). 
Similarly, interviewees from the community safety team, the police and county 
council in Cambridge noted that the mix of personalities and whether they 'got 
along' affected partnership relations. Clashes of personality could be a source of 
tension and disagreement, and even lead to the exclusion of some partners, as this 
interviewee illustrates: 
177 Foster (2002) notes the role of 'people pieces', or key members of the local community, in 
community safety. Pawson and Tilley (1997) also note the significance of practitioners in the 
successful implementation of crime prevention. 
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[T]he effectiveness of partnership working is very dependent on 
individual personalities and that's a serious weakness because they leave 
... You have to work at partnerships and if a personality is difficult, we 
have a problem, but if a person is good, and really contributing, and they 
leave, then you have a problem ... I don't know that you can personality-
proof partnerships ... you can have protocols, agreements, and all the 
paperwork you like ... that's your insurance ... but actually ... to get 
people to deliver what's on those papers is completely useless if you 
haven't got people who have got the right attitude, and the right contacts 
(City council representative, Birmingham). 
These findings suggest that, in order to address community safety, agency 
representatives must also negotiate interpersonal relationships and politics. 
The partnerships were not only affected by key players leaving, but also by the 
general continuity of representatives at partnership meetings. Interviewees in 
Birmingham and Cambridge suggested that the nature of public sector work meant 
that staff turnover was commonplace, particularly amongst the police who were 
noted for their high staff-turnover. In Cambridge for example, over a period of 20 
months, three different senior police representatives attended partnership meetings. 
Lincoln seemed to have had more stability amongst its members, as senior police 
and city council representatives had been involved with the partnership since its 
inception in 1998. 
Two interviewees in Cambridge and Birmingham suggested that staff turnover was 
advantageous because strong personalities or difficult relationships were overcome 
by a change in personnel, which rejuvenated the partnership with fresh faces and 
new ideas. Perhaps, as one city council representative in Birmingham suggested, 
there were more important issues than continuity of staff for the partnership to 
worry about, such as having a clear and well-communicated strategy. 
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However, interviewees in all three areas reported that staff turnover had negative 
consequences for professional relationships; it affected representatives' knowledge 
of each others' personalities and ways of working, trust and the dynamic of the 
team. If staff turnover occurred at the 'wrong' time, it could also disrupt statutory 
partnership activities. For example, in Cambridge staff turnover in the community 
safety team during the writing of strategy and audit meant that the workload could 
not be shared evenly. 
Staff turnover inevitably resulted in new178 representatives. Earlier in this chapter I 
suggested that those with the least experience179 of the partnerships were the PCT, 
fire service, the' other' category (which includes Customs, DAT) and the probation 
service (in Lincoln only), which further suggests that these agencies were also the 
newcomers. Table 5.9 confirms this picture; it contains estimates180 of the number of 
newcomers in each partnership during the course of the research. 
178 New representatives were defined as those observed attending partnership meetings for the first 
and/ or second time because, as interviewees commented, it took one or two meetings to familiarise 
oneself with the people and the issues. 
179 Even though these agencies had the least experience of the current partnership, they might have 
had lengthy community safety experience prior to joining the current partnership. 
180 During observations of meetings I counted those who were new when fieldwork began and 
partners that joined during the research The figures are estimates (especially the final column), based 
on my knowledge of partnership attendees, hints given by the Chairs during meetings (when they 
welcomed new members) and by comparing attendees to the lists of current members, supplied to me 
at the outset of my research. I have excluded individuals giving one-off presentations from the count 
of new members (although presenters were not excluded from the average number of attendees). 
Table 5.9 Estimates of new members at time of interview, at meeting one and during the course of the research 
Average No. of No. of interviewees with New attendees at my first New attendees during Partnership I no. of interviewees ~ 4 mths. experience partnership meeting course of my research 
attendees when interviewed 
Police, Other (2), 
CS team (2), 
23.9 126 I Other, City 
council 1 2 
1 City Council 
Customs (3) 14 
1 PCT, Elected 
member, 1
9
+
4 
=13 
City council, 
Police au 
13 118 I Fire, PCT, Police I 3 I YOS, Police, 13 1 Fire (4), Police, 
5 +3 
PCT =8 
10.4 I 13 I Fire 11 I Fire 11 I PCT, Probation, 4 +1 Other, Police =5 
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Table 5.9 indicates that approximately 50-60 per cent of the average number of 
attendees at partnership meetings were new over the course of 7-8 meetings. This 
means that, on average, in Cambridge and Lincoln there was approximately one new 
member for each partnership meeting, and in Birmingham there were approximately 
two new members for each meeting. 
When asked about their experiences, newcomers described a lack of familiarity with 
a range of partnership issues such as the roles and responsibilities of partners, 
(including the Home Office), the language and use of acronyms, (which made it hard 
to understand what was going on), and partnership processes such as funding, 
decision-making and the authority of the partnership. Newcomers were also 
unfamiliar with other attendees, which made it hard for them to network. 
These difficulties were perhaps compounded because induction and hand over 
procedures lacked systematisation. None of the newcomers received formal 
induction or training, although in Lincoln and Cambridge they were sent (on 
request) an induction pack which appeared to contain, at the very least, the latest 
strategy, audit and annual report. Therefore, some felt 'thrown in at the deep end' 
and that the induction process needed improvement, particularly to include 
information on the roles and responsibilities of agencies. This was already in place in 
Birmingham. Interestingly, an interviewee in Birmingham suggested that the 
induction procedure should be ongoing, as the partnership should not assume a 
priori knowledge: 
I think ... there's an assumption that you've got a history to it [the 
partnership] and that you were at the first meeting ... they probably did a 
lot of jumping off table exercises in trust and talking about what their 
approach was, but that only happens at the start of the process and we're 
four years down that process and so that doesn't actually happen 
anymore (City council representative, Birmingham). 
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Newcomers in Cambridge and Lincoln said that the community safety team had also 
been a source of information. As this interviewee suggests, partners also familiarised 
themselves with the partnership 'on the job' : 
Well, on the job really and with great difficulty and confusion ... There 
wasn't any formal induction to be honest, but it's a bit like the blind 
leading the blind ... it's no one's core responsibility ... my manager did 
not ... put together an induction pack because he's got so many other 
things to do ... the initial learning is that I had to go around and ask 
questions as much as I could but there were some questions that I didn't 
even know enough to be able to ask ... So it did take a while really. I mean 
some people say that it took them a year to really get to grips with it all 
(DAT representative). 
One of the consequences of staff turnover and newcomers to the partnerships was 
that more experienced representatives, in Cambridge for example, expressed 
frustration about time spent helping newcomers "get up to speed", as old 
discussions and decisions were' re-hashed'. 
Understanding others' roles and responsibilities was considered to be an important 
part of the induction process. This did not mean, however, that these roles and 
responsibilities were fully understood by partners. Interviewees in Birmingham and 
Cambridge suggested that they had a reasonable understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of other organisations. In Lincoln, interviewees reported that they 
did not understand the roles and responsibilities of other agencies as well as they 
should. In Birmingham, interviewees also mentioned that they understood some 
agencies (the fire service, voluntary sector, health service and the business sector) 
less well than others, whilst the larger statutory agencies, in particular the police and 
the local authority, were well understood. 
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In Lincoln, given the unusual structure of the partnership, newer members struggled 
to understand the roles and responsibilities of Urban Challenge (the charitable body 
which supported the partnership). In Cambridge, police and city council 
representatives at different levels of seniority complained that the police did not 
understand the way in which the city council operates (and vice versa), in particular 
in relation to decision-making. These misunderstandings caused tensions and delays 
on one or two occasions and were resolved through a meeting of key police and city 
council staff. Perhaps these difficulties were due to the strength of their perceptual 
anchors (Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986), or the difficulties of reconciling different 
working practices. 
Interviewees understood the roles and responsibilities of other key partners through 
experiences accumulated in their professional lives in the public sector. Away days 
and partnership meetings also provided information about topical issues. In 
Birmingham, for example, meetings often began with presentations about current 
issues faced by Birmingham City Council and West Midlands Police. Presentations 
of this kind did not occur in meetings in Cambridge. Understanding others appeared 
to be connected to ideas about joining-up community safety practice, which I discuss 
in chapter eight. 
5.4 Processes 
Decision-making 
In all areas partners described decision-making at strategic partnership meetings in a 
similar manner. The agenda, papers or short reports (which in Birmingham and 
Cambridge normally contained recommendations about the decision to be taken) 
were sent to representatives in advance. 
At meetings, typically each agenda item would be presented by a member of the 
community safety team or the author of the report and then discussed. In 
Birmingham, the discussion was more formal than in other areas; representatives 
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raised their hands and the Chair acknowledged the order in which they could speak. 
In Cambridge and Lincoln, the discussions were less formal, with partners 
occasionally raising their hand to speak. In all three areas, towards the end of the 
discussion of each agenda item the chair would summarise the issues and a decision 
would be reached or deferred. Decisions were not always necessary though, 
particularly in Lincoln where there were the greatest number of agenda items which 
were for information only. In all areas, decision-making appeared to be about 
reaching a consensus, rather than involving voting. 
Given that decisions were not always taken, questions were raised about how many 
decisions were taken. Whilst observing partnership meetings I noted down when a 
decision was taken and which agency was the main instigator of the decision. Table 
5.10 shows the number and percentage of decisions taken, not taken or deferred.181 
181 The frequencies and percentages in table 5.10 were derived from all possible decisions taken, rather 
than all agenda items. 
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Table 5.10 Decisions taken, not taken and deferred, across all meetings and by partnership 
~ . 
Decision ~ :: _.' Cambridge Lincoln 
N % N % N 
Yes 14 17.3 26 31 32 
No 64 79 49 59 54 
Deferred 3 3.7 8 10 8 
Total 81 83 94 decisions182 
% 
31.33 
59.04 
9.64 
Total no. 
of 
decisions 
N 
72 
167 
19 
258 
All partnerships appeared to make a small number of decisions. However, 
Cambridge and Lincoln were similar in relation to the percentage of decisions they 
made, whereas Birmingham made fewer. Further weight was added to this view of 
decision-making by interviewees in Birmingham. They suggested that (depending 
on the issue) too few decisions were taken because the strategic partnership did not 
have a role in decision-making; rather it received information from subgroups or 
ratified decisions taken elsewhere: 
[V]ery little [decision-making], ... how many times have you come away 
from those meetings thinking well actually they've made a decision about 
that. It's deferred to another group or some other structure is given the 
responsibility to take it away and then feedback and I'm not convinced in 
my mind how many times we get a definitive outcome (Interviewee, 
Birmingham). 
Similarly in Cambridge, despite a new Chair and improvements to the organisation 
of meetings (by colour coding different reports), interviewees continued to feel that 
too few decisions were taken, especially once decisions about funding allocation 
were excluded from the count. 
182 One case is missing (in Cambridge, N should =84), due to an error in inputting the data. 
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Views in Lincoln were polarised; interviewees suggested that decisions were taken in 
the partnership meetings, whilst others suggested that there were too few. This 
interviewee suggests that decisions were taken outside strategic partnership 
meetings: 
I don't think a lot of decision-making takes place in the meeting, I think 
most of the decision-making takes place in the action groups and most of 
the decisions take place, behind the chair, i.e. the chair or key partners 
will say this is an issue that is coming up ... and a lot of the pre-work is 
done... In some respects I see that as being a very positive thing as else 
we'd spend all day trying to identify issues, but for some issues I think 
there needs to be a much wider debate and I think there needs to be more 
openness to particular issues, it's about thinking outside the boxes 
(Interviewee, Lincoln). 
It is unclear from Table 5.10 whether some topics of discussion were more likely to 
require a decision than others and, if so, which agency was more likely to instigate 
that decision. Figure 5.4 illustrates the topics under discussion when a decision was 
taken (by partnership and by topic), and Figure 5.5 indicates the topic under 
discussion when no decision was taken (by partnership and by topiC).183 Figure 5.4 
shows that, in strategic meetings in Birmingham, representatives were most likely to 
decide about structure; in Cambridge, money allocation; and in Lincoln, information 
only or administration. 
183 The findings in Figure 5.4 and 5.5 could be skewed by the frequency with which a topic was 
discussed, shown in Figure 5.3. In Lincoln, for example, representatives were most likely to make a 
decision about information only and administrative matters but this was also the topic that was 
discussed the most in partnership meetings. I tried to control for this by calculating percentages of 
decisions taken or decisions not taken or decisions deferred (of all decisions, rather than all topics 
discussed). Perhaps a better method would have been to weight each of the topics according to the 
frequency with which they were discussed. 
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Figure 5.5 shows that in Birmingham and Cambridge, representatives were least 
likely to make a decision about performance monitoring. This could be interpreted 
as support for the earlier finding that progress reports by subgroup chairs were 
mostly for information only rather than for decision-making. In Lincoln, Figure 5.4 
shows that representatives were least likely to make decisions about information 
only and administration. Perhaps this finding would have been different had the 
categories of 'administration' and 'information only' been coded as two separate 
agenda topics. By its nature, information only would have required no decisions, 
whereas administrative issues would have been more likely to require a decision, for 
example, about the date of the next meeting. 
In table 5.11, I examine decisions taken by agency type and partnership.184 In all 
partnerships and across all meetings, decisions were predominantly taken by the city 
council, although the police also took a large proportion. These findings, however, 
are skewed by Birmingham as nearly 80 per cent of decisions were taken by the city 
council, perhaps because the Chair was from the city council. In Cambridge and 
Lincoln, the decisions were more evenly spread between agencies. In Cambridge 
these decisions were spread between the city council, the police and the YOS, 
perhaps because the Chair was from the YOS. In Lincoln, the decisions were spread 
between the city council, police and community safety team. The more even spread 
of decisions (and speaking interactions discussed above) suggests that meetings and 
decisions were more shared in Cambridge and Lincoln compared to Birmingham. 
Alternatively, these findings could be interpreted as Cambridge and Lincoln having 
weaker leadership than Birmingham. 
184 The difficulty with counting decisions taken in this manner is that there is no control for who 
attended the meeting. It would also be useful to control for the agency that the chair is from. 
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Table 5.11 Decisions taken by agency and partnership185 
City Totals for Partnership CSteam Fire Other PCT Police YOS each Council p/ship 
N 1% N % N % N % N N 1% 1% N % N 
10 176.9 I 0 1 7.7 0 0 2 15.4 0 13 100 
~ - ~ w.; Cambridge 8 I 38.1 I 1 I 4.8 0 1 4.8 1 4.8 4 19.1 6 28.6 21 100 
Lincolri 12 37.5 7 21.9 0 0 0 13 40.6 0 32 100 
Totals for each 30 45.5 8 12.1 1 8.3 1 1.5 1 1.5 19 28.8 6 9.1 66 
agency 
185 The reason that the total number of decisions taken in Table 5.11 (N=66) is not the same as in Table 5.10 (N=72, see the 'Yes' row) is because on six 
occasions the decision-maker was unclear; thus a decision was taken but I did not record who instigated the decision. 
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The analysis so far suggests that there was a lack of decision-making in strategic 
partnership meetings in all areas.186 Strategic meetings were therefore interpreted as 
a 'talking shop' by interviewees in Cambridge. In Birmingham and Lincoln there 
were conflicting views about the reasons for the lack of decision-making. As these 
interviewees suggest, perhaps it was because the strategic partnership was perceived 
to ratify the decisions of report-writers, subgroups or those with delegated authority, 
such as individual agencies:187 
[D]ecisions are happening ... in the people that originate the reports ... 
although we notionally take a report to the body for acceptance or 
endorsement, the passivity of the partnership means that it's actually the 
people who put the proposal together that are taking the decisions. Now 
that's OK when they're good, and they're thoughtful decisions made 
within a broader strategy that is about right, but you could see the 
capacity for that to be unhelpful if there weren't an overall agreed 
strategy (City council representative, Birmingham). 
I think some of the things that are brought are retrospective by the time 
they're brought to the meeting, so you're approving things that have 
already been done. And of course decisions have to be made and ... you 
can't always get them to a full meeting beforehand, so you have to 
delegate ... rubber-stamping sounds denigrating, but you're probably 
endorsing decisions you're not taking them. (Interviewee, 
Birmingham). 
By contrast, one subgroup Chair in Birmingham, for example, suggested that her 
subgroup did not make decisions, but it is not possible to say if this was true across 
186 Interviewees noted other difficulties with the decision-making process; interviewees in Cambridge 
were concerned that decisions were sometimes rushed when meetings over-ran, particularly in 
discussions of any other business. However, decisions were taken only a handful of times in the AOB 
section (once in Birmingham, twice in Cambridge and four times in Lincoln). 
187 The police, for example, made decisions about how to spend basic command unit funding, which 
was intended also to benefit CSPs. 
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subgroups or across partnerships. ISS Another interviewee in Birmingham argued 
that it was not the role of the partnership to make decisions; rather its role was to 
join-up decisions taken by individual agencies: 
A partnership of this kind brings together agencies delivering their own 
statutory responsibilities and tries to align them ... The partnership is not 
to be understood or justified on the strength of its decision-making 
actually. I could imagine an extremely good partnership making virtually 
no decisions but being a first-rate mechanism for ensuring that the 
decisions of individual agencies work extremely well together 
(Interviewee, Birmingham). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that decision-making in CSPs was complex, 
and not entirely located in strategic partnership meetings. 
Decision-making was further complicated by decisions taken informally, 'behind the 
chair'. In Birmingham and Cambridge, these negotiations were important as 
agencies did not want to 'air their dirty laundry' in public. Thus informal 
conversations and meetings were used to resolve potentially controversial issues 
before meetings. In Lincoln, 'behind the chair' discussions were viewed as useful in 
order to remain strategic. At the same time and in all areas, interviewees like the one 
below recognised the potential for a lack of transparency, bias, and the exclusion of 
some from decision-making: 
I don't think very much of it does take place formally at those meetings, I 
think it's more informal, outside in the various spin-off groups, meetings 
and discussions that people have informally and then that's fed back in ... 
I suppose the problem with it is that it becomes very idiosyncratic, it's 
188 It would have been interesting to examine the extent to which subgroups made decisions on behalf 
of the partnership; this would have required regular attendance at subgroup meetings, which was not 
possible given the breadth of the research. 
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people's agendas, personalities, rather than evidence-based ... open and 
transparent (DAT representative). 
'Behind the chair' discussions suggest that decision-making was a discretionary 
process. These discussions are perhaps similar to the informal meetings that take 
place before discretionary lifer panels, such as those described in Padfield and 
Liebling's (2003) research which also involve the operation of discretion. 
If partnership decision-making processes involve discretion, they are also likely to be 
affected by the operation of power.189 As has already been seen, key players such as 
the Chair, and police and local authority representatives, were the main instigators 
of decisions. Yet it was unclear to some interviewees which of these individuals had 
mandated authority. This perhaps explains why some interviewees complained that 
there were no clear lines of decision-making: 
This partnership is just gridlocked because there's no clear line of 
decision-making, everybody wants to have a say in everything, you think 
you've taken a decision on the allocation of funding and somebody comes 
out of the woodwork and says, well you haven't spoken to me about this 
(Community safety team representative, Birmingham). 
[T]he last meeting ... brought to the surface how were we making 
decisions, what's the basis of our decision-making, what process are we 
using, what criteria are we using to make decisions .... I'm unclear, the 
group's unclear and I think it's a question we've got to address fairly 
quickly, otherwise I think that could undermine ... good progress within 
the partnership ... People come from the county council, and particularly 
the city council, have elected members who have to be part of that 
decision-making process, so to me, the playing field is not even, and I 
189 See Hawkins (2003) for example, on the relationship between decision-making and power. 
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think it's very important that we discuss that, and think through the 
implications of that (peT representative).190 
This second view also illustrates a failure to clarify the decision-making process and 
how the use of discretion can undermine the legitimacy of this process. 
Delivery 
In Birmingham and Lincoln, interviewees suggested that delivery was carried out by 
subgroups or individual agencies, such as the police and city council. The tendency 
to rely on key players to deliver community safety suggests that strategic 
partnership meetings were multi-agency, but the delivery of community safety was 
not. A burglary subgroup meeting, for example, was criticised by independent 
consultants for simply informing other agencies about the police's progress with 
burglary reduction. I return to this issue of joined-up community safety in chapter 
eight. 
In terms of the delivery of community safety, interviewees in Birmingham 
mentioned a few key projects which had been evaluated and shown to be successful. 
Others suggested that the partnership delivered well in areas where there were 
mainstream resources available. However, other interviewees, particularly from the 
police, were sceptical; they felt that there had been a lot of talk but not enough action 
between meetings, or driving through of decisions. Indeed, towards the end of the 
fieldwork this latter view appeared to dominate; 'away day' was spent discussing 
how to restructure the partnership in order to improve delivery: 
[I]nstead of being grateful for people to take money off your hands, we 
have to commit them to do something that the partnership wants to see 
happen ... And that's what you saw yesterday [in the partnership 
190 The confusion about how decisions were taken, noted by this interviewee, might be partly 
explained by the newness of the interviewee. 
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meeting which discussed the away day], people are talking about a new 
structure because the existing structure was OK to talk, to shape up ideas 
and priorities, we need a structure for delivery now (Community safety 
team representative, Birmingham). 
Police representatives in Cambridge and Lincoln were also sceptical about the extent 
of delivery. A police representative in Lincoln, for example, suggested that delivery 
was 'successful' between 1998 and 2001, because disparate projects were brought 
together, and because of prior involvement in the Safer Cities initiative. Delivery had 
not been consolidated between 2002 and 2004, however, because the partnership had 
been distracted by other issues, such as a lack of involvement by the PCT and the 
changing relationship with the DAT. A government office representative agreed 
with the Audit Commission's (2002) finding that the partnerships had evolved, but 
had yet to make an obvious impact: 
CDRPs have slowly evolved, they are getting more business like, they are 
beginning to see the need for better data, better decision making ... But 
the Audit Commission, if you asked them the same question, their answer 
is quite simple, CDRPs haven't actually made an obvious impact, they're 
carefully using the word obvious because they're not saying they haven't 
made an impact. Hence the reason we're now into performance 
management because we've got to see that they do make an obvious 
impact (Government office representative). 
The overarching difficulty with delivery in all three areas appeared to be a lack of 
capacity; interviewees reported a dearth of practitioners to deliver partnership 
objectives. For example, a Birmingham level 1 subgroup vetoed a project involving 
young offenders because there was no one to run it from the YOS. The following 
interviewee illustrates that smaller agencies, like the YOS, had less capacity than key 
players, such as the police and local authority: 
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[T]he problem is that we don't have the capacity to do half of it. Who do I 
call on to manage these things and to implement them and there isn't a 
pot of money for us to dip into ... The YOS has been built from the second 
floor up, there is no infrastructure, unlike the police, ... I haven't got 
[police officers] to give work to. I've got very over-worked YOT 
managers. They are at a fairly junior level really compared to [police 
officers] (Representative from the YOS) . 
Difficulties in Lincoln, in particular, were also attributed to the lack of a delivery 
plan and a community safety team to turn the strategy into action. Interviewees in 
Birmingham and Lincoln also suggested that other processual issues limited 
delivery, such as the lack of decision-making, inadequate performance monitoring 
mechanisms and knowledge of what the partnership delivered. For example, one 
interviewee in Lincoln was eager to see a change in performance monitoring 
arrangements so that only those projects struggling with implementation would be 
discussed at meetings. 
In Birmingham, interviewees suggested that delivery could be improved through 
focusing partnership priorities, increasing capacity amongst practitioners, and 
involving local citizens. However, as I discuss in chapter six, the 'community' 
appeared to have a limited role in the partnerships. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
Relationships between the strategic partnerships and their subgroups were difficult 
at times, particularly in Cambridge and Birmingham. This appeared to be because of 
a lack of communication and a lack of clarity about the role of the subgroups. 
Similarly in Birmingham and Cambridge, there was a lack of clarity about the role of 
the community safety teams. In Lincoln, however, there was no community safety 
team as such, but it was in an embryonic stage of development towards the end of 
the fieldwork. 
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In all three areas the chair was viewed as a leader, who created positive connections 
between partners and possessed a range of personal skills (such as interest and 
enthusiasm) and chairing skills (such as facilitating the discussion). In Birmingham, 
in particular, the Chair also led the partnership and held partners to account for 
delivery. 
The partnership in Birmingham, unlike Cambridge and Lincoln, was viewed as too 
large. This affected practical issues such as the management of discussions, the 
reconciliation of conflicting views, and perhaps contributed to the view that the 
partnerships were bureaucratic and lacked a clear purpose. 
Meetings in Birmingham and Cambridge were less frequent than those in Lincoln 
but they also lasted longer, whilst the meetings in Lincoln were shorter but more 
frequent. The police, city council and the community safety team regularly attended 
meetings in all three areas. In meetings, performance monitoring was discussed the 
most frequently in Birmingham; money allocation, in Cambridge; and administrative 
matters or information, in Lincoln. 
Partners also spoke in meetings with varying frequency, which corresponded to 
their role as either key or minor players. In all three partnerships the consensus was 
that the city council and the police were the key players, whilst the more minor 
players and absent players were the probation service, YOS, youth service and 
sometimes the voluntary sector, PCT, fire service and the DA T. The fulfilment of 
these roles appeared to depend on the extent to which the goals of the partners' 
organisation fitted with those of the partnership, the capacity and resources of their 
agency and the length of their experience of the current partnership. 
There appeared to be a lack of decision-making in strategic meetings; this was 
perhaps because the strategic partnership was not viewed as a decision-making 
body, rather it ratified decisions taken, for example, in subgroup meetings or 'behind 
the chair' . In Cambridge, the lack of decision-making was interpreted to mean that 
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the partnership was a 'talking shop'. Partners also noted that 'behind the chair' 
discussions and decisions could undermine the clarity and legitimacy of the 
decision-making process leaving it open to distortion by personal agendas, and 
excluding those not privy to 'behind the chair' discussions. Decision-making also 
appeared to be dominated by the key players, who instigated most decisions. 
Similarly, implementation was reportedly carried out primarily by the key agencies. 
However, the police in all three partnerships were sceptical about the extent of 
delivery, which confirmed the view that the partnerships have yet to make an 
obvious impact on crime and disorder (Audit Commission, 2002). The main 
hindrances in all three areas appeared to be a lack of capacity and a lack of decision-
making. I return to the issue of the limited 'success' of the partnerships in chapter 
seven. 
Having described processes within the partnerships, in the next chapter I describe 
relationships between the partnerships and their wider social context. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE PARTNERSHIPS IN CONTEXT 
In the previous chapter I described relationships within the partnerships, as well 
their internal processes and structures. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
partnerships' historical and social contexts. First, I describe the history of community 
safety practice and second I examine the impact of the size of the city. Third, I 
explore the effect of the type of local authority structure on partnership relations. 
Fourth I consider relations between the partnerships and other community safety 
structures, such as the OAT and Local Strategic Partnerships, and between the 
partnerships and local citizens, the media and local political structures. 
6.1 The history of community safety 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 attempted to reform criminal justice practices 
including community safety. As I have already discussed, the legislation embodied 
many of the principles identified by the Morgan Report in 1991. It also attempted to 
formalise and standardise community safety practice, which had been developing 
unevenly since the late 1980s. Since 1998, the CDA has been supplemented by 
legislation such as the Police Reform Act 2002 and the Antisocial Behaviour Act 
2003. 
I began the fieldwork for the research described here some four years after the 
implementation of the 1998 legislation, yet few practitioners were able to describe 
the impact of the Act. This appeared to be because of staff turnover rather than 
because community safety did not exist prior to 1998. As has already been discussed, 
practitioners suggested that staff turnover was problematic in the public sector 
generally, but especially amongst the police. Staff turnover was also confirmed by 
practitioners' average experience of the current partnership: interviewees had 29.2 
months' experience in Birmingham, 31.5 in Cambridge and 33.2 in Lincoln. Yet in 
most areas of England and Wales, there were community safety panels in place 
before 1998 (LGMB, 1996). In their survey of 410 practitioners in England and Wales, 
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Gilling and Hughes (2002) found, for example, that the majority (57 per cent) of 
community safety managers had been involved in the profession long before the 
CDA. 
According to an unpublished report by Mark Liddle,l91 community safety in 
Birmingham had a chequered history; between the early 1980s and 1994 the city was 
regarded by some as a pace-setter, with a well established and unusually large 
community safety unit (of 15 staff). The city was also cited in the Government 
Circular 44/90 and in the Morgan Report as an example of good practice. Whilst 
government officials hailed community safety as a success in Birmingham, there 
were a number of difficulties. First, there was no citywide community safety group; 
rather, many localised multi-agency community safety groups met erratically and 
were not believed to be delivering. There was also confusion about the function and 
role of the community safety unit. It was variously seen as a resource which bid for 
external funding, or as co-ordinating and administering community safety, or 
delivering community safety, or as a policy unit, depending on whom you asked. 
Interviewees in the present research also noted confusion over the role of the 
community safety unit. 
Second, the city council192 resisted the Safer Cities initiative because it lacked local 
ownership. Third, this initiative was viewed as a failure, in the wider literature193 
and the media, because of inter-agency squabbling. A police representative in the 
present research confirmed that there was a history of tense relations between the 
city council and the police, exacerbated, he believed, by a particularly difficult 
member of the city council. This interviewee also suggested that poor relations 
between the police and the local authority partially explained why the assistant chief 
constable attended strategic partnership meetings. Interestingly, this interviewee 
191 This in-depth research was undertaken during the ascendance and decline of the community safety 
unit, on behalf of the Home Office. 
192 According to this report, the city council had a history of resisting central government initiatives. 
193 See Loveday (1999), for example. 
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refused to talk about this subject matter on tape, which gives a likely indication of 
how fraught relations had been between partners. 
In 1993, the community safety unit fell apart when it became embroiled in what 
turned out to be an unproven case of racial discrimination. According to the report, 
these events had both a short- and longer-term impact on community safety in 
Birmingham. In the shorter-term the community safety manager was temporarily 
suspended. In the longer-term there was a lull in community safety in Birmingham: 
the community safety unit declined in size to one (newly appointed) manager and a 
small team (of approximately nine employees), which one interviewee described as 
'one woman and her cat'. Commitment to community safety dwindled, along with 
its profile in the city. Together these difficulties suggest that, by the time the CDA 
was enacted, the popularity of community safety had waned in Birmingham. 
In Cambridge and Lincoln, community safety had a similar history; the current 
partnerships emerged indirectly from the Safer Cities initiative. After this initiative 
ended, the 'Safer Cambridge Steering Group' and Urban Challenge were set up, 
although I have been unable to determine exactly when these groups were 
established and how they differed from the old Safer Cities structures. In 
Cambridge, a city council representative described key players in the 'Safer 
Cambridge Steering Group' to be the probation service, the police and the city 
council, with no involvement of the health service or county council, and only 
informal involvement of elected members. The group was given direction by an 
active Chair, a criminologist who became a local councillor. 
This Steering Group also had at least three active subgroups concerned with 
domestic violence, burglary, and the management of the city centre and its car parks. 
However, when the Crime and Disorder Bill appeared in January 1998 these groups 
'went quiet'. In addition, there was a countywide strategic forum, which discussed 
community safety issues but had no legal power to make decisions. A police 
representative interviewed believed that the Safer Cambridge Steering Group 
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implied that the current CSP had a 'good pedigree' . Indeed, another city council 
interviewee claimed that this steering group may have shaped some of New 
Labour's thinking on partnerships, as it was visited by Jack Straw during his time in 
Opposition. 
In Lincoln, one interviewee, an ex-police officer and former coordinator of the Safer 
Cities programme, was able to describe the history of the partnership prior to the 
CDA. Urban Challenge emerged in Lincoln after the end of the Safer Cities initiative; 
it was established as a charity and limited company, its directors were ex-
practitioners from the Safer Cities group, and the ex-Safer Cities coordinator became 
the manager. Initially, Urban Challenge provided basic-skills training in deprived 
communities,194 but later began to address community safety. Hence the manager of 
Urban Challenge began to service the CSP and its subgroups, and his role became 
similar to that of a community safety manager for the partnership. 
This interviewee suggested that the history of community safety in Lincoln provided 
the partnership with a reasonable starting place, perhaps placing them slightly 
ahead of other partnerships in the county. Two other interviewees confirmed this, 
but also suggested that Lincoln's head start had been lost, partly because of the 
'baggage' of the old community safety structures, and partly because they had been 
distracted by the DAT merger and the introduction of the national crime recording 
standards. Indeed, as I have already discussed in chapter five, it was notable that the 
partnership in Lincoln lacked a formal community safety team. 
When interviewees discussed the impact of the CDA on community safety practice, 
most - with the exception of police and fire representatives in Birmingham -
194 This focus was partly because it used to be funded by the Training and Enterprise Council, 
although, at the time of the research, it was primarily funded through the Single Regeneration Budget 
and Europe, as well as being housed by the city council. 
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talked about processual and structural issues rather than outcomes.195 The two 
interviewees who did discuss the impact of the CDA on crime and disorder 
recognised the difficulties of untangling 'cause and effect', especially because the 
CDA was accompanied by other urban regeneration initiatives. I will return to the 
issue of the impact of the CDA on crime and disorder in chapter seven. 
In terms of processual issues, interviewees in all three areas suggested that the legal 
weight of the CDA forced agencies to work together in partnership, and it 
established the view that the responsibility for community safety should be shared. 
This quotation from a drug action team worker provides an interesting, if somewhat 
idealistic, view of the impact of the CDA on multi-agency community safety 
practice: 
[T]here is a will to try and understand ... even to the extent that we're 
actually realising where we're not good at it. ... I think that's healthy 
because it's self-critical and it's challenging and it proves that people care 
... some agencies are more important than others but it is happening. I 
think the Crime and Disorder Act probably helped to bring that 
realisation. It basically set it down in stone that ... if you're the police, we 
can't do this by ourselves, and we have to work in partnership (DAT 
representative). 
Whilst the CDA created a legal obligation, this had not guaranteed involvement 
from agencies such as the PCT and the county council (where applicable). This is 
further evidenced by the erratic attendance of these agencies at strategic partnership 
meetings, outlined in chapter five. 
Police and city council representatives in Birmingham also noted the special 
importance of the CDA for the police; in theory it shifted some of the responsibility 
195 Five interviewees did not know about the impact of the CDA on either processes or outcomes. 
They also tended to be newcomers. The role of newcomers is defined in chapter five. 
for community safety from the police to the city council (as well as other 
organisations) and, according to a police authority representative, the CDA allowed 
the police to relinquish their role as the primary providers of crime control, with 
good grace (after failing to impact on the problem themselves). This was not a view 
endorsed by a senior police representative in Cambridge, who suggested that the 
police were key players in the partnerships because community safety remained 
their 'core business'.196. Alternatively, perhaps, as a fire service representative 
suggested, the police were key players because they were unwilling or unable to 
relinquish this role. I will discuss the sharing or otherwise of the responsibility for 
crime control in chapter eight. 
The importance of the CDA for the police and city council was also described as an 
opportunity for joining-up community safety practice, developing closer working 
relations (particularly between these two organisations), and preventing duplication 
through better communication and the sharing of information. Indeed, partnership 
guidance encouraged information-sharing protocols (Home Office, 1998b). 
Representatives from the police and the city council in Birmingham and Lincoln 
expressed these views. In addition, in Birmingham police and probation service 
representatives viewed the CDA as a framework which clarified expectations about 
the CSPs and made it less vulnerable to the whims of local politicians. 
The CDA also meant that community safety was no longer voluntary; rather it was a 
statutory obligation. A city council representative in Cambridge viewed this as a 
negative aspect of the partnerships because the will to succeed was more important 
than legal obligations. In contrast, this Birmingham City Council representative felt 
that statutory obligations rather than volition had focused the partnership on the 
important community safety issues: 
196 In contrast, a youth offending service representative in Birmingham felt that the impact of the CDA 
had been most notable amongst police representatives, as they had embraced the spirit of partnership 
working as well as beginning to talk more like social workers. 
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Yeah, the difference was that we were doing it then because we thought it 
was a good thing to do or a nice thing to do. Whereas now we're doing it 
because we have to do it ... I think where the Act has forced us ... into a 
strategic response, bigger issue type stuff, rather than the bolt on stuff, so 
rather than looking at a quick-fix solution that some of that short-term 
stuff did, we ought to be looking at long-term squeezing out of crime ... 
so that you're actually looking at roots and causes, rather than just the 
leaves on the end (City council representative, Birmingham). 
This interviewee also indicated that community safety, as a statutory obligation, was 
no longer added-on to partners' 'day-jobs' in their respective organisations. Another 
police representative suggested that this mainstreaming of community safety was 
further endorsed by section 17 of the CDA.197 An interviewee in Cambridge 
suggested that the CDA also raised awareness about community safety amongst 
partner agencies, and this was perceived to be a 'good thing'. However, a county 
council representative suggested that the mainstreaming of community safety 
simply meant that social policy became inextricably linked to crime and disorder, 
and contributed to the 'criminalisation of social policy'. 
Other than mainstreaming, partners also referred to the other statutory processes 
contained in the CDA - the audit, strategy and public consultation - which did not 
exist prior to the CDA. According to a probation service representative, for example, 
the audit meant that the partnership was better informed than it had been before the 
CDA. Public consultation about crime and disorder was intended to create greater 
'community involvement' in, and public accountability for, community safety, 
although practitioners disputed this (as I discuss later in this chapter). 
197 Section 17 states that it is the duty, most notably of the local authority, to "exercise its various 
functions with due regard for the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do 
all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area" . This suggests that crime 
prevention should have an increasingly central place in the operation of agencies, other than the 
police (http ://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts1998/98037-b.htm). 
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Interviewees in all areas suggested that the CDA created new structures, such as the 
regional offices and dedicated community safety teams. They also indicated that the 
funding process changed; from 1999 onwards the Home Office gave money directly 
to the partnership, whereas in the past partner agencies had to apply to government 
departments for grants for specific projects: 
[T]he partnership is the primary driver for spending government money 
when it comes to community safety. Pre CDA it wasn't like that. The 
police had a budget, and partnerships, if they existed, could apply to 
various different government departments for grants - CCTV was one of 
them but that was back in the 1980s ... now, everything that counts is fed 
through the partnership ... So that's a definite change and obviously that 
brings responsibility along with it (Police representative, Cambridge). 
It appeared that additional government money198 was beneficial to the 
implementation of community safety, but also created additional bureaucracy for the 
partnerships associated with how and when the funding could be spent, which will 
be discussed in chapter seven. 
Systematisation and standardisation of community safety practice by the CDA 
appeared to depend on the local history of community safety. In Birmingham, the 
demise of the community safety unit before the CDA left a 'blank slate' and few 
community safety structures and staff to be standardised. However, in Cambridge 
and in Lincoln existing partnerships had to be restructured or scrapped altogether. A 
Cambridge City Council representative noted that, at the time of the CDA, there was 
a reluctance to "replace something that appeared to be successful with something as 
yet untried". A Cambridgeshire Constabulary representative also noted that it was 
difficult to harness pre-existing subgroups to the agenda of the re-formed CSP. 
198 The funding streams are described in chapter two. 
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Similarly in Lincoln, restructuring the partnership was a matter of trial and error; for 
example, a representative from Urban Challenge suggested that Urban Challenge 
was initially a separate advisory group to the CSP, but this meant that there were too 
many strategists on the LCRE and not enough 'doers', and eventually the two 
groups were merged. A police representative viewed this process of trial and error 
as "refining and formalising" what already existed. 
In sum, in Birmingham the CDA appeared to represent a fresh start after a 'troubled' 
past. In Cambridge and Lincoln, however, the CDA re-structured existing 
partnerships to conform to the incoming legislation. This suggests that the 
interpretation and implementation of the CDA were intimately connected with the 
history of community safety in both areas. Perhaps Lincoln and Cambridge had 
more 'baggage', which consequently slowed their progress. Birmingham had less 
'baggage' because of the lull in community safety immediately before the CDA, but 
earlier tensions, for example between the police and the city council, continued in 
partnership relations. Taken together this implies that partnerships may experience 
difficulties in escaping the 'baggage' of the past. 
The discussion thus far raises three questions about the impact of the CDA. First, 
was it a catalyst, kick-starting the process of change by providing a loose framework 
around which practitioners could work? Second, was the impact of the CDA direct, 
it being the main driver of change? Third, was its impact negligible, because changes 
which practitioners attributed to the CDA would have happened anyway? In sum, 
the CDA arguably had either a direct, a catalytic or a minimal impact. 
In Cambridge and Lincoln practitioners viewed the affect of the CDA to be direct - it 
more or less established the CSPs, although there was some flexibility in how the 
legislation was interpreted. In Birmingham and Lincoln, interviewees viewed the 
CDA simply as a catalyst; it gave community safety a 'jump-start' from which it 
could evolve. In Birmingham and Lincoln other interviewees viewed the impact of 
the CDA as more ambiguous; one was unclear as to whether the CDA or the 
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partnerships came first. The other felt that community safety practice would have 
evolved anyway without the CDA, although perhaps in a slightly different manner. 
In all three areas, interviewees believed that the partnerships had expanded since the 
CDA, although in different ways. In Birmingham, there were changes199 made to its 
structure, processes and priorities. For example, the partnership strengthened its 
community safety unit; created an ASB unit (to be re-located from the housing 
department to the chief executive's department) and a crime mapping web site; and 
developed a commissioning approach to funding. One interviewee was unsure, 
however, about how long this period of growth would last before the partnership 
was held to account for the way it was spending public money. 
Cambridge and Lincoln were not in such a state of flux; the changes since the CDA 
were described as an 'evolution', rather than a 'revolution'. Interviewees in Lincoln 
noted that membership of the partnership had expanded; it began to include 
Connexions and a representative from a local school. However, the range of partner 
agencies remained narrower than in Birmingham and Cambridge. The partnership 
appeared to have begun with a small, close-knit group; it included representatives 
from the police, city council and the county council, and they established good 
working relationships. Birmingham and Cambridge had also expanded; eventually 
Birmingham hoped to include an electronic network of (peripheral) members in 
order to reduce the size of the strategic partnership meetings. A Cambridge City 
Council representative suggested that increasing the number of partners encouraged 
a wider range of organisations to think outside of their 'silos', about their role in 
addressing community safety. 
The Police Reform Act 2002 might explain the expansion of each of the partnerships; 
statutory involvement was extended to the PCT, fire service and police authority. 
199 Practitioners in Birmingham described the partnerships' current period of change as 'spawning' 
and a 'metamorphosis' . 
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This legislation might have served to remind partners of their crime and disorder 
obligations. For example, a Cambridge city council representative hoped it would 
encourage the PCT to contribute resources to the community safety team. Other 
interviewees were sceptical, however, as to whether or not it would alter levels of 
attendance since the PCT, for example, had no community safety performance 
indicators. 
Three themes emerged when partners described the evolution of the partnerships,2oo 
all of which suggested that change was progressive. 201 First, partners referred to 
different phases of development: 
[T]he first three years ... that would probably be more about learning than 
it was about delivering, and settling down, because I don't believe there 
was a significant amount of delivery in that period ... so this next three-
year period we should have learnt the lessons of the first three years and 
now become more experienced at focusing ... and really talking about 
monitoring and evaluation ... So I think, phase I, first three years 
learning, phase 2, starting to deliver now, phase 3 is start to merge 
together more, linking in together more so that then phase 4 will be, you 
know, cooking on gas (Police representative, Cambridge). 
Second, practitioners described the partnerships as 'maturing' or 'growing up'. In 
Birmingham, a police and city council representative both described the partnership 
as becoming more critical and self-reflexive. For example, partners were able to 
acknowledge failings and limitations such as about what they could deliver; this was 
viewed as a testimony to the partnership's maturity. In Lincoln and Birmingham, 
two police representatives described maturation in terms of an increasing 
200 In Lincoln, a senior city council representative argued that it was difficult to identify any stages in 
partnership development because partnerships develop so gradually; he described it as like 'watching 
your children grow up', he said "you suddenly wonder how it is that they got to be so old". 
201 The term 'evolution' implies that change was progressive, an assumption that I question in chapter 
nine, where I examine whether or not Morgan's recommendations have been heeded. 
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appreciation of the differences between agencies. A youth service representative in 
Lincoln felt that the partnership gradually assumed greater independence from the 
Home Office and its priorities. Whilst they had not yet reached maturity, this 
interviewee commented that, in the future, the partnership should guard against 
senility, staleness and impotence: 
[M]ost things have a life, ... an energetic, lively youth, and mature and 
deliberative middle age, and then senility ... in an ideal partnership, I 
think you have to constantly look out for that point when maturity 
becomes old age ... this isn't working anymore, let's find a nice humane 
way to put it to sleep ... but we're far from that, we're still in the sort of 
developing phase, we're not even mature yet (City council representative, 
Birmingham). 
Thirdly, interviewees referred to the partnerships as 'nonning, forming, storming 
and performing', a model used to understand group dynamics and organisational 
behaviour.202 This interviewee described the partnership in Birmingham as having 
already been through these stages of development: 
[T]eams go through stages of development, there's a forming stage where 
people come to the table ... they're not quite sure why they're there, or 
what the other person's doing. Then there's a storming stage of dissent, 
and people starting to challenge what the status quo is. Then there's 
'norming', generating collective values, and then you finally reach 
performing ... I actually think that ours has got through all that and is a 
very mature partnership ... rated very highly by the Home Office (City 
Council representative, Birmingham). 
202 See for example the following uri for a description of the 'norming, forming, storming and 
performing' model: http://highered.mcgraw-
hilI.com/sites/0072470089/student viewOI chapter outIine.html 
By contrast, a different Birmingham City Council representative, with a lengthier 
involvement in the partnership, described it as at the 'nonning' stage and himself as 
the 'normer' . In Cambridge, two interviewees also referred to this model of 
partnership development, but did not indicate at which stage they were. 
6.2 Does size matter? 
Given that Birmingham has a population nearly ten times larger than that of 
Cambridge or Lincoln (977,087 compared to 108,863 and 85,595 respectively), it was 
unsurprising that in Birmingham the size and complexity of the city was mentioned 
by interviewees as affecting the operation of the partnership: 
The size of Birmingham is immense ... it's very difficult to get a handle on 
the scale of a city this size ... the demographic profile, the crime profile, 
the numbers involved, you know, it's an immense undertaking ... In fact I 
remember Nick Tilley [academic] ... actually said something to the effect 
that the crime and disorder act was never ever drafted to take account of 
somewhere the size of Birmingham (Police representative, Birmingham). 
In Cambridge and Lincoln, however, the two-tier local authority structure appeared 
to have a more important bearing on the partnership, which I discuss next. 
A Birmingham city council representative described Birmingham as a 'sleeping 
giant', as it had large budgets,203 but not as much political 'clout' as it should have 
given its size. The complexity of the city also appeared to hamper the delivery of 
community safety; for example, nine police BCUs served the partnership. In spite of 
this, practitioners mainly from the city council, recognised that the size and 
complexity of Birmingham could also be used as an excuse for inaction. 
203 This interviewee suggested that Birmingham's large budget meant that, even a small amount of 
flexibility at the local level, corresponded to a large amount of money 
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Difficulties in delivering community safety were also compounded by the enormity 
and diversity of social problems in Birmingham (compared to Lincoln and 
Cambridge),204 such as deprivation and serious crime, 205 which regularly received 
national media attention. For example, two young women were shot dead in Aston 
in January 2003 in a gang-related incident, and this received considerable media 
coverage. There is also immense diversity in Birmingham - in the 2001 census, 
Birmingham had a non-white population of 29.6 per cent (compared to 10.6 per cent 
in Cambridge, 2.2 per cent in Lincoln and 9.1 per cent in England as a whole).206 A 
police representative summarises these issues: 
[Y]ou have an issue of scale here that is quite difficult to describe, you 
have an organisation such as us that has eleven thousand employees ... 
we have a turnover of over half a billion pounds a year, operating with a 
council that has a turnover of two and a half billion pounds a year, sitting 
at the same table with organisations of a hundred people, and the 
disparity is immense really. And you have a city that has so many issues 
... you have international terrorism, running up to football violence, to 
criminal damage, to anti-social behaviour, all within one partnership. And 
then you have a population that's as diverse as it possibly could be .. . and 
somehow you've got to come to a consensus about what the priority area 
and the priority need is (Police representative, Birmingham). 
It appeared therefore that the size of Birmingham was a double edged sword: it 
guaranteed more money and more power on the national stage but at the same time 
it generated expectations from central government, and was sometimes used to 
excuse inertia. 
204 Interviewees in Cambridge also reported that the partnership was affected by contextual factors, 
such as the large student population and homelessness. 
205 See table 4.1, which summarises contextual information for each area. 
206 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/ 
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6.3 The local authority context 
Partnerships emphasise local authority structure (rather than the policing divisions 
or BCUs), since there is a partnership for every city or district council in England and 
Wales, depending whether it is a unitary or two-tier local authority (respectively). 
Interviewees in all three areas noted that partnerships in two-tier local authorities 
faced a number of challenges. In Lincoln and Birmingham, city council 
representatives suggested that two-tier local authority structures create additional 
bureaucracy and an increased number of potentially conflicting views to be 
managed and balanced. As one Birmingham City Council representative points out: 
[O]ne of the biggest issues in the two-tier area was just the difference of 
opinion ... we had an example where racially aggravated crime was being 
dealt with quite well in the bulk of the county ... But we had one district 
that refused to acknowledge racially aggravated crime ... Now the only 
option we had was to not ... go to their meetings ... or to go and end up 
being party to ... a strategy that we fundamentally disagreed with ... 
Now I think that's much less of a problem in a unitary area where those 
differences of opinion won't happen so much (City council representative, 
Birmingham). 
This comment implies that the priorities of the partnership and city council can be 
quite different to those of the County Council. This view was also expressed in 
Lincoln; a city council representative suggested that Lincolnshire is more rural than 
the district of Lincoln, and thus there were a greater number of contrasting views 
and priorities to balance. 
These differences in priorities between the county as whole and the district raise 
questions about the possibility of joining-up community safety practice across the 
county. In Cambridge, there appeared to be some progress with this; a police 
representative felt that the two-tier local authority structure was a good opportunity 
for districts to share 'good practice', especially since one police force serviced the 
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county. In Cambridge, a county council representative also commented that the 
partnership had attempted to standardise practice across the county. For example, 
there was a standard form used to apply for partnership funds, and a county website 
with links to the websites of each of the district partnerships By contrast, a police 
representative suggested that there were inconsistencies across the county, and it 
was difficult for the police to liaise with seven different chief executive departments, 
which hampered close working relationships between the police and the local 
authorities. 
Regular attendance by county council representatives was another difficulty. As has 
already been discussed, in Cambridge and Lincoln there were two main reasons for 
the paucity of county council involvement in the partnerships. First, it was difficult 
to find someone to represent all county council departments and disseminate 
information to other key players in their organisation. Second, servicing the district 
partnerships was costly in terms of the time and resources of county officers. 
In sum, two-tier areas experienced clashes between the priorities of county and 
district councils, difficulties joining-up community safety practice across the county, 
and difficulties encouraging county council involvement. In addition, interviewees 
in Cambridge and Lincoln suggested that legislation and guidance, for example 
about the DATjCSP merger, did not take account of these difficulties. 
Looking to the future, interviewees in Cambridge and Lincoln hoped that the city 
council would eventually become unitary and that strategic management of the 
CSPs would eventually occur at the county rather than the district level. 
Interviewees also talked about merging some of the district partnerships across the 
county. A police representative in Cambridge feared that such a merger would mean 
£10,000-15,000 less each year for the partnership to spend on community safety. In 
Lincoln, interviewees viewed partnership mergers in a more positive light, perhaps 
because such mergers were already underway; the drug and alcohol and domestic 
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violence subgroups had already merged with those of the neighbouring partnership 
of West Lindsay, for instance. 
The devolution of city council services207 to eleven constituencies was an important 
development for the partnership in Birmingham; in meetings, partners discussed 
creating eleven concomitant localised esps, one for each constituency. Interviewees 
suggested that devolution might encourage communication with the' community' 
and participation in the esp and the democratic process. Nevertheless, interviewees 
recognised that devolution might also create challenges for the esp to overcome. For 
example, police and peT representatives were concerned that the city council would 
focus on devolution rather than community safety, and that there would be 
difficulties reconciling the priorities of constituent partnerships with those of the city 
partnership. 
These concerns about devolution were remarkably similar to the concerns expressed 
by interviewees in two-tier local authorities. Indeed, one interviewee noted that the 
devolution agenda in Birmingham could create a partnership structure similar to 
that of two-tier local authorities, with all the attendant difficulties: 
[Y]ou're looking at something that's probably synonymous with a shire 
and it's districts, which is a nightmare, if you devolve things like that so 
each area is going to have its own partnership ... That's all very well but 
then you have to fall into some overarching strategy ... that takes account 
of the strategic but also all the little individual bits ... when you look at 
Birmingham ... it's much, much bigger than the sort of budget you'd be 
getting in a shire county with lots of districts, but it still raises those issues 
(Interviewee, Birmingham). 
207 According to a city council interviewee, housing, social services and the highways continued to be 
managed centrally and the remainder were devolved. 
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On the surface, the partnerships in Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln appeared 
to face quite different challenges, not least because of the two-tier structure, yet on 
closer examination, the devolution agenda in Birmingham, suggests at least one 
similarity between them. 
6.4 The wider community safety terrain: the relationship between 
CSPs, the local strategic partnerships and drug action teams 
The CSPs are part of a wider community safety terrain comprised of the LSPs and 
DATs. Local authority structure affects the nature of the relationships between the 
CSPs, DATs and the LSPs. In two-tier local authorities, such as Cambridge and 
Lincoln, there is a countywide DAT20B but a district level LSP. In unitary local 
authorities there is an LSP and a DAT for each CSP. During fieldwork, Birmingham 
had a I city strategic partnership', although after devolution there were plans to have 
an LSP in each constituency. For the purposes of my research, I assumed that the city 
strategic partnership in Birmingham had a similar status to that of the local strategic 
partnerships in Cambridge and Lincoln. 
Interviewees often had conflicting views on the relationship between the LSP and 
the CSP, but there were five themes. First, some interviewees suggested that the CSP 
was a subgroup of the LSP. Others, however, felt that the relationship was not as 
clear-cut as this. In Cambridge, this could be explained by the relative newness of 
the LSPs; when interviewing partners, LSPs had only just been introduced and 
relationships between the CSP and LSP had yet to take shape. Other interviewees 
from smaller agencies (such as the probation service) who did not attend LSP 
meetings felt" out of the loop" as there was not enough feedback to the CSP from the 
LSP meetings. 
208 Because DATs are multi-agency it appeared difficult to find an individual representative of the 
team willing to attend each district CSP meeting. In Cambridge, for the first half of the fieldwork, the 
DAT coordinator attended board meetings until he left the DA T. In Lincoln, no one attended from the 
DAT. 
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Second, interviewees in Cambridge and Lincoln were optimistic that the LSPs 
facilitated a citywide perspective and a joined-up approach to issues other than 
crime and disorder, such as education and health. This was not a view expressed in 
Birmingham, perhaps because of its size. Instead, interviewees in Birmingham 
suggested that the LSP created bureaucracy which added little to the partnership: 
[I]f anything, the city strategic partnership adds confusion and yet 
another layer of debate ... [it] doesn't add anything positive to what we 
do ... I think government is quite clear that they've got themselves into a 
pickle over partnerships ... Certainly for Birmingham, I don't think it 
works, it's too big (Community safety team representative, Birmingham). 
Third, two interviewees from Birmingham and Cambridge city council viewed the 
relationship with the LSP as a two-way flow of information, support and advice; it 
was viewed as a non-hierarchical arrangement, with the LSP only loosely holding 
the CSP to account. By contrast, other interviewees from a range of agencies in 
Birmingham and Cambridge, including the city council, felt that the relationship was 
hierarchical one in which the LSP held the CSP to account. Yet in Birmingham, two 
other interviewees (one from the city council and the other from the police) 
suggested that the LSP could not hold the CSP to account because the LSPs were not 
held to account themselves. These two interviewees were particularly critical of the 
LSPs, suggesting their purpose was for" navel gazing" and" sorting out egos": 
If LSPs are groups of people whose egos mean that they enjoy being 
members and that the most important thing to come out of them is navel 
gazing ... LSPs are there because they're there because they're there 
because they're there at the moment. People need to feel the burn ... why 
put people together with something with a p on the end of it unless they 
actually are delivering. I just think that anything with a p ought to have 
its own performance indicators ... LSPs don't strike me as being 
accountable to anyone at the moment for delivering anything (Police 
representative, Birmingham). 
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Fourth, interviewees also talked about merging or integrating the LSPs and CSPs in 
order to further improve delivery. Interviewees, especially in Cambridge, discussed 
the possibility of the LSPs becoming more powerful than and possibly subsuming 
the CSPs, thus becoming the main place where strategic decisions about community 
safety would be taken. 
Fifth, some interviewees felt that the LSPs were good at streamlining, joining-up and 
preventing duplication. By contrast, others thought that they took attention away 
from delivering community safety, as this interviewee illustrates: 
Now what we've got is local strategic partnership parachuting in ... but 
what's the interrelationship between the community safety partnership 
and the local strategic partnership ... some of these actions mitigate 
against success because whilst we're all concerning ourselves with how 
this bureaucracy links in together, you can take your eye off the ball and 
not address the issues which are important on the ground (Police 
representative, Birmingham). 
This interviewee also illustrates that practitioners consider the LSPs to be 
'parachuted in' by government, without sufficient thought or guidance about the 
relationship between the CSP and the LSP. Taken together, these conflicting views 
suggest a lack of clarity about the relationship between the CSP and the LSP. 
There were also confusions over the relationship between the DAT and the CSP. The 
Police Reform Act 2002 encouraged DATs and CSPs to merge,209 and to become a 
subgroup of the CSP in unitary local authorities. In two-tier local authority areas, a 
straightforward merger was not possible; instead the government 'encouraged' 
closer working relationships between DATs and CSPs. This illustrates how 
209 peT representatives were worried about the implications of the merger; in Lincoln, they were 
concerned that if drugs became a crime and disorder issue, then the focus would be on enforcement 
not treatment. 
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legislation and government guidance does necessarily take account of important 
contextual factors, such as local authority structure. 
In Birmingham, the DAT was a subgroup of the CSP and had been since the first 
strategy. In Cambridge and Lincoln,210 practitioners wrote to the Home Office; they 
explained the difficulties of merging a countywide DAT with many district 
partnerships, and requested flexibility in their interpretation of the legislation. The 
government made a national response; within all two-tier local authorities they 
encouraged a 'closer working relationship' between the CSP and the DAT. In order 
to comply with this, the LCRE created a time-limited task group to discuss how they 
could work more closely with the LSP, which produced a 'virtual induction pack' 
available on the Internet. In Cambridge, the partnership made few structural 
changes, although there may have been changes to working practices which 
complied with the government's request. The DATjCSP merger demonstrates that 
practitioners had some manoeuvrability in relation to government constraints. 
A DAT representative suggested that the DAT j CSP merger indicated that the DAT 
was being 'punished' by government for its 'failure' to deliver its goals. This 
interviewee was disgruntled that the CSPs had not been punished in this way, 
despite similar failures: 
Crime and Disorder Partnerships they've struck quite lucky ... DATs on 
the other hand were created ... with almost no additional money and 
ever since then they've been pilloried for not delivering. But somehow the 
Crime and Disorder Partnerships have managed to avoid being pilloried. 
I don't quite know how they've done it actually (DAT representative). 
210 In Lincoln, the Drug and Alcohol subgroup of the CSP merged with a similar subgroup of the 
neighbouring partnership in West Lindsay. 
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Other interviewees confirmed these difficulties with the DATs. A Birmingham City 
Council representative criticised the DAT for commissioning work without an 
overall sense of its purpose and priorities; lacking middle management; and failing 
to include alcohol, as well as street drugs, in its remit. In Lincoln, interviewees 
reported that the DAT had overspent on its budget due to miscommunication -
they thought that they had not spent their allotted money when in fact they had. In 
both Lincoln and Birmingham, police representatives complained that increases in 
DAT funding corresponded not with increases in the availability of treatment 
services, but with increase in the number of bureaucrats. 
6.5 Conveying 'community' concerns: relationships between the 
partnership, the 'community', the media and elected members 
The concept of 'community'211 arguably has a prominent position in the 
communitarian agenda of New Labour. Practitioners were asked about the role of 
the 'community' in the partnerships and to what extent they constituted an external 
pressure. Clearly, there could be differences between practitioners' perceptions and 
'reality'; however, it was beyond the scope of the research to conduct a community 
survey to ascertain the degree of 'community' knowledge and involvement in the 
partnerships. Besides, such a survey may have been futile since, with the exception 
of specific community-groups, practitioners suggested that citizens knew little about 
the partnership and its activities. 
In what follows, however, I examine the involvement of the 'community' in 
partnership processes such as consultation and the dissemination of information; in 
partnership structures such as subgroups; and their representation by the voluntary 
sector, community organisations and elected members. I also consider the issue of 
diversity and representation, which is of particular importance given the ethnically 
diverse nature of Birmingham in particular. 
211 As I noted in chapter one, the concept of 'community' is problematic. 
199 
In Birmingham and Cambridge, board and subgroup meetings did not directly 
involve individual members of the 'community', although in Lincoln there was a 
representative from a local school who attended board meetings. She did not have 
an explicit role in representing the views of the 'community' (as this was given to 
someone else), but her presence was a close approximation to direct community 
involvement. 
In Birmingham, practitioners suggested that citizens did not attend meetings 
because they discussed sensitive and sometimes confidential information, for 
example, about current policing operations or areas of the city where crime was 
rising rapidly, which could be inappropriately leaked to the public or the media with 
negative repercussions (such as fear of crime). Partners also worried that the 
presence of members of the public would inhibit professionals and prevent frank 
discussion. These views were expressed by a range of practitioners from police 
representatives to city council representatives to Customs and Excise. 
By contrast, interviewees in Cambridge and Lincoln suggested that, given their 
strategic focus, CSPs were of little interest to members of the public; they believed 
that citizens would focus on single issues or issues unrelated to the strategic 
meetings. Moreover, misunderstandings were another possibility; the' community' 
representative in Lincoln admitted that she struggled to understand the jargon and 
the remit of the CSP. 
Given these reservations about the direct involvement of citizens in strategic 
partnership meetings, practitioners involved the' community' in other ways, mainly 
through the statutory consultation process.212,213 Public opinion was collected in a 
range of ways by the three partnerships: Birmingham conducted surveys; 
212 As I described in chapter two, consultation was intended to check whether or not the audit and 
strategy corresponded to local concerns and needs. 
213 This tendency to connate 'community' involvement with public consultation is also noted by 
Marinetto (2003) . 
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Cambridge held conferences and relied on feedback from members of the 
community safety team and community development workers; and Lincoln received 
feedback from a network of community organisations.214,215 In addition there were 
consultation mechanisms employed individually by the local authorities and 
police.216 
Practitioners recognised the value of public consultation but also noted the inherent 
difficulties. Interviewees in Cambridge and Lincoln noted the low turnout at 
community conferences and the lack of interest in the partnership, as well as the 
difficulties of over-consultation and failing to provide the' community' with post-
consultation information about achievements. Police representatives in Lincoln also 
believed that members of the' community' would prefer to see delivery rather than 
consultation. In Cambridge and Birmingham there were concerns that consultation 
mechanisms were unspecialised; questions about community safety were tacked 
onto general surveys carried out by individual organisations, such as the city 
council, on the quality of life. In Cambridge, two police representatives also felt that 
consultation had not been wide enough; due to the pressures of time, it had failed to 
take full account of the views of 'hard-to-hear groups', especially in the first audit 
and strategy. 
Two unusual but nonetheless interesting points of view, expressed by key players in 
Birmingham and Lincoln, were firstly that public consultation failed to 'really' 
214 These differences in approach might be because Cambridge and Lincoln are smaller and could thus 
rely on feedback from the community safety team, since these practitioners were more likely to 
communicate regularly with members of the ' community', compared to those in Birmingham, who 
had a policy focus . 
215 In their analysis of consultation used by partnerships nationwide, Newburn and Jones (2002) 
found that practitioners rated citizens' panels as the best approach, but few used them. 
21 6 The 'community' were indirectly involved in the partnership via city council and police structures. 
For example, in Birmingham there was a regular MORI survey of public opinion about the quality of 
life and local area ward committees. Similarly, police representatives in all three cases noted the 
utility of police-community liaison forums, CBMs and minority ethnic liaison officers. However, 
interviewees questioned the relevance of these consultation mechanisms to the partnership since they 
were not focused on community safety. 
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involve the community in the partnerships, a point to which I return in due course. 
The second interviewee suggested that community safety policy could not be 
entirely based on public opinion because the public's views could be conflicting and 
controversial; for example, some members of the community might view expelling 
asylum seekers as an appropriate community safety policy. This raises questions 
about how the partnerships incorporated views of the 'community' into community 
safety practice. It also illustrates the contested nature of crime and disorder. 
The' community' was also involved in the partnership through the dissemination of 
information;217 the (local) media; and the publication of strategies, audits and annual 
reports on partnership websites and distributed to individual households, libraries 
and GP surgeries. The relationship between the media and the partnership was the 
main focus of discussions about keeping the public informed. The partnerships were 
keen to publicise positive news that crime and disorder was going down; hence 
there were discussions about the kinds of crime data to be released to the media. For 
example, in Lincoln there was disagreement about the data to be included in a public 
report, as the use of 'cleaned' data would have presented a more favourable view on 
crime in Lincoln than the 'uncleaned' data. The partnership decided to use the 
'uncleaned' data, to avoid potential allegations about dishonest practices. From time 
to time, this partnership also discussed the need to counter negative and misleading 
news stories with correct or up-to-date data, for example about progress with their 
targets. 
Birmingham had a crime data website, 'COSMOS',218 for simplistic analysis of local 
crime hotspots (based on police data). There was disagreement as to whether or not 
the public as well as practitioners should be given access to this database. It was 
decided that only practitioners should use it, as the data were considered too 
politically sensitive and access could be open to abuse by the local media. The Chair 
217 Unlike Cambridge and Lincoln, Birmingham had employed a public relations officer. 
218 See the following website for more information: http://www.cosmos-bcsp.com/ 
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in Birmingham also requested that crime analysts provide partners with "headline 
figures", so that all could publicise similar good news stories if contacted by the 
media. 
The need to publicise positive news appeared to arise because partners wished to 
raise the profile of the partnership and counter the view amongst the public that the 
police were solely responsible for addressing crime and disorder. In Birmingham, an 
interviewee also hoped that raising the public profile of the partnership would 
enhance the accountability of the partnership to the public. Partners also promoted 
positive news because they were acutely aware of the repercussions of negative 
news stories. In all three areas, partners were concerned that knowledge about 
geographical hotspots could stigmatise these areas and adversely affect house prices, 
as well as generally increasing fear of crime and tarnishing the reputation of the 
partnership and the city. For example, partners in Birmingham were concerned that 
high burglary rates amongst students would discourage young people from 
attending university in Birmingham. Publicising positive news could also be 
interpreted as having symbolic significance in assuaging citizens' fear of crime and 
enhancing the view that the government is controlling crime. Yet, as I discuss in 
chapters seven and eight, little firm evidence exists that there was any positive news 
to promote in the first place. That is, publicising positive news conceals 'messy' 
practice, which is not joined-up, and the lack of evidence about partnership 
outcomes. 
Partners also noted practical difficulties with promoting positive news. Partners felt 
that they were faced with a powerful media machine.219 One practitioner wondered 
why the public would be interested: 
[W]e live in a media frenzy, there's only so much that the community 
safety partnership can grab of that and it's probably going to be in local 
219 See Beck (1992) who acknowledges the power of the mass media in the ' risk society'. 
203 
papers in fairly sort of small column inches. It's hard to get a high profile 
and maybe people just aren' t interested, maybe people do just want to 
live their lives, do their job, come home from work, shut the door and do 
whatever they do (DAT representative). 
Unsurprisingly practitioners in all partnerships noted that the CSPs had not been 
entirely successful in raising the profile of the partnership, perhaps because the 
audit, strategies and annual reports lacked relevance to ordinary citizens: 
I see the [partnership] as ... great intentions ... but they need something 
that raises their profile, in terms of being viewed as a bit of an authority 
on something ... they should be a bit of a mouthpiece ... And I think that 
can only happen through ... saying ... here' s what we' re trying to achieve, 
these are our objectives, we're all sending individuals along ... we've got 
to make it tangible, it can't just be a case of nice annual report, sounds 
good (Probation service representative). 
The media was also viewed as an intermediary, or possibly even a source of 
pressure, communicating the concerns of local people. In all three areas, 
practitioners mentioned pressures from the media in relation to ASB and the use and 
enforcement of ASBOs, and in Birmingham, pressure relating to serious crime, such 
as the shooting of two young women in Aston in January 2003. Whilst practitioners 
wished to counter negative media publicity about crime and disorder, a DAT 
interviewee also suggested that the partnerships should not raise expectations 
beyond the level of what could be delivered because "there are no magic wands". 
Observation of subgroup meetings suggested that there was little direct community 
involvement, although there were members of tenants' associations, residents' 
groups, the voluntary sector and other community organisations present. 
Interviewees in all three areas suggested that 'community' involvement in the 
implementation of projects' on the ground' (rather than strategically), might be the 
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best way of involving the community. This had not yet happened, but practitioners 
in Birmingham hoped to increase this kind of 'community' involvement through the 
devolution of city council services. The difficulties of involving the 'community' in 
subgroups and on the ground were explained in various ways. Interviewees in 
Cambridge felt that the thematic rather than geographical focus of the subgroups 
limited the possibility of local ownership and involvement. In Lincoln, an 
interviewee noted a paucity of community organisations in Lincoln, compared to 
(her previous experiences of working in) Nottinghamshire. 
Only practitioners from Birmingham and Cambridge discussed the involvement of 
the voluntary sector, as Lincoln did not have a voluntary sector representative. As I 
noted in chapter five, a representative from the Council for Voluntary Services (CVS) 
irregularly attended strategic partnership meetings in Cambridge and Birmingham, 
although representatives from voluntary groups, such as Women's Aid and Victim 
Support, appeared to attend in greater number and with greater regularity at 
subgroup meetings. Practitioners questioned, however, whether the voluntary sector 
represented the 'community'. There were two themes: firstly, practitioners suggested 
that the voluntary sector was too diverse to be represented by one individual, for 
example from CVS. Second, the leader of CVS was viewed as too far removed from 
the 'community'; this individual liaised with other members of the voluntary sector 
rather than with the 'community', which limited his or her knowledge of the 
community safety needs of local people. 
In addition, in Birmingham and Lincoln there were few pressure groups to represent 
'community' interests. In Birmingham practitioners, with the exception of one 
interviewee, felt that the 'community' did not exert pressure on the partnership, not 
even after high profile events like the Aston shootings, due to a lack of knowledge of 
the partnership. Similarly in Lincoln, interviewees reported that there were few 
pressures from the' community' except occasionally around ASB, again because of a 
lack of knowledge of the partnership. 
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By contrast, in Cambridge there were vociferous community groups;220 in particular, 
one residents' group pressured the partnership to address the ASB of homeless 
people in their ward. Nearly all interviewees commented on this group, and it was 
frequently discussed at strategic partnership meetings. Initially, the partnership 
resisted these community pressures primarily because the crime problem in this area 
was not as severe as in other areas of the city, and also because their strategy was 
thematic rather than geographical in its focus. Community pressure was eventually 
effective; after a series of public meetings the partnership responded to community 
concerns, with the help of funding from the Policing Standards Unit (PSU). 
This example of 'community' pressure also supports the view that crime and 
disorder is a contested matter. In tackling the problem, the partnership had to 
balance resources, a range of concerns and possible solutions, and the possibility of 
simply displacing the problem elsewhere. This example raises questions about how 
partnerships address community safety; in this case, practitioners queried whether 
the partnership responded to the vociferous residents, rather than the extremity of 
the problem. 
The ward in question is relatively affluent; it has an unemployment rate of 1.7 per 
cent (compared to a Cambridge average of 2.3 per cent and a national average of 3.4 
per cent). Most people are well-educated, thus possessing the necessary social 
capita1221 or 'collective efficacy'222 for successful community pressure. For example, 
in the 2001 census, 57.4 per cent of residents in this particular ward were educated to 
degree level or higher, compared to 41.2 per cent of Cambridge residents and 19.8 
per cent of the nation. An interviewee commented that members of this residents' 
group were a 'constructive irritant' to the partnership, but he wished that residents 
220 In Cambridge there appeared to be a number of pressure groups, such as cycle groups, lesbigay 
groups and another residents' group in a different area of the city, to ensure their priorities were 
incorporated in the strategy. 
221 See Putnam (2000), for example. 
222 See Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997). 
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in other more deprived wards were the ones to make these demands. Therefore, 
whilst 'community' concerns were important in Cambridge, it was the concerns of a 
narrow and relatively powerful section of the 'community'223 that became included 
on the partnership agenda. 
Community pressure on the partnership in Cambridge also prompted uncertainties 
about why these pressures were particularly evident there. The size and complexity 
of Birmingham perhaps meant that the partnership was too distant from the 
'community'. Had I interviewed operational rather than strategic practitioners, 
perhaps I would have encountered a different perspective. As for Lincoln, perhaps it 
is a slightly sleepy backwater, with few community action groups and community 
centres, as noted by one interviewee. Furthermore, it could be that the vociferous 
residents' group in Cambridge raised community safety expectations of residents' 
groups across the city. All of these are possible explanations but difficult to 
substantiate without a community survey. 
The 'community' could also relay concerns to the partnerships via the local 
democratic structure of elected members. Elected members appeared to serve 
different purposes. They were described as conduits of information; this information 
flowed from the 'community' to the partnership and from the partnership back to 
the 'community'. Elected members were informally involved in the three CSPs, 
although towards the end of fieldwork, in Birmingham and Lincoln an elected 
member began to attend board meetings.224 Prior to this, senior city council officers 
reported relevant or sensitive information to elected members. Elected members 
were also sent copies of annual reports, strategies and audits. Cambridge and 
223 The PSU money was used to tackle the concerns of this particular residents' group, as well crime 
problems of a similar, if not, worse magnitude in two other, more deprived areas. This was because 
the partnership did not want to simply respond to 'those able to shout the loudest'. This example 
illustrates how easy it could be for partnerships to simply respond to the concerns of more powerful 
social groups. It also demonstrates the difficult 'tight-rope' that the partnerships have to walk in order 
to balance the concerns of different communities, the government, and resource and time pressures. 
224 It was suggested that elected members were not 'full' partners who took part in decision-making; 
rather they attended as observers in order to keep abreast of developments in the partnership. 
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Lincoln also held conferences for elected members, for example to launch the 
strategy or discuss the DATjCDRP merger or the development of PCSOs. 
Partners seemingly preferred elected members to remain on the periphery of the 
partnershi p: 
[T]here's never been any real pressure from elected members here, what 
they want to know is that the partnership is there, that the crime and 
disorder strategy is being developed, that there are linkages back to what 
we're doing, and that they've got the opportunity to contribute, they're 
not necessarily looking to join the executive and attend the meetings (City 
council representative, Lincoln). 
This interviewee also suggested that elected members were happy to remain on the 
periphery because they were involved in other partnerships and committees, and 
also because the partnership lacked the necessary prestige to make it a desirable 
meeting to attend. 
There were other reasons why officers and other partners were happy for elected 
members to be only informally involved. First, as I observed in Birmingham, 
attending strategic partnership meetings depended on the re-election of elected 
members, which could undermine continuity of membership. Second, interviewees 
in all case studies noted that elected members had strong personal and political 
agendas,225 which might overwhelm the agenda of the CSP. For example, an 
interviewee suggested that (in Lincoln or other old coalfield areas), as a result of 
political affiliations, CSP meetings might 'morph' into a local government meeting 
with all its concomitant city council rules. The personal and political agendas of 
225 For example, they were described as parochial, self-interested and focused on their wards, rather 
than the city. 
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elected members, however, were offset by their authority to grant access to 
resources. 
The personal and political agendas of elected members occasionally created tensions. 
The police, for example, were keen to maintain political independence, and two 
police interviewees in Birmingham felt that this was compromised by the presence 
of elected members at strategic partnership meetings. Hence elected members 
attended but were not 'full' members, as they had no voting rights in decision-
making. Nevertheless, this was not to say that they were unable to influence 
discussions; for example, in a strategic partnership meeting in Birmingham an 
elected member indirectly influenced the decision-making process by speaking, 
infrequently but at length,226 on topics that concerned him. This suggested that 
whilst elected members were unable to vote they could influence discussions and 
thus decisions. 
In Birmingham and Lincoln, interviewees also questioned the extent to which 
elected members had the necessary skills and training to be a part of the CSPs. For 
example, in one CSP meeting an elected member suggested that young people 
hanging around should be a high partnership priority. A police representative 
politely suggested that young people 'hanging around' was not the most serious 
problem facing the city, although it might be considered part of the public 
reassurance agenda. An interviewee in Lincoln also felt that it would be 
inappropriate for elected members to chair partnerships as they did not have the 
necessary expertise or resources to make decisions or divert funds. Questions were 
also raised about the parity of including elected members in the strategic partnership 
meetings, whilst excluding (with the exception of the police authority) their 
226 This elected member spoke twice (9.5 per cent) out of a possible 21 interactions. On this agenda 
item there were 9 speakers and a total of 21 interactions. In fact the Chair and the most senior police 
representative dominated the speaking interactions taking 8 (38.1 per cent) and 5 (23 .8 per cent) of 
them respectively. However, the data do not take into account how long an individual spoke; rather 
they reveal the number of times each individual speaks. Therefore it was possible the elected member 
spoke for a long time on the few occasions that he did speak. 
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counterparts from other partner organisations. For example, the partnership might 
have included the probation board227 or trustees from the voluntary sector. 
In relation to elected members there remains one further issue to discuss; that is, the 
extent to which elected members can be viewed as internal or external to the 
partnership process and whether or not this matters. Elected members were partly 
viewed as internal to the partnership process because they attended meetings and 
provided the' community' with a voice. Elected members could also be viewed as 
external to the partnership process, given their political motivations and 
concomitant focus on their constituency. (That is, given their desire to protect the 
interests of their constituents over their desire to protect the interests of the 
partnership). For this reason, partners appeared to worry about the leaking of 
information to the press or the public. This suggests a need to clarify, in Birmingham 
and in Lincoln, the role of elected members and their priorities, where elected 
members had begun to attend strategic partnership meetings. 
In sum, the 'community' were involved in the partnerships through consultation (by 
the partnership, the city council and the police) and the dissemination of information 
(for example, through the media or through the Internet); community organisations, 
residents' groups, the voluntary sector, and elected members represented the 
'community' in subgroups and the strategic partnership meetings. To what extent, 
however, had the partnerships engaged with the issues of diversity and 
representation? Practitioners appeared aware of the difficulties posed by the concept 
of 'community'; a few questioned what I meant by 'community', indeed one 
interviewee took offence at the word and refused to answer my questions until I 
227 Like the Police Authority the Probation Board allows the 'community' to contribute to the running 
of the probation service and ensures that targets and ethical standards are met. See for example, 
http:// www.westmidlands-probation.gov.uk!wmps!wmpb! howwework.asp 
replaced the word 'community' with the word citizen.228 Another interviewee in 
Birmingham preferred to talk about local people, rather than 'community' : 
I have a problem with the word community, if you're talking about local 
people who live in communities, in local areas, who are involved in local 
projects ... I think the community notion is conceptually spurious, it's a 
real problem - which community, is it where people live, or is it the faith 
grouping? There are thousands of interlocking groups and they're not 
homogeneous (Community Safety Team representative, Birmingham). 
As this quotation illustrates, interviewees also recognised there were many 
communities, rather than one. The problematical nature of 'community' appeared to 
receive greater emphasis in Birmingham compared to the other partnerships; 
perhaps this was a consequence of the diversity of its citizenry, which might have 
given it a more central place within their frames of reference. 
In all partnerships, interviewees claimed to have consulted and communicated with 
'hard-to-hear' groups; for example, in Birmingham the strategy was made available 
in different languages. In Lincoln, the youth council Ire-wrote' the consultation 
questionnaire for use with other young people. Despite these efforts, in all three 
areas (but particularly in Birmingham) interviewees questioned whether or not the 
involvement of the 'community' in the partnership was representative of the 
'community' at large. 
Moreover, other interviewees noted that the strategic partnership in Birmingham 
was comprised of primarily white, middle-class males.229 As one interviewee 
228 He defined citizen as "the people who are citizens of this city, who I would not condescend to call 
community" . 
229 The composition of the partnership might reflect the recruitment policies of partner agencies, 
which might not have been effective in addressing the dearth of women and ethnic minorities in 
senior management. The city council may be an exception to this as currently most of the local 
authorities in the West Midlands have female Chief Executives; Dudley, Sandwell, Wolverhampton 
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commented /I •• • seniority does not necessarily equate with white male, or it shouldn't 
do, especially in somewhere like Birmingham that is so culturally diverse./I This 
suggests that, unlike in the research by Pearson et al. (1992), the police no longer 
view multi-agency work as 'women's work', as most of the police representatives 
were male. By implication, perhaps the same could also be said of other agencies 
since most representatives from all agencies were male. 
At the same time, when asked about the necessity of the partnership representing 
the wider 'community', another Birmingham interviewee noted that tokenism 
should be avoided; she argued that involvement in the partnership should be based 
on merit rather than social group, otherwise it could be insulting. In late modern 
society, individuals are arguably characterised by multiple social identities.23o Thus 
as one interviewee noted, perhaps the meaning of representation is no longer clear: 
The thing that I've struggled with greatly is representation. What do we 
mean by representation, who represents who at any given time and are 
they truly representative? You pull together a group of people who say 
that they're representing a particular group or particular community but 
quite often it's those people who are interested in a particular issue ... 
who quite like attending meetings and talking, but how far do they 
actually represent a community or a section of the community and what 
do we mean by community in any case? (Female interviewee, 
Birmingham). 
One city council interviewee questioned whether the challenges to community safety 
are more important than the social group with whom they are associated, as these 
challenges cut across social groups: 
have male chief executives; whilst Birmingham, Coventry, Solihull and Walsall have female Chief 
executives. See http://www .oultwood.com/localgov I ukl westmidlands.php 
230 See Connell (1995), for example, who describes multiple masculinities; masculinity interacts with 
other social variables such as wealth, power, social class and sexuality. 
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[T]he community no longer sits in silos. It isn't about black people, 
African-Caribbean people, women, disabled people ... You've also got 
within groups different issues ... particularly within the Asian 
community, the elders are not representing either their women or their 
young people when they talk. So it just makes no sense along those lines 
any more because young Asian men have probably got very similar issues 
to young African-Caribbean men and perhaps young white women living 
in certain estates ... but in other ways young Asian men might have very 
specific issues .... what this does is take you away from representation 
and towards possible issue-based work ... so it reflects the community 
view rather than represents it (City Council representative, Birmingham). 
This interviewee thus illustrates a practical and almost bureaucratic approach to the 
issue of diversity, which blurs social categories and which is associated with 
multiculturalism. This is perhaps because, in multi-agency approaches, difference 
not only within communities, but also between and within agencies, is sidelined and 
eventually concealed behind a mantle of collaboration. 
Yet, the recognition of difference within communities and between agencies is 
important for two reasons. First, for ethnic minorities, difference can act as a 
platform from which to campaign for equality. That is, it allows ethnic minorities "to 
engage in political dialogue and debate that can help create more universal values 
and beliefs, and a collective language of citizenship" (Malik 2002: 6). It might thus 
provide a platform for ethnic minorities to engage with the CSPS.231 Second, the 
recognition of difference is important for understanding the inherent difficulties of 
multi-agency partnerships and the reasons these difficulties are seldom talked about. 
That is, difference undermines the possibility of collaboration and is seldom talked 
about because the symbolic utility of the partnerships, in enhancing the legitimacy of 
the state in controlling crime, has greater significance than the feasibility of 
231 See for example, Bowling (1998) who uses the example of racist violence to examine how 
competing agendas are submerged under the fa<;ade of multi-agency collaboration. 
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partnerships (Blagg et al., 1988). I will return to these issues in chapters eight and 
nine. 
So far I have discussed a number of possible ways of involving the' community' in 
the partnerships. There appeared to be a gap, however, between the possibilities and 
the 'reality'; practitioners suggested a range of ways in which members of the 
community could be involved but in reality there was insufficient community 
involvement. The majority of interviewees perceived this lack of community 
involvement as one of the major failings of the partnership so far, and something 
they wished to improve in the future. 
Practitioners seemed at a loss as to how to involve the community in meaningful 
(non-tokenistic) ways, given the complex issue of diversity, especially in 
Birmingham. One interviewee in particular felt that government emphasised 
community involvement but there was no substance to its claims, as it failed to 
provide any good examples of how to involve the' community'. This suggests that 
the partnerships were not alone in struggling to know how to involve the 
'community'. 
Interviewees such as the following ones also recognised that most citizens were 
unaware that the partnerships existed, partly because the' average citizen' continued 
to associate crime reduction with the police and were uninterested in the 
partnership: 
I think if you went and asked Mr Joe Bloggs in the street, what's the 
Cambridge community safety partnership they wouldn't know ... they 
don't know who we are and if that's a measure of success then I think we 
are failing miserably. As far as doing good works and putting money into 
projects that might impact on the community then I think we do okay, 
don't do any worse than anyone else (Community safety team 
representative, Cambridge). 
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I'm not sure how many of Joe Public on the street know that the 
partnership exists, and if you don't know something exists it's difficult to 
exert pressure upon it ... if nobody knows you exist then you can' t be 
accused of failure, which is sometimes a good tactic, but it also doesn't 
give people a great deal of positive expectation. I think it's under 
pressure from the police to try and deliver some of their targets. And I 
think it's under pressure from the government to try and deliver targets ... 
But from public pressure, I'm not convinced (Fire service representative). 
This second quotation is of interest because it suggests that the lack of community 
involvement in and knowledge of the partnership conveniently results in its being 
less publicly accountable. 
Overall, the apparent lack of 'community' involvement in the partnerships is both 
surprising and revealing. It is surprising because of the centrality of 'community' to 
the new governance of crime control and public safety, including in the CDA. 
Moreover, it reveals that, like the publication of positive new stories and indeed the 
partnerships themselves, the involvement of the 'community' operates as a useful 
rhetorical device. It provides a fac;ade behind which central government and local 
practitioners vie for control of the community safety agenda. Meanwhile, local 
ownership is sidelined unless citizens, like those in Cambridge, have the cultural 
capital to shout loudly enough. 
The discussion so far about the lack of community involvement meant that some 
practitioners wished for greater involvement in the future. Others, however, 
suggested that the 'community' might not have the 'answers', since they were not 
crime and disorder 'experts'. Besides, the contested nature of crime and disorder 
implies that the 'community' may not agree on partnership priorities; in these 
circumstances, the priorities articulated by the powerful or those able to shout the 
loudest could take precedence. An interviewee in Birmingham suggested that one 
solution might be to negotiate with communities about appropriate priorities, as 
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well as building capacity to ensure that everyone's views are heard and that 
'community' members are willing to be part of the solution. An interviewee in 
Cambridge expressed a similar view: 
There's a lot of tension around apathy ... a lot of people's response is why 
doesn't somebody do something about this and that's a disempowered 
position ... So it's that sort of trying to fight that feeling of powerlessness 
... There can be problems as well with that, as there's only so much that 
we can do, so we have to be clear about what we can offer ... and it's 
important to do what you say you're going to do really ... so it's just 
about breaking that cycle ... which takes a lot of time (Interviewee in 
Cambridge). 
Once priorities were negotiated, Birmingham and Lincoln interviewees suggested 
that professionals might propose solutions and commission the 'community' or 
community groups to implement and sustain them. Similarly, in Cambridge and 
Lincoln interviewees suggested that professionals had a duty to be responsive to the 
community whilst also being strategic with resources, as well as balancing 
community priorities with those of the government (who provided an overarching 
framework for the partnerships). Such proposals seemingly embodied the rhetorical 
appeal of the communitarian agenda, which neglects the fact that some communities 
will be less able to cope with these responsibilities than others, and that more 
'community' does not necessarily equate with less crime. At the same time, 
practitioners' proposals might also result in a 'progressive local governance', by 
building new mechanisms through which citizens can engage in the polity and thus 
compensate for the democratic deficit. 
6.6 Chapter summary 
All three partnerships emerged after the Safer Cities initiative ended in the late 
1980s, although the community safety team in Birmingham was decimated by a 
political wrangle, from 1993 onwards. The CDA appeared to encourage the sharing 
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and joining-up of community safety practice amongst key statutory agencies, 
particularly once funding became available in 1999. The extent to which the CDA 
formalised and systematised community safety practices appeared to depend on the 
local history of community safety. 
In Birmingham, the size of the city appeared to be a double-edged sword; it 
generated political clout but also resulted in complexity for the delivery of 
community safety. Also, as with all large cities, the partnership had to contend with 
a much wider range of social problems and more serious types of crime. 
Nonetheless, the partnerships in Cambridge and Lincoln had to address difficulties 
associated with being a two-tier local authority. 
Partners had mixed views about the relationship between the partnerships and the 
LSPs, which were not always favourable; for example, some viewed them as another 
layer of bureaucracy. Relations between the DATs and the CSPs were determined by 
the Police Reform Act 2002. However, two-tier local authority areas, such as 
Cambridge and Lincoln, had some flexibility in how they interpreted this legislation. 
In terms of community involvement, the 'community' were mostly indirectly 
involved in the partnerships through the subgroups, via the voluntary sector and 
elected members, through statutory consultation, and the dissemination of 
information via the media, for example about positive news. Overall, interviewees in 
all three partnerships were concerned that they had failed to represent or involve 
diverse' communities' in local community safety. This suggests that the apparent 
involvement of the 'community' is symbolic rather than real, and that the symbolic 
value of the partnerships in enhancing the legitimacy of the state in controlling 
crime, is of greater importance than their feasibility. The symbolism of the CSPs is an 
issue to which I shall return in chapter nine. 
In chapter five and six I have provided 'thick descriptions' of the structures and 
processes, and social and historical contexts, of each of the cases. In chapters seven 
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and eight I explore some of the implications of these findings for measuring 
performance, and the challenges posed by inter-agency relationships. 
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CHAPTER VII: MEASURING 'SUCCESS' 
Measuring partnership 'success' is one example of new public management (NPM) 
approaches to public service delivery; private sector performance management 
techniques are applied to the public sector such as the CSPs and their constituent 
organisations.232 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the meaning of the NPM 
approach in each area and how the partnerships were held to account for their 
performance. Performance measurement appeared closely intertwined with funding 
arrangements, which were used to justify performance monitoring and constrain 
partnership activities. Hence in this chapter I firstly consider funding arrangements 
and their associated difficulties. Second, I examine the way partnership performance 
is monitored and its connection with funding arrangements. Third, I explore 
practitioners' views on the 'success' or otherwise of the partnership. Finally, I 
examine the difficulties I experienced in measuring' success' and the implications of 
this for partners' knowledge about the 'success' of the partnerships. 
7.1 Funding arrangements 
In chapter two I described partnership funding arrangements; initially they were 
funded through CAD, SCI and PDF but these funding streams were merged in 
2003/4 to form the building safer communities fund. Practitioners in my research 
described a range of other ways in which their partnerships were funded, which 
constituted a complex web of annual, one-off, or competitive funding streams (see 
Table 6.1 below). 
In chapter five, I noted that money allocation was frequently discussed in meetings; 
indeed, it was the most frequently discussed topic in Cambridge. In Birmingham, 
despite the Chair's concerns that the strategic partnership meeting would become 
232 The Audit Commission (2002) notes the lines of accountability for key players in the CSPs. See also 
chapter one for an exploration of the NPM approach and its origins. 
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defunct, decisions about funding allocation came to be taken by the 'co-ordination 
panel', a group set up to deal specifically with these issues. In Cambridge, decisions 
about the allocation of money were taken in strategic partnership meetings. The 
partnership used a 'traffic light system' to prioritise bids and thus facilitate the 
decision-making process; each bid for funding (from community groups and partner 
organisations) was colour-coded green, amber or red, the idea being that 
practitioners would focus on green-coded bids. In Lincoln, decisions about funding 
allocation were made in subgroups rather than strategic partnership meetings, 
although they were later ratified by the strategic partnership. However, occasionally 
decisions about one-off sums of money, such as the recovered assets fund, were 
decided by the strategic partnership. 
The factors affecting the decision-making process were wide-ranging such as the 
relationship between bids and partnership priorities, the quality of the bid and, in 
particular, practical issues such as how much money and time there was available to 
make the decision. A Cambridge City Council representative was concerned about 
funding allocation because some decisions were deliberated for hours, whilst others 
were rushed, resulting in disparities in the decision-making process. Other 
representatives from the police and the DAT agreed with the views of this 
interviewee, but the process of money allocation appeared to remain the same. The 
focus on practical issues also suggests that criminological evidence or evidence 
about the extent of the crime problem was rarely considered, although it was 
possible that this evidence was taken into account by the community safety team, for 
example, when they colour-coded the bids. 
220 
· Table 6.1 Partnership funding streams233 
Funding Stream I Purpose I Source 
Building Safer 
Communities (a) Supplement mainstream resources 
(a) Safer to tackle local crime and disorder 
Communities problems. I Annual funds from the Home Office ./ ./ ./ 
Initiative 
(b) Communities I (b) To tackle drugs in the community. 
Neighbourhood Urban regeneration in the 88 most I Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 
Renewal Fund234 deprived local authority wards in ODPM 
./ ./ 
En land.235 
Single Regeneration Competitive bidding from ODPM ./ ./ Budget neighbourhoods. 
Money to tackle drug treatment, 
DATfunding drugs in communities, the supplv of Annual funds from the Home Office. I ./ ./ ./ 
;ing on y g 
Reduce drug-related crime, by 
Drug Intervention I assisting offenders (who commit I Annual funds from the Home Office. Programme 'trigger offences') in accessing drug I ./ ./ ./ 
treatment. 
233 These funds are supposed to supplement the use of the mainstream resources of partner agencies. 
234 NRF is administered through the LSPs. Areas receiving NRF also receive money from the Community Empowerment Fund, the Community Chest Fund, 
New Deal for Communities, Neighbourhood Management, Neighbourhood and Street Wardens (http://www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/map.asp?pageid=51) 
235 These 88 wards are determined using the indices of deprivation 2000. 
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Funding Stream Purpose I Source 
BCD funds (police236) For crime and disorder reduction and I Ann If d f h HOff' .. ua un s rom t e orne Ice. 
to promote partnershIp workmg. 
,/ ,/ ,/ 
Agreements between local authorities Funds from ODPM, based on 
Public service and central government to improve performance against targets over a Pending 
agreements key outcomes in their best value 
erformance Ian. three-year period. 
Money for ASB 
Coordinator Additional money to tackle ASB. One-off funds from Home Office. ,/ Trailblazer237 ,/ 
,/ 
ects ,/ 
Additional money to tackle domestic One-off funds from the Crime ,/ Reducing Burglary burglary in areas with burglary rates reduction programme in the Home Round 1,2 
,/ ,/ 
initiative (1999-2002) 
twice the national average. Office. and 3 Round 2 Round 1 
Domestic Violence I Additional money for domestic l One-off funds from the Home Office. ,/ 
coordinator violence coordinators. 
To tackle the underperformance of 
Police Standards Dnit I the police in relation to burglary, 
funding motor crime and ASB in deprived l One-off funds from the PSD. 
,/ 
wards. 
2,6 BCD funds are relatively free from rules as they can be carried over and there is no capital/revenue split 
(http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/crimereductionprogramme32b.htm). They are essentially police funds (since they are signed off by the Chief 
Constable), taken to the partnership for nominal ratification. One city council interviewee in Birmingham said that the senior police representative on the 
partnership encouraged BCD commanders to share some of their BCD funds with the partnership, but they preferred to retain independence in how they 
spent the money in their own BCDs. Similarly in Cambridge and Lincoln, BCD commanders simply gave a presentation on how the money was to be spent 
. and other partners nodded their agreement. 
237 BCSP were allocated trailblazer status as a result of their approach to dealing with difficult tenants in social housing. This additional money was to be used 
to launch an ASB help line and help the ASB unit move out of the housing department and into the Chief Executive's department. 
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l . ~ j 
Funding Stream 
Recovered Assets 
Fund 
Purpose 
To help recover more proceeds of 
crime and assist communities 
affected by crime (including gun 
and ASB. 
Source 
Competitive bidding for money from 
the Home Office recovered from 
convicted offenders and the proceeds 
of crime. 
./ 
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There were a number of difficulties with partnership funding arrangements. Short 
timescales were identified as a crucial concern in all three areas. Partners felt under 
pressure to spend money quickly, rather than appropriately - successful bids were 
those that met deadlines and conformed to funding criteria, rather than those suited 
to the crime problem. Hence members of the community safety teams in Cambridge 
and Lincoln were also concerned that money was wasted. Short timescales were of 
particular concern in Cambridge in the first round (1998-2001), when the 
government was slow to notify the partnership about how much money they were 
to receive and slow to issue guidelines. For example, in Cambridge in 1999/2000 
interviewees complained that they had only eight months to spend allotted money, 
which according to the following interviewee wasted money: 
[S]ome of the money gets wasted ... by the time you actually get it ... you 
are probably left with about 8 months of the year to spend it. If you come 
to the end of March then you have to give it back if it's not spent ... we'll 
get better at planning and having things ready to spend money, rather 
than waiting for them to get money and then think of things (Community 
safety team representative, Cambridge). 
As this interviewee noted, the partnerships were under particular pressure to spend 
government money in a timely fashion because otherwise they risked losing any 
unspent money and cuts in their budget for the following financial year. 
It was unsurprising, therefore, that the timely spending of government funding 
became a pressured partnership process. This pressure to spend money intensified 
towards the end of each financial year, when all three partnerships had 'under-
spends'. In a subgroup meeting in Birmingham, much of the meeting was spent 
calculating the over- or under-spend and speculating about how it could be spent 
(especially given government spending rules). In Birmingham, in order to avoid this 
situation in the future, they mooted the idea of 'over-programming', that is, 
developing more community safety projects than they could fully fund. 
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Another difficulty noted by interviewees was that government funding 
arrangements encouraged 'short-termism'. The amount of money allocated to each 
partnership through the main partnership-funding stream (Building Safer 
Communities) was decided on an annual basis without any guarantees about the 
amounts available in the following year. In practice, interviewees noted that this 
meant it was difficult to implement longer-term community safety projects and to 
recruit staff, since they could offer only short-term contracts and confidently fund 
projects for one year. A government office representative was unsympathetic 
towards these concerns, however. This interviewee suggested that practitioners 
should assume they would receive a similar amount of government money each 
year. In addition, a Birmingham City Council interviewee suggested that too much 
time was spent worrying about government funding when, in fact, they should be 
concerned about how key players should divert money from their mainstream 
budgets. 
Short-termism was further encouraged by one-off sums of money available to the 
partnerships, for example, through public service agreements and 'year-end gifts.'238 
A member of the community safety team in Birmingham drew an analogy between 
eating food from McDonalds and projects implemented to attain PSA money; he 
suggested that PSA projects satiated the hunger of every citizen because they were 
high-visibility and yielded quick-wins but, like cheap hamburgers, these projects 
would only temporarily satisfy citizens' hunger for community safety. 
This short-termism, encouraged by the funding arrangements, contradicts 'SMART' 
(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound) objectives, promoted 
by the Home Office in partnership guidance documents239 - these targets are 
238 This term was used by a Birmingham city council interviewee to refer to one-off government 
funding towards the end of the financial year, when government departments are also under pressure 
to spend their budgets quickly. 
239 See Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2000) and also the Crime Reduction toolkits 
http://www.crimered uction. gov. ukl toolki ts I 
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supposed to have both long and short timescales.24o Perhaps, as the following police 
officer suggested, the focus on performance measurement encourages short-termism 
because it is easier to measure the outcomes of short-term initiatives: ' 
There's no incentive on God's earth to spend that lump of [government] 
money in a way that will genuinely bring about robust, repeatable, 
continuous improvement anywhere because if you do then I could almost 
guarantee that the first twelve months will be spent identifying the 
problem and setting up the systems and processes ... because you can' t 
do that in a year so you always end up spending on those things that are 
easily measurable for outcomes. That puts quite a lot of pressure on the 
partnership to act in a myopic manner really (Police representative, 
Birmingham) . 
A further contradiction in the funding process was that partners competed for funds; 
bids received by the partnership emanated from constituent organisations and 
community organisations. Hence a DAT representative described the partnerships as 
a "feeding frenzy", where each agency claimed a piece of the partnership budget. I 
explore the idea that partners were in fact competitors in chapter eight. 
Another difficulty with funding arrangements, identified by key players in all three 
areas, were the rules and caveats not only about when funding could be spent, but 
how it could be spent. The partnerships did not have unfettered access to 
government funding. The rules depended on the funding stream and the 
capitalj revenue Split.241 With the exception of a Birmingham City Council 
representative and a Lincolnshire County Council representative, interviewees 
tended to view these rules as overly prescriptive. The county council representative 
argued that the use of government funds was restricted, but at the same time these 
240 This is only one of many contradictions identified by Crawford (2001) in relation to government 
crime reduction policies. 
241 Chapter two explains what is meant by the capital/revenue split in government funds. 
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additional funds created flexibility in how he spent his mainstream resources. A 
government office interviewee also argued that, with the exception of the 
capitalj revenue split, the rules were perfectly sensible, for example to divide CAD 
between treatment and enforcement. 
In Cambridge and Lincoln, there were frustrations about these rules because 
partners felt forced to buy services or spend money in areas or on problems where 
they were not needed. In Lincoln, for example, the partnership received money for 
an ASB coordinator when they already had one. In Cambridge for example, there 
was a discussion about how the PDF could be spent. The community safety team 
identified funding options, but the difficulty was that partners wanted to spend the 
money on community safety projects rather than training and partnership 
development, as the rules specified. This delayed the decision-making process whilst 
members of the community safety team clarified the rules with government office. 
Similar delays in decision-making were also observed in Lincoln. 
An interviewee in Lincoln felt that the rules were too restrictive and without them 
the partnership could function more effectively: 
[I]f the LCRE was empowered to make more decisions, then I think it 
would rise to the challenge and actually achieve more ... without being 
hamstrung by somebody saying, well we're going to give you five grand 
and you've got to spend it by the end of March, and you've got to spend it 
on this, this and this ... instead of saying, right, we've got this pot of 
money, we know you've got various issues in Lincoln that you might 
wish to spend it on, the money will be in your account by the end of the 
month, over to you, give us a report in six months' time as to how you 
spent the money ... What could be simpler than that? (Interviewee, 
Lincoln). 
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The rules suggest that central government retained a degree of control over the 
operation of the partnerships, thus the partnerships were also subject to its political 
whims; this was exemplified by the additional money for ASB coordinators (in 
October 2003),242 which was announced around the same time as the Antisocial 
Behaviour Act 2003,243 perhaps to emphasise New Labour's 'commitment' to 
tackling ASB. 
The discussion thus far also suggests that funding arrangements encouraged 
partnerships to focus on the process of funding allocation rather than delivery. 
Another example of this is when partnerships appeared to 'chase' funding; whilst 
discussing the funds attached to PSAs, an interviewee in Birmingham expressed 
concern that the partnership was stuck in a perpetual cycle of continually chasing 
money to cover extra staff to chase money and so on. 
Furthermore, the funding process was also bureaucratic and complex,244 as noted by 
the following interviewee: 
I think we're put under a lot of pressure by the Government Office of the 
East Midlands ... They've got their own agenda, they're allegedly trying to 
join stuff up and it's not joining anything up, it's just creating a huge 
amount of bureaucracy .... The issues, it's all about the financing really, 
it's about the way the government make money available, about the 
criteria, it's about the guidance being late, the fact that they insist on this 
revenue capital split. All those things just make everything difficult for 
242 See Home Office (2004c) for details of the press release. 
243 The White paper, 'Respect and Responsibility: Taking a stand against ASB' (see Home Office, 
2003b) was the precursor to the ASB act, which received Royal Assent in November 2003. The powers 
contained within it, became available from January 2004. For more details about the ASB Act 2003, see 
http:// www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/antisocialbehaviour I legislationl asbact.html 
244 A government office interviewee noted that external consultants had been employed by 
government to simplify funding arrangements because they were too complex. 
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the partnership to get on with some service delivery (Police 
representative, Lincoln). 
Thus in Lincoln, a police representative felt that they would have to create an 
additional team simply to manage government funds, whilst in Birmingham a 
programme manager had already been appointed to ensure that money was spent 
and projects delivered on time. These programme managers share some of the 
characteristics of the bureaucrats described by Weber;245 they are governed by the 
consistent application of a system of rules, and focus on the means rather than the 
ends of their task. Moreover, funding arrangements appeared to spawn an 
increasing number of bureaucrats working within the governance machine. Hence a 
senior police officer in Birmingham noted that "[y]ou need to ask what money builds 
apart from bureaucracy". 
There are two implications which emerge from the discussion so far. First, 
government appeared to hold the 'purse strings' to the partnership because of the 
rules about how and when funds could be spent. Interviewees in all three 
partnerships noted that because government supplies the partnerships with funding 
they were their "masters"; interviewees described the partnership as "having one 
hand behind its back" when it came to decision-making and having to jump when 
the government said so because" the funders were calling all the shots": 
The money that comes through nationally normally comes through with a 
tag on it about where it is to be spent and sometimes how it's to be spent 
... So local decision-making, well there's an element of going through the 
motions ... so you just spend the money and there's almost a sense of 
desperation ... we've only got six months left ... So I think they do 
operate with one hand behind their back. They kind of know what kind of 
245 Weber argued that bureaucracy is the product of 'rational-legal authority' . See Giddens 1994 (pp. 
157-160) for a full discussion of Weber's conceptualisation of bureaucracy. 
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decision they've got to come up with (Community safety team 
representative, Birmingham). 
Government purse strings also collided with a myriad of local, organisational, 
personal and political agendas which, as I will discuss in chapter eight, made the 
task of joined-up community safety a difficult one. Performance monitoring, as I 
discuss shortly, was another way in which central government was able to constrain 
the partnerships. 
The second implication of the discussion so far, is that funding arrangements 
undermined the efforts of the partnerships to affect crime and disorder levels. This 
could be because of the tendency generated by the funding arrangements towards 
short-term, measurable, projects which could be immediately implemented, as well 
as spending money in areas or on problems which were not necessarily the most 
pressing. Furthermore, time pressures meant that there was little consideration of 
crime data246 or criminological knowledge about projects likely to impact on the 
problem, or partners' prior experience of successful projects. This was especially true 
when the partnerships discussed 'under-spends', as they had even less time to 
thoroughly analyse the problem and seek an appropriate solution. 
Therefore, government funding arrangements appeared to force partnerships to 
allocate money to community safety projects in a way which was expedient, but also 
'hit and miss', which suggests that government money was not always 'well' spent. 
This might indicate that the partnerships were ineffective in delivering community 
safety. A government office interviewee was unsympathetic to these difficulties: 
So I know CDRPs whinge about the government and its spending ... but 
in the main part I don't think there's a problem with it at all. They don't 
246 There were discussions about crime data in Birmingham but interviewees complained that it was 
not always of practical benefit to decision-making, for example about funding allocation. 
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like it because they really don't want to work for it, they really want us to 
say, there's your pot of gold, go away, and in certain instances where 
you've got a known good CDRP, you've done self-assessment with them, 
they've got good development plans, and they have good processes, good 
leadership, I think that's quite right, we should be saying to them, go 
away, do it, send us a note of what you ought to achieve and tell us at the 
end of the year whether you've done it (Government Office 
representative). 
This interviewee argued that only' good' CDRPs should be allowed the privilege of 
unfettered access to government money, which suggests that he failed to recognise 
that the funding arrangements were a part of the problem. 
7.2 Monitoring arrangements 
Partnerships monitored their performance in a range of ways. In Birmingham and 
Lincoln at each strategic partnership meeting, subgroup chairs provided a short 
report outlining their progress since the last meeting. In Cambridge, the strategic 
partnership received quarterly reports and newsletters from subgroups. In 
Birmingham and Lincoln, the subgroup reports at the strategic partnership meetings 
were of varying quality and frequency, and sometimes reports were missing or 
tabled on the day. In all three partnerships, partners were not sanctioned when 
progress reports were not produced. 
In Birmingham, on two occasions, the Chair requested that the quality of progress 
reports be improved. For example, she asked subgroup leaders to provide quantified 
data, rather than references to relevant data sources, such as the youth justice plan. 
Her criticisms could be interpreted as a 'rap on the knuckles' for subgroup chairs. 
One subgroup Chair commented during interview that he lacked the time or 
resources to produce these reports. 
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Three interviewees were sceptical about the value of subgroup progress reports 
because, for example, partners were not held to account for their actions and 
because, despite the reports, some interviewees remained ill-informed about the 
progress of subgroups. A city council employee suggested that even when subgroup 
failings were identified in progress reports this did not necessitate action. Hence, she 
suggested that the process for holding subgroups to account lacked rigour. Two 
other interviewees also wondered if reports by subgroup chairs were simply written 
at the last minute and were never read: 
I see their reports and I like the format of their reports, but how 
accountable are those reports, how much has someone sat down on 
Monday and thought, my God I've got to get a report done, so they've 
had a quick check around and put some stats together. How much that's 
... checked out with all the operational people about exactly what they're 
doing I don't know ... the one I saw on domestic violence, where I know 
quite a lot about what's going on in the background, gave a much rosier 
picture than the reality (Community safety team representative, 
Birmingham) . 
[I]f you're a chief officer then you can say ... I will drive through that 
agenda and of course they never do it actually ... I've done five- to six-
page reports and I don't believe they've ever been read ... there should be 
spot checks ... the Audit Commission should be able to go randomly into 
a chief officer's office and say ... what was your last activity and when? 
(D A T represen ta ti v e) 
In Lincoln, progress reports by subgroup chairs (at the strategic partnership 
meetings) rarely contained information about progress against targets or impact on 
crime and disorder, rather they focused on outputs. Indeed, one interviewee felt that 
the format of these reports should be changed to a 'traffic light system' in which 
subgroup chairs would report only on projects experiencing difficulties. He argued 
that this system was necessary in order to prevent subgroup chairs selectively 
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reporting only on successful projects, whilst others quietly failed. Subgroups also 
provided annual reports which included information about progress against targets; 
each of these subgroup reports were compiled into the partnership annual report. 
In the strategic meetings of all three partnerships, crime statistics were regularly 
discussed, but in a descriptive way rather than to examine the impact of the 
partnership on crime and disorder. In Birmingham, the police analyst examined 
volume crime trends and changing hotspots. In Lincoln, the community safety 
manager sometimes provided a summary of the number of burglaries, vehicle 
crimes, violent crimes and incidents of disorder in each of the policing divisions in 
Lincoln. In Cambridge, there were irregular presentations by police analysts on 
particular crime problems as and when they emerged. However, towards the end of 
the fieldwork it was decided that these presentations were to become a regular 
agenda item. 
The presentations in all three areas relied on police statistics. In addition, 
representatives in Birmingham were unsure about their purpose; they were unclear 
as to whether they were for monitoring purposes or information only or to help with 
money allocation or to simply stimulate discussion. The Chair was keen for partners 
to use information about crime statistics, but even she was unsure how they could 
do so. The other difficulty with these presentations was that fluctuations in the crime 
rate were not necessarily connected to partnership activities, although partners, 
especially in Lincoln, would occasionally speculate about possible connections,. 
Each partnership also compared their performance against targets in their strategy, 
on a quarterly basis and as part of their annual review process. Birmingham and 
Cambridge had produced annual reviews since the first round of their strategy 
(1998-2001) but in Lincoln 2002/03 was the first time they had done so, perhaps 
because annual reviews became a statutory requirement as a result of the Police 
Reform Act 2002. A Birmingham City Council representative said that the most 
recent annual review questioned the extent of joined-up community safety and 
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performance management. In a strategic partnership meeting in Cambridge, a city 
council representative appeared annoyed that their strategy included targets they 
could not measure because of a lack of baseline data. 
Overall, it seemed that there were difficulties in all three areas with internal 
processes used to monitor partnership performance and progress against targets; for 
example, progress reports appeared to lack credibility and there was little or no 
consideration of the connection between crime rates and community safety projects. 
This reluctance to examine partnership outcomes might be explained by the 
perceived challenges of measuring outcomes, which I discuss later in this chapter. 
Partnership performance was also indirectly monitored by central government 
(through the regional government offices) in four main ways.247 First, at the end of 
2003/04, all three partnerships completed the 'self-assessment framework' 
developed by the Home Office (and administered by the regional government 
offices).248 Partners were asked to rate their performance on five key areas: 
leadership; the production of audits and strategies; the management and 
development of the skills of partners and subgroup members; the management of 
internal and external resources; and the planning, management and improvement of 
partnership processes, such as section 17 responsibilities, delivery plans and 
problem-solving approaches. The partnerships were asked to provide evidence, such 
as the Best Value Review or audits or minutes of specific meetings, to support their 
claims. The self-assessment framework was intended to be the first step in drawing 
up a self-improvement plan. Indeed, a government office representative commented 
that the self-assessment procedure was only important in so far as partnerships used 
it to write an improvement plan. 
247 As I already discussed in the chapter examining the partnerships in context, the LSPs were viewed 
as possibly having a role in holding them to account in the future 
248 For an overview of the self-assessment framework, see: 
http://www.crimereduction.co.uk/selfassessment/ and its links. 
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In Birmingham, partners were reluctant to undertake the self-assessment process; in 
the initial stages of completing the document (before partners received further 
training), only three people completed the form. Partners appeared unclear about 
the implications of the self-assessment procedure; they were particularly worried 
that it would contribute to a league table of partnerships or key performance 
indicators. One police interviewee worried that the partnership self-assessment 
would be "used against them"; hence he was sceptical about partners' honesty in 
their responses. 
In a strategic partnership meeting in Cambridge, it appeared that the reluctance to 
complete the self-assessment procedure stemmed from the lack of capacity, 
especially amongst members of the community safety unit, to complete the form 
which inevitably meant less time for other partnership activities. Hence the self-
assessment procedure, like the funding arrangements, could be interpreted as a part 
of the growing bureaucracy associated with the partnerships, instigated by central 
government. 
In Lincoln, partners were much more receptive to the idea of the self-assessment 
procedure; this was partly because they had already completed the task once before, 
having been a part of the pilot in the preceding year. A police representative viewed 
the self-assessment process as a chance for partners to reassess each others' views 
about the purpose of the partnership. Two I away days' were organised; one to 
complete the self-assessment form, and another to create an improvement plan with 
the help of an independent facilitator. 
In terms of outcomes, police data were assessed in all three partnerships and 
compared with other similar partnerships; this was initially through the Home 
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Office family groupings but more recently through the IQuanta process,249 also 
developed by the Home Office. It compares partnerships in terms of the levels of 
volume crime in their area and encourages those areas with the highest crime rates 
to converge with those with the lowest. In a partnership meeting in Lincoln, the 
details of a Home Office letter250 were discussed, which ranked the partnerships in 
terms of their volume crime rates. The ranks of CSPs were based on 2002-3 crime 
statistics for vehicle crime, robbery and burglary in the 94 CSPs with the highest 
crime rates. The letter encouraged crime reduction in all CORP areas, but especially 
in the 94 listed in the letter. The Home Office found that Birmingham, Cambridge 
and Lincoln were respectively ranked 35,75 and 91. 
In Birmingham, the partnership had public service agreement targets for burglary 
and fire-related deaths; their performance in relation to these targets was tied to 
financial rewards. 251 The difficulties with public service agreements were that they 
appeared to encourage short-term approaches to community safety and the pursuit 
of money. A senior city council representative noted a further difficulty with the 
PSA targets; they resulted in the focus of the partnership changing from community 
safety to burglary and fire reduction. Interviewees from the city council were 
concerned that so much money was spent on burglary reduction to the exclusion of 
other kinds of crime, and also when the voluntary sector were desperate for 
resources. A government office representative, however, felt that PSAs could 
improve partnership performance rather than cause problems. He cited an example 
of a partnership whose approach to crime reduction "improved beyond all 
recognition" . 
249 IQuanta compares partnerships on volume crime rates. See: 
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/aud0403.pdf See also chapter two for a brief discussion of 
IQuanta and its origins. 
250 The letter from the Home Office was dated 26 November 2003 and circulated in a strategic 
partnership meeting on 11 December 2003. For more details see Home Office (2003a). 
251 Towards the end of fieldwork, public service agreements were also being introduced in the other 
two areas . 
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Furthermore, the outcomes of individual community safety projects were 
occasionally evaluated, either by an independent organisation or consultancy, such 
as Crime Concern or NACRO, or sometimes by the Home Office or the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. For example, in Cambridge, a burglary reduction 
project had been evaluated by academics on behalf of the Home Office,252 and 
NACRO carried out an evaluation of an ASB project. In Birmingham, the national 
street crime reduction project, 'Splash Extra', which ran in the summer of 2001 and 
2002 in Birmingham, along with nine other areas with high levels of street crime, 
was independently evaluated and hailed a success. There was a 31 per cent 
reduction in robbery in BCUs in the West Midlands where the Splash Extra projects 
had taken place (compared to a 17 per cent reduction in other BCUs where there 
were no Splash Extra projects).253 In Lincoln, a member of the community safety 
team said that quarterly reports were used to monitor the performance of funded 
community safety projects against their targets; the amount of evidence required 
was commensurate with the amount of money provided for the project. 
Aside from the difficulties I have already noted with performance monitoring 
arrangements, interviewees mentioned a number of other difficulties. The main 
criticism expressed by interviewees from the city council and the police in all three 
areas was that performance indicators were overly focused on outputs, rather than 
outcomes, and paid too little attention to the context in which crime occurred. It was 
believed that this was partly because the partnership, as well as government, 
struggled to know how to measure performance, a theme I explore later in this 
chapter. A member of the community safety team in Lincoln also argued that there 
was too much focus on "bean-counting", rather than on the services that citizens 
received: 
252 See Bennett and Durie (1999). 
253 See Woolland (2003) for more in-depth information about the evaluation of Splash Extra . 
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You have to have performance management, yes, I don't disagree with 
that, you've got to have some way of measuring yourself ... but it should 
be on outcomes rather than all this bloody bean counting that goes on ... 
And they should be looking at quality, what we actually deliver at the 
bottom end, what service are the public getting ... and we don't do much 
of that, and we haven't got the time to do it because we're answering all 
these other bean-counting things, and that's getting worse (Representative 
from the community safety team, Lincoln). 
In addition, other police interviewees felt that there were too many performance 
indicators for constituent organisations in the partnerships, with little accountability 
for the partnership as a whole. The Audit Commission (2002) also noted there were 
no community safety performance indicators; rather each organisation had its own 
performance indicators, some of which were related to community safety. 
Furthermore, another police interviewee in Birmingham argued that performance 
indicators were unhelpful because they meant that the partnership was accountable, 
wrongly in his view, to the government rather than the public. Similar views were 
evident amongst interviewees in Birmingham and Lincoln: 
The external pressures are largely by the wrong people, the external 
pressure should actually be put on by the public ... and that's whom we 
should be responding to the most. But the reality is that external pressures 
come from central government, from government office, East Midlands, 
and they are becoming even more so ... so much resources on answering 
questions, that we haven't actually got time to concentrate on delivery 
(Representative from the community safety team, Lincoln). 
Another important criticism expressed by police representatives in Birmingham and 
Lincoln was that performance-monitoring arrangements (like funding arrangements) 
undermined the government's emphasis on SMART targets; they encouraged short-
term, quick-win projects which were measurable rather than desirable. As one police 
interviewee noted: 
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A great problem that we have ... is the current government's desire to 
measure everything with performance indicators ... I have no issue 
whatsoever with my performance being measured. In fact I welcome it .. . 
The problem is that if you apply hundreds of performance indicators in a 
thousand different areas it drives the wrong behaviours ... it drives 
behaviours which are there to service the performance indicators and not 
service the fundamental problem. What that means is that organisations 
become output orientated and not outcome orientated (Police 
representative, Birmingham). 
The arrangements discussed so far raise questions about whether or not the 
pressures on partnerships to measure performance were increasing. If so, then 
perhaps, as Phillips (2002) suggests, the 'honeymoon' has ended for the 
partnerships. The views of partners were mixed on this issue; partners suggested 
that there was too little monitoring and evaluation, which meant that the 
partnerships lacked accountability for their performance. These interviewees wanted 
more monitoring and evaluation in the future, in order to avoid partnerships 
becoming 'talking shops' and wasting public money on ineffective projects. 
Interviewees explained the lack of monitoring and evaluation in a number of ways, 
and although there were no patterns in terms of the agency or area, there were three 
main themes. In Birmingham and Cambridge, a DAT representative and city council 
representative felt that the partnerships lacked a suitable framework for monitoring 
performance. Second, interviewees in Birmingham suggested that there was a lack of 
performance monitoring because partners did not hold each other to account. It was 
suggested that challenging questions should be built into performance-monitoring 
frameworks. Third, partners (from the city council, police and fire service) in 
Birmingham and Lincoln also noted there was too little performance monitoring 
because partners lacked the capacity: 
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Interviewees explained the lack of monitoring and evaluation in a number of ways, 
and although there were no patterns in terms of the agency or area, there were three 
main themes. In Birmingham and Cambridge, a DAT representative and city council 
representative felt that the partnerships lacked a suitable framework for monitoring 
performance. Second, interviewees in Birmingham suggested that there was a lack of 
performance monitoring because partners did not hold each other to account. It was 
suggested that challenging questions should be built into performance-monitoring 
frameworks. Third, partners (from the city council, police and fire service) in 
Birmingham and Lincoln also noted there was too little performance monitoring 
because partners lacked the capacity: 
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[N]ot enough [evaluation] from what little I've seen ... I'm not sure that 
any of us have the capacity to do that ... Each of the projects ought to be 
managed and monitored to see whether it's making a difference ... that's 
what we ought to be measuring, not the outputs, but the outcomes, and I 
don't see any evidence that we're trying to even consider that ... it's even 
more important to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the group as 
a whole, otherwise it's a waste of time, we may as well all go horne (Fire 
service representative). 
Finally, a government office representative suggested the partnerships shied away 
from performance monitoring because they were afraid of the complexity of the task: 
There's not enough evaluation everywhere ... I think at one time people 
were frightened because the Horne Office sent out a leaflet about how to 
do evaluations written by researchers, and it was too complex ... to me, 
evaluation is, well, you said you would reduce something by 30 per cent, 
did you, and why (Government office representative). 
I explore this theme of the difficulties associated with measuring performance in 
more detail later in this chapter. 
In contrast to the views given above, other interviewees suggested that the pressure 
from government to measure performance had increased, especially given the 
investment of public money. This view was expressed by interviewees in Cambridge 
and Birmingham, but not at all by interviewees in Lincoln. Interviewees in 
Cambridge and Lincoln suggested that the partnerships were allowed a three-year 
'period of grace', but that this had corne to an end: 
[N]ow we are more accountable certainly the Government Office has 
made it clearer that they are expecting actual delivery. I think in the first 
three years, post CDA there was a certain acceptance that you were still 
finding your way. Well we've had three years to play and the government 
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office are now saying actually we want you to do something, we want to 
see some results with public money (Police representative, Cambridge). 
I think we are often given ... [a] period of grace to get yourself sorted out 
and you know the delivery, delivery, delivery message has been coming 
down from central government .. . and we are getting more resources in ... 
I think with the public as well . . . we will be a lot more accountable and 
they will either think that we are a waste of time or are worth having 
around (Representative of the community safety team, Cambridge). 
This theme of increasing pressure on the partnerships appeared to be a variation of 
Phillips' (2002) ideas, about the end of 'honeymoon' for the partnerships. In the 
present research it referred to increasing pressure both to deliver and to measure 
performance. In Birmingham and Cambridge, partners (from the police, city council 
and community safety teams) noted the increasing pressure to perform: 
Now there is more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, which is 
actually quite an important point because before ... with most 
partnerships evaluation wasn't really a high priority .. . Whereas now, in 
this new strategy, everybody understands that we are now being judged, 
you must now deliver some results; good or bad, it must be assessed 
somewhere along the line (Police representative, Cambridge). 
Increasing pressure to perform also explained why one government office 
representative thought that the role of government office had changed, from 
administering programmes to performance management: 
Now the role in government office is changing significantly. When we 
first started it was very much administration of a programme, it was all 
about monies, and bids, and evaluations, and monitoring, and things like 
that. Whilst that hasn't gone away ... there's a bigger push now actually 
towards partnership performance management ... to see what happens ... 
with the projects they're running for us, and so we know they're running 
them well (Government office representative) . 
It is plausible that the 'honeymoon' had ended for the partnerships because at the 
end of fieldwork they had existed for approximately six years, and thus long enough 
to demonstrate 'success', especially in the context of a managerialist, audit culture. 
Given the politicisation of crime and disorder, the government might also be 
increasingly desperate to demonstrate the effectiveness of the partnerships in the run 
up to the next general election. 
In sum, the concerns expressed by partners about performance management and 
funding arrangements suggest that the partnerships delivered short-term, quick-
win, measurable projects, enmeshed in government bureaucracy, which necessitated 
increasing numbers of practitioners or bureaucrats to attend to the inspection and 
funding arrangements. Whether the CSPs succeeded in impacting on crime and 
disorder was unclear. 
7.3 Are the partnerships 'successful'? 
Practitioners' views 
In terms of outcomes, views ranged from no impact to some impact to uncertainty 
about the impact of the partnership on crime and disorder. One interviewee in 
Lincoln felt that the partnership had made no obvious impact on crime and disorder. 
In Cambridge, another interviewee was unsure if the outcomes justified the 
investment of resources, perhaps because there could be more efficient ways of 
tackling community safety. He argued that the partnership spent a lot of time talking 
and "fiddling around edges" with small projects so that partners retained their jobs, 
when in fact partnership funding could be better spent on tackling disadvantage and 
social exclusion. Both of these views suggest that the partnerships were wasting 
public money. 
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Related to this was the view that there were factors over which the partnership had 
little control which limited their ability to impact on crime and disorder. The 
presence of a prolific offender in the area was cited as one such factor by 
interviewees in all three areas.254 Interviewees from the city council and the 
community safety team in Cambridge also noted that crime decreased even when 
the partnership did nothing; vehicle crime, for example, had decreased more than 
other types of crime, even though it was not a partnership priority. 
In Lincoln, partners from the police, city council and community safety team viewed 
the behaviour of citizens and the social context of the city as beyond their control; for 
example, a police interviewee suggested that it was difficult to educate people to 
close windows and lock doors, as leaving them open was a part of the culture of 
elderly people in Lincoln. There were also other factors such as the influx of asylum 
seekers or students into the area (which created a larger number of possible targets) 
or the closure of a local factory, which were cited as factors beyond the control of the 
partnership. Taken together these views suggest that some practitioners were 
fatalistic, sceptical, and possibly even pessimistic about the ability of the partnership 
to impact on crime and disorder. These narratives could also be interpreted as 
excuses. 
Partners were also sometimes sceptical about the value added by the partnerships. In 
all three areas, some noted the value added by positive connections and increased 
knowledge between partners, as well as access to additional government funding. In 
Lincoln especially, interviewees felt that some of the outputs and outcomes (for 
example, the employment of a youth crime coordinator and community safety 
projects involving both the police and city council) would not have happened, 
without the partnerships, although some of them would have. 
254 Narratives about prolific offenders were comparable as the antithesis of narratives about ' people 
pieces', described in chapter five, since prolific offenders increased crime whilst 'people pieces' help 
to reduce crime. 
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However, interviewees in Cambridge and Birmingham also suggested that the 
partnerships had not achieved anything that organisations, such as the police and 
city council, would have achieved individually, as part their 'core business'. For 
example, a Birmingham city council employee noted that the partnership did not 
drive the burglary group, as the police did, nor the ASB subgroup, as the housing 
department did. Similarly, a community safety team member in Birmingham 
questioned two other police-led projects: 
[I]t's quite a public statement that people work together ... but how much 
of these things would have happened anyway, like the offender 
management stuff or the policing operations ... So how much of the work 
is just going on regardless and just would have been happening anyway? 
I hear quite a lot of useful things when I go there but whether it's an 
entirely useful, productive use of all those people's time and whether 
some of them just go through the motions (Member of the community 
safety team, Birmingham). 
Similarly, I noted in chapter one the possibility of community safety plagiarism and 
appropriation. 
Representatives from the fire service in particular argued that little had been 
achieved by way of outcomes, other than what the police (because of their resources) 
and the city council would have achieved individually. Indeed one interviewee felt 
that the police should have sole responsibility for community safety as, with the 
exception of the city council, the other partners were just passengers. Together these 
views support findings from earlier in the dissertation that the CDA had a limited 
impact on community safety because of its indirect impact on structures and 
processes. 
By contrast to the fatalistic and sceptical views of interviewees discussed so far, 
other practitioners suggested that the partnerships had achieved successful 
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outcomes reducing specific types of crime through particular community safety 
projects. In Birmingham, some interviewees felt that the partnerships were 
succeeding in relation to the burglary and fire PSAs, as well as the' grime and crime 
agenda'. A number of interviewees also mentioned the Splash Extra street crime 
initiative. In Cambridge, city council and police representatives mentioned a few 
successful projects such as a cycle crime initiative, a project for tackling the 
victimisation of language students in the city, and the installation of CCTV in car 
parks. In Lincoln, interviewees noted that they had met government crime and 
disorder targets, particularly by the end of 2001. 
Furthermore, some partners occasionally 'blew their own trumpet' as they claimed 
that the partnership had made what appeared to be an unsubstantiated255 impact on 
crime and disorder. 256 This theme appeared in strategic partnership meetings in 
Birmingham and Lincoln, when partners attributed decreases in the crime rate to 
partnership activities without providing sufficient evidence, particularly given some 
of the difficulties in making such claims. Perhaps these views were, in part, 
encouraged by the Home Office; partners in Birmingham and Lincoln noted that the 
Home Office was pleased with their performance so far. For example, Lincoln was 
described as a "rising star" that had" saved the bacon" of the regional government 
office. 
So far, views about partnership outcomes ranged from little success, perhaps 
because there were factors beyond the control of practitioners; to limited success for 
particular types of crime; to claiming unsubstantiated successes. Importantly, other 
255 These claims were unsubstantiated in the sense that none of the three partnerships regularly 
analysed crime and disorder data in the light of partnership activities. Indeed, as I will discuss later in 
this chapter, Cambridge and Birmingham appeared not to have (easily accessible) records of 
partnership activities. 
256 It would seem that partners need to be particularly careful about attributing decreases in the crime 
rate to successful partnership activities because crime has been going down in the UK since the mid-
1990s. For example, since 1995, British Crime Survey crime fell by 39 per cent (Dodd et al. 2004) . 
Hence Eck (2004), for example, warns against such self-congratulatory behaviour amongst crime 
analysts. 
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interviewees also suggested that they did not know if the partnership had impacted 
on crime and disorder, referring instead to processual issues rather than outcomes. 
There appeared to be three main reasons why interviewees did not know if their 
partnership was successful in reducing crime and disorder. For newer partners, they 
simply had not seen the data or had not been involved in the partnership for long 
enough to know about successful outcomes. Second, a police representative in 
Cambridge suggested that it was because, as I have already discussed above, there 
had not been enough monitoring and evaluation. The third and perhaps main reason 
given by partners in all three areas was that it was too difficult to measure 
partnership outcomes because there were difficulties accessing data and drawing 
'hypotheses' : 
I don't think we do know it works ... If burglary is being reduced, to what 
extent was that due to the partnership, and that's going to be very hard to 
prove one way or the other ... I don't think you've got the information to 
put a hypothesis together even, and then you find that you haven't got a 
methodology to test it (County Council representative, Cambridge). 
Measuring partnership outcomes was described as difficult because the relationship 
between partnership activities and fluctuations in crime and disorder is complex. As 
one interviewee notes, this is because social research does not take place in a 
vacuum: 
[T]rying to assess community safety is very difficult unless you've got 
areas which are an island which no-one is going to touch except you and a 
control island next door to it .. . you can never confidently claim that 
everything we've done and the fact that crime's gone down in the last few 
years is because of community safety (Police representative, Cambridge). 
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Another interviewee noted that there were also difficulties identifying who or what 
contributed to decreases in crime: 
[I]t is really hard .. . who can say ... what actions of which agencies made 
that work. The lovely people that do the safer neighbourhoods 
programme have written us a beautiful report that says crime's gone 
down in this area, therefore we've done it right, nobody in their right 
mind could pretend that just having the safer neighbourhood's group 
made that flipping great difference in those areas. So it is very hard to say 
who contributed to the success (City council representative, Birmingham). 
This appeared to be because it was difficult to separate partnership activities from 
those of individual organisations, such as the police. A member of the community 
safety team in Lincoln reiterated this view. He also noted the importance not only of 
knowing if an initiative worked, but also why it worked because otherwise cause 
and effect relationships could be spurious: 
[T]he problem is that those [community safety] measures have never been 
done in an area in isolation, there are usually a whole plethora of other 
things that are going on at the same time ... you can have some wonderful 
reduction initiatives which actually probably do work, but the real impact 
has been that two criminals have been arrested who have been 
committing crime in that area .... I think it's very difficult to say which 
has had the most impact (Community safety team member, Lincoln). 
In sum, some partners acknowledged the limited impact of the partnerships on 
crime and disorder, pointing to the difficulties of measuring 'success'. Others, 
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however, worked on the assumption that the partnership impacted on crime and 
disorder.257 
7.4 The challenges of measuring 'success' and their implications 
At the outset of the research, in order to understand more about the impact of the 
CDA, I intended to measure the impact of the partnership on crime and disorder 
since 1998. As time progressed, the focus narrowed until it became too difficult and 
time consuming, within the confines of a PhD thesis,258 to measure partnership 
outcomes; I decided instead to focus on partnership processes.259 Despite spending 
time and effort accessing police data and learning to use relevant software and data 
analysis techniques, there were a number of clear reasons why it was not practicable 
to analyse the data. This was mainly because of difficulties with access, limitations in 
the data and limitations in information about where and when relevant community 
safety initiatives were implemented (see Appendix 14 for a full discussion of these 
challenges) . 
These difficulties raised questions about how members of the partnerships 
monitored and evaluated the performance of the partnership or knew if the 
partnership impacted on burglary, and possibly even crime and disorder. These 
difficulties also confirm practitioners' uncertainties about partnership outcomes. The 
partnerships may have met government targets in relation to crime and disorder, but 
without accurate records it would be impossible to know if this was a consequence 
of partnerships activities or the general downward trend in crime since the mid 
1990s. Furthermore the paucity of relevant information suggested that it would be 
257 Liddle (2001) also notes that the CSPs are assumed to impact on crime and disorder. 
258 The analysis of police data took place in the context of ongoing interviews and observation of 
meetings in all three locations. The analysis of police data comprised one-fifth of my research, 
pertaining to one of five research questions. 
259 A critical review of partnership processes is enough to make a valuable contribution to 
criminological knowledge because it updates existing research in this area. 
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difficult for practitioners to examine why initiatives were successful, which might 
have benefited the future implementation of community safety projects. 
Difficulties with access to police data - particularly in Lincoln - raised questions 
about how practitioners other than the police measured partnership performance if 
the data were not freely available. In all three areas, access to this important resource 
was restricted. In Birmingham and Cambridge, for example, police data were 
analysed by police analysts, although sometimes on behalf of other agencies. The 
restrictions on the use of police data could be because only the police had the 
necessary 'expertise', but it might also reflect difficulties with access. In Lincoln for 
example, a police representative commented that a team of researchers conducting 
research on behalf of the partnership experienced difficulties accessing the necessary 
grid-referenced data from the police. 
It was difficult to understand why police data was 'protected' from bona fide 
researchers, aside from confidentiality issues, the need to comply with the Data 
Protection Act 1998, and the time and effort involved in downloading large amounts 
of data . This raised further questions about why the analysis of police data appeared 
to be the preserve of the police and why other kinds of data were not considered. 
The answer to this appeared to revolve around the definition of 'success' and the 
wider context of managerialism. The partnerships perhaps accepted ' objective' , self-
referential performance indicators, based on police data, as proof of their validity 
and their worth because they were in turn driven by the political agenda of New 
Labour, who define ' success' in this manner. 
Another possible reason why the analysis of outcomes remained the preserve of the 
police is because representatives from other agencies lacked the skills and/ or the 
knowledge base. This would certainly be in keeping with Hughes and Gilling's 
(2002) findings that community safety practitioners lacked IT, auditing research 
methods and evaluation skills; technical jobs involving these skills were delegated to 
police analysts and external consultants. This suggests that the production of 
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knowledge in the partnerships was not a democratic process, which could be 
problematic given that knowledge can equate to power. Indeed, as I discuss in 
chapter eight, the police were able to use their privileged access to police data to 
influence the decision-making process. 
7.5 Chapter summary 
Since 1999, partnership funding has come primarily from the Home Office. In all 
three partnerships, decisions about funding allocation appeared to be influenced 
chiefly by pragmatic issues such as how much time remained in which to spend the 
money or the rules relating to how it should be spent, rather than criminological 
considerations. Difficulties with funding arrangements appeared to stem from short 
timescales and short-term funding arrangements. This made it difficult to implement 
long-term community safety projects or to employ staff on a long-term basis, and 
also encouraged a focus on projects which were deliverable and measurable, rather 
than necessarily suited to the problem. Prescriptive rules about how government 
funds were to be spent suggest that government retained control of the 'purse 
strings' to local community safety practice. 
In terms of performance monitoring, partnerships had a number of internal 
arrangements such as progress reports and annual reviews, and external 
arrangements such as self-assessment, IQuanta and Public Service Agreements. 
None of these arrangements emphasised the connection between partnership 
activities and fluctuations in crime and disorder, and some, through the 
implementation of short-term measurable projects, encouraged partnerships to chase 
after funds and/ or tackle volume crime rather than community safety. Despite these 
difficulties and the seemingly meaningless nature of performance monitoring 
arrangements, there was also evidence to suggest that the 'honeymoon' had ended 
for the partnerships and that government was increasingly holding them to account 
and expecting them to deliver community safety. 
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In terms of the impact of the partnership on community safety, views ranged from 
no impact to some impact, to uncertainty. Interviewees expressed uncertainty about 
the impact of the partnership because they recognised the complexities of 
unravelling the relationship between partnership activities and fluctuations in crime 
and disorder. 
By contrast, other practitioners suggested that the partnerships had achieved 
successful outcomes; for example, it was claimed that the partnerships had reduced 
specific types of crime through particular community safety projects. By even greater 
contrast, partners occasionally attributed decreases in local levels of volume crime to 
partnership activities. However, the difficulties I experienced in accessing grid-
referenced data and information about partnership activities suggests that these 
claims were unsubstantiated.26o Thus, whilst the partnerships met government 
targets, there was little way of knowing if decreases in recorded crime were 
attributable to partnership activities. These difficulties also raised questions about 
why the analysis of recorded crime appeared to be the preserve of the police and 
why other kinds of data were not considered. It was perhaps because police data 
were most amenable to governmental definitions of 'success' or because 
representatives from other agencies lacked appropriate skills or knowledge. This 
suggests that knowledge production in the partnerships was not a democratic 
process. 
In chapter eight I further explore relationships between the partnerships and central 
government, as well as inter-agency relationships. I also examine the implications of 
these relationships for the responsibility for community safety and joined-up 
community safety practice. 
260 These claims were unsubstantiated in the sense that none of the three partnerships have analysed 
crime and disorder data regularly in the light of partnership activities. Indeed, as I will discuss later 
in this chapter, Cambridge and Birmingham appeared not to have (easily accessible) records of 
partnership activities. 
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CHAPTER VIII: MANY AGENCIES ARE BETTER THAN 
ONE? 
The purpose of this final empirical chapter is to examine tensions within and 
outwith the partnerships and the assumption that many agencies are better than one 
in addressing community safety. The following interviewees summarise some of 
these tensions: 
[W]hat you get then is the standard tension between the operationally 
led, managerially led opinions of the police, and the often more politically 
led, ideologically led opinions of councillors ... And then I think part of 
the other tension is that government gets its knickers in a twist about a 
particular thing, street crime, mobile phone crime, whatever, puts all of its 
eggs in that particular basket for a period of time, and you get very jerky 
behaviour (City council representative, Birmingham). 
[C]rime and disorder partnerships are not really about just setting up an 
organisation, they're not just setting up a table with people around it, they 
are a melting pot for organisational angst, conflicting priorities, 
conflicting personalities, power struggles, everything is up for grabs 
about civic leadership around crime and disorder (Police representative, 
Birmingham). 
In essence, this chapter explores the politics261 of partnerships and responsibility for 
joined-up community safety practice and, in chapter nine, the implications for 
'community governance', that is, decentralised governance through the 
, community'. 
261 Politics refers not only to the affairs of the state but also differences of opinion between 
practitioners. 
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In this chapter I first explore interpersonal politics, tensions between partners and 
why they arose. In particular, drawing on evidence from chapter five about key, 
minor and absent players, I examine the balance of power between partners. Second, 
I explore practitioners' experience of governmental constraints, including the extent 
to which they could manoeuvre around them. Third, in order to summarise these 
hierarchical relationships between partners and government I draw an analogy with 
naval personnel. Finally, I examine practitioners' views on their responsibility for 
community safety, and the implications for it being joined-up. 
8.1 Interagency politics 
Interestingly, in all three partnerships some interviewees believed that there were 
few tensions or disagreements262 between partners in strategic partnership meetings, 
although there were sometimes differences of opinions or expressions of concern or 
requests for more information. In fact, in Birmingham city council and police 
representatives felt that there was not enough disagreement between partners. In 
Birmingham, partners believed that disagreement did not occur during partnership 
meetings because partners were too polite. For example, a Birmingham City Council 
representative described the partnership as having" an innate sense of courtesy". 
One community safety team representative described partners as too good-natured 
when, in theory, they should be disagreeing given their different agendas: 
[A] lot of them are far too good-natured because there are tensions in 
terms of priorities and things and everybody's trying to get on well and 
work together and present a united front. And yet there are, around drugs 
and things like that, there are different perspectives on these things 
(Community safety team representative, Birmingham). 
262 When I asked practitioners about disagreement in the partnership, I tried to convey the idea that 
disagreement was not necessarily a negative aspect of partnership working. 
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A city council representative suggested that if the voluntary sector were involved 
there would be more disagreement, although they would still remain on the 
periphery: 
I think everyone's terribly polite you see. And we haven't got the 
voluntary sector in there. We're statutory agencies who are well brought 
up ... I think it would be different [if the voluntary sector was there] but 
they would be significantly ignored still, because we're very skilled at 
this, as the big agencies, and the voluntary sector are not very skilful at 
saying the right things at the right time (City Council representative, 
Birmingham). 
A Birmingham City Council representative also wondered if tensions were avoided 
because discussions went" over the heads" of attendees, or because the partnership 
had yet to make any difficult decisions. Interviewees in Birmingham and Cambridge 
also questioned whether representatives were afraid to disagree in case they "rocked 
the boat" or upset the balance of partnership relations, thus making the partnership 
dysfunctional. 
In all three areas, there appeared to be two main strategies to circumvent 
disagreement. First, partners suggested that the quality of partnership relations 
reduced the risk of disagreement, in particular through an appreciation of each 
others' perspectives and, in Lincoln, as one interviewee noted, through the stability 
of these relations: 
I think stability, in terms of membership, helps ... in my view I think 
that's much more important than having a piece of paper that's got 
conflict resolution strategy at the top, I think it's developing a personal 
relationship with your partners. And that's not always easy because you 
do get a turnover of people, but if you can achieve it, I think that's the 
more practical (City Council representative, Lincoln). 
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Second, as I discussed in chapter five, controversial issues were also discussed 
informally before meetings; a police representative in Birmingham suggested that 
this was so that partners did not' air their dirty laundry in public' and were able to 
reach an agreement prior to the meeting. 
These two strategies appeared inter-related as the quality of relationships, especially 
between the police and city council, affected their ability to discuss issues informally. 
In Lincoln, for example, interviewees suggested that key players regularly discussed 
partnership matters on the telephone, or face-to-face if they happened to meet in 
other professional contexts. Interviewees in Cambridge also suggested that the 
availability and preparation of reports, prior to strategic partnership meetings, was 
important because it facilitated informal discussions of difficult issues within and 
between organisations before the meeting began. 
Whilst interviewees in all three areas indicated that there were few tensions or 
disagreements, this was not confirmed by my observation of strategic partnership 
meetings.263 Disagreements appeared to arise, primarily between the city council and 
the police, about funding. In Birmingham, there were disagreements about who was 
to decide funding allocation, or about the amount of funding available at the end of 
the financial year, and how it should be spent. In Cambridge, similar disagreements 
arose between partners about funding allocation (including under-spends), and 
about the interpretation of government funding rules.264 There also appeared to be 
tensions about the structure of the partnership, the lack of decision-making, 
263 I am unsure why interviewees and I had different perceptions about the existence of tension and 
disagreement. Perhaps I was unsuccessful at allaying partners' concerns about the negative 
connotations of disagreement and tension. Alternatively, perhaps we simply had different 
understandings of their definition. In any case, it was difficult to quantify how much tension or 
disagreement arose. 
264 An example of disagreements about government funding rules concerned whether the PDF could 
be spent on community safety projects, rather than just on partnership development activities such as 
training. 
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administrative issues (such as the colour and format of the strategy), individual 
personalities and working styles, and tensions over ownership and responsibility.265 
One cause of tension appeared to be distinct organisational agendas and 
performance indicators; these caused practitioners to focus on the 'core business' of 
their agency rather than the business of the partnership. For example, a police 
representative in Lincoln reported that the PCT would not be involved in the 
partnership until they had community safety performance indicators. Hallam (2002) 
also notes a similar focus by the police on their performance indicators. Indeed, in 
Cambridge, two interviewees (including a police representative) said that they were 
not involved in the partnership simply to further community safety, rather they 
were there to gain something for their organisation. 
Organisational agendas also appeared at odds with each other. For example, in 
Birmingham during a discussion of burglary reduction measures, the police 
favoured the installation of window restrictors, whilst the fire service were 
concerned about the implications of the restrictors for the safety of the building in 
the event of a fire. Another example of this occurred in a Cambridge subgroup 
meeting when bids were being considered for funding. The Chair of the subgroup 
recognised that /I everyone will be fighting their own corner", and that there would 
be a tendency to prioritise bids from their own organisations. The competing 
agendas of partners illustrate one of the contradictions, identified by Crawford 
(2001), embedded in New Labour's criminal justice policy and which, according to 
Walters (1996), undermine inter-agency co-operation. These competing objectives 
265 When disagreements arose, they were resolved in different ways. Difficult issues were sometimes 
discussed until a consensus was reached. Voting was also considered an option, although rejected by 
some in Cambridge. Discussions were also simply deferred to either formal or informal meetings 
outside the main strategic partnership meetings, to allow additional information to be circulated or 
different perspectives to be understood. Decisions taken in this context would sometimes be ratified 
by the strategic partnership . Alternatively, in all three partnerships, an external mediator was 
occasionally employed or sometimes the chair was asked to mediate on difficult issues. 
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also illustrate the complexity of translating the partnership approaches into practice 
(Rein, 1983). 
Partners also appeared to have different occupational cultures, that is, working 
practices and behaviours learned through organisational membership.266,267 
Occupational cultures were rarely mentioned in Lincoln.268 Interviewees in 
Birmingham and Cambridge, however, commented on the differences in the 
occupational cultures of the police and the city council. In Birmingham, the police 
described themselves as representing the police generally, rather than specialised 
departments, whereas they described members of the city council as representing a 
specialised department, protective of its own budget: 
The council is a highly centralised organisation, which exists in a series of 
sub-organisations ... and people would join and spend their whole 
careers in one of those silos ... While the police force having reorganised 
... the police has got hardly any central headquarters, so every local area 
commander has two roles, the first is to be part of the force senior 
management team and ... the second role is to be the commander of such 
an area. So we are sort of like out-posted directors as opposed to local 
area commanders (Police representative, Birmingham). 
In Birmingham and Cambridge, the city council were also described as reflexive, 
working out the best way to tackle a problem, and perhaps even bureaucratic, 
whereas the police were described as 'do-ers', concerned with delivery: 
266 This definition seems appropriate given that cultures can be defined as "the symbolic and learned 
aspects of human society", which are transmitted socially rather than biologically (Marshall 1996: 
104). 
267 Occupational cultures were not always a source of tension; a Birmingham city council interviewee 
described the differences between the police and the city council as an opportunity to learn from each 
other. 
268 Again this could be because of the longevity of some of its members and the apparent lack of 
disagreement between partners. 
257 
[O]ne of the key frustrations for my police colleagues is the apparent lack 
of activity the city [council] undertakes, and the truth is it's a mismatch of 
cultures. The police are practitioners first, doers first, and reflective 
practitioners second, whereas the city are reflective practitioners first, and 
then they'll do ... The police are Thunderbird One ... as soon as the 
emergency comes in, we get in that rocket and we blast off, and we fly 
there ... The council are Thunderbird Two, ... they get the call, they spend 
a bit of time deciding what equipment they're going to use, which 
department is going to do it, how they're going to do it, they take off, they 
fly across to the scene, nine times out of ten, as soon as ... Thunderbird 
Two arrives Thunderbird One's gone (Police representative, 
Birmingham). 
The above views may not accurately represent the occupational cultures of either the 
police or the city council, but they provide a sense of the different perceptions, 
beliefs and possibly even stereotypes that prevailed. 
Differences in occupational cultures appeared sometimes to cause disagreement 
because of a lack of understanding of these differences. This was evident in relations 
amongst the community safety team in one area; a city council representative 
described how tensions arose because each team member (from a different 
organisation) had a different job description (drawn up by their host organisation), 
which created different expectations about each of their roles. 
In another area misunderstandings about the occupational cultures of the police and 
city council resulted in tensions over delays in decision-making. A city council 
representative described how a police colleague requested a decision which she was 
powerless to make without consulting with elected members. In order to speed up 
the decision-making process, the police representative wanted elected members 
present at all strategic partnership meetings. These tensions were resolved through a 
meeting between senior representatives from the city council and police, which 
explored their different working practices. 
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Partners also differed in terms of the prevailing values and ideologies of their 
organisations, which perhaps underpinned differences in occupational cultures and 
agendas. During the research, the ideologies of the police were most apparent, 
perhaps because of their role as one of the key players. The police were concerned 
with operational independence. This helps to understand why, in Birmingham at 
least, they tried to remove themselves from the influence of elected members: 
Part of the reason why we ended up with this coordinating body [to make 
decisions on funding allocation] is that the police particularly want to get 
some of those decisions out of the environment where councillors sit, 
because they don't want things that are quite close to operational policing 
decisions being taken in a setting where it's a voluntary sector opinion, or 
a councillor opinion that's holding sway (City council representative, 
Birmingham). 
Loveday (1999) also notes the emphasis placed on operational independence by the 
police. Secondly, the police were viewed by a range of agencies as an organisation 
with a professed hierarchy, requiring deference from those at the bottom of the 
organisation towards those at the top. This deference was evident in strategic 
partnership meetings, as lower-ranking police officers referred to more senior 
officers as "sir" .269 
During my research I observed a third ideological difference associated with the 
police; they tended to be viewed by others as the agency with the greatest expertise 
and knowledge about crime and disorder. Crawford (1997) and Tierney (2001) also 
noted that the police were the main custodians of information on crime. In all three 
areas, the police were responsible for presentations to the partnership on current 
crime issues. However, since it is intended that community safety had a broader 
269 In the context of stra tegic partnership meetings, it seemed incongruous to hear lower-ranking 
police officers referring to their seniors as 'sir'; it suggested that this socially constructed, deferential 
behaviour is deeply embedded in police culture and ideologies. 
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remit than crime and disorder, this suggests that other agencies should have relevant 
information about local community safety issues. For example, the city council in 
Cambridge had information from their 'City Rangers'270 about ASB. 
In addition, crime statistics and command and control logs are not the only way of 
assessing local community safety, especially as some kinds of crime remain under-
reported to the police (such as domestic violence, rape and other kinds of hate crime) 
(Maguire, 2002). Agencies such as Women's Aid might provide a better insight into 
these issues, for example. Victimisation and fear of crime surveys could also be of 
use in exploring local community safety. Yet, the emphasis in strategic partnership 
meetings was on police data and statistics rather than victimisation surveys or the 
knowledge of local practitioners. Partners also appeared to treat police statistics as 
facts, rather than interpretations of the crime problem - this appeared to be bound 
up with the pragmatic approach to community safety, discussed in chapter seven 
and encouraged by funding and performance monitoring arrangements. Police 
statistics may not have been the best suited to the problem, but they were 
presumably the most accessible data, at least for the police. 
The prevailing ideology that the police were 'experts' on crime and disorder 
appeared, at times, advantageous for the police. In one strategic partnership 
meeting, for example, in which decisions were to be made about the allocation of 
partnerships funds for that financial year, the meeting began with a presentation by 
the police about the increasing problem of crack cocaine in the area. The senior 
police officer responsible for this presentation said that if projects were not 
addressing the problem of crack, the partnership could not afford to fund them. In 
this meeting, he successfully secured funding of a police project to tackle crack 
cocaine. 
270 City Rangers is the name given to street wardens, in Cambridge. 
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These ideological differences appeared to contribute to power differentials between 
partners, which were manifested in the existence of key, minor and absent players 
described in chapter five. Depending on the area, the key players were the police 
and the city council, and the minor players (who regularly attended) and absent 
players (who irregularly attended) were the probation service, YOS, youth service 
and sometimes the voluntary sector, peT, fire service and the DA T. 
Power differentials were also evident when practitioners described equality between 
partners. Views were on a continuum ranging from equality to inequality. There 
were practitioners who argued that partners were equal; some partners felt they 
were all equal in every way, whilst others thought partners were equal in that they 
could all make an equal contribution to the strategic partnership discussions but 
they were not equal in their overall commitment to the partnership. 
Interestingly, a police representative in Birmingham suggested that the partnership 
"pretends" everyone is equal because it serves the interests of the partnership to do 
so. This would suggest that equality is an ideology used to maintain the existing 
balance of power. However, if this were so one might expect the police and the city 
council to be the main agencies promulgating the view that partners were equal. 
This was not the case. 
Interviewees also argued that partners were unequal but should be equal, although 
equality might not be possible because of 'real' differences between partners: 
Well as long as you didn't put any kind of pejorative notion on inequality, 
then I would say of course they are not equal. We have got different 
functions and different responsibilities, different sizes and we couldn't be 
equal. Now each tries to contribute appropriately to our role and 
resource. If you say is there a commitment within the partnership to 
inclusiveness and to listening to the voices of all, then I would say it is not 
bad actually (Probation service representative). 
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Interviewees also suggested that equality was undermined because the police and 
the city council, and sometimes the other statutory partners, were the most powerful 
players. 
Differences in power, manifested in degrees of equality amongst partners, appeared 
to be caused by a range of factors, such as resources. In Birmingham in particular the 
city council reportedly 'dwarfed' all other agencies because of its size, power, 
resources and influence. In the other areas, partners viewed the police and the city 
council as having the greatest resources at their disposal. Instead of resources 
generally, partners talked about money specifically as a source of power. Indeed, fire 
service and DAT representatives appeared to resent the police because of the 
additional resources they gained through the partnerships. The ability of the city 
council and the police to commit resources to community safety suggests that they 
also had the ability to determine what happened' on the ground'. Power differentials 
were also affected by the capacity of partner organisations. For example a YOS and 
PCT representative noted that, compared to the police, they had little support for 
completing tasks (between meetings) such as performance monitoring reports. 
Power differentials might also be explained by the extent of partners' ownership of 
the community safety agenda. Agencies such as the fire service, the business 
community, and the PCT, for whom the links with community safety were less clear, 
remained relatively powerless. Indeed, as I already discussed in chapter five, 
partners from these three agencies felt marginalised. 
The balance of power might also have been affected by the seniority of partners. An 
interviewee in Cambridge commented that it was sometimes difficult for members 
of the community safety team to contribute to discussions in strategic partnership 
meetings, since they had to do so in front of their line managers. Longevity of 
partnership membership was another possible factor which affected power 
differentials; those who were new had less of a grasp of the issues (partly due to 
poor induction procedures). Power differentials were also explicable in terms of the 
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number of attendees from each agency, at each meeting. This could for example 
affect the decision-making process since, as I noted in chapter five, the larger 
statutory agencies (with more numerous representatives) dominated speaking 
interactions. 
I have already noted there were ideological differences between organisations; the 
police in particular assumed the role of crime and disorder I experts' since they were 
gatekeepers to information on crime and disorder. The operation of this ideology 
illustrates Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power, which is the process by which 
(through the use of ideology) one social group is able to manipulate the desires of 
another social group, contrary to their best interests. For example, in Cambridge the 
police used their knowledge about crack cocaine to assume a position of authority 
through which they secured funding for a police project. This example also 
illustrates how, as noted by Foucault (1977), knowledge is a source of power. It also 
supports the idea that knowledge production, and even the partnerships themselves, 
were not as democratic as the concept of coordination suggests. 
Given the range of factors underpinning the balance of power, this might imply that 
some partners suffered multiple forms of powerlessness. For example, in 
Birmingham there were individuals who were new, relatively junior in their 
organisation, and from smaller agencies, such as the business sector or the PCT -
these individuals rarely spoke in strategic partnership meetings. This suggests that 
equality of voice or status or commitment was not possible in CSPs, and perhaps 
equality was instead of symbolic value because it perpetuated existing power 
relations. 
8.2 Governmental constraints 
The purpose of this section is to explore the relationships between the partnerships, 
regional government offices and central government, in particular whether these 
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local practitioners were constrained271 by central government or whether 
practitioners had flexibility, within the directives issued by government, to pursue 
their own community safety agendas. 
Relationships between the partnerships and government offices appeared not to be 
characterised by constraint, although there were occasionally tensions. In all three 
areas, it was primarily the community safety teams who communicated with 
government office. Unusually in Lincoln, however, a government office 
representative attended most strategic partnership meetings in order to monitor 
progress. Although the community safety teams were the first point of contact 
between the partnership and government office, it was the chief officers who were 
viewed as accountable for community safety. 
Government office was partly viewed as an external pressure, particularly in relation 
to performance monitoring and funding, and partly as a source of bureaucratic 
pressure, since partnership paperwork had to be returned to them: 
I think we're put under a lot of pressure by the Government Office ... 
They've got their own agenda, they're allegedly trying to join stuff up and 
it's not joining anything up, it's just creating a huge amount of 
bureaucracy (Police representative). 
According to this interviewee the pressure from government office was coming 
indirectly from central government, which I will discuss shortly. In Cambridge and 
Lincoln, partners suggested that the pressure from government office was slowly 
increasing, which supports the idea that the 'honeymoon' had ended for the 
partnerships. Tensions and disagreements also arose in relation to government 
office, for example, the tensions discussed in chapter seven, about the self-
271 In chapter seven, I examined constraints resulting from funding and performance monitoring 
arrangements. This section examines other kinds of constraints. 
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assessment process and rules attached to government funding. However, other 
interviewees, particularly in Cambridge, also questioned the competency of 
government office, since on some issues government office staff knew as much about 
current government directives, as local practitioners.272 
At the same time, other practitioners suggested that government office was not an 
external pressure, as they did not monitor performance but instead provided advice 
on best practice, training and support. This advisory role explains why a member of 
the community safety team in Birmingham described government office as 
"pussyca ts" . Interviewees also viewed government office as a "messenger" or 
"mouthpiece", perhaps even an "agent" for the Home Office. This suggests that 
relationships between the partnerships, government office and central government 
were hierarchical; there was a chain of command from the Home Secretary to the 
Home Office to government office, to the partnerships and practitioners at the 
bottom.273 
Central government was also viewed as a direct and indirect pressure. Central 
government was an indirect pressure because only constituent agencies rather than 
the partnership itself, had community safety performance indicators. In addition, a 
Birmingham city council representative noted that pressures emanated from 
multiple government departments (the Lord Chancellor's department, Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, the Youth Justice Board and the Home Secretary), which 
meant that these pressures were disjointed because there was "more than one 
master". This was paradoxical as the CSPs were intended to join-up agencies, yet 
this was not the case for government departments: 
272 A government office interviewee indicated that he had taken his current job as a means of retiring 
to a more desirable location after working for a long time for the Home Office in London. This raises 
questions as to whether or not other staff from government office were similarly ' put out to pasture' 
before retirement. 
273 As I discuss later in this chapter, practitioners resisted governmental constraints and this suggests 
that the chain of command was two-way (that is, bottom-down and top-up), not just one-way (that is, 
top-down). 
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I know there are directives that are coming from central government 
about the way they view the crime and disorder partnerships working ... 
part of the problem that I have ... is because there'll be directives to 
probation, there'll be directives to the police, directives to the primary 
care trust and I'm not convinced that there's a joined up approach to 
central government in the way that they issue that (Probation service 
representative) . 
In other ways, however, central government exerted direct pressures, some of which 
have already been discussed throughout the thesis. Firstly, as noted in chapter 
seven, there were pressures in relation to targets, the measurement of performance 
and the demonstration of 'success, not least because the 'honeymoon' appeared to 
have ended. Second, there were pressures in relation to funding and 'proving' that 
public money had been wisely spent. 
Third, there were pressures in relation to partnership priorities, which were 
sometimes prioritised over those of local citizens. Partnerships were pressured by 
government law and order campaigns (and their media coverage); for example, in 
relation to street crime in the summer of 2002, and more recently in relation to anti-
social behaviour. This interviewee summarises these pressures: 
Now the government might turn round and say, actually robbery is the 
most important thing because nationally mobile phone theft is quite 
important. We'll have 100 crimes a year of robbery of mobile phones, it 
may not be our priority, it may not be something the community has 
actually said is important, but we could get a focus coming to us 
nationally that says, actually you've got to deal with this problem (Police 
representative, Cambridge). 
According to a Birmingham City Council representative, law and order politics 
resulted in "jerky" and short-term projects, rather than continuous and sustainable 
approaches to community safety. 
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Fourth, the government exerted pressure through public visits by key ministers. This 
was especially so in Birmingham. In the wake of the shooting of two young women 
in Aston in January 2003, Birmingham received a number of visits, for example, by 
John Denham MP (Minister of State at the Home Office 2001-03) and Barbara Roche 
MP (the Minister of State for Social Exclusion and Deputy Minister for Women 2001-
03). Finally, legislation such as the Police Reform Act 2002 or the ASB Act 2003 was 
another way in which the partnerships were constrained. In relation to the former, a 
Cambridge City council representative suggested that it could be used to "force" 
issues when and if partnerships failed to comply with government. 
In sum, in all three areas it appeared that government office constrained partnership 
activities in limited ways. This was not true of central government, however, which 
was perceived to exert increasing pressure on the partnerships, although often 
through government office. One cannot assume that partnerships and practitioners 
were passive in their relationships with regional and central government, as this 
would deny practitioners' agency, and hence questions were raised about their 
opportunity to resist governmental constraints. Gilling and Hughes (2002) also 
raised this issue; they found that community safety managers were trying to 'steer' 
the community safety agenda, rather than just follow government prescriptions. 
Government was viewed as prescriptive. For example, the DATjCSP merger caused 
concern in all three areas, as there was not enough freedom for the partnerships to 
handle this as they saw fit: 
I've got the government office saying, thou shalt abolish your DAT ... 
we're not going to have a DAT Chair by April ... I think there is a need for 
government direction, but sometimes we need to be less literal about its 
interpretation ... you cannot ever get government guidance which 
prescribes, as the needs of Lincoln are very different from the needs of 
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Birmingham it's never going to work is it? (City Council 
representative, Birmingham)274 
Other interviewees from the PCT and the city council in Birmingham suggested 
there was little room for manoeuvre, and government was the most" senior partner" 
or the "master" in the partnership, who controlled much of the local detail. Partners 
in Lincoln and Cambridge also expressed unhappiness about government 
constraints on local community safety practice. For example, a Y05 worker 
described herself as powerless in the face of top-down government control. A 
Birmingham City Council representative suggested that because partnerships were 
funded and inspected by government, ultimately partners conformed to government 
expecta tions: 
[G]overnment is trying to manage too much detail in this relationship, but 
that's not specific to community safety; if you look at any policy analysis 
it's all about the micro-management of central government, they try to 
control what's happening in what enumeration district ... 50 the drivers 
are central government most definitely, government office as their agents, 
the middle men, and then the other key driver, absolute key driver, is 
public perception about the place they live in (Member of the community 
safety team, Birmingham). 
This view is interesting because this interviewee suggests that the public were also 
key drivers of the community safety agenda. 
However, practitioners also resisted government prescriptions, and this supports 
Gilling and Hughes (2002) research on community safety managers. A Cambridge 
County Council representative suggested that only certain processes were 
274 However, as I discussed in chapter six, in two-tier local authorities such as Cambridge and Lincoln, 
the DAT/CSP merger was an example of how practitioners manoeuvred around government 
guidance, which illustrates that there were opportunities for local practitioners to resist governmental 
constraints successfully. 
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prescriptively determined by government, such as the need to have district rather 
than county level partnerships.275 In fact two practitioners in Lincoln also believed 
that the flexibility accorded to community safety practitioners to determine local 
issues was increasing not decreasing: 
I think in the early years people [community safety practitioners] were 
very much constrained, money was given out for burglary, you could 
only use it on burglary, and very specific at that. ... in the first couple of 
years there was only one fund and that went to the police, that was of a 
general nature, a type of policing fund, so they were very constrained ... 
well eighty odd per cent of CORPs never saw the money anyway. Now at 
least they get some ... most of it is not overly prescribed (Interviewee in 
Lincoln) . 
A Birmingham city council representative argued that the performance management 
culture gave practitioners discretion in how they addressed community safety as 
long as they met government targets. This also illustrates, however, one of the 
difficulties with managerialism, that is, practitioners run the risk of a bureaucratic 
focus on what can be measured. 
Practitioners in Birmingham and Lincoln also noted how they resisted attempts by 
government to dictate the local community safety agenda. One way was to retain a 
strong sense of partnership priorities (as described in the strategy): "[T]he 
partnership has to hold on to some sense of what its agenda is via the strategy so 
they can decide which strings they allow to be pulled by government". A Lincoln 
City Council interviewee re-iterated this view; he noted that practitioners avoided 
prescriptive national performance indicators by focusing on local priorities which 
were also linked to the national ones. 
275 This issue was interesting because, whilst the CDA states that partnerships should be on a district 
level, towards the end of fieldwork the subgroups of partnerships in Lincolnshire were beginning to 
merge, thus having the potential to be more like a countywide partnership. 
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A youth service representative described how he resisted government constraints; he 
saw government money (despite the strings attached to it), as an opportunity to use 
his mainstream budget and staff in other ways: 
[W]e do have some flexibility in terms of how we move our resources 
around. So for example, because [name of city] is receiving funds from the 
BCU funding for detached youth workers to work with the youth 
disorder team, what I've been able to do is to is move one of those 
detached youth teams from the city to [a different area] ... And all it 
means is that some of the resources in [name of city] are more focused to 
an external agenda, i.e. a government agenda but that's not to say that 
they're not the youth services focuses as well (Youth service 
representative) . 
This was an unusual view, not expressed by other practitioners. Perhaps he 
articulated these views because the youth service, unlike some of the other agencies 
in the partnership, was less constrained by government performance indicators. 
Certainly, a youth offending service representative argued that the partnership, 
compared to the youth offending service, had more flexibility and manoeuvrability 
around its targets, not least because they set some of these targets themselves: 
My primary objective has got to be for this service to be delivering under the 
thirteen performance measures that I have within the service. There's no 
manoeuvrability on those, they are set in stone and we have to deliver full-
stop and if we don't then people are going to be asking why. In terms of the 
crime and disorder partnership there is some flexibility in one sense, in that 
you can review your own targets and set your own targets. So there's kind of 
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more opportunity I guess to impact on what you think is necessary and 
appropriate in your area (Youth offending service representative).276 
The tensions noted so far illustrate how differences between the partnerships, 
government office and central government influence partnership relations. 
8.3 Interpreting the politics of partnerships: an analogy with naval 
personnel 
In order to summarise the politics of partnerships, I have developed a thirteen-
pronged typology which draws an analogy with naval personnel.277 This analogy 
was also chosen in order to emphasise the hierarchical nature of relationships in the 
CSPS.278 Furthermore, it compares and integrates the types developed by Belbin 
(1993) and Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b)279 also drawing on earlier findings in this 
thesis. For a briefer version, see the Table in Appendix 16. 
The highest naval rank is Admiral; these officers are in overall charge of the fleet but 
seldom go out to sea, as this role is performed by the Commodore or Captain. 
Central government appeared to partly fulfil this role as it exerted indirect pressure 
on the partnerships by measuring the performance of partner agencies, as well as 
direct pressure through priorities, targets, funding, public visits to partnerships, 
legislation and particular types of crime, such as ASB or street crime. The 
partnerships were active in their relationship with central government, however, as 
276 This view also illustrates the focus on performance indicators for constituent partner agencies, 
rather than the objectives of the partnership. 
277 I am grateful to my supervisor, Loraine Gelsthorpe, for suggesting this analogy and assisting with 
its development. 
278The hierarchical nature of relationships in the CSPs contrasts with the view that inter-
organisational networks are informal and non-hierarchical (Thacher, 2004). This could be because of 
the legislative basis of the partnerships, which had the effect of formalising relationships. 
279 The research of Belbin (1993) and Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994b) was described in chapter two. 
Thanks to David Thacher who suggested comparing my typology with existing research. 
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practitioners appeared to resist governmental constraints.28o The difference in size of 
Birmingham, Cambridge and Lincoln implied that Birmingham had proportionately 
more power to resist government constraints, although in Birmingham the size of 
the city also meant additional and sometimes unwanted political attention. 
Continuing the analogy with naval personnel, the Captain is responsible for 
preparing the ship for sailing including the recruitment of personnel; looking after 
the ship and crew's well-being; directing the ship's activities in naval engagements, 
and delegating authority when necessary. This is similar to the role of the 
coordinator, noted by Belbin (1993), a mature and confident chairperson who 
clarifies goals and promotes decision-making. The role of captain was typically 
assumed by the chair in each partnership, especially in Birmingham for example, as 
the Chair instigated most partnership decisions. In Cambridge and Lincoln, 
however, as decision-making was more shared, the chairs appeared to share the role 
of captain with other key players, such as the city council, the police and the 
community safety manager. Interviewees in Birmingham suggested that the Chair 
shaped the direction of the partnership and this illustrates that the Chair had a role 
not only as captain but also as the Master. The main duty of the Master is navigation, 
which involves supervising the midshipmen and mates in their measurement of the 
sun and compass which are used to steer the ship. They are responsible for keeping 
the ship on course. 
The Commander is second in command to the captain. There were parallels between 
this role and that taken by subgroup chairs, especially in Birmingham and Lincoln, 
where subgroup chairs reported to the Chair of the partnership at each strategic 
280 See also Gilling and Hughes (2002) or Tilley (1993), for example. 
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partnership meeting. 281 This was less obviously so in Cambridge, because there were 
difficulties in the relationships between subgroups and the strategic partnership. 
The Purser oversees the supply of consumables and is responsible for the payroll 
and finances. This role might be similar to parts of Belbin's 'completer' role, such as 
rectifying errors and delivering on time. In Cambridge and Lincoln, members of the 
community safety team possibly shared this role. In Birmingham, however, the 
community safety programme manager appeared to fill this role, as he/ she was 
appointed to ensure community safety programmes were delivered to budget and 
on time. 
The Sergeant of Arms 'polices' the ship (for troublemakers or drunkards) and 
resolves disputes. This role could be similar to Belbin's 'plant', who resolves 
problems either creatively, or the 'shaper' who resolves problems through being 
challenging and dynamic. Again, the chair potentially filled this role,282 as 
interviewees in all areas noted that the chair was involved in resolving 
disagreements and tensions between partners. 
The Warrant Officer reports to the Captain; he/she have technical knowledge used 
to maintain the ship. This role is similar to Belbin's 'specialist' who is single-minded, 
possessing rare skills and knowledge. There were parallels between this role and 
that of community safety managers, who provided information, support and 
technical advice, as well as negotiating with others on behalf of the Captain. Crime 
analysts possibly filled this role too, as they presented technical information about 
local crime. Their single-mindedness might be inferred from interviewees' criticisms, 
in Birmingham, that their presentations were of limited use. 
281 On the surface it seemed that subgroups were held to account in this manner by the strategic 
partnership. My research focused on strategic partnership meetings rather than subgroup meetings, 
however. 
282 It was plausible that the chair took a range of roles in the partnership (Captain, Navigator and 
Sergeant of Arms) because as Belbin (1993) notes, people in teams commonly have a profile or 
repertoire of team roles between which they move depending upon social context. 
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The Boatswains (or Bosuns according to its phonetic spelling) are responsible for the 
hardware of the ship, its anchors, rigging, and sails, and they report to the Warrant 
Officer. Boatswains may be similar to Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994b) 'prime 
movers' who took an active role in the partnership, undertaking a disproportionate 
amount of the work. Belbin's (1993) 'team worker' (who is co-operative and 
diplomatic); 'implementer' (who is disciplined, reliable, efficient and able to turn 
ideas into practice); or 'completer' (who is conscientious, seeking to rectify errors 
and delivers on time), might also fit into the overarching label of Boatswain. The 
community safety team, especially in Birmingham and Cambridge (but less so in 
Lincoln given the teams embryonic stage of development), might fulfil the role of 
Boatswain; they completed policy and administrative work between meetings, 
ensuring targets and deadlines were met, for example. The applicability of this role 
appeared to depend on the interviewee, the case and the context of interactions. In 
Cambridge, for example, members of the community safety teams behaved 
differently in subgroup meetings compared to strategic partnership meetings. In the 
former they were Captain, and in the latter they were Boatswains. This confirms 
Belbin's (1993) suggestion that team players possess a repertoire of roles which 
depend on social context. 
There were also roles which appeared to arise from the complexities of partnership 
politics. The look-out scans the horizon for any trouble ahead and might incorporate 
both Belbin's (1993) 'resource investigator', who is enthusiastic and extroverted and 
willing to explore new opportunities, and Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994b) 'agency 
spies,' who take part only to keep tabs on the activities of other agencies. On the one 
hand, the resource investigator, such as the community safety manager, appeared to 
filter information and guidance from government to the partnership. On the other 
hand, 'agency spies' could have been representatives from the fire Service, customs 
and excise, the DAT and connexions, who suggested that their only reason for 
attending partnership meetings was to network, glean information and resources. 
This role appeared to overlap with the collector role, which I discuss shortly. 
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Passengers and driftwood were connected with levels of attendance and 
engagement with the partnership, the flow of money and the operation of power. 
Passengers attended partnership meetings on a regular basis (unlike driftwood) 
because they found meetings to be a useful source of information or because they 
made useful contacts. Like' driftwood' they were unclear about why they were there. 
This role is similar to that of the supportive passenger, noted by Liddle and 
Gelsthorpe (1994b), who gave vocal support to the activities of the partnership but 
few resources. This type is exemplified by the minor players identified in chapter 
five: the fire service, customs and excise, the PCT and the Chamber of Commerce, 
community representatives and the probation service, depending on the area. 
Driftwood is material floating at sea, which is washed up on the shore. Some 
representatives could be likened to driftwood, as there were some who attended 
irregularly and were unclear about why they were engaged with the partnership at 
all. They were different from passengers because they attended meetings irregularly, 
and struggled to engage with the community safety agenda. Driftwood was perhaps 
similar to Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994b) 'sleeping partners' or 'chair warmers', 
who contributed little in terms of ideas, verbal support or resources. This type is 
exemplified by the absent players noted in chapter five: the police authority, the 
PCT, the county council, the voluntary sector, the probation service, and the YOS, 
depending on the area. 
The Collectors (of flotsam and jetsam)283 were those who attended partnership 
meetings in order to access additional resources, particularly funding for their own 
agency. This role is similar to Belbin's 'resource investigator' who is enthusiastic and 
extrovert and willing to explore new opportunities. For example, a DAT 
representative attended the meeting to monitor how money was allocated. At the 
same time, a different DAT interviewee gave examples of when the police, rather 
283 Flotsam refers to wreckage floating on the sea, which anyone is entitled to pick up. Jetsam refers to 
goods ejected from a boat, which remain the Queen's property. This might refer to the resources 
partners were able to acquire by attending strategic partnership meetings. 
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than the DAT, benefited from additional partnership resources. Furthermore, 
interviewees from the fire service, customs and excise, and connexions, were open 
about joining the partnership in order to access partnership funds to help meet the 
objectives of their organisation. 
Pirates hijack ships in order to acquisition their goods. In the partnerships, a pirate 
was perhaps someone attempting to influence the CSP agenda for his/her own 
purposes. A pirate was different from a collector (of flotsam and jetsam) because 
they were not simply attending the partnership to pick up small amounts of funding; 
rather they used their authority to channel the partnership and its entire resources, 
to fit in with their agenda. In at least one partnership, the police appeared to act like 
pirates, perhaps because of the power they wielded over other organisations due to 
their criminological expertise and knowledge.284 
The Ship's fool is like Shakespeare's Fools, who are far from foolish; they are 
insightful, wise and able to speak the truth when others cannot. Fools use their 
apparent naivety and tomfoolery to conceal criticism and point out errors, as well as 
to offer a detached outsider's view of the unfolding plot; they tend to be observers, 
rather than participants in the action.285 This role might be similar to Belbin's (1993) 
'plant or ideas person' who is a creative thinker and able to solve difficult problems. 
By contrast, a mutineer is unafraid of asking challenging questions, whilst others 
might perceive them to cause trouble by asking difficult questions for the sake of it. 
This role is similar to Liddle and Gelsthorpe's (1994b) 'obstructers', who were openly 
critical and/ or negative about the activities of the partnership and other 
participating agencies. 
284 This was also noted by Crawford (1997) and Tierney (2001), for example. 
285 For example Feste, the clown in 'Twelfth Night', uses his wit to poke fun at other characters, such 
as the pompous Malvolio. See the following websites for more information about Shakespeare's 
Fools: http://www.talkingto.co.uk! ttws! or Geraghty (2002) [hhttp://www.english-
literature.org! essays! twelfth-night.htmll 
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There appeared to be a few individuals in all three areas (two in Birmingham, one in 
Cambridge and one in Lincoln), drawn from the city council, probation service and 
the community safety teams, who asked challenging questions of others; 
interviewees described them as 'critical thinkers' or 'strong personalities'. In 
meetings it was difficult, however, to determine the motivation of these 'critical 
thinkers'. Their questions appeared to hold others to account; they were sometimes 
light-hearted and sometimes not, which might illustrate their role as the ship's fool. 
At the same time, an interviewee noted how a 'critical thinker' criticised partnership 
activities, but rarely did anything to remedy it himself/herself. This illustrates the 
role of mutineer. 
In a few respects, the metaphor developed so far may not 'hold water',286 as it over-
simplifies social processes and relationships in the partnerships. These difficulties 
with the metaphor are useful, however, as they further illuminate the complexities of 
the politics of partnerships. Since a ship is watertight, the metaphor suggests that 
partnerships have clear boundaries. This oversimplifies partnership relations in two 
ways. First, it suggests that the boundaries of control are neat and distinct from each 
other; for example, it would follow that the Admiral or central government directed 
the ship, but their ability to exercise control ended at the boundary of the ship. 
Funding and performance monitoring arrangements suggested that this was not the 
case; rather, government appeared to direct the local community safety agenda both 
from afar and in close proximity to practitioners. 
Secondly, the boundaries of the ship suggest that naval personnel are contained on 
board and would experience difficulties in leaving, for example, if they were in the 
middle of the ocean. In practice, however, even when agencies were statutorily 
obliged to attend, this did not mean that they were represented at meetings on a 
regular basis. In Lincoln, the PCT and the county council, both of which are statutory 
286 Thanks to Sebastien Roche and Jaques De Maillard for their helpful comments about the problems 
with the metaphor. 
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agencies, attended board meetings irregularly if at all, for example. Furthermore, 
staff turnover and the steady influx of newcomers to the partnership, described in 
chapter five, suggests that representatives leave if necessary. 
The metaphor further suggests that partnerships are hierarchical, perhaps even 
militarised in their approach; the Admiral and/ or the Captain give orders, which are 
filtered down to the other naval personnel. Relationships were hierarchical as there 
were power differentials between agencies, and between the partnerships and 
central government. This is misleading, however, because community safety 
practitioners did not simply take' orders'; rather' orders' (if they exist) are open to 
negotiation. For example, local practitioners appeared to resist and manoeuvre 
around governmental constraints. 
The metaphor also suggests that partnerships are coherent, but in practice 
partnerships appeared to lack coherence because of inter-agency differences and 
tensions, which had implications, as I discuss next, for joined up community safety 
practice. The metaphor conveys some of the inter-agency tensions in the 
partnerships,287 but not the implications for joined-up community safety practice. 
Finally, differences between agencies in terms of resources, power, ideologies, and 
occupational cultures, suggest that the partnership might be more of a flotilla of 
boats rather than an armada. 288 
8.4 Responsibility for community safety 
The tensions described so far between agencies and between the partnerships, the 
regional government offices and central government, creates uncertainties about 
who was responsible for community, the possibility of joined-up community safety 
287 The collector or the pirate role, for example, indicated that agencies compete with each other for 
scarce resources. 
288 A flotilla is a collection of boats, whereas an armada is a collection of boats united by the common 
purpose of defeating the enemy. 
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practice, and moreover if this was desirable. When practitioners were asked about 
who was responsible for community safety, three main themes emerged from their 
responses. Firstly, practitioners from a range of agencies deemed the police and city 
council to be primarily responsible for community safety; this was partly because of 
the legal obligations of the police and city council under the CDA, but also because 
community safety was viewed as part of their 'core business': 
[T]he local authority and other agencies, where appropriate, should be 
responsible for creating an environment in which crime is minimised, and 
the capacity for criminal activity is minimised. And the police should be 
responsible for catching people who engage in serious criminality, the 
local authority should be engaged in whatever assistance it needs getting 
people who engage in what you might call minor or institutional 
criminality (City council representative, Birmingham). 
Interestingly, only one police officer shared the view that the police and the city 
council were primarily responsible for community safety. Perhaps this was because 
since the Morgan Report, the police have tried to distance themselves from the view 
that they were solely responsible for delivering community safety. 
The second theme was that together the agencies which comprised the partnerships 
were responsible for community safety. In all three areas, representatives from the 
police and city council, as well as smaller agencies such as the probation service, the 
youth offending service and connexions, expressed these views. This responsibility 
appeared to be weighted, however, as particular agencies were responsible for 
appropriate parts of the strategy, and intervened on different issues and at different 
stages in the criminal justice process: 
[I]f you take anyone [agency] of them out of it, then we're weaker for it ... 
they are all in their own way crucial ... it's debatable how we could 
impact on youth without the youth service, without the youth offending 
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team, without the involvement of the schools, yet it's also to do with how 
we deal with the kids on the street, it's how we interact with them, how 
we deal with them if they're in custody, how we deal with them as 
victims (Police representative, Birmingham). 
If you take burglary, we arrest offenders ... and hopefully prosecute them 
successfully, we are able to give people crime prevention advice ... we 
can identify trends as we've got intelligence .. . everybody at that table has 
got a part to play. The District Council particularly in terms of their 
housing stock, making it much more secure, for example. If the youth 
offending service makes sure that the work they are doing with young 
burglars is effective ... The county council in terms of their education and 
youth service makes sure that kids that are at risk of offending are picked 
up early enough and channelled and diverted. Probation can do their bit 
in terms of offenders who commit offences to feed drug habits ... you can 
identify the part that everybody's got to play and I think it's all an equal 
part, it's just you do it at different stages of the process (Police 
representative, Lincoln). 
Thirdly, interviewees suggested that the partnerships alongside offenders, citizens 
and central government were responsible for community safety. Two probation 
service representatives suggested that whilst the partnership was responsible for 
community safety, government provided the overall structure and framework, for 
example through targets, priorities and legislation. The' community' was viewed as 
partly responsible for community safety because the partnerships worked on their 
behalf and thus required their consent, and because the I community' were 
responsible for socialising young people and for informal social control. This city 
council representative noted the complexity of the debate about citizens' 
responsibility for community safety and the need for a balance between individual 
rights and duties: 
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I think we are all responsible at some level, and I would take that down to 
include the individual citizen. You can't make a safe society without 
layers of accountability that go from the kind of internal value system of 
each individual ... I think there is a kind of a basic societal need to accept 
that there are limitations on individual freedoms for the good of society 
... there's then kind of weighted responsibility where I think we have to 
accept that the police and ourselves have ... probably the largest 
responsibility for trying to create a city that's safe, but there are other bit 
players, probation, learning and schools council, health (City council 
representative, Birmingham). 
Representatives from the fire service, DAT, and youth service in each area were 
concerned that the partnerships encouraged the 'community' to renege on its 
responsibilities for community safety; they feared that the partnerships created 
expectations that the statutory agencies would provide solutions to the community's 
problems. A fire service representative, in particular, worried about the partnerships 
contributing to the 'nanny state'.289 For similar reasons, a member of the community 
safety team in Birmingham suggested that offenders should also be responsible for 
community safety in order to avoid a culture in which crime and disorder is 
'someone else's responsibility'. These views perhaps reflect the wider political 
climate of communitarianism, which offsets individual rights with social 
responsibili ty. 290 
Throughout the discussion so far, a distinction was drawn, in interviewees' 
responses, between who is and who should be responsible for community safety; 
practitioners suggested that, in theory, everyone (including the' community') should 
be responsible, but in reality, agencies for whom crime was their 'core business', 
289 By contrast the other interviewees also noted the difficulties of overcoming disempowerment and 
apathy. 
290 See Etzioni (200la), for example, who argues that the focus on individual rights, in the 1980s, was 
curbed by the communitarians, who increased the balance between individual rights and social 
responsibilities. 
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such as the police and the city council, continued to take the most responsibility for 
crime control: 
Well I suppose they [the partners] all should have responsibility, I think at 
the moment it's probably mainly the police ... But, I don't know, I suppose 
the youth offending team do as well, and everyone does to a certain 
extent, but I mean, the police, they see that as their core business, whereas 
the county, they might see that as one of the little strands ... It's just totally 
changing the way of thinking with everyone in every organisation, which 
is going to take a long time (Member of the community safety team, 
Cambridge). 
Similarly, a member of the community safety team in Birmingham noted that 
everyone, including citizens, should be responsible for community safety but the 
reality was that the police and the city council remained primarily responsible. This 
suggests a gap between the rhetoric of partnerships and its meaning in practice. 
Practitioners' believed that responsibility for crime control should be shared, but in 
practice this was quite different - perhaps this was because, as I outlined in the 
previous section, there were power differentials between agencies which meant that 
some agencies, particularly the police and the city council, were able to share that 
responsibility more than others. This suggests that Garland (2001) is partially correct 
about the concept of 'responsibilisation';291 it had occurred at the symbolic level, 
rather than in practice.292 That is, the partnerships implied that the responsibility for 
community safety was shared, but in practice it remained primarily the 
responsibility of the police and the local authority. 
291 'Responsibilisation' refers to the devolving of the responsibility for crime control from the 
government to localised state and non-state actors and organisations (Garland, 2001). 
292 This appeared particularly likely, given that in practice, the 'community' are little involved and 
thus not fully responsible for community safety, and given governmental constraints on local 
community safety agendas. 
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8.5 Joined-up community safety practice? 
The assumption is that 'many agencies are better than one' (Liddle, 2001) in 
addressing community safety because problems have diverse causes which require a 
range of agencies to tackle them together, thus eliminating duplication and 
increasing efficiency (Rein, 1983). In the present research, joined-up community 
safety appeared to refer to connections between different parts of the community 
safety structure; for example, connections between the strategic partnership and its 
subgroups or among the different subgroups. Joined-up community safety also 
referred to connections between different agencies which facilitated the 
identification of common targets and priorities, as these interviewees suggest:293 
A partnership of this kind brings together agencies delivering their own 
statutory responsibilities and tries to align them. That's so decisions made 
by organisations about their own business are informed and influenced 
by being brought together with other partners ... The question is, does the 
partnership make an impact on the way we all work? That's the most 
important indicator of whether or not the partnership is successful 
(Probation service representative). 
We have a problem with rats in [a local area], the rats are in the rubbish ... 
it's corning from Tesco. Who's responsible for Tesco? Well, that would be 
environmental health or fire safety ... Now my remit isn't rats in [a local 
area], but it is about clearing up means of escape at the back of the shop, 
do you see what I mean? ... as long as someone has the intelligence to see 
the links, and has a knowledge of where all the organisations fit in with 
the safety aspect (Fire service representative). 
Litter's a classic one. Everybody sees people throw litter down, and 
nobody's doing anything about it, it drives everybody mad. Well, the 
293 Both interviewees appeared to have broad understandings of the definition of community safety. 
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reason nobody's doing anything about it is that the police haven't got the 
statutory power to take any action at all .. . and we've [the city council] 
got the powers, but we haven't got the power of arrest, or the power to 
require anybody to give a name and address, and if they refuse, arrest 
them (Representative from Birmingham City Council). 
This joined-up approach to community safety fits with the pan-hazard approach 
advocated by Pease (2001); he argues that currently the public, when faced with a 
problem, must decide which service to call. A pan-hazard approach would 
ultimately mean that there would be one state agency to address all social problems 
and the public would no longer have to judge, which agency should tackle the 
problem. 
There were also some positive examples of joined-up approaches to community 
safety. In Birmingham, one subgroup tackled 'crime and grime'; it involved 
primarily the city council and the police, and tackled the issues raised by the 
Birmingham City Council interviewee above. In Cambridge, the partnership was 
galvanized into presenting a united front when faced with pressure from a local 
residents' group; they sent representatives from a range of agencies to public 
meetings. 
However, there were also instances in which the partnerships appeared not to act in 
a joined-up manner. In Birmingham, after the shooting of two young women in 
Aston in January 2003, partnership funded initiatives to tackle the issues of guns and 
gangs, were criticised for lacking coherence or integration. A partner in Birmingham 
also complained that he felt disconnected not only from the local strategic 
partnership, but also from the subgroups. The subgroups also appeared 
unconnected with each other; for example, the Birmingham DAT, which formed the 
substance misuse subgroup, was viewed as self-contained and thus left to pursue its 
own path. Hence another interviewee described Birmingham as a multi-agency 
meeting, rather than a multi-agency partnership: 
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I'm not sure if there's a real attempt to achieve a partnership. I don't get 
any sense that people are making a real effort to move outside of their 
agency boxes and grapple with something on a group and team basis. 
They just come and report in, it' s like a sponge and then they go away. I 
would have much more time for it if we did something ... where you 
actually work as a team to ... find some creative solutions to it. But we're 
not doing that bit, so what this actually is, isn't so much a multi-agency 
partnership ... as a multi-agency meeting (City council representative, 
Birmingham). 
This view also illustrates how perceptual anchors (Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986) 
possibly limit inter-agency understandings and thus joined-up practice. 
In Cambridge, as I discussed in the chapter five, there were ongoing difficulties in 
the relationship between the strategic partnership and its subgroups - partners 
tried a number of approaches to improve these relationships, which were as yet 
unsuccessful. In Lincoln, some interviewees described the partnership as joined-up 
whilst others were uncertain; for example, some interviewees cited working together 
as one of the hurdles to be overcome in the future. Furthermore, the strategic 
partnership had little contact with the city council ASB team or its coordinator. 
In all three areas, the partnerships also appeared poorly integrated because of the 
way subgroups were chaired. Whilst there were a range of agencies represented at 
each strategic and subgroup meetings, each subgroup was chaired by a 
representative with a vested interest in the matters of the subgroup. For example, 
subgroups that dealt with youth crime were chaired by a representative from the 
youth offending service or the youth service; burglary subgroups were chaired by 
the police; ASB subgroups were chaired by a representative from the city council, 
housing department and so on. This was a sensible approach, according to this 
interviewee, given that these representatives were likely to be the best qualified for 
the position of subgroup chair, in terms of their knowledge and expertise: 
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I would say, our action groups are all chaired by people who have a 
strong interest in that field .. . the knowledge and the commitment that 
they can bring to the chair is a by-product of their post if you like 
(Interviewee, Lincoln). 
At the same time, this approach to the chairing of subgroups raised questions about 
whether or not the partnerships were joined-up, beneath strategic partnership 
meetings, especially because the lines of communication within and between the 
subgroups and the strategic partnership board were not well established, 
particularly in Cambridge. Taken together, this suggests that joined-up community 
safety practice, particularly at the subgroup level, was limited.294 Yet the joining up 
of service provision is one of the primary goals of the CSPS.295 Therefore, like the 
responsibility for community safety, joined-up practices were symbolised rather 
than realised in the CSPs. 
The reasons the partnerships appeared not to be joined-up were similar to those 
underpinning tensions within the partnership; that is, different agendas, 
occupational cultures, ideologies and levels of power. There were also pressures 
associated with performance measurement, which encouraged agencies to focus on 
the priorities of their organisation, rather than on partnership priorities, as this 
interviewee suggests: 
[T]here is starting to be a tension between my role as the local police 
commander ... in terms of the targets I have to deliver and because of the 
increasingly rigorous inspective regime around policing ... I could argue 
that because all those agencies aren't doing all the bits that they need to 
do, that's impacting on my operational performance relating to burglary 
and car crime, for example. So there starts to be a tension and if you chair 
294 Crawford (2001) also noted that the partnership are not joined-up, indeed this is one of a number 
of contradictions in New Labour's criminal justice policies. 
295 Rein (1983) notes that one source of the pleas for coordination is the possibility of plugging gaps 
and ensuring continuity in service delivery . 
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the crime and disorder group, where is your ultimate responsibility and 
accountability? (Police representative, Lincoln). 
Also, partnership priorities were not easy to reconcile or balance - it required the 
amalgamation of the priorities of partner agencies, the 'community' and the 
government. Views revolved around the extent to which the priorities of the 
partners, 'community' and government were conflicting and how they could be 
balanced. Practitioners suggested that the priorities of the' community', partners and 
central government were similar and thus did not need reconciling; they included 
vehicle crime, burglary and violent crime. The Audit Commission (2002) also noted a 
good fit between local and national priorities. Yet other interviewees argued that the 
priorities of the partners, 'community' and central government were conflicting and 
it was difficult to reconcile them: 
You'll get the government possibly telling you one thing, and the police 
telling you another, the fire service another, DAT team another, and 
which way do you jump, you know, I wouldn't care to say ... lets' face it, 
it is a politically driven animal, it's funded politically through the Crime 
and Disorder Act ... and therefore you've got to look at what the 
politicians are telling you to do, and what the grass roots are telling you, 
and meet somewhere in the middle ... Find the common themes and 
those are the ones it should act on, it's a matching process (Fire service 
representative) . 
This situation was compounded in Birmingham by its diversity and its range of 
social problems. In addition, a youth service represented noted that not only were 
competing priorities difficult to reconcile, but the very definition of crime was a 
contested issue; he cited an example of adults' fearful reactions to a group of young 
people in a local/community', who paradoxically hung-around together in order to 
feel safe. This myriad of competing definitions and priorities perhaps reflects the 
287 
complexity of the social relations of crime control (Lea, 2002), as well as the locally 
contested nature of crime and disorder.296 
Amongst those practitioners who believed that priorities were conflicting and in 
need of reconciling, some felt this process was achieved "messily" and in an 
unsystematic manner, and that the balancing of a range of priorities was not peculiar 
to the partnership, but was simply an aspect of working in local government. 
Another method noted by interviewees in Lincoln and Cambridge was to take a 
"scattergun approach" to priorities, which prioritised nothing and included 
everything: 
So how do we balance it? I don't think we even try to consider balancing 
it ... we do an audit, we put out a list of priorities that nobody could 
argue with, and we all put together some tasks under those priorities 
which people probably are going to do anyway ... I'm not sure whether 
we've actually got that balance which is saying, we can do a little bit of 
this, and a little bit less of that. As a result, I don't think we try to balance, 
I think we just say, oh well they're worried about this, that and the other, 
so let's put it in a strategy (County council representative, Cambridge). 
As a police representative in Birmingham noted, one of the consequences of the 
'scattergun' approach is that the strategy becomes a collection of single-issue 
priorities, rather than a coherent document. This interviewee suggested that the 
latter approach requires I difficult' decisions to be taken, which can exclude some 
partners and their priorities. Perhaps these decisions were unnecessary, however, 
that is, if government priorities took precedence and given the governmental 
constraints around funding and performance management noted in chapter seven.297 
296 Stenson and Edwards (2002) provide an example of the contested nature of crime and disorder. 
297 See also Hallsworth (2002), Cilling (2003) and Phillips, Considine and Lewis (2002), for example. 
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Another reason partnerships struggled to join-up community safety practice was 
that partner agencies competed for funding, as this interviewee notes: 
[E]verybody on that partnership is enthusiastic for different reasons, but 
one of the things that holds people together is the fact that there's a huge 
amount of money flowing into crime and everybody wants some of that 
money ... [As a subgroup Chair] I've got to find a way of making 
everybody feel that they're doing the same thing, whilst at the same time 
knowing they're competing for the same resource, well that's a bit of a 
skill isn't it? (City council representative, Birmingham). 
Furthermore one interviewee noted how competition for resources increased in 
relation to under-spends, thus further undermining the possibility of joined-up 
relations. These aspects of the politics of partnerships are reflected in the role of the 
collector or the pirate in the naval analogy. 
In sum, a number of factors appeared to undermine joined-up community safety 
practice, some of which were similar to those underpinning tensions between 
partners. Yet multi-agency partnerships continue to rest on the assumption that 
joined-up community safety practice is desirable because of the benefits of increased 
efficiency. By contrast, a OAT worker argued that joined-up practice rendered 
partners immobile; perhaps this was because of the difficulties in establishing some 
common ground.298 Moreover, as I discuss in chapter nine, joined-up community 
safety may be undesirable because it erodes checks and balances between agencies, 
and possibly enhances the power of the state because social control becomes more 
efficiently dispersed and integrated into the social fabric, through a range of joined-
up statutory organisations. 
298 See Thacher (2001) for a discussion of how reconciling differences can render multi-agency 
partnerships immobile. 
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The findings in this chapter and in chapter six suggest that partnership relations 
were affected by differences within a given 'community', between local agencies, 
and between the partnership and central government. Together these differences 
undermine the possibility of collaboration because of the difficulties of agreeing 
common priorities. Hence difference, as a 'messy' consequence of the multi-agency 
approach, was seldom acknowledged; rather it was concealed by the rhetorical 
appeal of the concept of partnership. At the same time, without acknowledging 
difference it would seem unlikely that partnerships could identify common priorities 
and thus begin to tackle the needs of all relevant partners. This is one of the 
conundrums of the politics of partnerships, which poses problems for the their use, 
as a rhetorical device, to support New Labour's criminal justice reforms. 
Furthermore, given the difficulties of reconciling different priorities, and given that 
government holds the 'purse strings' to the partnerships, perhaps it means that the 
partnerships will simply accede to top-down control. 
8.6 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the tensions that existed within the 
partnerships and between the partnership and government, and their implications 
for the responsibility for community safety and joined-up community safety 
practice. Practitioners in Birmingham and Cambridge reported there was (too) little 
tension or disagreement in the partnerships, perhaps because partners were too 
polite, good-natured or simply did not want to "rock the boat". 
By contrast, when observing strategic partnership meetings, tension arose 
particularly over the allocation of partnership funds and perhaps because of 
differences between partners in terms of organisational agendas, occupational 
cultures, ideological differences and the operation of power. These differences were 
seldom discussed and this suggested that knowledge production, and even the 
partnerships themselves, were not necessarily democratic and equal, although the 
rhetoric suggests otherwise. 
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There were further tensions between the partnerships, regional government offices 
and central government. Government office appeared to exercise limited control 
over the partnerships, although this was not true of central government, which was 
perceived to constrain the partnerships through funding allocation and performance 
monitoring arrangements, for example. Yet practitioners were also to partially resist 
these governmental constraints, for example by retaining a sense of local priorities 
and the contents of their strategy. 
When practitioners were asked about who was responsible for community safety, 
they distinguished between who was and who should be responsible for community 
safety, which illustrated a gulf between rhetoric and practice. In theory, agencies 
such as the police shared responsibility for community safety, but in practice they 
remained in a powerful position to determine the community safety agenda. This 
suggests that Garland (2001) is partially correct about the concept of 
'responsibilisation', at the level of rhetoric rather than practice. 
The concept of joined-up community safety also appeared to be of rhetorical rather 
than practical import. There were a few examples of joined-up practice, but on the 
whole joined-up practice was undermined by the differences between agencies 
described earlier in the chapter (in relation to organisational agendas, occupational 
cultures, ideological differences and the operation of power). In addition, partners 
were competitors for scarce partnerships funds. 
Together the findings in this chapter suggest that in the partnerships there were a 
myriad of competing agendas which were not always successfully balanced. This is 
one of the conundrums of partnerships which is rarely acknowledged, yet 
undermines the possibility of collaboration. This conundrum is concealed behind the 
rhetorical and commonsensical appeal of partnerships, that is, that 'many agencies 
are better than one'. 
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In chapter nine, I revisit the recommendations of the Morgan Report in order to 
further examine the impact of the Crime and Disorder Act, if at all, on local 
community safety practice. I also examine the symbolic utility of the partnerships 
and the implications for debates about 'community governance/ . 
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 
In chapter three I outlined four challenges for the partnerships which emerged from 
existing research and which I reformulated into four key questions: 
1. What do the partnerships do and how do they do it? 
2. What impact does social context have on the operation of the partnerships? 
3. How do the partnerships 'know' that what they are doing has an impact on crime 
and disorder? 
4. How do partnerships overcome difficulties, such as different organisational 
cultures and tension with central government? 
These questions were addressed in chapters five, six, seven and eight respectively. 
In this final chapter I consider the implications of the empirical evidence presented 
throughout the dissertation. First, I comment on the possible impact (if at all) of the 
CDA 1998. Second, I consider the reasons why the CSPs appear to have 
underperformed and possible responses to this underperformance. Third, in the 
light of extant research, I examine the implications of the findings for the politics of 
partnerships; in particular, I examine the symbolic functions of the partnerships, 
debates about 'community governance', and the positioning of the criminal justice 
system in late modernity. Finally, I weigh the advantages and disadvantages of three 
future scenarios for the CSPs and their implications for the concepts of community 
safety, 'community' and partnerships, and the 'measurement of success'. 
9.1 The Morgan Report revisited 
It was noted in chapter one that at the time of publication the Morgan Report was, 
unofficially, an influential document for local practitioners, with some of its central 
ideas being embodied in the CDA 1998. By comparing the present findings with 
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those of the Morgan Report I am able to explore the extent to which community 
safety has progressed since its publication in 1991, and thus the impact of the CDA 
1998 and its associated guidance. This will supplement the views of practitioners 
described in chapter six. I now explore, in turn, the themes of the Morgan Report 
outlined at the beginning of chapter two. 
Structure 
In the early 1990s, the Morgan Report suggested that CSPs had developed unevenly 
and unsystematically as a consequence of a lack of funding. Similarly, in the present 
research, there were structural and processual variations between the three areas, 
although this was seemingly unconnected to a lack of funding. The three areas 
varied in terms of the presence, role and composition of a dedicated community 
safety team, and this was seemingly a consequence of community safety 
arrangements prior to the CDA 1998. The structure of the local authority (that is, 
whether it is unitary or two-tier) also affected community safety practice such as the 
DATjCDRP merger. Size was also of significance to structural arrangements in 
Birmingham; it created similar challenges to those experienced in Cambridge and 
Lincoln,299 as a result of the two-tier local authority structure. The apparent 
importance of social context to the CSPs confirms that guidance and legislation are 
interpreted by practitioners in a contextually specific manner. 
In relation to structure, Morgan also suggested that priorities, lines of decision-
making, and responsibility for community safety were unclear. This difficulty 
remained in Birmingham and Cambridge; partners struggled to agree on common 
objectives, and this resulted in structural and processual change towards the end of 
the fieldwork in May 2004. Difficult inter-agency relations, underpinned by power 
differentials might explain the lack of agreement about the purpose of the 
partnerships, lines of decision-making and responsibility for community safety. So 
299 Birmingham City Council was in the process of devolving the delivery of some public services to 
nine constituencies. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
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too might the failure to acknowledge difference (between agencies, within 
'communities' and between the partnership and central government). Indeed this is 
an intractable challenge for the CSPs, a matter I discuss below. 
Leadership and ownership 
The Morgan Report suggested that partnerships require a balance between 
leadership, and individual and collective ownership of community safety. In terms 
of leadership, in Birmingham the Chair (from the city council) led the partnership, 
whilst in Cambridge and Lincoln the leadership was shared between two or three 
key players, normally representatives from the police or the city council. Therefore, 
in practice the police and city council (although not the county council) had fulfilled 
their statutory obligation to lead the partnerships. 
Ownership of community safety was more difficult to interpret. In strategic 
partnership meetings, agencies such as the PCT, the voluntary sector, the business 
community and the fire service struggled to own the partnership agenda because 
there were few partnership priorities with which they could engage. Similarly, the 
lack of involvement of citizens would also suggest a lack of ownership by the 
'community', and that the partnerships failed to meet the needs of public citizens.30o 
At the same time, the police were in a position to own the CSPs because of their 
apparent value as crime and disorder 'experts'30l and custodians of crime statistics, 
necessitated by managerialism. Similarly, the Government also owned local 
community safety practice as a result of its 'schizophrenic' approach to the 
governance of crime control, which I discuss shortly. 
300 Interviewees noted that the voluntary sector and elected members represented the 'community' on 
the CSPs, but there was no direct involvement of the public. 
301 The status of the police as crime and disorder 'experts' suggests the operation of Lukes' (1974) 
third dimension of power. 
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Information and knowledge production 
The Morgan Report and the CDA 1998 and its concomitant guidance recommended 
that partnerships conduct crime audits using a problem-solving approach and a 
range of data sources. In my research, I chose not to examine the audit process since 
it had been well documented in other research (such as Phillips, Considine and 
Lewis, 2000).302 Suffice to say there were difficulties; the three-yearly process of 
auditing, consulting and developing the partnership strategy meant that information 
was soon out-of-date. The audit and other partnership processes also relied on police 
data. Birmingham, for example, had a regular agenda item in strategic partnership 
meetings for up-dates on current (recorded) crime issues. The information provided, 
however, was reported to be of limited use to practitioners in shaping community 
safety practice, such as the selection of partnership activities. 
Furthermore, there was a tendency to view police statistics as 'facts', rather than 
interpretations of the problem. Police data were also more readily available to the 
partnerships (through police representatives) than other kinds of data, and thus 
relied on to expedite partnership activities and' get the job done'. This reinforced the 
view that the police were the crime and disorder' experts', particularly given that 
other agencies had limited access to police data, and given that other kinds of data 
were rarely considered. 
Therefore, the production of knowledge in the partnerships was dominated by the 
police,303 which illustrates a lack of clarity about the locus of control in the 
302 As Mike Hough noted in a recent personal communication, audits demonstrated a poor 
understanding of local crime problems because they lacked analytical breadth, failed to consider 
anything other than police data, and were too crime-specific (rather than focusing on community 
safety). Partly as a result of Government pressures to meet short-term targets, there was also an over-
emphasis on tactical issues (that is, the practicalities of how to implement crime reduction) rather 
than strategic issues (that is, the overall approach to crime reduction and the issues upon which the 
bulk of partnership funds were to be spent). Yet audits could also be an opportunity for closing 
ideological divides between partner agencies (Hough, 2004) . 
303 Other research has found the police to be a dominant organisation in multi-agency setting. 
Bowling (1998), for example, points out that the police dominated the discourse in multi-agency 
partnerships, whilst at the same time absolving themselves of sole responsibility for racial incidents. 
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partnerships; perhaps control was acceded to those with the power to drive the 
partnership, such as the government (because they held the 'purse strings') or the 
police (because they were viewed as crime and disorder 'experts'). Thus, as 
Coleman, Sim and Whyte (2002) point out, the partnerships provide opportunities 
for local hegemony building, particularly by the police. 
Identity 
The Morgan Report encouraged partnerships to publicise positive news about 
partnership activities, in order to establish a strong partnership identity. Strategies, 
audits and annual reviews were often publicly available on partnership websites, 
and in accordance with the Morgan Report and the CDA 1998. In all three areas 
partners also appeared to recognise the necessity of communicating with the media, 
especially in relation to positive news stories. However, partners deliberated over 
the kinds of information that should be available to the public because of fears about 
stigmatising particular areas and increasing the fear of crime amongst citizens. This 
suggests that Morgan's recommendations - that the media require careful 
management in order to promote positive news and prevent the stigmatisation of 
communities - had been followed. 
However, without researching the local press and the 'community', it was difficult to 
ascertain the effectiveness of partnerships in publicising positive news. It appeared 
that publicity was not always a partnership priority, in view of other governmental 
targets to which they had to attend. Further questions were raised about the quality 
of the information disseminated since practitioners appeared to lack appropriate 
research methods skills to adequately assess the impact of their activities. 
Durability and resources 
The Morgan Report suggested that durable and sustainable partnerships were 
created through the promotion of partnership activities and the involvement of the 
'community' in the partnership. As I have already noted, partners appeared to 
promote the partnership but the involvement of the I community' was limited. In 
297 
addition, staff turnover particularly amongst police representatives was problematic, 
and compounded by reportedly poor induction procedures and short-term 
contracts.304 Thus questions are raised about the durability and sustainability of the 
partnerships. 
The Morgan Report also recognised the importance of adequate resources to the 
durability of partnerships. Hence it recommended that central government fund a 
full-time coordinator, administrator and community safety projects known to 'work'. 
For the partnerships presently observed, the issue of adequate resources had been 
partially resolved, since from 2001 onwards the competitive bidding system was 
replaced by core funding through CAD, PDF and SCI (Audit Commission, 2002). 
The issue of resources were not fully resolved, however, because government money 
created additional difficulties such as extra bureaucracy, short timescales, and 
stringent rules and caveats about how and when money could be spent. In the 
context of a managerialist political culture and particularly since the end of the 
'honeymoon period' for the CSPS,305 the Government (through partnership funding 
arrangements) appeared to drive short-term, measurable projects and a pragmatic 
(rather than strategic or criminological) approach to community safety. Reliance on 
government funding also ensured that central government held the 'purse strings' to 
the partnerships, thus contributing to the simultaneous centralisation and 
decentralisation of the delivery of crime control. 
Coordination 
The Morgan Report highlighted the necessity of a full-time community safety 
coordinator and this appeared to have been heeded through the establishment of 
community safety teams in each of the areas. Nationally, there is also a new 
304 See Maguire (2004) for additional information on the reasons for staff turnover. 
305 Maguire (2004) notes that the end of the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) in 2002 also saw an 
end to longer-term targets, and the accumulation of knowledge about how and why crime reduction 
programmes reduce crime. The end of the CRP appears to correspond to the end of the 'honeymoon 
period' for the CSPs, after which the partnerships became subject to increasing regulation of their 
performance through target setting. 
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profession of community safety practitioners who are 'flexing their muscles', and 
appear to resist government constraints (Gilling and Hughes, 2002). In practice, there 
was a lack of clarity about the role of these dedicated community safety teams 
within the partnerships, as administrators, local policy-makers and/ or 
implementers. 
Involvement 
In the early 1990s the Morgan Report noted that the voluntary and business sectors, 
and the' community' had a relatively minor role in the partnerships. In spite of the 
CDA 1998, these groups remain on the periphery of the partnerships (Audit 
Commission, 2002). This failure to secure the involvement of the voluntary and 
business sectors and the 'community' is worthy of further research, especially if 
these groups are to be included in partnerships in the future. As one interviewee 
noted, "why should the 'community' be interested in community safety?" This is a 
matter which lay outside my research plans. Suffice to say here, there may be a gap 
between what CSPs think they are doing for (and with) communities and how 
citizens experience those intentions. 
9.2 Explaining the underperformance of the CSPs 
The previous section illustrates that the recommendations in the Morgan Report and 
the CDA 1998 and associated guidance have not come to fruition. Since the CDA 
1998, matters of funding, identity and coordination have been resolved. However, 
other issues such as the structure of the partnerships, the use of information, 
leadership, durability, and the involvement of the 'community', the voluntary and 
business sectors remain unresolved. The failure of the partnerships to resolve these 
problems suggests that the CSPs have underperformed against the original 
expectations. In this section I examine some of the reasons why recommendations 
have not been realised and possible responses to the underperformance of the CSPs. 
My research offers an 'on the ground' vantage point from which to examine 
Maguire's (2004) overview of the realities of the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP). 
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The issues he raises about the general difficulties with the CRP are extremely 
pertinent to my micro-level analysis of the CSPs. 
As with the CRP, perhaps what was expected of the CSPs was overly ambitious. 
Maguire (2004) notes that multi-agency partnerships such as the CSPs were one of 
the 'fresh' approaches to crime reduction introduced to counteract the pessimism of 
the 'nothing works' crisis of the 1970s. This was indubitably a 'tall order'; firstly 
because there were difficulties implementing the partnerships, secondly because the 
wider political context of managerialism undermined performance, and thirdly, 
because tensions between central government, regional offices and the partnerships 
left practitioners uncertain of their role. 
Implementation 
The difficulties with implementation in the CSPs are similar to the more general 
points noted by Maguire (2004) about the CRP. The CSPs began operating in a 
crowded terrain; there were already many existing crime reduction initiatives and 
multi-agency partnerships. Moreover, this terrain became even more crowded as the 
CSPs progressed, for example with the introduction of the local strategic 
partnerships and more recently the drug intervention programme. 
The community safety teams lack appropriately qualified staff,306 and because of a 
general shortage of such individuals, recruitment can be a lengthy process (Maguire, 
2004). In my research, delays in recruiting 'partnership' staff were also caused by the 
practicalities of finding a suitable host organisation and line manager; there was no 
'natural' home for members of the community safety team, unless they were 
seconded from a partner agency. Once in post, new recruits had to figure out what 
their job description meant in practice. This was partly because of reportedly poor 
306 Gilling and Hughes (2002) found that community safety staff were least likely to have research 
method and evaluation skills compared to the other kinds of skills necessary for the job. This clearly 
has implications for measuring 'success' and the performance monitoring expected by the 
Government. 
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induction procedures, but also because in some circumstances their line manager 
was none the wiser. Hence, one such new recruit described his job as lithe blind 
leading the blind". There was also a lack of capacity at the subgroup level; there was 
simply no one to implement partnership activities. Difficulties with recruitment 
were compounded by short-term contracts which failed to give new recruits the 
opportunity to 'prove' themselves, and the insecurity of jobs could also be 
demoralising. In these circumstances, the level of staff turnover is unsurprising. 
The CSPs would also appear to suffer from what Hough (2003) describes as a 
'limited strategic competence' and which encompasses a range of issues. Most 
pertinent to my research, however, are his concerns that the CSPs have difficulty 
identifying strategic priorities and translating them into action, and that there are 
few ways to hold project leaders to account. This was certainly the case in my 
research, particularly in Cambridge and Birmingham. For example, in Cambridge a 
project leader failed to produce a report on her activities, as requested by the 
subgroup, but there was little the subgroup chair could do to 'encourage' 
compliance. Similarly, there was little that could be done about non-attendance at 
strategic meetings by agencies such as the PCT and county council. 
Maguire (2004) notes that the lack of available data to external evaluators was the 
first indicator of widespread implementation failure in the CRP. Similarly, in the 
CSPs in my research, implementation failure was evident in the lack of available 
information about partnership activities.307 This suggests that, at best, practitioners 
in these CSPs do not know what they have implemented, or at worst they have not 
implemented the activities for which they have received funding. The latter position 
is a real possibility given the reported lack of capacity at the subgroup level, where 
implementation is supposedly carried out. The key consequence is that it is not 
307 One caveat to this apparent implementation failure is that 'successful' partnerships might rely on 
factors other than information management. 
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possible to assess whether partnership practitioners have implemented projects in 
the way they were intended and if so, whether or not they reduce crime. 
One further factor which might explain the underperformance of the CSPs concerns 
inter-agency politics; certainly partner agencies differ ideologically, culturally and 
materially and this creates the potential for tension. Difficulties revolve around the 
impossibility of reconciling competing agendas, giving rise to difficulty in clarifying 
partnership objectives and building relationships within the partnerships. The 
building of relationships requires organisational change, compromise, the 
relinquishing of power and possibly even incentives to smooth the transition (Rein, 
1983). Similarly, it is a challenge for the partnerships to involve the 'community', let 
alone represent it in all its diversity. In Cambridge, for example, 'community' 
pressure came from affluent sections of the city with sufficient cultural capital to 
enable them to articulate their views. 
It is difficult for partner agencies to reconcile these differences because they are 
heterogeneous organisations supporting diverse communities.308 As Rein notes 
"[ w ]hen coordination programs are proposed by diverse constituencies to fill 
different needs, the effort to translate theory into administrative practice becomes 
complicated" (1983: 67). The reconciliation of difference is one of the conundrums of 
partnerships that arguably undermine the performance of the CSPs. Yet it is rarely 
acknowledged; it is hidden behind the rhetorical appeal of the CSPs. This 
conundrum reflects the contested nature of crime and disorder and its roots in the 
social relations of crime control (Lea, 2002). Ultimately difference may not be 
reconciled without alienating the interests of some social groups in order to 
accommodate the interests of others. This difficulty is not peculiar to partnerships, 
308 Individual agencies were also heterogeneous; there were differences between representatives from 
the same organisation, in terms of seniority, role as well as individual differences, in terms of 
personality or ways of working. 
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however; historically, the state has favoured the interests of some social groups over 
others, in its administration of governmenP09 
Furthermore, in the light of the history of the rise of the modern state and the 
differentiation of its constituent institutions, these inter-agency differences are 
unsurprising; arguably the agencies involved are railing against the constraints 
imposed by the differentiation of social institutions during modernity (Thacher, 
2001). Moreover, as Thacher (2001) suggests, these differences allow organisations to 
regulate the behaviour of each other, through the operation of checks and balances. 
For example, the voluntary sector was perceived by some as having an important 
role because they were able to challenge the status quo of the statutory 
organisations.310 
ManageriaJism 
The underperformance of the esps may also be attributed to a growing 
managerialist culture. Maguire (2004) argues that the eRP (and by implication the 
eSps) is in the political spotlight, thus making it subject to political whims. He cites 
the street crime initiative, implemented in the summer of the 2003, as an example of 
the political influences on crime reduction. Similarly esp practitioners cited the 
same example when they described the constraints imposed on them by 
Government. Practitioners noted that the politicisation of single issues such as street 
crime meant that the partnerships paid more attention to the priorities of 
government, than to those of public citizens or the contents of partnership strategies. 
However, the politicised nature of crime reduction is most notably seen in relation to 
the measurement of performance, given that it supports (or detracts from) political 
ambitions. Paradoxically, performance management designed to shore up 
309 See Coleman and Sim (2001) for a Marxist account of the role of the state in promoting the interests 
of some social groups over others. 
310 It was unclear, however, whether the voluntary sector had the power or resources to follow-up 
criticisms with action and thus make a difference to community safety practice. 
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politicians' success appears to undermine partnership performance. One difficulty 
with the performance management of the CSPs is the crude way in which 
performance has been measured.311 Not only does performance monitoring ignore 
the complexity of the social problems encountered by the partnerships as a 
consequence of their varied social contexts, but also target setting by the 
partnerships and by Government is unsound. For example, in Cambridge, when 
reviewing their performance against the targets in their strategy, partners realised 
that some of their targets could not even be measured, let alone the partnerships' 
performance against them. 
Another factor which has arguably contributed to the underperformance of the 
partnerships, is the over-use of police data to measure performance. This appears to 
have been driven at least partly by a pragmatic approach to community safety and 
the need to fit in with the short times cales and short-term targets imposed by 
regional offices, the Home Office and, in turn, the Treasury. Hence, data collected in 
victimisation surveys or by other agencies such as neighbourhood wardens or 
Women's Aid are seldom used. In addition, recorded crime statistics are not as 
reliable as they are assumed to be because they are susceptible to changes in 
recording practices (Maguire, 2002). 
Furthermore, the Home Secretary imposed a performance management regime on 
local partner agencies, but this had no statutory basis, although there were political 
imperatives for (local authority) Chief Executives in Labour councils to comply. 
Maguire's (2004) perceptive analysis also suggests that the focus on short-term 
targets has intensified as a result of shifts in political attitudes. At the outset of the 
CRP, a 'window of opportunity' emerged in 1997 in which the Government became 
interested in accumulating knowledge about how and why crime reduction might be 
311 In a personal communication, Mike Hough suggested the following ideas about the crude nature 
of performance measurement, although I have supplemented them with my own empirical findings . 
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effective, but widespread problems with implementation and evaluation caused a 
shift in political attitude towards the CRP, which ended prematurely in 2002 (and 
was replaced by the Safer Communities Initiative). Put simply, the Government was 
no longer concerned with the accumulation of knowledge; rather, it became fixated 
on whether or not partnerships met narrow, short-term, 'quick-win' targets. This 
shift in political attitudes towards crime reduction appears to coincide with what I 
have described as the end of the honeymoon period for the CSPs (a period of 'light 
touch' Government monitoring and intervention). 
These changing attitudes towards the measurement of crime reduction may have 
further undermined the performance of the CSPs; as Maguire notes, it encouraged 
practitioners to think of 'success' in terms of narrow government targets, rather than 
how or why a particular initiative works: 
[E]valuations aimed at answering difficult and complex questions about 
the impact of specific (often multi-stranded) interventions do not fit easily 
with agency cultures which have increasingly taught local managers to 
place primary importance on the achievement of narrow targets, 
measured by crude statistical indicators, and hence to regard any new 
source of 'project' funding as simply an extra means to an end. (2004: 232). 
This certainly contributes to an understanding of why the practitioners in my 
research conflated meeting government targets with 'success'. 
Finally, it is possible that managerialism also undermines partnership performance 
because as Crawford (2001) notes, it contributes to competition between agencies for 
partnership resources, and to efforts to meet organisational targets rather than those 
of the partnership. This sense of competition may be compounded by the creation of 
parallel systems of performance management: one system for the partnership and 
one for each of the partner agencies. 
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Given the features of managerialist culture that I have described, it is unsurprising 
that practitioners, government, and external researchers and evaluators do not 
understand the impact of partnership activities on crime. Thus managerialism would 
appear to be a major contributing factor to a lack of knowledge about partnership 
performance, and about underperformance itself. Paradoxically, managerialist 
culture (in particular the Government's emphasis on short-term targets) gives rise to 
questions about the utility of the partnerships - aside from their role as a forum for 
multi-agency discussions of community safety and their symbolic value which I 
discuss later - and their future in their current form. 
Micro-management 
The underperformance of the CSPs against expectations may also be influenced by 
relations with the regional government offices and central government. Like the 
CSPs, the Home Office and its regional offices are also thought to lack capacity 
(Maguire, 2004). In my research, Government Office staff appeared to be either 
inexperienced, ill-informed or close to retirement. Hence CSP practitioners did not 
always view them in a favourable light. This apparent mistrust conceivably damages 
already fragile relations between the partnerships and government, and is likely to 
be compounded by uncertainties over the precise role of Government Office in the 
partnerships, whether it is there to hold the partnership to account or simply to 
inform, advise and support them in their day-to-day activities. 
A further possible reason for partnership underperformance lies in the hierarchical 
nature of relations between the partnerships and the government, and in which the 
Government has simultaneously centralised and decentralised control of CSP 
activities. I discuss this' schizophrenic' approach to the governance of crime control 
in more detail below. Suffice to say, however, this perverse kind of micro-
management has meant that CSPs are pushed and pulled in different directions,312 
312 One caveat to note, though, is that community safety practitioners should not simply be seen as 
passive observers; at times they also actively resist the constraints imposed by fragmentation in 
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leaving practitioners unclear about their role or the role of central government in 
addressing community safety. 
This 'piggy in the middle' role forced upon the CSPs is ironically the consequence of 
fragmentation in central government. As Maguire (2004) notes, the Treasury 
emphasises the need for timely spending of government funds on activities likely to 
meet short-term targets (especially given that the CRP had spent only 13 per cent of 
its budget by the end of 1999/2000), but the Home Office is designed for a different 
purpose and is thus slow-moving and bureaucratic. This might explain why there 
were delays in partnerships receiving notification of government funding. The result 
is that the CSPs are caught between two different government departments with 
different approaches and priorities, and thus the CSPs are forced to reconcile yet 
another tension (along with tensions between agencies, and between the partnership 
and the 'community'). 
Responses fo underperfonnance 
Given these reasons for underperformance it would seem that the Government is 
forced to emphasise the symbolic value of the partnerships rather than the realities, 
an issue to which I turn in the next section. To conclude the present section, 
however, it is important to consider the responses that might be made to 
underperformance against expectations. 
Ideally, Government might re-think the means by which performance is measured; 
this could involve a complete overhaul, and at the very least a return to approaches 
which emphasise the accumulation of research on why and how crime reduction 
works,313 rather than simply focusing on whether crime reduction initiatives meet 
central government. See also Gilling and Hughes (2002), for example, where they describe the 
resistance offered by community safety practitioners to governmental constraints. 
313 Research might break away from the narrow methodology of quasi-experimental approaches 
because, as Maguire notes, over-reliance on this method entails a substantial risk "if the data available 
were insufficiently reliable, or contained too few crimes or cases for valid statistical analysis, the 
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short-term government targets. If targets are to continue to be a part of the 
performance management regime, then the Government should be more judicious in 
how they are set, taking into account the targets of partner agencies, so that parallel 
systems of performance management can be dispensed with or reduced in number. 
Some serious thought might also be given to how funding would fit into 
performance management and target setting in order to prevent partnerships and 
their subgroups simply chasing after money to fund mainstream or existing 
activities, and to encourage longer-term approaches to crime reduction. 
The regional offices and central government would clearly have a role to play in 
tackling the underperformance of the CSPs, and hence their role and relationship to 
the CSPs requires clarification. Maguire (2004) raises questions about whether the 
Home Office is the most suitable location for the central control of the CRP. He 
wonders whether or not it should be replaced with something more nimble and less 
influenced by short-term political concerns,314. This might help to create a buffer 
between politicians and crime reduction managers. For namesake let us call the 
alternative to the Home Office the Independent Crime Reduction Council (ICRC). 
The ICRC would require 'independence' or at least arms length status from central 
government, but this could be difficult to achieve in practice if central government 
were to fund it. However, independence might not be beyond the realms of 
possibility; organisations such as the police and to an extent the Youth Justice Board 
manage to maintain operational independence from Government. An independent 
existence from Government might also facilitate a more critical stance in relation to 
crime reduction, perhaps enhancing its credibility and legitimacy. At the same time, 
an independent crime reduction body of this kind would have to be wary of being 
seen as a 'piggybank'. Thus its role could be extended to encompass advising and 
evaluator would be left without anything substantial to say about the effectiveness of the 
programme" (2004: 230). 
314 In some ways this might be to de-politicise crime reduction and community safety. 
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supporting practitioners, researching crime reduction, as well as allocating 
funding.315 In addition, given existing shortages of appropriately qualified 
practitioners inside and outside the Home Office, this raises questions about who 
would staff an ICRC, and what would be an appropriate balance of academics and 
policy makers. 
Furthermore, if such an independent body were to exist it is unclear how it would 
relate to the regional government offices or whether they too would have to be 
replaced by regional branches of the ICRe. Provided that appropriately qualified 
staff could be found and performance management culture were re-thought, 
replacing regional government offices with local branches of the ICRC might help to 
revitalise' flagging' relationships with local practitioners and encourage them to act 
in ways conducive to partnership performance. For example, local ICRC staff could 
cajole and assist local practitioners and use funding to create and cement these 
relationships.316 
9.3 The politics of partnerships 
The symbolic functions of the partnerships 
The discussion so far highlights a number of practical difficulties and areas of 
underperformance in the CSPs, all of which suggests that they might be seen as a 
failure so far. But this does not explain their continued existence: it is important to 
consider their wider symbolic function here in an attempt to comprehend their 
survival,317 First, the CSPs symbolically appeal to the 'community'; this in keeping 
with a communitarian agenda concerned with rekindling the spirit of 'community', 
and with the creation of responsible citizens who share some of the burden of crime 
315 If the Government thought it were absolutely necessary its role might also be to set targets; these 
might be longer-term, as well as being both 'soft' and 'hard'. 
316 Thanks to Mike Hough for this particular idea. 
317 Sumner (2002) supports this distinction between the symbolic and practical aspects of community 
safety. Blagg et al. (1988) also noted the distinction between rhetoric and reality in community safety 
practice. 
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control with local and centralised agents of the state.318 The appeal to the 
'community' is indicative of a democratic approach to local crime control in which 
citizens are able to influence local practice to the same extent as the statutory 
agencies. My research findings, of course, led to a contradictory conclusion; in 
practice, members of the 'community' were not engaged and partners were not 
equal; thus knowledge production and the partnerships themselves were not as 
democratic as the concept suggests.319 
Secondly, the partnerships symbolise the reform of the criminal justice system 
through joined-up services, which are thought to be more efficient and effective. It is 
assumed that 'many agencies are better than one' in tackling community safety. The 
concept of partnership is seemingly also a government mantra which pervades 
criminal justice policy; it has most recently been utilised in the introduction of the 
Drug Intervention Programme in April 2003. Yet in practice, the CSPs are 
fragmented, and practitioners and policy-makers non the wiser about crime 
reductive benefits because they cannot measure them. It remains to be seen whether 
fragmentation is the fate that awaits other kinds of criminal justice multi-agency 
partnerships.32o 
Thirdly, the symbolism of the partnerships is important because it disguises 
differences between agencies and within communities (for example, in terms of their 
ideologies, occupational cultures, definitions of social problems and their solutions). 
Recognition of these differences might also necessitate acknowledging the inherent 
challenges faced by partnerships and their underperformance thus far . 
318 See Etzioni (2001a) for example on the symbolic importance of 'community'. 
319This failure to transfer power from central government to the 'community' is also noted by 
Marinetto (2003) in relation to urban regeneration initiatives. However, he argues that is too simplistic 
to interpret the espousal of 'community' involvement merely as a rhetorical device, as arguably there 
is a genuine attempt to promote 'community' involvement. 
320 The advantage that partnerships such the drug intervention programme have over the CSPs is that 
perhaps they have tangible goals to achieve (reducing drug-related crime through assisting offenders 
who commit 'trigger offences' in accessing treatment for their drug use) rather than the nebulous task 
of addressing community safety. 
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Consequently, 'messy' practice and the lack of knowledge about outputs and 
outcomes are hidden from view and the partnerships are dressed up in rhetoric and 
symbolism321, in particular relying on the new discourse of managerialism to 
provide 'factual' evidence that the partnerships are meeting targets. 
Perhaps the 'reality' of the partnerships is that they are a useful device to enhance 
the legitimacy of New Labour's criminal justice reforms in the climate of 'Third Way' 
politics. The distinction I have drawn, between the symbolism and practice of 
community safety, concurs with Crawford's (2001) analysis of the contradictions that 
underpin New Labour's criminal justice reforms. In particular, Crawford (2001) 
argues that 'Third Way' political culture is inherently contradictory because it 
attempts to go beyond the Left and Right and create a new democratic state which 
strikes a balance between risk and security, and individual and collective 
responsibility. These political contradictions are reflected in community safety 
practice, and perhaps even explain the apparent distinction between community 
safety practice and symbolism. 
Theorising the politics of partnerships 
The politics of partnerships and their symbolic functions raise questions about who 
is setting the community safety agenda. Over the last fifteen years, government has 
become decentralised and occurs on multiple levels - including at the level of the 
'community' - and corresponds to the 'rolling back' of the welfare state in late 
modernity (See Rhodes 2000, for example). Decentralisation seemingly contradicts 
the tendency that I have indicated towards centralised control of local community 
safety agendas. At the same time, perhaps it can be interpreted as yet another 
manifestation of the contradictions embedded in 'Third Way' politics (Crawford, 
2001) and that governance and government can be viewed as points on a continuum, 
321 This rhetoric and symbolism is evident in the justifications for the partnerships; they include the 
need to prevent duplication, join-up services and work towards the common goal of community 
safety. These justifications are remarkably similar to the pleas for coordination that Rein (1983) notes 
in relation to social services. 
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rather than representing fundamental changes in the role of the state (Crawford, 
2002b).322 
In the light of the present research, CSPs appear to partly illustrate 'community 
governance'. According to Rhodes, governance is manifested in "self-organizing, 
inter-organizational networks" (2000: 346) whose characteristics include 
interdependence between organisations, based on trust and regulated by rules. The 
CSPs mainly conform to these characteristics. In the present research, the 
partnerships partially required the interdependence of organisations and the 
merging of organisational agendas. This could also render partnerships immobile, 
however. For example, partnerships created long lists of 'priorities' rather than 
focusing on just a few, which calls into question whether or not they are priorities at 
all and thus their likelihood of impacting on community safety. Implicitly, trust was 
of importance in the partnerships in my research; for example, in Lincoln longevity 
and stability of partnership membership appeared to be a factor which facilitated 
inter-agency relationships. It was clear that the partnerships were also regulated by 
copious amounts of (government) rules. 
Rhodes (2000) also notes another aspect of governance; interdependent networks 
have autonomy from the state because they are not accountable to the government. 
In the present research, the partnerships were accountable to the government, in 
particular through performance measurement arrangements such as IQuanta or the 
self-assessment process. Together these matters suggest that the partnerships 
embody some but not all aspects of the governance that Rhodes (2000) describes. 
That is, the partnerships appear to exemplify a contradictory trend towards 
centralised and decentralised government. 
322 Crawford (2002b) argues that it is easy to overestimate the extent to which the state governed with 
absolute control in the past and to underestimate the role that government currently play in 
contemporary governance. 
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The partnerships suggest a second contradictory trend towards a stronger and 
weaker role for the state in the provision of crime control. On the one hand, the 
'systems failure thesis' suggests that the state has been weakened by difficulties with 
delivering public services as a result of the gaps between institutions. Its role in 
delivering public services is seemingly further weakened by the practical difficulties 
noted above, such as competing priorities, occupational cultures, ideologies and 
power differentials. This would appear to minimise the possibility of the blurring of 
organisational boundaries, proposed by Cohen (1985) . It is also true that, in practice, 
practitioners resisted government constraints and moreover had flexibility in 
relation to the delivery of local community safety. 
On the other hand, the role of the state may have been strengthened. Whilst 
government may be increasingly polycentric this does not necessarily weaken its 
role in controlling crime, as governance is simultaneously more encompassing 
through the symbolism of 'joined up' community safety practice; thus in the 
Foucauldian sense, social control appears to penetrate deeper into the social fabric,323 
although only through statutory agencies. 
In addition, performance measurement and funding arrangements ensure that in 
spite of practitioners' resistance, the government maintains a degree of control over 
the community safety agenda in each locality. For example, in 2003 the government' s 
focus on street crime took precedence over local concerns. Indeed, the government 
may even be tightening its grip given that the 'honeymoon period' (in which there 
was an absence of government control) has seemingly ended for the partnerships in 
the research; this is illustrated by growing managerialist pressure, for example 
through IQuanta and the self-assessment process. It was also marked by the end of 
the CRP in 2002; this signalled a shift in emphasis in the Home Office from the 
323 This is in keeping with an 'extended policing family' , which includes police community support 
officers, special constables, neighbourhood wardens, local authority guards such as the ' Urban 
Rangers' in Cambridge and commercial security guards (Crawford and Lister, 2004). The CSPs are 
involved indirectly in this extended policing family because they fund some of its members such as 
neighbourhood wardens and local authority guards. 
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accumulation of knowledge about how and why crime reduction is effective, to a 
focus on achieving short-term targets (Maguire, 2004). 
Furthermore, local 'responsibilisation' strategies take place alongside populist 
punitiveness; for example, some of the apparently repressive measures associated 
with the CDA 1998 and more recently the ASB Act 2003.324 The CDA 1998 
introduced ASBOs; these civil orders are imposed for non-criminal offences, 
although individuals risk imprisonment if they breach them. Populist punitiveness is 
also manifest in the increasing prison population325 and concomitant overcrowding. 
In sum, the discussion so far indicates that the first and last interpretations of 
'community governance' described by Edwards and Hughes (2002) are of particular 
significance: the state's authority in relation to law and order is simultaneously 
stronger and weaker. Furthermore, 'community governance' evident in relation to 
the CSPs illustrates the contradiction I have noted between community safety 
symbolism and practice. The simultaneous strengthening and weakening of 
governmental control over crime and disorder is perhaps a consequence of the 
instabilities of 'community governance' noted by Hughes (2004a). That is, the state's 
power in relation to crime control cannot be conferred on the 'community' (the 
intended recipient) because the' community' is difficult to mobilise and harness as 
result of diverse identities and interests, and concomitant tensions. "In practice, if 
not in rhetoric, communities are generally weakly bounded and leaky systems in our 
late modern conditions" (Hughes, 2004a: 17). 
324 Ashworth (2004) argues that aspects of the ASB Act 2003 either defy or are oblivious to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its jurisprudence. For example, the definition of public 
assembly (in s. 57 of the Act) as the gathering of two or more persons may breach Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which concerns freedom of assembly. 
325 Since New Labour came to power in 1997, for example, the prison population increased by 16 per 
cent in 2002, reaching its highest-ever level at that point (Home Office, 2002), but since October 2003 
and particularly since February 2004 the prison population has arguably stabilised at approximately 
74,000 prisoners (de Silva, 2005). At 137 per 100,000, England and Wales has the highest number of 
prisoners (per 100,000 in the general population) in Western Europe, although these figures are 
nowhere near those of the US (702 per 100,000) or Russia (602 per 100,000) (Home Office (2002)) . 
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The contradiction between community safety practice and symbolism and also the 
instabilities of community governance might also be a consequence of the socio-
political developments of late modernity; as Garland (2001) notes, this provides an 
overarching framework for understanding the development of crime control. Late 
modernity by definition is contradictory: it implies a simultaneous tendency towards 
continuity and change. This helps to avoid the assumption that the past no longer 
has relevance to the present or vice versa. For example, perhaps the government did 
not rule with absolute centralised control in the past, nor are we currently subject to 
absolute decentralised governance (Crawford, 2002a). 
These contradictory forces are also evident firstly in 'Third Way' politics which have 
contributed to the growth of managerialism and thus competition between partner 
agencies (Crawford, 2001) . Second, the contradictions of late modernity are also 
evident in inter-agency relations; there is continuity (as partner agencies retain 
separate identities) and change evident in the symbolic joining-up of some of the 
institutions of society in the CSPs. The rhetoric about the CSPs suggests that the state 
has moved from its modern form of differentiated institutions to a late modern form 
where these institutions and their social functions are beginning to merge. Yet the 
partnerships also symbolise a revival of pre-modern approaches to the provision of 
crime control through private institutions and individuals in the 'community'. 
The forces of late modernity are also evident in relation to the exclusion of 'flawed 
consumers' (Bauman, 1999) who are unable to confer their identity and respectability 
through consumption. The partnerships provide new opportunities for the 
repressive control of these social groups. This was observed in Cambridge, for 
example, where the partnership acted on complaints - expressed by a vociferous 
residents' group - about the antisocial behaviour of homeless people in their 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, as Bauman (1999) notes, this exemplifies the 
intrinsically divisive nature of mass consumerism in advanced capitalist societies. 
This example of the residents' group in Cambridge also illustrates that the 
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partnerships risk contributing to increased spatial segregation;326 that is, if resources 
are spent in areas where residents articulate their views, rather than in areas where 
the need is greatest. 
The symbolic value of the partnerships is also important to the preoccupation with 
risk in late modernity (Beck, 1992). It is unclear whether the partnerships tackle the 
'objective' risk of victimisation given the difficulties of measuring their impact. Their 
symbolic function in assuaging the I subjective' dimension of fear might be sufficient, 
however, as subjective perceptions of risk might be as important (if not more 
important) to feelings of insecurity and the fear of crime (Skinns, 2001). 
Another important aspect of late modernity concerns increasing pluralism and the 
concomitant creation of multiple social orders. As with risk, the partnerships 
symbolically attend to increasing pluralism, whilst in practice they reach an impasse 
because they have been set the 'impossible' task of reconciling the irreconcilable, that 
is, reconciling the locally contested nature of crime and disorder. Furthermore, the 
CSPs fail to attend to pluralism in practice, because the 'community' is not 
meaningfully involved and hence the partnerships symbolically offer the 
democratisation of social life and culture but fail to deliver it. This is not to say, 
however, that the CSPs fail to illustrate the growth of multiple social orders such as 
those noted by Bottoms and Wiles (1996b) or Shearing and Stenning (1985) in 
relation to Disneyworld and other kinds of mass private property. Rather, as I 
described earlier, these multiple social orders are opportunities for local 'hegemony' 
building by the police, possibly local authorities and perhaps central government as 
part of the move towards' community governance'. 
Thus socio-political developments associated with late modernity convey a 
contradictory tendency towards continuity and change. Late modernity therefore 
326 See Davis (1990), for example for an extreme vision of spatial segregation. 
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offers an additional, and perhaps even overarching, framework through which to 
explore the theory, practice and symbolism of community safety. 
The original research questions revisited' what has been learned? 
The overall conclusions in relation to the original research questions stated in 
chapter one are that the processes involved in smooth-running, multi-functioning 
and active partnerships are underpinned by the recognition of differences between 
partners, within the 'community' and between the partnership and the government. 
The impact of the partnerships on crime and disorder is unclear due to difficulties in 
accessing data and relevant information, and due to analysts' impotence in using 
data appropriately to understand how and why crime reduction was effective (given 
the Government's focus on achieving short-term targets). This suggests that 
practitioners lack knowledge and expertise in the measurement of outcomes. Indeed, 
by restricting access to data, the police monopolise the production of knowledge 
about outcomes. 
Since the introduction of the CDA in 1998, there have been various structural and 
processual changes to the CSPs, such as the introduction of funding and 
performance monitoring arrangements, the appointment of community safety 
practitioners and the development of a partnership identity. These changes might be 
a response to the changing socio-political context of the partnerships such as the 
growth of managerialism. Change is not necessarily progressive, however; some of 
the difficulties noted in the Morgan Report of 1991 remain a problem in the post-
1998 partnerships, such as the lack of involvement of the voluntary and business 
sectors and of the' community'. 
The distribution of the responsibility for crime control is symbolically shared, but in 
practice resides with the local authority and the police, who are in turn steered by 
central government. The 'community' appears to have little responsibility for 
community safety. 
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My research therefore adds 'new' empirical insights into 'old' puzzles about 
community safety and multi-agency partnerships. The 'thick description' provided 
in chapters five and six means that the empirical evidence is nuanced and takes 
account of the uneven way in which community safety has unfolded in different 
social contexts. I have taken account what Hughes describes as "the crucial 
contingencies associated with the specific contexts in which crime control and 
community safety strategies emerge and how actions and meanings in situ are 
negotiated" (2004a: 8).327 My research certainly differs from the administrative 
criminological perspectives associated with the Home Office and the possibility of 
'false universals' (Hughes and Edwards, 2002).328 
The empirical insights provided here update important research like the Morgan 
Report 1991 and Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a, 1994b and 1994c). They also add 
empirical weight to more recent research such as that of Gilling and Hughes (2002) 
on community safety practitioners and their relationship to government; Crawford's 
(2001) discussion of the joined-up but fragmented nature of criminal justice reforms; 
Garland's (2001) concept of 'responsibilisation'; Edwards and Hughes' (2002) 
discussion of 'community governance'; and Maguire's (2004) overview of the 
failures of the CRP. This research also provides further evidence that' communities' 
are difficult to harness, and moreover, that this instability of 'community 
governance' (Hughes, 2004a) challenges the rhetoric of communitarianism. 
Yet the research findings described here contradict other research findings. For 
example, Hughes' (2000a) prediction that the CSPs risk burdening stressed, deprived 
communities has not been borne out in practice. This is partly because of the 
327 The importance of micro-level research into community safety practice, is also noted by Edward 
and Hughes (2002), Stenson (2002) and Edwards (2002) . 
328 I am using the term' Administrative Criminology' here in a pejorative fashion, following Jock 
Young and other critical criminologists. Maguire (2004) has argued that when New Labour came to 
power in 1997 there was a 'window of opportunity' not only for a new approach to crime reduction, 
but also to research into how and why crime reduction was effective. Whilst the dissemination of this 
research was delayed or in some instances not published at all, the intention was to develop policy 
research which differed significantly from previous Home Office research, labelled by Jock Young 
and others as 'Administrative Criminology' . 
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apparent lack of 'community' involvement, but also because the 'communities' that 
Hughes describes are the least likely to complain (as previously stated, the evidence 
from Cambridge, for instance, suggests that the vociferous groups are those with 
cultural capital) . 
The findings described here also contradict governmental endorsement of the value 
of partnerships, as well as Pease's (2001) views on the value of the pan-hazard 
approach to community safety. In a sense, my research suggests the reverse; that is, 
the politics of partnerships undermines a cohesive and joined-up approach to 
community safety - underpinned as it is by the continuity and change in late 
modernity in which social institutions are differentiated (and modern) and yet 
simultaneously expected to be integrated (and late modern). 
9.4 Partnerships in the future 
My research suggests that the symbolic utility of the CSPs overrides practical 
difficulties and circumvents attempts to acknowledge underperformance. This raises 
questions about the future of the partnerships. In this section I explore three 
alternative scenarios, and outline their advantages and disadvantages329 in order to 
further explore the implications of my research findings for community safety 
practice. My aim is to raise questions rather than provide solutions or 
recommendations (which can be overly prescriptive) . 
Firstly, the CSPs could remain as they are; that is, joined-up but fragmented 
(Crawford, 2001) and driven primarily by central government (although regulated 
by practitioners). This would require a continued emphasis on their symbolic value. 
The advantages might be that practitioners would retain a sense of their 
organisational values and would thus be able to regulate the behaviour not only of 
each other (Thacher, 2001), but also perhaps of government. A further advantage 
would be that multi-agency partnerships provide opportunities for agency 
329 Thacher (2001) was particularly useful in identifying possible advantages and disadvantages of 
these alternative perspectives. 
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representatives to learn from each other's experiences, knowledge and expertise, and 
to avoid insularity. Moreover, as Matthews (2002) and Lea (2002) note, conflict and 
resistance could be harnessed to resist the 'iron cage' of crime control that Garland 
(2001) suggests. The main disadvantage of this would be that power differentials 
would undermine the ability of agencies to challenge each other and government. In 
addition, there might also be a lack of clarity about who would be responsible for 
community safety, and a lack of accountability and ownership. There could be 
further confusions over lines of decision-making and implementation. 
A second vision of the future is one in which partnerships could begin to balance 
competing agendas, including that of central government, by merging and 
assimilating organisational goals. Partnerships might become like the 'post-modern 
hybrid crime prevention agency' that Gilling (1993) described and which emphasises 
a pan-hazard approach to community safety (Pease, 2001). As with the first scenario, 
multi-agency partnerships could thus provide opportunities for agency 
representatives to learn from each other's experiences, knowledge and expertise, as 
well as encouraging the 'community' to be involved in the CSPs, and perhaps in a 
'progressive local governance' (Hughes,2000a). 
The disadvantage of this approach, however, would be that partners could become 
like 'chameleons', with no firm sense of their values and priorities. They might also 
have to contend with potential paralysis and inaction caused by the complexity of 
the decisions faced, as a result of the need to consider and reconcile competing 
perspectives. Balancing these priorities might further mean the exclusion of some for 
the benefit of partnership decision-making, and possibly contribute to the 
criminalisation of social policy. This could enhance the power of the state in its 
provision of social control, by creating an increasingly large state machine which 
spans from the national to the local level, and through statutory and non-statutory 
organisations and individuals. 
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Thirdly, community safety could return to a situation in which individual 
organisations provide separate services for specific problems. This would emphasise 
the practical 'realities' of multi-agency partnerships. An advantage of this approach 
would be that practitioners would face less complex decisions and would have to 
contend only with differences within their own organisations. A disadvantage to this 
approach would be that community safety practitioners and citizens would be left 
with the perennial difficulty of social problems falling between institutional gaps, 
and thus remaining unmet. There would also be disadvantages associated with the 
state appearing to lack unity or standardisation in its approach to crime control, 
which could further undermine its legitimacy. Furthermore, there would be no inter-
agency checks and balances on community safety practice. 
It is helpful to view these alternative scenarios on a continuum. The location of 
partnerships on this continuum might depend on contextual factors such as the 
history of inter-agency relations in the area, the issue being discussed, their stage of 
development or the wider politics of the partnerships. This continuum is also able to 
reflect the distinction I have drawn throughout this chapter between community 
safety practice and symbolism; the government might emphasise the second 
scenario, whilst in practice the partnerships represent the first or possibly even the 
third scenario. By representing these scenarios as a continuum they cohere with late 
modernity where the 'old' and the 'new' continue alongside each other. 
If community safety were to continue in any form in the future, perhaps community 
safety practice should be laid bare, no longer concealed behind the symbolism and 
rhetoric. This would be a better starting point for frank (public) debates about their 
meaning and future. There are five ways this could be achieved. First, the concept of 
community safety is too nebulous and requires refinement to make it more tangible. 
The inclusion of the word 'community', for example, is a misnomer. Greater clarity 
about the meaning of community safety would help partners (minor players in 
particular) to understand the differences between their organisational agenda and 
that of the partnership, and would also assist with the overall clarity of the purpose 
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and priorities of the partnership. Therefore, perhaps partnerships should select a 
name which better reflects the activities of the partnership; for example, if they were 
focused on crime and disorder, the name should reflect this. Furthermore, perhaps 
the name of the partnership should also reflect the fact that there is more talking 
than decision-making and action, and that there have been few (measurable) 
impacts. For all these reasons, perhaps it is more realistic to conceptualise CSPs as 
local crime and disorder forums or local safety forums. 
Second, community safety practice could also be divested of its symbolism by 
questioning the use of the concept of 'community' (as part of a communitarian 
agenda of creating 'responsibilised' active citizens). Hughes (2004) notes that appeals 
to the 'community' (and to partnerships) will not go away. He cites Bauman (2000) 
who describes the concept of 'community' as akin to a nuclear bunker, a safe place 
for politicians to hide. Hughes (2004b) (in a rejoinder to Kit Carson (2004a, 2004b)) 
argues that the incessant use of the concept means that it is not simply a question of 
deconstructing and thus excluding the concept of 'community' from debates about 
crime control, as Carson (2004a) suggests. Rather, the concept of 'community' might 
contribute to a progressive politics of crime control and community governance so 
long as 'community' is used in "inclusivist and realistic ways of talking about 
belonging, respect and deep civility in late-modern conditions to be found in the 
celebration and recognition of the diasporic - rather than the multicultural ... " 
(Hughes, 2004b: 438).330 This strikes a chord with the findings presented in this 
dissertation because a diaspora appears to address the difficulties noted by a 
Birmingham city council representative (on page 213) of multiple social identities 
and the impossibility of essentialising different ethnic groups. One difficulty would 
be in translating this inclusivist conceptualisation of 'community' into practice; 
however, the opportunities for emancipating local communities provide sufficient 
reason to try. 
330 Diaspora avoids naming essentialised communities; instead, identities are conceived as an 
unfinished process, as a result difference is 'normal', and thus celebrated. 
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Third, and related to this, partnerships should cast off the 'ideology of unity' 
amongst partners (Crawford and Jones, 1995). Instead, perhaps difference requires 
recognition (Crawford, 1997) and management in an open and constructive manner 
(Crawford, 1998b). This recognition of difference between partners is important 
because it might provide a first step towards the recognition of the diasporic 
qualities of the 'community'. At the very least it might help partners to think more 
carefully about representation and the contested nature of the politics of crime 
control. 
Fourth, there is a need for realism rather than rhetoric in the reporting of the impact 
of the partnerships on crime and disorder and the possibilities of measuring this 
impact. This would mean additional research methods training for practitioners 
which might encourage them to consider the significance of social context to their 
activities, rather than simply measure performance against government targets. This 
would serve to enhance the contribution of all partners to the production of 
knowledge and might redress some of the imbalances of power that I have described 
in this dissertation. 
Yet, any such training would, ironically, contradict the Government's attempts to 
measure performance based as it is on volume crime rates, police data and short-
term targets. Therefore, perhaps it is not only practitioners who require training on 
how to measure partnership outcomes, but also government. In addition, given the 
complexity of the task, perhaps there is a need for further academic consideration of 
how we measure the impact of the partnerships.331 Arguably we need to look beyond 
the 'what works' paradigm of administrative criminology (in its narrow sense) and 
towards the crucial contextual contingencies which affect crime control and 
community safety practice (Hughes, 2004a). Furthermore, as I described earlier 
perhaps the Home Office is no longer best placed to administer the CSPs (Maguire, 
331 Bowers, Johnson and Hirschfield (2003) examine one approach to measuring the impact of 
burglary initiatives. 
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2004), and should be replaced with an 'independent' crime reduction councilor 
similar. 
Fifth, partnerships need to be divested of the rhetoric that 'many agencies are better 
than one'. That is, the benefits of partnerships and joined-up practice should not be 
overstated or oversold; partnerships appear to be useful and sensible, but their use 
can also be limited. Indeed, there may be a need for more research to deduce the 
circumstances in which partnerships are likely to be of use in reforming the delivery 
of public services. Also, as Rein (1983) suggests, there are numerous ways to reform 
public services; these should considered first, rather than simply assuming that 
'joined-up' partnership approaches will work best. 
What is clear, however, is that the future of the partnerships may not be contingent 
upon an honest debate about the 'realities' of underperformance and community 
safety practice (rather than its symbolism). As Hughes notes, crime prevention is as 
"much a political and normative enterprise as a scientific endeavour" (2004a: 8). 
Therefore the' realities' of community safety practice may continue to be sidelined as 
long as the symbolic significance of the partnerships and the concept of 'community' 
can be harnessed for political gain. 
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ApPENDIX 1: CONCEPTUALISING CRIME 
PREVENTION 
The concept of crime prevention emerged in the nineteenth century with the advent 
of the British police, as crime prevention became one of their primary objectives 
(Gilling, 1994). Since then, the meaning of crime prevention has changed; in the 
1980s it was defined as "any activity by an individual or a group, public or private 
that precludes the incidence of one or more criminal acts" (Brantingham and Faust, 
1976: 284). This definition is all encompassing, however, as it includes all efforts to 
prevent crime by agencies both within and outside the criminal justice system. 
Since the 1980s, crime prevention has been conceptualized in various ways. 
Brantingham and Faust (1976), for example, applied the public health model used to 
conceptualize the prevention of illness, to the prevention of crime;332 they developed 
a three-pronged conceptual framework of primary, secondary and tertiary 
prevention. Primary prevention refers to changing "conditions in the physical or 
social environment that provide opportunities for criminal events" (Brantingham 
and Faust, 1976: 290). Secondary prevention "engages in early identification of 
potential offenders and seeks to intervene" (Brantingham and Faust, 1976: 290). 
Tertiary prevention refers to interventions with actual offenders, which prevent 
them from committing further offences. Van Dijk and De Waard (1991) refined this 
framework, suggesting that primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention can be 
directed at the offender, the victim or the situation, resulting in a nine-fold typology. 
332 Moore (1995) uses a similar public health model of prevention. Primary prevention targets the 
whole community in order to prevent the onset of 'disease', and attempts are made to prevent crime 
before harm occurs. Secondary prevention targets people with a high risk of contracting the disease 
and thus attempts are made to address those at risk of becoming involved in crime (as an offender or 
victim), based on the assessment of risk. Tertiary prevention targets people who have already 
contracted the disease and thus addresses those people already involved in crime (offenders or 
victims) after crime has occurred. 
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Tonry and Farrington (1995) suggested a three-fold strategic approach to crime 
prevention which appeals to commonsense understandings of crime prevention and 
corresponds to the implementation of crime prevention in practice. Situational 
prevention refers to changes in the situation in which crime takes place, in order to 
reduce the opportunities for crime. Developmental prevention refers to attempts to 
reduce risk factors and enhance protective factors in developmental pathways 
associated with the commission of crime.333 Community crime prevention refers to 
changing aspects of communities, such as the physical and social organisation, in 
order to alter the behaviour of those who live there. To this Hope (2001) added that 
community crime prevention emphasises the importance of the context of crime-
preventive action; it provides a framework for action through everyday practice. 
More recently, Ekblom's (2000) conceptual framework, aimed at community safety 
practitioners examines inter-relations between crime prevention, crime reduction 
and crime control. It considers the proximal and distant, offender-related and 
situational circumstances in which crime takes place, which he calls the 'conjunction 
of criminal opportunity'. Crime prevention intervenes in the causes of criminal 
events before crime occurs, in order to reduce the risk of crime in the future. Crime 
reduction has a more general meaning than crime prevention because it refers to 
current interventions in criminal events, for example, by the police as well as more 
future-oriented interventions in the causes of crime (like crime reduction). Crime 
control is concerned with reducing crime below a tolerable level of harm, which 
indicates the limitations of the state in preventing crime in its entirety.334 
333 More recently, the term developmental crime prevention has been replaced by the term risk-
focussed prevention (Farrington, 2002). 
334 The conceptual frameworks of Tonry and Farrington (1995) and Ekblom (2000) do not take full 
account of structural variables, however. For example, Ekblom focuses on situational rather than 
offender-related circumstances of crime. 
ApPENDIX 2: CDRP FAMILIES 
Box 2: The Thirteen CORP families (numbers in each family are in brackets) 
CORP FMl1ity 1 (3 ) 
Camden 
Citt 01 London 
Cirl' 01 Westminster 
CORP F.,mily 2 ( 1~) 
Blenl 
Ealing 
GI~n\\ich 
Ha(kne)' 
Harin'1e'1 
Islington 
L,m1Jblh 
L~wi~~m 
Ue\\t,am 
SIc-ugh 
SOU1h\\"uk 
To\\..;( Hamlets 
CORP F.lI11ily 3 tl 7) 
Barnet 
Cro)l±.n 
Enlibld 
HarnnElsnith& Fulham 
Harrow 
HilfingJ:-n 
Hounsbw 
Kensin910n & Chel~a 
Kingston upon Thal'l");'5 
lUI~n 
l.1el10n 
Rea:ling 
R~blidge 
Ri:hmond uj:on Thame!:> 
'r'IalUlarn FOI&S\ 
Wands'holth 
Wa\tord 
CORP Fillnily J (12) 
Birmingham 
BI<ldl0rd 
City of Kingston uln Hull 
Le~s 
Lelcfslel 
U\'brpool 
1.lan::hB.!.ler 
Mk.:f1~bCfOUgh 
He\\~aslle upon T~'ne 
l~ottin9tG l1I 
She-rlir.ld 
Wolve,harnpton 
CORP F., mily S (39) 
A$hfiel:l 
Basi!dcn 
Brldgeoj 
"0,), 
Canooc k Cha~ 
Qwslerlield 
Cholley 
[),u linglon 
DO'~er 
Codley 
ErewaYl 
Gravesham 
Gre<ll Yarmoulh 
Havan l 
High Peak 
Kellffing 
I.lanslield 
I.l-?dway 
l,j~/lca!Jl~un:Jer·L)'tT'r"t 
~lor1h Easl Oerby!>hhe 
"'unealon &. &dllorlh 
Aed:1il;;h 
Sellon 
SIO:kporr 
Swal~ 
Tanh\>jrth 
T€>H'Jrd & Wr€>~n 
TM Va le 01 Glanl':;Hgan 
nlUliock 
TraUC'rd 
V.'akelield 
Wallinglon 
Wellingborough 
WeslL<"1IlCAshire 
Wigan 
'NorcesliH 
Wt,..mam 
Wyre F{tI'='31 
CORP F<'Imily 6 (33) 
Barking Dnd Dagenham 
Barnsl~y 
Barroll·jn·FurnE-!>s 
BlafnauGwenl 
Blylh ViltI&y 
Ebtso·.-er 
CaE;rphil~1 
Ch€>!.Iel·I&·Streel 
Cepeland 
Craw"!:',. 
DHmntsi:fe 
DJn:aster 
Easinglon 
Gal .. !>Mad 
Halbw 
Hanlt.p-..:>I 
t.ler1h)·rTydf il 
H ... ,1h Purl TaL-.ot 
"'OM T,ne-si.i:: 
RE-d:a r & C le'J~land 
Rhon:fda . C)'Mn. T.,rl 
Rothe rham 
Sedgeiad 
South Tyneside 
51 H;lens 
S!E!''IIC("1age 
Slo:I..lon..:>n· Te es 
Thanet 
Tor1a<:n 
Walsall 
Wansbed; 
Wear\'<lI\o;,y 
Willal 
CORP F",nily 7 (39) 
Arnb~ Valley 
A!Jllo,d 
Bostvn 
BIi\in lJae-
Call1;k 
Chich~let 
COOYI'I 
C IIE!IIe & Nanlwi:h 
~nbjghshlre-
Ea!>t N.:oi1han)plOnshire-
East Ai:fing 01 YorkshirE-
Ea!>1 Stallordshire 
F€>nland 
Ainlshil& 
FOI~ol D&an 
IsleolWighl 
Kellier 
King"s l}'nn & West Nor1olk 
!.Ial'o'anHiUs 
/.I€ndip 
,"j!:'/lark&. Sh€>rtloo:f 
North Uncolrnhile 
OS'lleSII"l 
Penwith 
Reslorme 
R~hoH 
AushdHtE-
&a!b:'lough 
~:fgen'l:1(I1 
Shrew;b..IIY & Alcharn 
&iuth Delb'fshile 
Sialloidshir€> MXtllan:ls 
Taunton Dean& 
T".lgnblkJge 
T~dring 
Vale Royal 
\'Ja'""ney 
Wyre 
(Leigh, Arnott, Clarke and See, 2000) 
CDRP Fnmily8 (62) 
.. ..<lUI 
A,un 
Balh & U"rth Easl S.:mersel 
&-drotd 
e~,dE:'1 
Bournenuuth 
Bra .:kn€:H Fore-sl 
Br€>nt/looo 
&omle.·" 
Bro)bourne 
Bf'O)Jol\'~ 
CMI .. tbury 
Castle-Poinl 
ChallTllocd 
Ch .. lmslold 
Chell .. nham 
Ch...st.e.r 
Chillern 
Christch urc h 
Cokh~t'!:r 
Con91elon 
Daoorum 
East Oorsel 
Ea.!l H~ lIordshir~ 
Elrnblidge 
Ep;cm & E\\'~,n 
Fillerorll 
Fylde 
Gedling 
Obuce.!>!".r 
Guildlvrd 
Halt 
Ha" 'e ting 
Hinckley & BosI\~rth 
L&wes 
Lkhfie'J 
MaoclMfi~kf 
Mid Sus~x 
Mol€>Vall£oY 
New Foreosl 
Nii rlh Son~~~ 
03dby & Wig;too 
Poo" 
R~i9lle & Bnnsl8.1d 
Fbchlord 
Runnym:.de 
Rushm:lOr 
Solihull 
South B«Ilcldshire 
SoutMnd·on·Sea 
Stallcrd 
SUlley H .. alh 
Sutton 
ValeoIWhil,..H:>rS'!-
Wa~'E.rley 
Windsor & Maid::nhetld 
Wo~ing 
Wo~npham 
Worthing 
Wycorrt."'? 
York 
CDRP F.'nlily9 (Ja) 
Ayt~tury Vale 
8<1bergh 
BtidgOOr1h 
Br~adland 
Caslle t.lcrpelh 
Cherwell 
Dave nlty 
Ea!>1 Camblidge.shire 
Easl De','on 
Easl Hampshire 
Fore..!>1 H€:o.l\h 
Hart:c rough 
Harrogate 
Hasham 
Hunting:bnshilE! 
IslesolS: illy 
~nnet 
Mald)n 
Mellon 
Mid 8edlord;hire 
t.lonn))uthshire 
f-Icflh Dor!.'!:! 
Nalh K"sl&\'en 
r~ ,:orth Wiltshire 
Purbeck 
RitbleV.ll1!:',. 
Richrmn~shile 
Aulland 
Salisbury 
&!Iby 
S:>uth C.mi)ridg&shlre 
&)Olh Ke-sl .. ~-en 
S:>ulh NCOtlh .-unplonshire 
$:,u1h O.dordshire 
Soulh Somerset 
SI Edrrurr:bbury 
Slrallord·lpon·Avvn 
Strou:l 
SlrltolkCooslal 
Tandridg~ 
TeostValley 
Tunblidg~ W~II, 
Utde!lord 
We.!t Belkshils 
West O~ordshile 
WHIWitlshir~ 
Wyo:.havon 
CDRP F.:lIuily 10 (29) 
Blacl..[.ooJ 
Blighlc.n & HCfo'e 
Cambridg: 
Ca r·jill 
C'I'/ol Bdstol 
CO"l&rltry 
DE:tl"" 
Durrom 
Ea!olbo.Jln .. 
EMler 
GoSp:>tl 
HMlings 
'psI\kh 
KooW'~I&y 
lanc<\slH 
lincoln 
Millon Keynes 
Ncrthampton 
i+::f'llich 
O»old 
PetHl-.:;rcugh 
P~/nlouth 
Portsrmulh 
Preston 
s:.u\harrpton 
Stoke·on·Tr"nl 
S\\'.:msea 
Tcibay 
Weymoulh &. Ponlan:l 
Ba!>ingslok.e Po Oean~ 
Slaby 
BrCilT1'iglo"l~ 
Ca rlisle 
Dar1/ord 
E<lslI'!!igh 
EII~mo:re Port &. H€-Slon 
Epping For£.1,1 
Her1stllers 
Mai:blon~ 
Horth Hertkto:hhire 
Harth Warwickshire 
!-Iorth Wesll€>i:e-slershire 
Ru£by 
Se',-r:n:.aks 
Sh"p'llay 
$oulhBu:ks 
Soulh Gbucesl';r;hire 
South Rilt.le 
S::.uth SI<lflordshire 
Spelthorno: 
SIAINn!> 
T~flMsbulY 
Thr~e Aive,,~ 
Tonbridg~ & M3i!inJ 
Wel'(rJnHalfi~lj 
WinchHt.er 
Alladal~ 
Alnwi;k 
B;:;r'lli: k·upon·T\\'~:1 
BredJan:f 
Ca r,)j.:on 
Carmarlhenshiro:.-
Cereojigion 
Cols'l\l.1d 
Oa\"~11 
D'=ib~'Shir~ Oill~ 
E.\SILIndsey 
Eden 
GI\'inedd 
Hambleton 
H'E!relordshire 
IsledJongleSo€:oy 
t.tidOa'ion 
t.1id~unolk 
HorthColn\\'illl 
Hor1hD:,von 
Nor1h N:or1olk 
Hor1h Shrcpshire-
Perrbrolu:shire 
PO\\)" 
Ryedale 
South Hams 
S:.uth Holland 
S,o:,uth La ... .;.land 
~outh norlolk 
Sc,uth Shropshire 
T£.-e!.dale 
TOllidge 
Tyn~ale 
West [)s,~\)n 
WESt Dor v:1 
Wesllind; 6',. 
WcsISofl)?I~1 
CDRP Forn il v 13 (t~) 
Bolton 
Bum' .... ,' 
Cat"J;:;ldale 
CO/by 
Hallen 
HyndbUln 
Kirklees 
IJ!::'/lp':'II 
i-Ionh Easl Un:d n!>hir~ 
Oldham 
P;:;ndl'!: 
Ao:hdale 
RO'is endale 
Sallord 
Sandwell 
Sunderland 
Tam~side 
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ApPENDIX 3: VARIABLES USED IN THE HOME OFFICE 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS TO OBTAIN CDRP FAMILIES 
5. Percentage of young males (16-24) 
6. Percentage of minority ethnic population 
7. Percentage of single-adult households 
8. Percentage of single-parent households 
9. Percentage of student households 
10. Percentage of residents living at a different address one year before the 1991 
Census 
11. Percentage of local authority housing, plus new town renters and housing 
associations 
12. Percentage of terraced housing 
13. Percentage of overcrowding 
14. Population sparsity 
15. Population density 
16. Length of A, B and minor roads per head of population 
17. Percentage of daytime population (leisure and retail employment) 
18. Percentage of young male claimants (of unemployment related benefits) 
19. Percentage of long-term claimants (of unemployment related benefits) 
20. Index of homogeneity 
21. Motorway junctions per 1000 population 
22. Population per square kilometre 
23. Percentage claiming income support (for CDRPs only) 
24. Percentage claiming family credit (for CDRPS only) 
(Leigh, Arnott, Clarke and See, 2000) 
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ApPENDIX 3: VARIABLES USED IN THE HOME OFFICE 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS TO OBTAIN CDRP FAMILIES 
5. Percentage of young males (16-24) 
6. Percentage of minority ethnic population 
7. Percentage of single-adult households 
8. Percentage of single-parent households 
9. Percentage of student households 
10. Percentage of residents living at a different address one year before the 1991 
Census 
11 . Percentage of local authority housing, plus new town renters and housing 
associations 
12. Percentage of terraced housing 
13. Percentage of overcrowding 
14. Population sparsity 
15. Population density 
16. Length of A, B and minor roads per head of population 
17. Percentage of daytime population (leisure and retail employment) 
18. Percentage of young male claimants (of unemployment related benefits) 
19. Percentage of long-term claimants (of unemployment related benefits) 
20. Index of homogeneity 
21 . Motorway junctions per 1000 population 
22. Population per square kilometre 
23. Percentage claiming income support (for CDRPs only) 
24. Percentage claiming family credit (for CDRPS only) 
(Leigh, Arnott, Clarke and See, 2000) 
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ApPENDIX 4: D AT A COLLECTED IN EACH AREA 
A. All data 
Interviews Board Subgroup Totals 
meetings meetings 
observed observed 
25 7 3 35 
19 8 4 31 
14 7 2 23 
57 (58) 22 9 89 
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B. Interviews 
Date of interview Sex Partnership Agency 
27/03/2002 Female 
-~--~--~------j~~----~-------------------
Cambridge Ci ty council 
05/04/2002 Female Cambridge Community safety team 
--
12/04/2002 
127/ 05/2002-
I 29/05/2002 
31/05/2002 
Male Cambridge Probation service 
------ --~--~~------~~~-------------------
Male Cambridge Police 
Female Cambridge County council 
Female Cambridge I Community safety team 
-r----------------
05/07/2002 Male Cambridge Youth offending service 
25/07/2002 Female Cambridge Community safety team 
-
r-------------~------------+_-----------~------------~----------- --
30/07/2002 Female Cambridge Community safety team 
09/08/2002 Male Cambridge 
10/10/2002 Male Cambridge 
23/10/2002 Male Cambridge 
01/11/2002 Female Cambridge 
01/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
06/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
12/11/2002 Male Cambridge 
18/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
--!--
Education 
Police 
Police 
Primary care trust 
Police 
City council 
Drug action team 
Police 
I I! / 11 / 2002 Male ______ +-B_ir __ m __ in_g_h_a_m ____ -+_D_r_u_g-,--a_c---:t-,-io_n_t:-e_a_m ______________ ----I 
20/11/2002 Male Birmingham Youth offending service 
23/11/2002 Male Birmingham I Probation service 
16/12/2002 Male Lincoln Police 
---------------r:-~-------~~------:~----------------------------
. 20/01/2003 Male Birmingham Community safety team 
24/01/2003 Male Birmingham City council 
104/02/2003 Male Birmingham ~ity co..':nci~ 
r----m - -- -!-- ---------I 01/03/2003 Male Birmingham Fire service 
I 20/03/2003 Male Cambridge City Council 
20/03/2003 Female Cambridge City Council 
03/04/2003 Female Cambridge City Council (ASB) 
04/04/2003 Female Lincoln School 
I 29/05/2003 Female Lincoln Youth offending service 
10/07/2003 Female Lincoln Police 
110/07/2003 Male Lincoln City council 
110/07/2003 __ +_M __ a_le _______ L_i_n_c_o __ ln ___________ + Fire service ___________ _ 
rll/07/2003 Male Lincoln Urban Challenge 
: 11/07/2003 Female Birmingham Community safety team 
115/07/2003 Male Birmingham Customs and excise 
i 15/07 /2003 Fe~ai-e- - -- Birmingham -+~-------,--------------- ---City council 
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B. Interviews 
Date of interview Sex Partnership Agency 
~7 /03/2002 Female Cambridge City council 
05/04/2002 
'12/04/2002 
Female Cambridge Community safety team 
~~~-4~~~~~~~4-~~~~~~~~~~~---­
Male Cambridge Probation service 
"-
-- --
~ .~~--~~~---+--~~~--~--~~~- - --
I 27/05/2002 Male Cambridge Police 
~-~ I 29/05/2002 Female Cambridge County council 
31/05/2002 Female Cambridge I Community safety team 
-- ----- - -- ---- -r-----c----:- -----r, --
05/07/2002 Male Cambridge Youth offending service 
25/07/2002 Female Cambridge Community safety team 
-
30/07/2002 Female Cambridge Community safety team 
-~~~-+----~--~-I-~~--~--- -I---~:-----~-- ---~- - - -
09/08/2002 Male Cambridge Education 
10/10/2002 Male Cambridge Police 
23/10/2002 Male Cambridge Police 
01/11/2002 Female Cambridge 
01/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
06/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
12/11/2002 Male Cambridge 
18/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
I ~/11!2002 ____ +-M __ ale___ Birmingham 
20/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
23/11/2002 Male Birmingham 
Primary care trust 
Police 
City council 
Drug action team 
Police 
Drug action team 
Youth offending service 
Probation service 
16/12/2002 Male Lincoln Police 
- ~ ------t- -~~--~-----+---~----~~-t-----~-~--:-----.---- --
20/01/2003 Male Birmingham Community safety team 
24/01/2003 Male Birmingham City council 
04/02/2003 Male Birmingham I City council 
[01/03/2003 ~~-+-M-a-l-e - ~ B irmingham- 1fu-e-ser-v-ice -
1 20/03/2003 Male Cambridge City Council 
20/03/2003 Female Cambridge City Council 
03/04/2003 Female Cambridge City Council (ASB) 
04/04/2003 Female Lincoln School 
29/05/2003 Female Lincoln You th offending service 
10/07/2003 Female Lincoln Police 
10/07/2003 Male Lincoln City council 
10/07/2003 Male Lincoln Fire service 
~----:---:--- - - ------ -,-~--,-~~~---+-~.,.-- -------::c---:-:---~---- -~~-
I 11/07/2003 Male Lincoln Urban Challenge 
h l/07/2003 -- Female Birmingham Community safety team =J 
115/07/2003 Male Birmingham Customs and excise 
l_ - - - - 1----- -- -- ----- --------
[ 15/07/2003 Female Birmingham City council 
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; Date of interview Sex Partnership Agency 
l 15/07/2003 Female Birmingham City council 
I 16/07/2003 Male Cambridge Drug action team 
f-
: 11/08/2003 Female Lincoln Connexions 
, 11/09/2003 Male Lincoln Police 
111/09/2003 Male Birmingham Police 
--
22/09/2003 Female Birmingham City Council 
23/09/2003 Male Birmingham Community safety team 
24/09/2003 Male Lincoln Government office 
06/10/2003 Male Birmingham City council 
01/11/2003 Male Lincoln Police authority 
! 04/11/2003 Male Cambridge Fire service 
I 06/11/2003 Male Birmingham Primary care trust 
I 
17/11/2003 Male Birmingham City council 
! 
119/11/2003 Male Birmingham City council 
19/11/2003 Female Birmingham Chamber of commerce 
27/11/2003 Female Birmingham Chamber of commerce 
27/11/2003 Male Lincoln Youth service 
I 12/12/2003 Female Birmingham Drug action team 
I 20/01/2004 Male Lincoln Probation service 
--
C. Meetings 
f 
- - --- --- --
Partnership Length of 
Date name Meeting-'!ype meeting (mins.) 
10/05/02 Cambridge CSP 180 
12/07/01 Cambridge CSP 210 
-- -
02/10/02 Cambridge CSP 150 
22/11/02 Birmingham CSP 154 
12/12/02 Cambridge CSP 145 
24/01/03 Birmingham CSP 151 
03/02/03 Cambridge ASB subgroup 90 
28/02/03 Cambridge ASB subgroup 90 
19/03/03 Cambridge Burg~ subgroup 111 
19/03/03 Cambridge CSP 198 
20/03/03 Birmingham CSP 160 
;21/05/03 Birmingham CSP 160 
i29/05/03 Lincoln CSP 167 
f:6/06/03 __ Cambridge _ CSP 137 
-----
-- ------ --- -
26/06/03 Lincoln Crime subgrouE 50 
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- ---- -
Partnership Length of 
Date name Meeting type meeting (mins.) 
16/07/03 Birmingham CSP 170 
-----'-
12/08/03 Cambridge CSP 136 
11/09/03 Lincoln CSP 102 
23/09/03 Birmingham CSP 163 
10/10/03 Cambridge Community safety team 180 
14/10/03 Cambridge CSP 144 
23/10/03 Lincoln CSP 143 
04/11/03 Lincoln Crime subgroup 140 
Supporting victims and public 
19/11/03 Birmingham reassurance subgroup 93 
~/12/03 __ Lincoln CSP 95 
20/01/04 Birmingham CSP 170 
27/01/04 Birmingham ASB subgroup 114 
04/02/04 Lincoln CSP 74 
1 8/03/04 Lincoln CSP 106 
10/07/04 Lincoln CSP 111 
30/10/04 Birmingham CSP 90 
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ApPENDIX 5: TIMELINE OF THE RESEARCH 
A. First year: October 2001 to September 2002 
Activities Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May I Jun Jul Aug Sept I 
Cambridge 
Initial contact X 
I 
Formal access to the X I 
partnershi:e I 
First interview X I 
First meeting X I 
Final interview --1 ------- I--- - --Final meeting 
Access to police data X I requested - -j 
Access to police data I 
~anted I 
Birmingham -1 
Ini tial contact 
First interview 
Formal access to the 
partnership 
--
I 
First interview 
First meeting ________ I 
-------j 
Final interview 
Final meeting I 
Access to police data I 
requested 
Access to police data 
granted 
Lincoln 
Initial contact 
--------- -
---
------
-- - .- ---- --I- - - - - - -- -
First interview I 
-- -
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T ruviti" =!" -- I Sept I Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar t--A..£r May I Jun Jul Aug I--- Formal access to the -
I 
~ 
I 
____ partnershi~_ _ _ _ __ 
- - ----
--- - -----
---
---,---- -
_ ___ L-
~ 
First interview 
I First meeting 
Final interview I I 
f-----
Final meeting __ 
---- f--- -- --- --~-
Access to police data 
I requested 
Access to police data I 
granted I I 
Other PhD tasks 
I 
I 
End of year review X I 
Feedback to participants in 
I the research 
Coding and analysis 
Writing 
----
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B. Second year: October 2002 to September 2003 
Activities Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr I May I Jun Jul Aug 5" 
Cambridge 
I lni tial con tact 
Formal access to the I 
partnershi 
First interview 
First meeting I 
Final interview X r-----L- ------~ '------ - --
Final meeting 
Access to police data I X requested 
Access to police data 
I 1 granted 
Birmingham 
I Initial contact 
Formal access to the 
I I partnership 
First interview X I I 
First meeting X I 
-
Final interview f-------L ~-- --~- -- ~-- ----f---- ---.- -~ -~- ----- ----
Final meeting 
Access to police data X I 
requested I 
Access to police data X 
granted 
Lincoln 
lni tial con tact X 
Formal access to the X I 
partnership 
First interview X I 
First meeting I X 
Final interview 
--{--- I -- f------ I---~ ----"- ---Final meeting I 
------- --
--I -Access to police data -I -. --
requested I 
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'Activities 
---.--~.--
Oct Nov Dec r J'" Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul ..J~g Sep~ Access to police data 
---
_ gr~!I~ed_ 
---e------------- -'. -- ,--,_ .. _-- ------ -.--- --- -- -~--.--1------
Other PhD tasks 
End of year review X 
I 
Feedback to participants in I_ X the research 
I---- - -- --- ---f-------
Coding and analysis + X X -, f------- Writing I X X 
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C. Third year: October 2003 to September 2004 
-
_ JUI -T- Aug I Activities Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Sept 
-- J Cambridge lrutial contact I 
Formal access to the 
I partnership 
First interview 
First meeting t 
Final interview 
f---- -f- I 1--------- - --- --Final meeting X 
Access to police data 
requested 
Access to police data X 
granted 
Birmingham 
I lrutial contact 
Formal access to the I 
I 
partnership 1 1. I 
First interview I 
, 
1 
First meeting I 
Final interview X I 
- --r -- -- - ----- --
Final meeting X 
Access to police data 
requested 
Access to police data 
granted 
Lincoln 
lrutial contact I 
I 
Formal access to the 
partnership 
First interview 
First meeting I X 
Final interview X 
----- - - --- - - --- - ---- - - -- - -- l---Final meeting -
Access to police data X 
I requested 
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r M~' f A~ ~~y ~_ I -Activities Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Jul Aug Sept _. __ . -Access to police data 
____ i£.~ted _ I 
----
---.-
-- --
. -- -
__ 1 _____ -Other PhD tasks 
I I 
End of year review 
1------
Feedback to participants in I I 
the research I 
-- ---
---_ .. .. - - -
Coding and analysis X X X X X X X I 
Writing X X X X I X X 
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D. Fourth year: October 2004 to present 
Activities Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
-
Cambridge 
Initial contact 
Formal access to the 
partnership 
First interview 
First meeting 
Final interview 
--- - -----
- -
Final meeting 
Access to police data 
requested 
Access to police data 
granted 
Birmingham 
Initial contact 
Formal access to the 
partnership 
First interview 
First meeting . 
Final interview 
- .- .- - -
Final meeting 
Access to police data 
requested 
Access to police data 
granted 
Lincoln 
Initial contact 
Formal access to the 
partnership 
--
First interview 
First meeting 
Final interview 
- -_._-_ . . _- - --
-
-
._-
-_._- -- --
Final meeting I 
Access to police data I __ _~uested 
339 
· -
Activities Oct _+~ov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
Access to police data 
IITanted 
----:-:- __ 3:'_. _______ . __ 
--- - --- - -- -
Other PhD tasks 
End of year review 
Feedback to participants in 
the research 
Coding and analysis 
r-----------
I Writing and revising X X X X X X 
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ApPENDIX 6: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 
RESEARCH PROCESS 
Introduction 
In this appendix I discuss personal observations, critical reflections and perhaps 
even caveats (in relation to my methodology chapter), because I wish to record the 
complicated and 'messy' way that my research unfolded. I explore how the 
fieldwork affects the researcher and the researcher affects the field, a topic that 
normally remains unexamined. It is important to record at least some of these 
subjective experiences, because the researcher's consciousness mediates the 
experiences of conducting research (Gelsthorpe, 1990). Therefore I am also 
acknowledging the "researcher's involvement in and experiences of the research as 
both problematic and valid" (Gelsthorpe, 1990: 105). 
These critical reflections appear in an appendix as I prefer to focus on my findings 
within the body of the dissertation. I wish to acknowledge my location within those 
findings, however. Thus, like Bill Whyte, in 'The Street Corner Society', I intend to 
provide an 'insider account' of how my research has evolved and developed, where 
the self is a medium through which fieldwork is conducted (Coffey, 1994). 
Based on field notes and my field diary335 I explore the negotiation of access and 
relationships with participants and missing elements in the research. This account is 
intended to be self-reflexive, rather than self-indulgent, focusing on issues and 
experiences relevant to the research process. I also hope to avoid post-hoc 
rationalisations of the research process, by making as much use as possible of my 
field diary. 
335 As Coffey (1994) notes, field notes rarely see the light of day, as they remain a private record of 
places, people, events, emotions and personal experiences. My field notes are a private record and for 
this reason I will present them for public scrutiny, only in an edited form . 
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Choice of cases - a few personal reasons 
My cases were primarily chosen for reasons described in the methodology chapter. 
There were also personal reasons for choosing Birmingham and Glasgow. My 
interest in Birmingham was fuelled by Mark Liddle's findings on community safety 
practice in Birmingham,336 where there had been upheavals in early 1992/3 as a 
result of allegations of racial discrimination in the community safety unit (the 
allegations were subsequently rejected by an industrial tribunal). I was therefore 
curious about developments post-CDA, as questions were raised about how the 
partnership recovered from such turmoil. One consequence, for example, might 
have been a relatively small community safety team which remained a fraction of 
what it used to be. In addition, conducting research in Birmingham was facilitated 
by the proximity of family members with whom I could stay overnight. 
Scotland was of interest partly because it is often neglected in criminological 
research. A Scottish case study would have also added an original dimension to my 
research because there is no extant research comparing the development of 
community safety in England and Scotland. I also wanted to 'repay' the country 
where I had studied as an undergraduate. I was therefore committed to conducting 
research in Glasgow, indeed, I was prepared to live there for a month or so. Hence I 
was disappointed when the partnership declined to take part in my research. I 
considered negotiating access with another Scottish partnership, but there was no 
other Scottish city comparable with Glasgow, and it had become too late in the 
research to negotiate access to another partnership. 
Formal access 
Access to partnerships required formal negotiations with the partnership chair, the 
data protection managers in individual police forces, and informal negotiations with 
336 Mark Liddle's research was conducted in Birmingham between 1993 and 1997 but was never 
published by the Home Office. 
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individual participants. Formal access was premised on my offer of a short report of 
my findings to partnerships that participated in my research.337 The precise nature of 
these negotiations varied between partnerships, however. In Cambridge CSP, a 
personal acquaintance introduced me to the Chair of the partnership who 
approached the other partners with my research proposal, and agreement was 
quickly secured within a couple of weeks. 
In Birmingham, negotiations took four and a half months, before I commenced my 
research. Senior police officers338 from West Midlands Police, provided a police 
contact for the partnership in Birmingham. Formal access was agreed after six weeks 
but unfortunately my police contact with the partnership moved jobs, his successor 
went on maternity leave and I was unable to begin fieldwork. Fortunately my 
supervisor discovered that a former colleague was working for the CSP and he was 
able to facilitate the start of fieldwork. He contacted the Chair of the partnership, 
circulated my research proposal to partners, supplied a list of current members 
(indicating those who regularly attended), and introduced me to relevant people at 
the first partnership meeting I attended. 
I learned from my experiences in Cambridge and Birmingham to write directly to 
the partnership chair when requesting access. Hence, in Lincoln, it took less than two 
months from writing my first letter to the Chair, to conducting my first interview. I 
used a similar approach in Glasgow, although with less success. I began negotiations 
in November 2003; initially I communicated with the police, but then with a 
I gatekeeper' from Glasgow City Council who was busy and difficult to contact. The 
most frustrating moment, during the negotiation process, was when I arranged to 
meet my contact at Glasgow City Council, in December 2002, only to find that my 
contact had cancelled the meeting without warning. A deputy was sent in his place 
337 I also gave a presentation to Cambridge CSP on some preliminary observations. 
338 I met these police officers when I spent a week at Bramshill Police Training College in July 2002, 
whilst they completed part of the Strategic Command Course. These police officers provided useful 
(police-based) insights into the CSPs. 
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who, although helpful, could not agree to the research. Instead the deputy suggested 
I write again to my original contact. 
By the start of June 2003 my contact expressed willingness over the phone, but not in 
writing. However, he also had concerns about the impact on my research of changes 
in the city council. By the end of June 2003 and after numerous unreturned phone-
calls, his deputy indicated that the partnership declined my invitation to participate 
in my research. By this time it was too late to find another suitable partnership, 
unless negotiations were completed extremely quickly. 
In sum, negotiating formal access required constant communication with a key 
gatekeeper, often the partnership chair; persistence, including gentle reminders and 
offers of additional information; patience and understanding (participants' 
commitment to their job is greater than to academic research) and offers of 
reparation for participation, such as a short report. 
Being young, female and a student 
On occasion participants in my research did not take me seriously339 as a researcher, 
and I can only speculate about why this was the case. This can hinder research, but 
according to Easterday et al. (1982), it can also facilitate the 'naive researcher' role 
and elicit carefully explained information.34o Foster (1994) and Gurney (1991) 
connect the issue of not being taken seriously to being a female researcher, although 
Foster ultimately views being a female researcher as advantageous because of 
stereotypes about women as unthreatening and harmless. 
339 For example, participants thought my research was for an undergraduate project, rather than a 
PhD thesis. 
340 According to Easterday et al. (1982) the role of 'naiVe researcher' can be useful provided it is not 
overdone, which can be irritating for participants. 
344 
I am uncertain as to whether the difficulties I experienced were attributable to either 
my gender, given the male-dominated nature of at least two of the three CSPs I 
studied, or age, especially as I appear younger than I am, or the relative power 
imbalance between myself and the participants in my research, especially in 
Birmingham.341 If Gurney (1991) is correct that gender is relatively unimportant in 
short-term research,342 perhaps it was my age and perceived lack of seniority that 
contributed most to my sense of not being taken seriously. 
Since self-presentation affects the establishment of trusting and co-operative 
relations with participants, I tried to counteract misperceptions about my age and 
lack of authority by emphasising my appearance and credentials. I tried to match my 
appearance, including my dress and demeanour, with those attending the meetings. 
In addition, I tried to be punctual, interested and enthusiastic, in order to convey my 
genuine interest in and respect for participants. Hence it follows that, as Shaffir 
(1991) notes, 'commonplace sociability' is as important in social research as any other 
unrelated setting. For similar reasons I was open about the purposes of my 
research.343 After interviews I sometimes discussed my views about community 
safety with participants in order to demonstrate my knowledge of the topic and 
enhance my credibility. 
341 Partners in Birmingham were at the top of the management hierarchy in their organisation; this 
meant that they were very busy and 'high powered', given the size of Birmingham. Birmingham is 
the largest local authority in the UK and the second largest city outside of London. Thus, when I 
interviewed the Chief Executive of Birmingham city council, for example, there was clearly a power 
differential. 
342 Gurney (1991) argues that provided a female researcher establishes herself as professional at the 
outset of short-term research, its short duration will militate against serious problems, such as sexism 
or harassment. 
343 Gelsthorpe (1990) argues that honesty is also part of the democratization of the research process, in 
order to question rather than deny hierarchical relationships. 
345 
The interview and observation process 
Interviews 
At the outset, I was unclear about the extent to which I should reveal my knowledge 
about community safety to the interviewee during the interview. On reflection, the 
two-way flow of information increased over time because it meant I gleaned more 
from the interviewee. Since then I have wondered if I was initially influenced by 
(masculinist) views of the mechanical and neutral researcher, critiqued by feminist 
researcher,344 who argue that an objective, unbiased and 'proper' interview is 
impossible because all research is grounded in personhood and experiences. 
Interviewees were not selected in any particular order, although I tended to 
interview newer partners345 towards the end of the fieldwork in each location. In 
order to avoid 'cold calling', normally I introduced myself to each interviewee before 
or after a partnership meeting; I would later telephone and/ or email to arrange a 
convenient interview date and time. Given the travelling involved to Birmingham 
and Lincoln, interviews were arranged close to the date of partnership meetings. I 
hoped interviewees found the interviews a rewarding experience, since it is rare to 
be able to talk at length on a topic of personal relevance. Some interviewees 
commented that they enjoyed the interview and appreciated the questions I asked. 
Other interviewees were not so flattering. 
One interviewee, a senior police officer, appeared to dislike being interviewed.346 His 
was a challenging interview and on reflection an informative experience. The 
344 For example Oakley (1981) argues that the 'proper' interview is unattainable because the pretence 
of neutrality (on the interviewer's part) is counter-productive. Interviewer 'bias' occurs because 
interviewers are human beings, not machines, and the quality of interviewee participation is affected 
by interviewer participation. 
345 I would normally wait at least three months (after they attended their first meeting), before 
interviewing new practitioners, to allow thoughts relevant to my research to develop. 
346 After the interview, whenever I encountered this interviewee at subsequent partnership meetings, 
he ignored me or looked at me blankly. This was the opposite reaction to other interviewees who 
tended to become friendlier and more welcoming once I had interviewed them. 
346 
interview or 'monologue' was challenging because he wished to talk only about 
issues that concerned him, rather than answer questions from my research. 
Eventually, for fear of wasting my time, I asserted myself by saying "would you 
mind if I asked you a few things about x ... ". The interview was also challenging 
because he appeared to take offence at my questions, claiming he was "too thick" to 
understand what I meant. For example, I asked him about the role of the 
'community' in the partnership and he would not answer the question until I used 
his preferred word' citizenry'. In addition, he did not listen carefully to the questions 
I asked and became defensive about the questions he thought I had asked, 
particularly in relation to sensitive topics, concerning the history of the partnership, 
for example. I was unclear why this interviewee responded to me in this way; 
perhaps he was responding to my gender, age, powerlessness or maybe he was just 
having a bad day. 
This interview is an extreme example of why interviews are more informative if they 
are a two-way conversation. It also suggests that a structured format may not elicit 
the required information because interviewees will not always adhere to this format. 
Perhaps a skilful interviewer is one who can balance structure and an adherence to 
their research agenda with free-flowing, two-way conversation adjusted to the needs 
and demands of the interviewee. 
Observation 
As with the interviews, I was unclear about the extent to which I should reveal my 
knowledge about community safety when observing CSP meetings. This problem 
was less acute when observing a group of people, as it is easier to avoid giving an 
opinion in these situations compared to a one-on-one interview. I decided from the 
outset that I would be more of an observer than a participant in meetings, but there 
were occasions when the urge to offer an academic point of view was strong, 
although not overwhelming. 
347 
Whilst observing meetings, especially at the beginning of my research, there were 
occasions when I felt awkward. At the end of partnership meetings, for example, I 
would often linger in order to observe informal relationships or talk to potential 
interviewees (who were sometimes engrossed in important conversations with 
someone else). In these circumstances: 
It is often difficult to know what to physically do in the field in order to 
look natural, comfortable, engaged and welcoming, while not appearing 
bored, threatening or judgmental. Immersion and integration are physical 
aspects of fieldwork, as well as academic and person ones. The 
fieldworker is a visible as well as a watching body. (Coffey, 1994: 73) 
As a result of this awkwardness, I would sometimes leave or leave, and come back 
only to find that the person I wished to speak had also left. These difficulties 
emphasise once more the importance of 'commonplace sociability' (Shaffir, 1991) 
when conducting social research. 
Informal access: establishing and maintaining field relations 
The discussion so far suggests that relationships347 with participants in the research 
affect data collection.348 Coffey (1994) notes that the onus is on the researcher to 
build rapport and trust. I found that being true to one's word was important. In my 
research in Lincoln, for example, there was a delay of five months between 
conducting my first interview and observing my first meeting. During these five 
months, I telephoned to indicate I was too busy with the fieldwork in other areas, 
but the delay in commencing my research could have been interpreted as disinterest 
or a failure to prioritise research in Lincoln. This was temporarily detrimental to the 
347 These relations might be professional and sometimes personal. 
348 Oakley (1981) calls this the micro-political dimension of research in the field . 
348 
fieldwork because it took longer to establish trust and rapport with participants 
there. 
Once trust and rapport was established, it appeared that maintaining relations with 
participants was also crucial. Whilst researching in Cambridge, for example, there 
was a misunderstanding about the feedback I would provide. When negotiating 
access, I indicated I would provide a short written report of my findings; however, 
the partnership also requested feedback part-way through the research. This request 
was made during a partnership meeting, although I understood it to mean 
something else.349 
A few weeks later, whilst reading the agenda on the morning of the CSP meeting, I 
noticed that there was an agenda item for me to provide feedback to the partnership. 
I was somewhat aghast. On my arrival at the meeting, I explained to the Chair that 
there must have been a misunderstanding, as I was not prepared to give feedback 
and that we agreed I would provide feedback at a later date. This feedback, although 
not a part of my original agreement with the partnership, allowed me to maintain 
trust and rapport with partners, and check the accuracy and validity of my 
preliminary observations. This situation also illustrates the vexed issue of 
reciprocity; participants rightly expect something in return for participating in 
research and, even if you should want to, it is difficult to avoid this obligation. 
Some possible limitations and their implications 
There are two possible limitations to my research. First 'community consultation' 
could have illuminated the extent of 'community' knowledge about community 
safety, which is important given that citizens are the intended 'beneficiaries' of the 
partnerships. I found that practitioners recognised the limited role of the 
349 I thought the partnership requested a letter, not feedback, in order to continue my research in 
Cambridge (given that I wanted to include it as a case in the main body of my research, rather than 
use it only in the preliminary stages of the research) . 
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'community' in the CSPS350, which called into question the extent to which 
practitioner perceptions could be validated by a 'community' survey. In 
Birmingham, a survey of this kind would, of necessity, address the issue of diversity, 
which was also absent from my research. I found few women or minority ethnic 
groups were represented in the partnership in Birmingham, which raised questions 
about why these social groups were not involved and how they could be represented 
and involved in the future. 
Whilst the absence of 'community' consultation is a limitation to my dissertation, I 
never intended for it to be a part of its remit because of limited time and resources. 
Attempting to negotiate access to four partnerships and three sets of police data, as 
well as researching and analysing data from three partnerships, was enough to make 
an original contribution to criminological knowledge. Had I used only two cases, 
perhaps a 'community survey' would have feasibly added depth to my thesis. I 
chose the breadth of three cases, however, because of my desire to compare cases 
and to generalise to other similar partnerships. 
The second limitation of my research was its lack of follow-up information. I 
recognise that each interview is a 'snap-shot' of the views of an interviewee, at a 
particular point in time and open to influence by prevailing issues, such as political 
imperatives or 'bad days'. With more time, I would have asked each interviewee to 
comment on the validity and representativeness of their views expressed in the 
transcript of their interview. I partially cross-checked the validity of my findings, 
however, when I gave feedback to Cambridge CSP in March 2003, through which I 
modified my views on the relationship between the partnership and central 
government. 
350 Given that the 'community' appeared to have limited involvement in the partnership, perhaps a 
community survey would have been a wasted effort with low response rates and/ or responses, 
which indicated limited knowledge of the partnerships. 
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ApPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
1. Pragmatics 
2. Structure 
How long have you been involved in the partnership? 
Have you been involved in other partnerships? If so, which ones and 
for how long? 
How does the partnership work? Who does what? Can you briefly 
outline the structure of the partnership? 
Who are the key partners? Who should I talk to? Who is marginal? 
Does the size of the partnership matter? How? 
Does local authority structure matter (unitary vs. two-tier)? How? 
3. Roles and responsibilities 
What is your role in the partnership? What is your role in your own 
agency and what is your job title? How are these two roles connected? 
Roughly what proportion of your time do you spend on community 
safety partnership-related activities? 
What is the role of the CSO or policy support officer or LALO? What 
makes a good CSO? Why? 
What is the role of the chair? How is the chair chosen? Why have you 
not been chair? What makes a good chair? Why? 
What is the role of the community in the partnership? 
What is the role of elected members in the partnership? 
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How well do you understand each the roles and responsibilities of the 
other partners? 
Are you equal partners? If not, who are the key players? 
Given the involvement of all these different agencies, who is 
responsible for crime and disorder in Birmingham? Who should be 
responsible? 
4. Decision-making: agreement/ disagreement 
At a typical meeting how are decisions reached? How much decision-
making actually takes place at the meeting? 
How much decision-making takes place outside the partnership 
meetings? 
Do you always agree? 
What causes disagreement? For example are there different 
professional cultures or ways of working? 
How are disagreements resolved? 
5. Translating decisions into practice 
6. Pressures 
How are decisions taken within the partnership translated into' on-the-
ground' activity? 
How effective is this approach? What makes it effective? 
How would you change the way you translate decisions into practice? 
Why? 
What sort of external pressures is the partnership put under and by 
whom? 
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County Council 
Regional Office and Directors 
Central Government 
Anyone else? Media, wider political context etc. 
How are all these different priorities balanced? 
7. Skills: leadership and teamwork 
What sort of skills do you need to work in the partnership? 
How important is leadership? Why? Who are the leaders? 
How important is teamwork? Why? Who are the team players? 
How important is continuity of partners? Why? 
8. Training and professional development relating to community safety and 
partnership development 
Do you have the opportunity to improve on the skills that are needed 
for the partnership? 
9. Outcomes 
Would you like to have this opportunity to improve on these skills? 
What sort of training would you like to receive? 
For example, would you like to understand the roles and 
responsibilities of representatives from other agencies better? 
Does the partnership in Birmingham work? 
Has the partnership reduced crime and disorder? 
In what other ways has it worked? 
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I How do you know that it works or not? What measurements have you 
taken? 
How much monitoring and evaluation takes place? 
What has the partnership added to CS activity? Did the working 
groups exist anyway? 
What makes it work? 
10. Impact of CDA or reflect on experiences since have been involved: continuity or 
change? 
11. Future 
How has the partnership evolved since you have been involved [or 
since the CD A]? Can you reflect on your experiences of pre/post CDA 
What has changed and what has stayed the same? 
What has been the impact (if at all) of the CDA on CSPs? 
What have been the positive and negative aspects of the CDA? 
Has the partnership moved through any identifiable stages? 
How do you envisage the future of the partnership? Why? 
Are you optimistic/ pessimistic? Why? 
Will it last? Why? 
Will things become easier/harder? Why? 
Are there any limitations to the partnership? 
Are there any hurdles ahead or new opportunities? 
What impact have recent changes had on the CSP? 
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Merger with the DATs 
Emerging LSPs 
12. Have you any other comments that you would like to add? 
ApPENDIX 8: SAMPLE OF OBSERVATION FIELD 
NOTES FROM A CSP MEETING 
CSP meeting in partnership area C on 11 tl! December 2003 
Seating plan 
TP RA LB GH TK RY 
FG Layla Skinns TY RD LT 
Apologies, minutes and matters arising [quite a few agenda items are covered in this section] 
Discussion 
FG says that there are no apologies [although there are a number of people missing]. 
We dispense with introductions as he feels that we all know each other [although I 
do not know who TK is] . Also comments that hope to get through the agenda 
quickly, given · that he has other important things to do today. RD and GH also 
comment that they have to leave at 10.15. 
In the matters arising they comment that they have received RAF money (12.Sk 
followed by another 2.5k). They are using it to fund a youth diversionary project (bid 
for by TY) and not the radio ads (as Government office is doing something similar 
itself). 
They then discussed the issue of a press release that FG and TP were supposed to 
write. FG says "I must confess that we haven't got round to doing it". He also 
comments that they needed to have done it straight away, otherwise it is a pointless 
exercise. He wonders if, in future, they might have a pre-prepared press release 
indicating positive news, which might be used to counter any negative reporting in 
the local media [is this possible given that crime rates fluctuate?]. 
FG also reports back on decisions taken at the LSP meeting about having a joint 
secretariat. He says that it has been agreed to use NRF money to pay for someone to 
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manage both the LSP and NRF and he wonders if the needs of Partnership C can be 
incorporated into this person's role. The Government office have approved the 
spending of NRF money in this way and so they can set the ball rolling. He points to 
two papers. He also adds that two of the LSP partners (the university being one) 
have offered cash to support this post. It is going to be April, at the earliest, before 
this person is in post. Everyone agrees that the papers cover the core jobs associated 
with RA's current role. 
LT then mentions a bid to the regional capacity fund for partnership development 
and indicates that they may have some money coming to the partnership for 
improving computer resources, as well as having an away day. RA also fills 
everyone in about the employment of a domestic violence coordinator (using 
government money) for 2.5 years. This person will be housed alongside the ASB 
coordinator and the youth crime coordinator [at the city council?] FG also comments 
that they are hoping that the PCT may contribute the resources of one person a 
couple of days a week. Thus they are developing a team which will be able to 
develop policy, write bids, implement strategy, share knowledge. TY comments that 
he sees this team as being the "hub" of the LSP. TP also agrees that she sees such a 
team as having a role in translating" strategy into tactics". FG sums by saying that he 
will keep everyone informed of developments as the terrain is changing rapidly. 
• Topics discussed 
• Decisions reached? RAF money, secretariat, DV coordinator 
• Speaking turns 
TP I, RA 5, LT 4, RD I, TY 2, FG 7 
NRF under-spend and CDRPjDAAT integration 9.17 
Discussion 
FG says that the LSP is withdrawing funding from one project as it has not made any 
progress. Also the skate park project has failed to secure a property, which is 
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problematic as they cannot carry NRF funding forward to next year. In total there 
has been an under-spend of 80k and the grants panel are meeting later today to work 
out how to spend this money by the necessary date. Simply transferring the money 
to another party does not constitute spending it. TY asks about the capital/revenue 
split and FG says that they are more likely to spend it on capital than revenue. LB 
asks if the 'Burn and learn' project has been funded and it has. 
FG then goes on to talk about the spending of 800k over the next two years. He says 
that it is difficult to make objective decisions. The LSP are looking to take a 
commissioning approach in which they will stipulate what the aims and objectives 
of the projects are going to be and then ask organisations to bid around those 
aims/objectives. [phone rings and RY from Government office arrives]. LB says that 
the commissioning approach is a good idea although they need to avoid simply 
reinventing things. TY comments that there are enough people sitting around the 
table here to recognise if duplication is occurring. RA says that they should not be 
insular and should also recognise what is happening in the rest of the surrounding 
area. LT then clarifies about whether or not environmental improvements to a local 
house are going ahead, which they are, and TP explains that the Area X project is 
also going ahead as social services are now on board and so too are the local 
community, making the project a model of good practice, and one that they might 
consider rolling out. FG says that the project will be evaluated in the summer and 
the funding will run out in October. RA comments that the partnership should 
continue to support the project given its success. FG: says that he will recommend 
this at the LSP meeting. 
• Topics discussed? Desperation in spending NRF money on time. 
• Decisions? To continue to support the Area X project, instigated by RA. 
• Speaking turns 
TP I, RA 4, LB 4, JO I, LT I, TY 3, FG 9 
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CDRPjDAAT 9.27 
Discussion 
RY mentions the capacity fund, which is there to fund partnership development. She 
says that Partnership C is one step ahead of the game in terms of relations between 
CDRP /DAT /LSP; these relations are working better here than elsewhere, to which 
TP comments "God help other regions then". RY also says that they are developing 
induction packs for new members and awareness packs for the public, which will be 
accompanied by a launch event some time next year, probably April, in which they 
will inform local people about what the partnership is doing for Partnership area C. 
She asks people to let her know if they have any ideas for the brochure. 
RA says that in terms of the DAT/CDRP merger, two-tier local authorities are still in 
woolly position and are awaiting further guidance. However, Partnership area C has 
already merged the substance misuse groups of Partnership area C city and a 
neighbouring partnership. LT says that it is also about creating similar priorities 
between the DAT/CDRP and government PIs. RA says that their most recent 
strategy did contain DAT priorities, but the government have changed DAT targets 
since they wrote the strategy. 
• Topics - Information on partnership development issues. Information of 
DAT/CDRP merger. 
• Decisions? None 
• Speaking turns 
TP I, RA 2, JO 2, LT I, FG 1 
BCU funding 9.34 
Discussion 
TP says BCU funding will be spent firstly on a researcher for the partnership; the 
interviews for this crime analyst post will be held next week with a view to the 
analyst starting the job in the New Year. This analyst will feed information to the 
new secretariat so that the partnership will start to make more informed decisions. 
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Second, the money will also be spent on the prolific offender scheme which is a 
partnership between the police and probation service. They are taking the top 7 most 
prolific offenders and doing intensive work with them. However, this is problematic 
as most of them need appropriate drug treatment and the PCT cannot provide it 
immediately. Therefore, TP is putting the under-spend into appointing a nurse to 
provide drug treatment. RA immediately asks how the funding of the post will 
work. In his experience the PCT money can disappear into a black hole with no 
invoice. Often the money goes to the NHS trust but they lack the capacity to provide 
the services for the money as well as being very inefficient at processing the money. 
TP says that an appropriate nurse has already been identified to provide the 
services. RA concedes that if TP can go directly to her then it might be ok. TP says 
that she will run the details past RA [slight tension, RA being too overbearing?] RA 
says that the principle sounds great. GH also supports RA's point about the PCT. 
TP continues indicating that the remaining money will be spent on panic alarms, 
ANPR, in order to deal with serious drug dealing, ASB unit. This leaves 30k for a 
general fund to which everyone can bid, of which 10k is going to TY, and another 
10k to Area B. TP says that there may be a slight under-spend and asks if anyone has 
any on-the-shelf projects to fund. FG asks if the same amount of BCU funding will 
be available next year to which RA replies that CAD, BSC, BCU are all likely to be 
the same next year. TP comments that Government Office has been very late in 
allocating the money this year. FG asks if everyone is happy. LB asks if any of the 
money is to be spent on diversionary work which it is via TY. 
• Topics - info on spending of BCU funds and that some still available for small 
projects. 
• Decisions? None 
• Speaking turns 
TP 9, RA 5, LB 3, GH I, TY I, FG 3 
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Crime rates 9.44 
Discussion 
FG says that the Home Office has identified 94 CDRPs with the highest crime rates. 
Partnership area C is no. 91. The Home Office will be keeping a close eye on these 
areas. RA then presents the local crime statistics [these are so general that they are 
pretty meaningless as they are not compared to previous periods, crime rates are 
also presented as if they are facts]. RA says that all crime is going down but it is 
going up in division one. TP comments that in division two there has also been an 
increase in burglary of dwellings (due to a prolific offender going on a crime spree) 
and criminal damage (blamed on students). RA says that he has talked to the city 
centre manager, TG, and he says that the criminal damage is nothing to do with the 
students. TP and LT both express optimism that crime rates are going down. RA 
says that it must be to do with the work being done by the partnerships and partners 
in a range of areas [how does he know this?]. FG comments that when they have 
positive messages like this then they need to inform the media. 
• Topics? Information on national comparisons of CDRP areas and crime statistics 
for Partnership area C city. 
• Decisions? None 
• Speaking turns 
TP 2, RA 3, LT I, FG 2 
ASB Act 2003 and coordinator 9.49 
Discussion 
RA says that he has received a letter from Tony Blair about ASB (TP teases him that 
the letter was addressed to him just because he has an MBE). They are also in the 
process of employing an ASB coordinator but they are unsure about who should be 
their employer. They will be using some of the top-up money from the BSC fund and 
the coordinator will be based with the new secretariat. TP says the post will be full-
time. FG says that we are going to be under the microscope for ASB, as the 
perception amongst the public is that Partnership in area C is not as good as other 
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areas at dealing with it. Therefore they need to step up their action. He thinks that 
maybe they should use a similar model to a neighbouring partnership area who 
have an ASB team. LB suggests they get some input from a neighbouring 
partnership area and RA thinks that this would be a good model to follow. FC 
comments that if every CDRP in the country gets money for an ASB coordinator, the 
competition is going to be fierce to appoint someone very competent. FC says that 
maybe they should plan an event in Jan to help plan the ASB post. 
• Topics? Appointment of ASB coordinator - who employs? Where situate? How 
appoint? 
• Decisions? To hold an event to discuss the appointment of coordinator. 
Instigated by FC 
• Speaking turns 
TP 2, RA 2, LB 2, FC 5 
Domestic violence coordinator funding 9.59 
Discussion 
FC comments that money is being thrown at the partnership. RA goes through a 
report he has prepared on the DV coordinator. He says that there is £11.5k to spend 
and they need to develop an action plan by December. There is a great deal of 
flexibility as to how the money is spent - it can be on employment, research, and 
recruitment costs etc. However, there is also a long-term issue of who employs the 
coordinator [this is a more general issue, of which agency should host coordinators 
like this]. RA proposes the money be spent partly on national recruitment as well as 
on research on domestic violence. Women's Aid cannot second someone to the post. 
RA comments that if the city council were to be the employer then once the 
overheads are taken into account 25k is not enough for the post. Women's Aid can 
employ the coordinator for less than 25k but second them to the office of the 
secretariat, youth crime coordinator and ASB coordinator. RD asks if there will be 
any money available for professional development of the coordinator. RA says no. 
RA proposes that the DV coordinator be employed by Women's Aid but seconded to 
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the secretariat. FG strongly supports this because (i) it helps Women's Aid, (ii) sends 
out the right messages that the coordinator is not led by the statutory agencies, (iii) it 
avoids duplication [is not just because it is cheaper?]. TY supports RA's 
recommendations but is concerned that the focus of the coordinator should not just 
be on DV affecting women. RA says that Women's Aid does have male clients and 
that men were mentioned in the job spec. GH asks about the conditions of service 
and leave for the coordinator. RA says that they will be roughly the same as for other 
coordinators. FG asks if they are all agreed and everyone nods agreement. 
RA then asks RY about money available from Government office for specific ASB 
projects. She does not know but offers to find out. RA comments that Partnership 
area C does not have a DV forum so he suggests that they join up with that of a 
neighbouring partnership area. Everyone agrees to this. 
[GH and RD leave] 
• Topics - the employment of a DV coordinator 
• Decisions? For the coordinator to be employed by Women's Aid but seconded to 
the city council. Instigated by RA. 
• Speaking turns 
RA 9, GH 1, HELEN 1, JO 1, RD 1, TY 2, FG 5 
Partnership self-assessment 10.10 
Discussion 
RA says that it has been completed and they will be writing the development plan 
on 30 January to compliment the self-assessment. FG says that the LSP is going 
through a self-assessment procedure and it has been suggested that one more person 
from Partnership C might attend the self-assessment day. He asks them to let him 
know if they are interested to attend. 
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• Topics - information on partnership self-assessment and also on LSP assessment 
• Decisions? None 
• Speaking turns 
TP 1, RA 2, TY 2, FG 4 
Project management, evaluation and applied problem solving courses 10.15pm 
Discussion 
LT says that there are to be two two-day courses on project management and 
problem-solving. He asks if anyone would like to attend. TY suggests the youth 
crime coordinator might like to go. TP asks if they are restricted to one place and LT 
says no, TP then suggests that he attend as well and gives overview. 
• Topics - attendance at conferences 
• Decisions? To send youth crime coordinators and LT instigated by TY and TP 
respectively. 
• Speaking turns 
TP 2, RA 1, LT 2, TY 1, FG 1 
Media strategy 10.16 
Discussion 
FG says he has already raised issue of press release that did not go out. TP suggests 
that the partnership do a press release before Xmas about burglary and not leaving 
back doors open. She feels they need to reinforce the issue and raise public 
awareness in the run up to Xmas, especially about not leaving wrapped presents 
under the tree. 
• Topics - awareness campaign in relation to burglary. 
• Decisions? Not sure. 
• Speaking turns 
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TP 3, RA 3, FG 1 
Updates from the action groupslO.18 
Discussion 
RA says that the city centre subgroup has started to achieve things, as they have 
begun discussions with Area Y businesses and have developed service agreements. 
The night toilets have also opened. Policing policy has also changed so that there is 
now a more physical presence of up to 14 proactive officers on foot. RA then begins 
to give feedback on the youth action group. TY interrupts and says that he is happy 
to give feedback on the group. He says that they have been developing youth 
disorder teams to deal with ASB but there have been difficulties getting probation 
service on board. He also thinks they need to deal with older age groups (19-23 
years) too because they are interacting with the younger age groups. He said that 
they saw the Youth Works presentation and were not impressed, as they could not 
see how they would add value. 
TP talks about how a police officer is running a Knight School in his spare time with 
little involvement from the youth service, connexions and CDRPs. TY comments that 
he has heard of it and it is supposed to deal with citizenship issues amongst the 
younger age groups and how it is a bit like cubs. TP wonders if is good practice [she 
is a bit sceptical]. Everyone is agreed that it cannot really be rolled out because it 
duplicates the activities of YIPs and activities in schools. 
• Topics - info on safe in the city and youth crime action groups 
• Decisions? Not to roll out 'Knight School' 
• Speaking turns 
TP 2, RA 4, LB 2, LT 1, TY 2, FG 1 
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AOB 10.29 
Discussion 
TP says that partners need to start thinking about the new licensing act and how 
they will deal with it, and the new partnership strategy. FG comments that they 
need to think of this in relation to the growth of the night-time economy in 
Partnership area C and it will require a cross-agency team. They then set the next 
meeting and LT is to circulate future dates. 
• Topics - changes in licensing laws and dates of next meetings. 
• Decisions? Date of next meeting. 
• Speaking turns 
TP 1 RA 2, L T 1, FG 2 
ApPENDIX 9: SUMMARY OF PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY DOCUMENTS FOR 1998-2001 
AND 2002-2005 
as victims and offenders 
II<pc::n()nc::p c::nnn()rt - disorder and ASB 
victims and reassurance 
city centre - violence, ASB and safety in 
centre 
- graffiti, disruptive young people, 
street drinking, criminal damage, 
IPr()nprh.r crime - burglary, motor vehicles, 
351 The information for 1998-2001 was not available for in Lincoln. 
safety - through reducing crime and 
lriic::()rripr, ASB and fear of crime. 
people and positive lifestyles - address 
and offenders 
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lCuecnve partnership working - including 
o-pnr;p<: and communities 
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ApPENDIX 11: SAMPLE OF CHAPTER NOTES FOR 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Key 
Blue refers to a sub-theme of the chapter 
Red refers to connections with other themes 
[Information in square brackets is based on interpretation] 
Italics indicate quotations, with important parts of the quotations in bold 
CAPITAL LETTERS IN BOLD INDICATE PARTNERSHIP MEETINGS AND 
ANONYMISED SPEAKER INITIALS 
Bureaucracy - [all three case studies very different on this] partnership bureaucracy 
(endless subgroups and meetings), government bureaucracy (funding streams), city 
council burea ucracy 
Birmingham 
LP's comments about localised partnership becoming similar in structure to two-tier 
local authorities [two-tier local authorities] Lengthy procedures to secure relatively 
small sums of money, city council like mother Russia and it will take cultural change 
to overcome this, in particular asking what they have delivered. Otherwise run the 
risk of perpetuating bureaucratic structures and procedures. 
ST But this is also about cultural change, I mean, you're dealing with organisations here that 
are incredibly large, we were described in a peer review earlier this year as Mother Russia, 
you know, Birmingham, great in terms of the strategies to hang on, but Mother Russia in the 
sense of, well I'm going to tell you what your problem is, and I'm going to solve it for you, 
you know, it's that sort of approach, and we have to unravel that, we have to change our 
minds towards something that's much more geared to saying, well let's take some risks, let's 
have a go, let's ask ourselves at the end of that partnership what actual difference have we 
made, to one person out there. Because if we haven't made any difference to one person 
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out there then as far as I'm concerned there's no point in meeting, it's really got to be 
at that level, otherwise we just regenerate, and reconstruct, another set of 
bureaucratic procedures and structures. 
RQ Level of bureaucracy can be measured by how much panic caused by the need to 
spend money quickly. NRF is a red herring; lots to do for relatively little money. In 
relation to NRF the group has slipped into the bureaucracy of the city council, 
decisions have to be made based upon overly length papers. Came to a head recently 
when realised that need to talk about delivery not NRF money. Initially problems 
unravelling the partnership. Even now still frustrated by the bureaucracy (due to 
complexity and size) and lack of focus. 
RQ When I first took over I really just didn't understand how the whole thing worked, 
genuinely, it was as if I didn't recognise the city that r d worked in for a fair number of years, 
and the first two or three months ... I literally just unravelled structures and systems that 
had emerged over time, and it was amazing, it was like a ball of spaghetti really. Couldn't 
track decisions, couldn't relate expenditure to outcomes, decisions in the past lacked 
transparency as to how they came about, and it somewhat alarmed me to be frank, and we 
spent a lot of time, and that's why I suspect it's felt like 100 per cent, but I suspect in reality 
it's been about 20 per cent, 25 per cent, just trying to unravel and put back structures and 
systems that didn't exist. 
Cambridge 
MM big groups [like the partnership] have a tendency to create endless subgroups. 
CCSP6 [GOEAST add to bureaucracy] OSG outlined time to be spent over coming 
months and 50 per cent of it spent on partnership self assessment and training. TL 
also comments that this bureaucracy growing e.g. applying for money (despite 
merging of funding streams the form has become more complicated). AG need to cut 
down on red tape in decision-making. [connects with decision-making]. PO 
partnerships have spawned a huge bureaucracy; in an attempt to rationalise the way 
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his staff spend their time he has worked out who attends which meetings. [I did see 
this document]. 
Lincoln 
HV Single management of all non-council funding, sign one contract. Aiming to 
reduce bureaucracy. HO employed consultants to reduce bureaucracy in relation to 
CDRPs. It will become simpler but it will take time. CB the partnership does move 
slowly; take a long while to move. VI Would hate to multiply bureaucracy. Way 
round is to perhaps have time limited task groups which have to achieve something 
by a particular date, so then not having meetings just for the sake of it. 
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ApPENDIX 12: SAMPLE OF THE FORM USED TO INPUT AGENDA AND MEETING 
INFORMATION IN ACCESS 
Partnership name: I iJ Length of meeting: ro who Attended 
iJ No of agenda items: r---o Attendee initials: I iJ Meeting type: I 
No of agenda items cov'd: r---o Agency I ::::J Date: I 
Record: &JI 1 I ~II I of 1 
Am/pm: I ...:.J 
Notes: I 
Agendaid Topic category Decision taken Decision-maker Decision maker agency 
I I ~I ~I ...:.J I ...:.J Attendee id: I ...:.J 
I ...:.J Decision Notes: 
I 
Agency id: I ...:.J 
Topic Notes: No of speaking turns: I 0 
~ins per agenda item: 
Record: &JI I ~II I of 1 1 
0 
Record: &JI 1 I ~II lof 1 
Record: J.!l.!J I 32 I ~II lof 32 
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ApPENDIX 13: CODING OF TOPICS DISCUSSED AND AGENCY CATEGORIES 
A. Coding of topics discussed in partnership meetings 
~iccateg~ Definitions 
Any other business 
Arson All kinds of arson 
ASB 
Audit Is the previous or impending audit discussed, if so how? 
Burglary Domestic or commercial burglary as the main topic of discussion 
Crime Data/ intelligence Use or discussion of the use of crime data/intelligence 
Ext presentation Presentation by an agency who is not :eart of :eartnershi:e e.g. Crime Concern or Groundwork 
General crime When no specific kind of crime is discussed, rather a scheme which tackles all crime types e.g. Wardens 
Internal presentation By a re:eresentative of one of the :eartner agencies e.g. a :eolice :eresentation on their :eerformance indicators 
Introductions and apologies 
Minutes and matters arising 
Money allocation How is money to be divided u:e and what it should be s:eent on? 
Performance monitoring Discussions about the monitoring of partnership performance e.g. by the Government Office or subgrou:es re:eorting back 
Strategy How the partnershif'should develop and follow up_ its strategy + work strategically. 
Street Crime All kinds of street crime, including street robbery and mobile :ehone theft. 
How the partnership is structured. This is about something that is relatively permanently put in place e.g. links with 
Structure s~~gI:ou:es or a new post 
--- - --_. --"---_._-
Youths Young :eeo:ele as victims and offenders 
How the partnership is/ should go about its business. This is something more fluid than the structure e.g. what it the role of 
Process the support officers or the chair? 
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Topic category Definitions 
Delive~ How the partnership is/should deliver CS e.g. which subg!ou.e should deliver a .earticular .eroject 
Regeneration Regeneration initiatives 
Other When a discussion does not easily fall into any of the topics that I have created 
Media How the partnership should deal with the media e.g. a discussion about writing a .eress release 
Info only or admin Info on conferences, events, dates of next meetings, distribution of reports 
Information exchange How deal with drawing up of protocols, data sharing and exchange 
Hate crime Including domestic violence, racially motivated crimes and crimes motivated by religious hatred 
Vehicle Crime All ty.ees of vehicle crime. 
Social issues Issues which affect the operation of the partnership e.g. a recent influx of asylum seekers 
Drugs Drug and alcohol misuse and/ or drug related crime 
Community consultation Consultation carried out on the partnership and including for the strategy/audit .erocess 
Public reassurance Including fear of crime and how this can be tackled 
Violent crime All types of violent crime 
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B. Coding of agency categories 
~gencyname Agency categ~ 
Business Other 
Chamber of Commerce Other 
Connexions Other 
Consultant Other 
Community safety team: County Council Community safety team 
Community safety team: Local Authority Community safety team 
Community safety team: Local Authority or Police Authority Community safety team 
Community safety team: Police Community safety team 
Customs and Excise Other 
Council for Voluntary Services Voluntary 
Drug action team Other 
Drug action team and Police other Other 
Domestic violence Voluntary 
Elected member Other 
Fire Fire 
Government Office Other 
Highways Other 
Housing Association Voluntary 
Local Authority ASB City Council 
Local Authority Bids City Council 
Local Authority Chief Executive City Council 
Local Authority Education City Council 
Local Authority Environmental services CityCouncil 
Local Authority Eguali!y division 9!Y Council 
Local Authority Housing Department City Council 
Local Authority Other City Council 
Local Authority Policy City Council 
Local Authority rangers or wardens City Council 
Local Authority Social service City Council 
Local Authority Youth service 9!Y Council 
Primary care trust Primary care trust 
Police Assistant Chief Constable Police 
Police Analyst Police 
Police Authority Police 
Police Commander Police 
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Agency name Agency category 
Police Local Authority liaison officer Police 
Police other Police 
Presenter Other 
Probation Probation 
Public relations Community safety team 
Residents group Other 
School Other 
Urban Challenge Community safety team 
Unknown Other 
Voluntary Voluntary 
Youth offending service Youth offending service 
County: Education County Council 
County: Policy County Council 
County: Social Services County Council 
County: Youth service County Council 
County: Other County Council 
Other Other 
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ApPENDIX 14: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 
CHALLENGES OF MEASURING 'SUCCESS' 
The decision not to examine partnership outcomes was a gradual filtering process 
when I began to recognise my own limitations in terms of time, resources and skills. 
During the initial phases of the research I decided, with the help of my supervisor 
and others, to focus on burglary and ASB data, for a number of reasons. 352 ASB was 
of interest because little research had at that time been carried out on this topic and 
because this wide-ranging category of 'crime' had a multi-agency dimension to it. 
ASB was also of interest because of Government's increasing interest in it. Like ASB, 
burglary had also received governmental attention, and despite the plethora of 
research on burglary, it is also one of the most reliably recorded types of crime 
(Maguire, 2002).353 
In Birmingham, access to police data was granted relatively quickly as a result of a 
personal recommendation by a senior police officer. Whilst I was allowed unfettered 
access to the data (including address, offender and victim information) my analysis 
had to take place at a police station in the West Midlands. This was problematic as 
the police used Maplnfo, rather than ArcGIS (which I had taught myself to use) and I 
would not have had access to the resources and contacts I relied on in Cambridge. 
After some negotiation, Cambridgeshire Constabulary granted me limited access to 
burglary data and ASB data. Access to burglary data was limited because whilst the 
data was grid-referenced and I was given the repeat victimisation flags noted by the 
police, there was no information on victims' addresses. This was problematic 
352 I also discussed my ideas with Andrew Costello and Anthony Bottoms. 
353 Burglary is mostly reported and recorded correctly. Attempted burglary is an exception to this. For 
example, the British Crime Survey (d. Maguire, 2002) found that burglary was unlikely to be 
reported if it was an unsuccessful attempt. Unsuccessful attempted burglary might also be recorded 
by the police as criminal damage, rather than attempted burglary. 
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because one grid reference could refer to multiple households such as a block of 
flats. Also, the police repeat victimisation flags were determined by police 
definitions of repeat victimisation354 and the skills of those logging incidents on the 
system. Furthermore, the repeat victimisation flags were a relatively new feature of 
the way Cambridgeshire Constabulary recorded crime and there was as yet no 
research on their reliability. 
In terms of the ASB data, during the negotiation process a police analyst indicated 
some of the pitfalls with the data. The analysis, had it gone ahead, would have relied 
on the disorder category from 'command and control' logs of calls for service. 
Within command and control logs, aside from the disorder category, there are also 
other categories which are used to log calls relating to ASB, such as abandoned cars 
or young people hanging around. Hence, the reliability of the disorder category in 
command and control data would depend on how each call for service was logged 
by the police. Furthermore, the amount of disorder data for Cambridgeshire for the 
period 1998-2000 was extremely large. After a meeting with Ken Pease, who also 
noted the difficulties with coding and managing ASB data, I decided that, given the 
complexities and conceptual ambiguities in the data,355 I would discontinue this part 
of the analysis. The data were simply too unreliable to use in any meaningful way. 
In Lincoln, despite numerous letters and two personal visits to police headquarters, 
access to data was not granted. Unfortunately, the data protection manager was not 
convinced of the worth of the research and was also too busy to comply. I also wrote 
twice to the Deputy Chief Constable but received no reply. 
354 There are variations in the way in which repeat victimisation can be defined, for example, the time 
period in which an additional burglary were to happen for it to be considered repeat victimisation. 
Repeat victimisation can also be defined either in terms of the same victim or the same household. 
355 Since I made this decision, the Home Office have attempted to clarify for practitioners the 
definition and measurement of ASB (see Home Office, 2004b). 
380 
In sum, in Cambridge, I had access to grid-referenced police burglary data on my 
personal computer for Cambridgeshire between 1998-2002, but these data did not 
contain victim information or address information (necessary to understand repeat 
victimisation). The obvious point of comparison for this data would have been 
Lincoln but I was not allowed access to any of their data. I had unfettered access to 
data in Birmingham, but only if I were to use it on police premises and computers, 
which would have required learning how to use additional software. Therefore I 
decided that it would be best to focus upon burglary data in Cambridge, but 
remained open-minded about using the data in Birmingham. 
The next step in analysing outcomes was to identify records or individuals with 
knowledge about burglary reduction projects in Cambridge and Birmingham, 
between 1998 and 2002. This information was crucial to my analysis of outcomes 
since, without any knowledge of what or where burglary reduction projects were 
implemented between 1998 and 2002, it would be difficult to determine whether 
these projects influenced burglary rates. This information was not easy to find. In 
both Birmingham and Cambridge, key informants indicated that there were one or 
two files which might be of use to me, but they were in storage. These informants 
were also unclear as to what was in these files or the time period to which they 
referred. These key informants suggested that I speak with administrative staff 
about accessing them. My telephone calls and em ails to administrative staff were not 
returned. 
In Cambridge, I had reason to think that had I accessed these files, they would have 
been of limited use as the burglary subgroup, according to one police representative, 
had experienced difficulties for some time. For example, the subgroup had not spent 
any of the £16,000 of partnership money allocated to it. Instead, the police had 
implemented burglary reduction, and hence the burglary subgroup was viewed as 
unnecessary by some interviewees. This suggests that had I carried out an impact 
evaluation based on police files, I would have simply evaluated police rather than 
partnership activities. 
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Given the difficulties of not having relevant information about where/ when 
burglary reduction projects had taken place, I began to think of other ways of using, 
at the very least, the Cambridge data. It was suggested356 that I use the Cambridge 
burglary data to explore the shifting patterns of geographical, burglary hotspots over 
time and then explore practitioners' views on why these hotspots shifted, for 
example, if they were connected to burglary reduction projects. Based on this 
information I might also have written an 'alternative burglary strategy'. In addition, 
it was suggested that I ask practitioners to identify areas they considered to be high 
burglary areas, between 1998 and 2002, and where they would focus burglary 
reduction activities, and then compare these with the data.357 I also considered 
exploring reasons for some of the geographical hotspots, such as the attributes of the 
property or victim, geographical distribution of offences in high-burglary areas.358 
These approaches were problematic, however, as they depended on the knowledge 
of practitioners involved in burglary reduction initiatives between 1998 and 2002. A 
police representative in Cambridge suggested that this would be problematic due to 
staff turnover. In addition, limitations in the data meant that I would have been able 
to explore only some of the factors in the local chemistry of burglary.359 
In sum, my experiences of measuring the 'success' of partnerships suggest that 
research requires a balance of the practical and the possible with the desirable. 
356 Andrew Costello suggested this approach. 
357 Vania Ceccato suggested this approach to me, based upon her PhD research, which employed a 
similar approach. 
358 See Appendix 15 for a list of the types of factors useful for exploring the 'local chemistry of 
burglary'. This list is taken from Tilley et al. (1999). 
359 Of the nine types of analysis, I would have been able to explore only four of these, which were 
attributes of the property, geographical distribution of crime in the high crime area, patterns in the 
method by which burglaries were committed, property stolen and temporal patterns of burglary. 
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ApPENDIX 15: THE CHEMISTRY OF BURGLARY 
Types of analysis Benefit of analysis 
Attributes of the property (e.g. tenure, type, dwelling Assists in identifying the type of properties preferred 
type). by burglars. Helpful for understanding why such 
properties are targeted and helpful for developing 
effective situational preventive measures. 
Attributes of the victims (e.g. age, ethnicity, household Assists in identifying groups particularly prone to 
composition) . burglary and for whom a tailored burglary reduction 
package could be produced. 
Geographical distribution of offences within the high Assists in identifying particular burglary hotspots. 
burglary area. Point data is preferable to street or Also useful for showing location of burglary over time 
postcoded data. (e.g. is hotspot temporary or permanent?). 
Patterns in the method by which burglaries are Assists in linking burglaries to the MOs of known 
committed. offenders. Assists in identifying methods of entry to 
properties that may help in targeting preventative 
action. 
Patterns of repeat victimisation, including prevalence Shows how burglary is distributed between 
(no. of victims), incidence (no. of offences), households. Will help to identify locations/households 
concentration (no. of offences per victim), rate (no. suffering high burglary rates. 
victimised once, twice, three time etc). A rolling year is 
more revealing than aggregations over a twelve month 
period. 
Profile of the known offenders. Assists in identifying who is committing burglaries. 
Will enable assessments of whether the problem is 
endemic to the area or imported and will inform 
approaches to targeting offenders. 
Property stolen and methods of disposal. Assists in identifying any trends in types of goods 
stolen and will inform market reduction approaches to 
tackling the problem. 
Ratio of successful to attempted burglaries. Analysis of unsuccessful burglaries may give useful 
pointers to prevention. Tracking trends in attempts 
may provide insights into the impacts of preventative 
measures. 
Temporal patterns to burglary (e.g. time of day, day of Assists in identifying the key times when interventions 
week, time of year) . may not be needed. 
Tilley et al. 1999 
ApPENDIX 16: N AV AL PERSONNEL COMPARED TO BELBIN (1993) AND LIDDLE 
AND GELSTHORPE (1994B) 
Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
The admiral is the Possibly central [Y]ou clearly get things that have a major 
highest naval rank; the government, although impact that corne in from outside, like the 
admiral is in overall not without resistance street crime initiative, where it doesn' t matter 
charge of the fleet but from local practitioners. what it says in your strategy, if you've 
seldom goes out to sea, suddenly got Blair and Blunkett and the rest of 
requiring the the government saying the effort has got to go 
Commodore or Captain on reducing street crime, and we're going to 
for this purpose. resolve it by September .. . Well, you kind of 
have to take it seriously, and you have to give 
it priority even though it may be cutting across 
what you actually think are the local priorities 
(Representative from the community safety 
team, Birmingham}. 
The captain is The coordinator, a Typically this was the In terms of decision-making, the Chair made 
responsible for mature and confident chair of the partnership, most partnership decisions in Birmingham but 
preparing the ship for chairperson who clarifies especially in decisions were more shared in Cambridge and 
sailing, including goals and promotes Birmingham but less so Lincoln between the city council (Chair in 
recruiting personnel; decision-making. in Cambridge and Lincoln), youth offending service (Chair in 
looking after the ship Lincoln. Cambridge), police, and community safety 
and crew's well-being; manager. 
directing the ship's 
activities in naval 
engagements and 
delegating authority 
when necessary. 
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Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
The main duty of the The Chair in [K]eeping the confidence of the partners, and 
master is navigation, Birmingham. [the Chair] is extremely good at that ... I think 
which involves there's a second set to that which is possibly 
supervising the below the table as opposed to above the table 
measurement of the sun agenda ... what is its direction, and is it 
and compass, which are performing as well as some other 
used to steer the ship. partnerships, and then how does the chair 
Masters are responsible help shape and inform that direction of travel 
for keeping the ship on ... I think it's important that the chair has a 
course sense of drive and energy, and the capacity, 
and political skills ... So I think kind of being 
aware of the next steps really. (City council 
representative, Birmingham). 
! , 
The commander and Subgroup chairs, Subgroup chairs regularly reported their 
lieutenants are next in particularly in progress to the strategic partnership in 
rank, below the captain. Birmingham and Birmingham and Lincoln. 
Lincoln. 
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Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
The purser oversees the The completer is Community safety The programme manager in Birmingham was 
supply of consumables conscientious, seeking to programme manager in appointed to ensure money was spent and 
and is responsible for rectify errors and Birmingham and programmes were delivered on time. Central 
paying the crew and delivers on time members of the government holds the 'purse strings', 
looking after the money community safety team however, because they restrict access to 
on board the ship. in Cambridge and funding. 
Lincoln. Ultimately So I know CDRPs whinge about the 
central government, as government, and it's spending ... They don' t 
the admiral. like it because they really don' t want to work 
for it, they really want us to say, there's your 
pot of gold, go away, and in certain instances 
where you've got a known good CDRP, 
you've done self-assessment with them, 
they've got good development plans, and they 
have good processes, good leadership, I think 
that's quite right, we should be saying to them, 
go away, do it, send us a note of what you 
ought to achieve and tell us at the end of the 
year whether you've done it (Government 
Office representative). 
The sergeant of arms Two different kinds of Possibly the chair, but Interviewees in all three partnerships noted 
polices the ship (for problem solvers: The also through informal that the chair and informal meetings were 
troublemakers or plant or ideas person is negotiations. used resolve tensions between partners. 
drunkards) in order to the creative thinker who 
resolve disputes. is able to solve difficult 
problems; 
The shaper is 
challenging and 
dynamic and able to 
overcome obstacles. 
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Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
The warrant officer The specialist is single- Community safety They were relied on in meetings to provide 
reports to the captain; minded, possessing rare managers or crime technical and administrative details about 
they have technical skills and knowledge. analysts. community safety. 
knowledge used to 
maintain the ship. 
The boatswain is Boatswains might be: Prime movers who take Community safety team The community safety teams completed policy 
responsible for the 'team workers' who are a more active role in the in all three areas, and administrative work between meetings, 
hardware of the ship and co-operative and partnership, taking on a especially in ensuring targets and deadlines were met, for 
reports to the Warrant diplomatic; disproportionate amount Birmingham and example. The role reportedly taken by the 
Officer. 'implementers' who are of the work. Cambridge. Boatswain depended on the interviewee, case 
disciplined, reliable, and context. 
efficient and able to turn 
ideas into practice; or 
'completers' who are 
conscientious, seeking to 
rectify errors and 
delivers on time. 
The look-out scans the The resource ' Agency spies' who take Community safety Community safety managers appeared to be 
horizon and looks out investigator is part only to keep tabs on managers and some of the main conduit of information about 
for trouble ahead. enthusiastic, extrovert the activities of other the minor players. community safety to the partnership from 
and willing to explore agencies. government. The fire service, customs and 
new opportunities. excise, the DAT and connexionssuggested 
that their only reason for attending 
partnership meetings was to network, and 
glean information and resources. 
Passengers attended Supportive passengers Minor players: Business, Minor players attended strategic partnership 
partnership meetings on gave vocal support to county council, customs meetings on a regular basis, yet struggled to 
a regular basis but were the activities of the and excise, fire, PCT, be involved in the agenda of the partnerships 
unclear about why they partnership but few voluntary sector because it was too focused on crime and 
were there. resources. (depending on the area). disorder, for example. 
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Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
Driftwood were partners 'Sleeping partners' or Absent players: business, Absent players may have lacked capacity or 
who attended meetings 'chair warmers' county council, fire, key players to send to board meetings. One 
infrequently and were contribute little in terms probation, PCT, can speculate that the voluntary sector in 
unclear why they were of ideas, verbal support voluntary sector particular mistrusted the statutory agencies. 
there. or resources. (depending on the area). 
Collectors (of flotsam The resource All agencies Agencies appeared to compete for scarce 
and jetsam360) were those investigator who is partnership resources. 
who attended enthusiastic, extrovert "It's always linked to money isn't it, the 
partnership meetings in and willing to explore funding that I get actually comes through the 
order to access new opportunities. community safety partnership team, they're 
additional resources, accountable for it, they approve it, they deliver 
particularly money for it to the DAT, they sign it off. So from that 
their own agency. point of view I've got a vested interest to be 
there . .. in terms of decisions around budget 
setting and carving up the funding, I feel it's 
very important for me to be there when 
decisions are being made." (DAT 
representative, Birmingham). 
A pirate was defined as Powerful agencies such Access to knowledge about crime and disorder 
someone attempting to as the police. appeared, in at least one area, to increase the 
influence the CSP power of the police to define the community 
agenda for their own safety agenda and the allocation of partnership 
purposes funds. 
360 Flotsam refers to wreckage floating on the sea, which anyone is entitled to pick up. Jetsam refers to goods ejected from a boat, which remain the Queen's 
property. This might refer to resources which partners are able to acquire by attending strategic partnership meetings. 
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Naval Personnel Belbin (1993) Liddle and Gelsthorpe Practitioner equivalent Evidence 
(1994b) 
The Ships' Fool, like The 'plant or ideas 'Critical thinkers' or One' critical thinker' used humour and inter-
Shakespeare's' fools, person' is a creative 'strong personalities' personal skills to present criticism in a 
used his/her apparent thinker, able to solve constructive and pleasant manner. 
naivety and tom-foolery difficult problems. 
to conceal criticism and 
point out errors. 
The Mutineer was The 'obstructers', who 'Critical thinkers' or Individuals described as 'critical thinkers' 
unafraid of asking are openly critical 'strong personalities' appeared to ask challenging questions of 
challenging questions and/ or negative about others; these were not light-hearted questions, 
but others perceived the activities of the but it was difficult to discern if they were 
them to be causing partnership and other asking only for the sake of it. 
trouble by asking participating agencies. 
i difficult questions for 
the sake of it. 
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